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 Summary 
The 12 March 1938 was not only the beginning of Nazi rule in Austria; it was also the 
end of a six-year struggle by a significant minority of Austrians to maintain Austrian 
independence against very considerable odds.  This study has sought to refocus 
attention on the role of the Dollfuß Government 1932–34 in attempting to prevent a 
Nazi takeover, and to reassess the state of current scholarship on the reasons for its 
collapse. 
 In this regard, this thesis sets out to re-examine the behaviour and motivations 
of Dollfuß in particular, and the Christian Socials in general, during the period in 
question, as well as to document and clarify the key strategies of the Austrian 
leadership in dealing with the twin threats of Austrian and German National Socialism.  
Its overall conclusion is that there is a pressing need to modulate the historical 
narrative of the Dollfuß era to reflect more accurately what actually occurred. 
 This thesis seeks to prove that despite the extreme pressure that it was under 
from Nazi Germany, the Dollfuß government and its mainstay, the Christian Socials, 
used all realistic means at their disposal to keep the Nazis from the centres of power 
while maintaining Austrian independence.  It investigates why Dollfuß refused to 
publicly co-operate with the Social Democrats, but was apparently willing to enter into 
a deal with the National Socialists, and what this tells us about his anti-Nazi stance.  It 
also considers the question of whether the traditional focus on the breakdown of 
democracy, as a key cause of the collapse of the Austrian state in 1938, is useful in 
understanding of the period. 
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 Introduction 
An|schluss, der; -es, Anschlüsse... 4. Angliederung, politische Vereinigung: der A. des 
Saargebiets; Die Autoren...rekonstruieren die Geschichte das Anschlusses Österreichs (die 
Einverleibung Österreichs durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland im Jahr 1938; 
Spiegel 10, 1988, 275); den A. eines Gebietes [an ein Land] betrieben. Duden 
(1999), 243.1 
 
No one single word has influenced the course of recent Austrian history to such a 
degree as the term ‘Anschluss’.  Its negation lies at the very heart of contemporary 
Austrian identity, the point of departure and journey’s end for Austria’s historical 
discourse.  Three perspectives dominate the historiography of the Anschluss.  Hitler 
and his Nazi clique painted March 1938 as a triumph, the inexorable conclusion of an 
anti-Austrian, pan-German vision.  For the rest of Europe it was the inevitable, if 
regrettable, conclusion of a twenty-year struggle for the right to self-determination 
that had been denied by the victorious Allied Powers in Paris in 1918–19.  From the 
delirious enthusiasm with which the Austrian populace greeted Hitler, it appeared that 
the country had collaborated in its own demise.  Yet, unlike the case of Germany, the 
Austrian state, as represented by the government and officialdom, cannot be 
implicated in the Nazi takeover.  It is this fourth perspective that shall be the focus 
here: the Austrian state as an actor against its own demise. 
 The first chapter of this thesis is dedicated to situating the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg 
era in the wider historiographical debate.  At its heart, it seeks to understand how two 
opposing groups of historians can come to mutually exclusive conclusions about the 
same events.  It will demonstrate how the issue of how to interpret the events of the 
First Republic, the Dollfuß government and the Ständestaat has fundamentally divided 
historians, particularly those in Austria, since 1945.  Tracing the development of the 
narratives that underpin our understanding of the Dollfuß government and the 
Ständestaat, it will detail how the issue was neglected during the first few decades of 
the Second Republic on account of its politically divisive nature, trace the impact of 
                                            
1 Cited in: Thorsten Eitz and Georg Stötzel, Wörterbuch der 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung': Die 
NS-Vergangenheit im öffentlichen Sprachgebrauch, (Hildesheim, 2007). 
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this neglect, and explain why it was only with the 1970s that research into the interwar 
years really got under way.  It will then examine how the historical record has been 
systematically coloured by the highly political nature of the debate.  Finally, it will go on 
to demonstrate how politicization has shaped historical narratives of the 
Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era and how, despite knowledge of this politicization and some 
genuine attempts to overcome it, understanding of the era still labours under its 
weight. 
 Chapter two provides the backdrop to the struggle for Austrian independence 
from 1932 onwards and a closer examination of the complexities and ambiguities of 
the Anschluss idea in the early Republic as well as the role of Ignaz Seipel, presented 
later as the spiritual forebear of the Ständestaat in stabilizing the country after the 
calamity of 1918.  This is followed in chapter three by an examination of the year 1932, 
the formation of the Dollfuß government in May of that year, the rise of National 
Socialism and the political and economic crisis that the country faced.  It also considers 
the question of whether the traditional focus on the breakdown of democracy, as a 
key cause of the collapse of the Austrian state in 1938, is useful in understanding of the 
period. 
 Chapter four analyses relations between the Dollfuß government and the Social 
Democratic opposition and investigates why, when faced with the burgeoning Nazi 
threat, Dollfuß did not enter into a coalition with them, choosing instead immediately 
after the Machtergreifung of the National Socialists in Germany to abandon parliament 
and democratic rule.  Chapter five investigates the thorny question of why Dollfuß 
refused to publicly co-operate with the Social Democrats, but was apparently willing to 
enter into a deal with the National Socialists and what this tells us about his anti-Nazi 
stance.  Chapter six takes a longer view, seeking to situate the struggle against 
National Socialism of the Austrian government within a broader historical, political, 
and cultural context.  It also clarifies some of the key strategies used by Dollfuß and his 
government to deal with the threat posed by the Nazi movement at home and abroad 
and demonstrates how and why Dollfuß and other Austrian ‘patriots’ looked back to 
the Habsburg Empire for inspiration in their struggle. 
 Chapter seven looks at the question of whether (Austro)-‘German’ identity 
espoused by the Dollfuß government and the Ständestaat undermined Austria’s 
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capacity to defend itself against National Socialist ideology.  It also details the nature of 
the conflict between Austria and Germany during 1933–34, and details more of the 
ways in which the Dollfuß government sought to discredit the Nazi movement at 
home and abroad in an attempt to neutralize the Nazi threat.  The study concludes 
with a brief glance at the Anschluss itself, and the way in which the Nazi narrative as 
well as post-war political machinations continue to colour perceptions of the Dollfuß 
era. 
 This thesis seeks to prove that despite the extreme pressure that it was under 
from Nazi Germany the Dollfuß government and its mainstay, the Christian Socials 
used all realistic means at their disposal to keep the Nazis from the centres of power 
while maintaining Austrian independence.  It will demonstrate how the Austrian 
government attempted to maintain Austrian independence by accentuating Austrian 
particularism vis-à-vis North Germany, particularly the Prussian tradition, highlighting a 
separate historical and cultural tradition which had the potential to resonate with an 
Austrian audience and how the struggle to maintain Austrian independence was 
understood in terms of a longer historical continuum.  An article published by Hans 
Kohn, a Jewish émigré from Prague in 1939 lamented what he saw as Austria’s missed 
opportunity ‘to emphasize that German was not identical with National Socialist’. 2  
Austria, he argued, ‘could have developed into a conscious rallying-point of a non- and 
anti-National Socialist Germanism, of one more humane, more western, “catholic” and 
European’.  Kohn, who had left Europe for Palestine in 1925, was not as well informed 
about the situation in Austria as one might initially be led to believe.  This thesis will 
demonstrate that, within the parameters of what was realistically possible, Kohn’s 
preferred answer to Nazism is exactly what the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg governments 
were attempting to do. 
 The issue of sources is a challenging one for all those investigating the Dollfuß 
era, in particular when trying to decipher Dollfuß’s personal role, his motivations and 
his strategy.  There is, quite simply, a distinct paucity of unambiguous documentary 
evidence.  This is, in part, due to the nature of the situation that Dollfuß was facing.  
Surrounded by rivals, leakers and spies, and trying to keep a volatile and fractious 
                                            
2 Hans Kohn, 'AEIOU: Some Reflections on the Meaning and Mission of Austria', The Journal of 
Modern History, 11/4 (1939), 524. 
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coalition afloat, much of what was going on occurred behind the scenes and was left, 
quite naturally, either partially or fully unrecorded.  For that reason, there are none of 
the copious personal records one would ordinarily expect of a democratic head of 
government.  Similar problems beset the correspondence between the 
Bundeskanzleramt and the Austrian Minister in Germany; with the Nazi takeover in 
1933 and the escalation of tension between the two countries, it was increasingly 
difficult to ensure the safe passage of confidential information between Vienna and 
Berlin.  Those sources that do exist – chronicling Dollfuß’s clandestine 
communications with the Nazis, for example – are fragmentary and widely dispersed.  
They are also contradictory; the brief report sent from the Bundeskanzleramt to the 
Austrian Minister in Berlin detailing Dollfuß’s meeting with two members of the 
Nationale Kampffront in October 1933 differs from the record published after the war 
by one of the other participants in that meeting.3  It is for this reason that it is useful to 
amplify official sources, published or otherwise, with other written evidence such as 
government newspapers and the records of the British legation in Vienna.  
Newspapers, cross-referenced against other evidence, are particularly useful for 
deciphering broad anti-Nazi strategies while the records of the British Foreign Office 
provide a wealth of detailed information from the perspective of an outside observer.  
The latter have, of course, been accessed in the context of understanding British policy 
towards Austria, but they are equally valuable in providing a complementary 
perspective on the day-to-day minutiae and machinations prevailing in Vienna.4  While 
undoubtedly it would be desirable to compliment this thesis with a thorough trawl of 
the Foreign Office files in Prague, Budapest and Rome, obvious linguistic problems have 
prevented historians from outside these countries accessing the files of the respective 
foreign offices.  A thorough investigation of the Nazi German response to the Dollfuß 
government would also hold up an interesting mirror on events in Austria, but this is, 
                                            
3 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, (ÖstA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), Auswärtige Angelegenheiten 
(AA), Österreichische Vertretungsbehörden im Ausland 1. Republik, (ÖVB 1 Rep.), Berlin Gesandtschaft, 
Karton 16, Bundeskanzleramt (BKA) to the Öesterreichische Gesandtschaft/Berlin (ÖG/B) (Tauschitz) 
26.152–13, 14 November 1933, ‘Görings Romreise’. 
4 For a discussion on the official British response to the gathering crisis in Austria see: Siegfried Beer, 
Der "unmoralische" Anschluss: Britische Österreichpolitik zwischen Containment und Appeasement 1931–1934, 
(Vienna, 1988). 
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unfortunately, well beyond the realistic scope of this thesis, and would probably 
require a major collaborative project to remedy that.5 
 Although this thesis clearly covers a lot of common ground of nineteenth and 
twentieth century history, the focus is on Austria and Austrian perceptions of events, 
not Germany.  On a further note: Dollfuß, not Schuschnigg is at the centre of this 
study for three main reasons.  Firstly, although historians tend to be vaguely critical of 
Schuschnigg, it is Dollfuß ‘the fascist’ who is considered the real villain of the piece.  
Secondly, Schuschnigg largely followed the path laid out by Dollfuß and thirdly, Dollfuß 
enjoyed a degree of leverage during his Chancellorship, albeit relatively speaking, 
leverage that Schuschnigg simply did not have.  In spite of the few months respite 
afforded him by Hitler’s tactical volte-face in the aftermath of the failed putsch, 
Schuschnigg inherited an already impossible situation.  Indeed, it is credit to his 
underestimated adroitness that he managed to outmanoeuvre Hitler and maintain 
Austrian independence for almost four more years.  Nonetheless, the Ständestaat is 
judged on the basis of Dollfuß’s policies, thus it is Dollfuß who must be the focus of 
this study. 
                                            
5 For an indication of the promise of such an approach, but also of the considerable breadth it might 
need to take, see the analysis of Nazi anti-Austrian propaganda during the Berlin Olympics in: Gerwin 
Strobl, The Swastika and the Stage: German Theatre and Society, 1933–1945, (Cambridge, 2007). 
 Chapter 1 
‘Der Kampf ums “Haus der Geschichte”’: 
The Historiographical Landscape 
In the summer of 1997, Leon Zelman, founder of the ‘Jewish Welcome Service Vienna’ 
first suggested converting Vienna’s Palais Epstein into a ‘House of History and 
Tolerance’ intended to facilitate Austria’s encounter with its recent past. 6   His 
suggestion became the catalyst for the creation of a ‘Haus der Geschichte der Republik 
Österreich’, a museum that would serve as a public platform for Austrian 
contemporary history, with special emphasis on the history of the First and Second 
Republics, as well as the Third Reich.7  A road map published in 2006 explains that its 
role would be to present an overview of Austrian history from 1918 to the present, as 
well as provide both academics and the public with an open forum for historical 
debate.8  However, achieving consensus on the parameters of the project has proven 
troublesome, and as of 2012, it is still far from being realized.  This is, one might argue, 
due to the very nature of the beast; such ventures have an almost natural 
predisposition for controversy.9  In Austria, however, this is not the whole story.  The 
situation is further complicated by what may be described as a quite peculiar 
relationship with the recent past. 
                                            
6 For further details see: 'Karl Renners Lieblingsschöpfung', Der Standard [online edition], 7 Nov. 2008, 
accessed: 23 Jun 2011. 
7 The idea of a ‘Haus der Geschichte’ was, in itself, not a new one.  The establishment of a 
‘Geschichtliche Kammer’ was first proposed in 1919.  Karl Renner revived the idea in 1945, albeit with 
vastly different motives to those of Zelman.  See: Gertrude  Enderle-Burcel, '"Haus der Geschichte" – 
Eine Idee wird 90 Jahre alt' 2009, http://oesta.gv.at/site/cob__33092/currentpage__0/6648/default.aspx, 
accessed: 23 Jun. 2011 and 'Karl Renners Lieblingsschöpfung', Der Standard [online edition], 7 Nov. 2008, 
accessed: 23 Jun 2011. 
8 See: '"Haus der Geschichte der Republik Österreich"; Umsetzungsstrategie – Zusammenfassung' 
http://www.doew.at/frames.php?/thema/haus_der_geschichte/roadmap.html', accessed: 4 Sep. 2012". 
9 For a further example, consider the debate surrounding the creation and realization of the 
Deutsches Historisches Museum (DHM) in Berlin.  See: Jan-Holger Kirsch and Irmgard Zündorf, 
'Zeitgeschichte-online, Thema: Geschichtsbilder des Deutschen Historischen Museums. Die 
Dauerausstellung in der Diskussion' July 2007, http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/md=DHM-
Geschichtsbilder, accessed: 4 Sep. 2012. 
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 Such a venture – if it is to be taken seriously – demands an intellectually mature, 
politically objective and academically judicious view of the past, as well as a degree of 
historical and societal consensus on how that past should be represented.  In the 
Austrian case this is inherently problematic as Austria’s collective historical memory is 
sharply divided regarding the events of the twentieth century.  Yet, it would be a 
mistake to assume that the major bone of contention is the issue of Austria’s Nazi past.  
It is a curious fact that it is the First Republic (1918–38) and not the Nazi era that is 
considered the most controversial period in Austria’s twentieth century.  For Austrian 
society, confronting the frightful deeds of 1938-45 has proven much less problematic 
than dealing with the divisive legacy of 1933–38.  Notwithstanding the decades spent 
evading responsibility for the crimes committed under the Nazi regime, Austrian 
historians and mainstream politicians are now relatively united in acknowledging the 
role that Austrians played in implementing the policies of the Third Reich.10  In stark 
contrast, despite the more than seventy years that have passed since the Anschluss, 
the academic community has been unable to reach a genuine scholarly and 
non-partisan consensus on the events of the interwar period. 
 Despite protestations to the contrary, this is not a conventional case of 
bickering academics at loggerheads over the nuances of historical interpretation.  
Rather, historical analysis of the Dollfuß era has been governed by the highly political 
nature of the debate.  A number of factors are at work here.  Part of the problem lies 
in the fact that the history of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era has been put to political use.  
For decades, Austrian elites have exploited the past either to enhance their own 
political legitimacy, or to undermine the legitimacy of their political opponents: the 
SPÖ, for example, use the ‘February Uprising’ to uphold a narrative of democratic, 
antifascist resistance, while the ÖVP, in turn, emphasize their forebears’ dogged 
defence of Austrian independence in the face of the Nazi onslaught.  For this reason, 
Austria’s bi-partisan political establishment has played too prominent a role in the 
evolution of the academic discourse of the period, and academics, for their part, have 
                                            
10 See: Günter Bischof, 'Victims? Perpetrators? "Punching Bags" of European Historical Memory? The 
Austrians and Their World War II Legacies', German Studies Review, 27 (2004), 1.  It remains to be seen 
just how much of this sentiment has filtered down into the perceptions of society as a whole.  For more 
on this theme see, for example: Wolfgang Neugebauer, 'Zur Problematik der NS-Vergangenheit 
Österreichs', Rassismus und Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Südafrika und Österreich – ein Vergleich? (Austrian 
Parliament, Vienna, 2000). 
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not always remained above the fray.  Over the years this has blurred the boundaries 
between historical analysis and political debate, tainting, if not distorting, understanding 
of the period. 
 Unsurprisingly, such intrusion has resulted in a historiography of the First 
Republic that is highly politicized and heavily partisan.  As Bischof and Lassner point 
out in the introduction to The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Era in Austria; A Reassessment, 
evaluations of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg system of rule are often determined by political 
preference; while those on the right tend ‘to portray [the ‘regime’] strictly as a 
defensive bastion against Nazi Germany’, those on the left tend to indict ‘the 
Dollfuß-Schuschnigg governments as decisive contributors to the successful Anschluss 
through their rejection of parliamentary democracy.’ 11   A comparison with Irish 
historiography is perhaps useful here.  With Irish history, the ‘tradition’ – nationalist or 
unionist – to which a historian adheres is generally discernible from the tone and 
flavour of their work.  In much the same way, in Austria, the Dollfuß era is often 
presented through a filter, in this case either ‘red’ or ‘black’, again according to the 
tradition to which the historian adheres.  The problem is, while each filter draws the 
reader’s attention to different aspects, neither provides a glimpse of the picture as a 
whole.  The result is a body of literature split between two, mutually exclusive 
interpretations, even in those cases where the motivation is not consciously political.  
Rather than genuine synthesis, this rigid dichotomy has resulted in ideological deadlock, 
a stalemate so immutable that it has been treated as a historiographical ‘draw’.  
Despite moves towards differentiation on an academic level – Ernst Hanisch’s excellent 
body of work is particularly notable here – there is no sign of a decisive breakthrough 
on the horizon.12  Thus, with no cohesive meta-narrative, reaching an agreement on 
how to depict Austria’s twentieth century will prove exceptionally difficult.  As it 
stands, Austria would need to build two ‘Houses of History’, not just one. 
                                            
11 Günter Bischof, et al., The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Era in Austria: A Reassessment, (New Brunswick, 
2003), 1. 
12 Particularly worthy of note is Hanisch’s history of Austria in the twentieth century: Ernst Hanisch, 
'Der lange Schatten des Staates:  Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert', in ed., 
Herwig Wolfram Österreichische Geschichte 1890–1990 (Vienna, 1994).  For an insight into how the book 
was received in Austria – his reviewer notes how Hanisch felt the need to defend his work even before 
it was published – see: Steven Beller, Review of: 'Ernst Hanisch. Österreichische Geschichte 1890–1990: 
Der lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert', Austrian 
History Yearbook, 30, (1999), 305–07. 
 ‘Na ja, wir haben alle geirrt und daher ist es schief gegangen’ 
Austria’s historiographical imbroglio and dysfunctional relationship with the recent past 
can be traced back to the earliest days of the Second Republic.  In 1945, the fledgling 
Austrian state was in a vulnerable position: while officially liberated by the allies it was in 
effect treated as an enemy combatant and occupied accordingly.  Austrian elites quickly 
recognized the need to prove to the Allies that a post-war Republic, in contrast to its 
disastrous pre-war predecessor, was both politically and economically viable.  Bound by 
this one, mutual objective, the leading representatives of the two major pre-war parties 
executed a remarkable change of tack; surrendering the sectarian strategies of the 
interwar years, they agreed to co-operate in establishing a civil administration and to 
present a united front in negotiations with the Allies.  The pre-war parties were quickly 
re-established, now as the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) and the Sozialistische Partei 
Österreichs (SPÖ).13  As a unity government offered the most stable basis for dealing with 
the allies, they formed a provisional coalition government, which, as a nod to the Russian 
occupiers, also included representatives from the Kommunistische Partei Österreichs 
(KPÖ).14  The Communists, having gained only four seats in the 1945 Nationalrat elections, 
left the coalition in 1947 in a dispute over a financial measure, leaving the two major 
parties to co-operate closely in constructing the foundations of the Second Republic.15 
 Austria quickly found itself travelling down the road towards consociationalism.16  
The coalition was renewed, even after the ÖVP won an absolute majority in the first 
                                            
13 The ÖVP succeeded the Christlichsoziale Partei (CSP), the SPÖ the pre-war Sozialdemokratische 
Arbeiterpartei (SDAP[D]Ö).  The latter changed its name to Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs in 1991.  
See: Manfried Rauchensteiner, '"The Big Two": The Grand Coalition, 1945–1966 and 1987–2000', in eds. 
Rolf Steininger, et al. Austria in the Twentieth Century (New Brunswick, 2002), 235-39. 
14 Renner government I. (27 April – 20 December 1945). 
15 The KPÖ left the Grand Coalition on 24 November 1947. 
16 Consociationalism is a form of government found in states which are deeply divided along ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, or, in Austria’s case, political lines, where no one group commands a majority and yet 
the state remains stable due to power-sharing agreements and guaranteed group representation.  Many 
scholars consider consociationalism to have a close affinity to corporatism.  For more on Austrian 
consociationalism and Austro-corporatism respectively see: Kurt Richard Luther and Wolfgang C. Muller, 
eds., Politics in Austria: Still a Case of Consociationalism?, (London, 1992) and Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, 
eds., Austro-Corporatism: Past, Present, Future, (New Brunswick, 1996). 
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post-war parliamentary elections of December 1945.17  It held until 1966.  Although the 
bitter ideological enmity of the pre-war period persisted, the humiliating loss of 
independence in 1938 and the disgrace of Nazi rule had had a sobering effect.  In the 
‘spirit of 1945’, Austrian elites pledged to ‘miteinander unter allen Umständen reden’, in 
theory if not always in practice.18  Over time, differences of political opinion were 
mitigated by means of a system of Proporz – in short, a power-sharing agreement – 
whereby power and responsibility was divided according to political strength, effectively 
dividing the country into ‘red’ and ‘black’ spheres of influence.19 ⁠  This may not have been 
the much-lauded antifascist ‘Geist der Lagerstrasse’, but a degree of trust was gradually 
established through, on the one hand, the mutual control mechanisms offered by the 
coalition and Proporz and on the other, the reciprocal demonstration of political 
pragmatism and ideological restraint.20 
 The price of political stability was historical truth.  In the public sphere, Austria’s 
‘rebirth’ was presented as a tabula rasa, and ‘Austrian history was purged for the purpose 
of stabilizing democracy’.21  Although there was certainly a very public debate in Austria 
about Nazi crimes in the immediate post-war years, as well as significant attempts at 
denazification, after 1948-49 there was little desire – or incentive – to look too closely at 
the events of the recent past; not the Nazi era – the so-called ‘Great Taboo’ – nor the 
                                            
17 Figl government I. (20 Dec. 1945–8 Nov. 1949). 
18 The ‘spirit of 1945’, exemplified in a speech by Viktor Matejka Stadtrat für Kultur und Volksbildung (KPÖ) 
on the opening of the antifascist exhibition, Niemals vergessen! in Vienna on 14 Sep. 1946: ‘Das ist ja das 
einigende Band, das uns alle verbindet: die Schrecklichkeit des gemeinsamen Erlebens und der unabdingbare 
Wille, damit fertig zu werden und etwas Neues – unser demokratisches Österreich – zu schaffen, das für die 
Zukunft unerschütterlich steht und fest im Volk verankert ist.’  In: Wiener Rathauskorrespondenz 1946, 
http://www.wien.gv.at/ma53/45jahre/1946/0946.htm (8 Jan. 2012).  Viktor Matejka, (4 Dec. 1901–
2 Apr. 1993), a ‘Linkskatholik’ during the interwar period, from 1934–36 Matejka was Secretary of the 
Volkshochschule Volksheim Ottakring until he was removed from his post by the Major of Vienna, Richard 
Schmitz.  On the same subject, see, also: Anton Pelinka, 'Karl Renner – A Man for All Seasons', Austrian 
History Yearbook, 23 (1992). 
19 ‘Red’ refers to the SPÖ, ‘black’ the ÖVP, the latter an allusion to the cloth of the clergy and the party’s 
traditional links to the Catholic Church. 
20 See, for instance: Manfried Rauchensteiner, '"The Big Two"', 239. 
21 See: Anton Pelinka, 'Karl Renner – A Man for All Seasons', 116. 
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events that had led to it.22  Accordingly, under Allied occupation, a ‘spirit of historical 
forgetfulness…pervaded the country’, and discussion of the events of the recent past was 
impeded by the official policy of externalising National Socialism and promoting the 
convenient half-truth of Austria as ‘the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite 
aggression’. 23  The official line was exemplified in the Rot-Weiß-Rot-Buch, a series of 
documents published by the Austrian Foreign Ministry in 1946.  Its purpose was to 
demonstrate to the Allies why Austria should not be held responsible for what had 
happened between 1938 and 1945, explaining – not unreasonably – how Austria had 
attempted to defend itself against Nazi aggression before being overpowered and 
occupied in 1938.24  The domestic angle was, on the whole, neglected, not least because 
such discussion would inevitably lead to difficult questions about Austrian complicity – or 
rather, the complicity of some of its citizens – in the Nazi takeover, complicating the 
country’s ‘first victim’ defence strategy at a time when academic nuance was somewhat 
surplus to requirements. 
 It was not until the signing of the State Treaty in 1955 and the restoration of 
Austrian sovereignty that this external barrier to discussing the ‘Anschluss years’ was 
lifted.25  However, external considerations were not the only motivation for burying the 
past.  Rather, the victim discourse dovetailed neatly with the need to preserve the fragile 
political consensus and avoid ideological factionalism.  The Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era, in 
particular the collapse of parliamentary rule in March 1933 and the civil war of 
                                            
22 There is a wealth of literature on the ‘Great Taboo’ and Austrian collaboration with the Nazis.  See, for 
example: Thomas Angerer, 'An Incomplete Discipline: Austrian Zeitgeschichte and Recent History', in eds. 
Günter Bischof, et al. Austria in the Nineteen Fifties (New Brunswick, 1995), 221–225.  See also: Tony Judt, 
'The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe', Daedalus, 121 (1992), 221–225. 
23 As described in the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943.  See: F. Parkinson, 'Epilogue', in ed., F. 
Parkinson Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday & Today 1989), 328.  See also: Gerhard Botz, '"Eine 
neue Welt, warum nicht eine neue Geschichte?" Österreichische Zeitgeschichte am Ende ihres Jahrhunderts. 
Teil 1', Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, 1 (1990), 51 and Ernst Hanisch, 'Die Dominanz 
des Staates. Österreichische Zeitgeschichte im Drehkreuz von Politik und Wissenschaft', in eds. Alexander 
Nützenadel and Wolfgang Schieder Zeitgeschichte als Problem: Nationale Traditionen und Perspektiven der 
Forschung in Europa (Göttingen, 2004), 55.  Angerer calls this the ‘Anschluss Syndrome’.  Thomas Angerer, 
'An Incomplete Discipline'. 
24  Rot-Weiß-Rot-Buch. Gerechtigkeit für Österreich! Darstellungen, Dokumente und Nachweise zur Vorgeschichte 
und Geschichte der Okkupation Österreichs (nach amtlichen Quellen), (Vienna, 1946). 
25 Gerhard Botz, '"Eine neue Welt"', 55. 
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February 1934, was still too politically and socially divisive to be soberly discussed.  
Haunted by the trauma of ‘civil war’ and acutely aware that addressing the reasons for the 
country’s loss of independence in 1938 could bring about a return to the class warfare 
that had crippled the First Republic, Austrian elites opted instead for a ‘process of evasion’.  
In effect, they agreed to disagree in their interpretations of the events of the interwar 
period. 
 This ‘antifascist consensus’ strategy was epitomized in the exhibition Niemals 
vergessen!, an expose of Nazi war crimes, staged by the coalition partners in 1946.  In it 
Austria was portrayed as the ‘first victim of fascist aggression’, yet all discussion of 
so-called ‘Austrofascism’ was buried, but for the most oblique of references.  So much so 
that Dollfuß – assassinated by the Nazis in July 1934 – could appear in the list of the 
victims of fascism alongside Karl Münichreiter, Koloman Wallisch and Georg Weissel, 
executed for their roles in the ‘February Uprising’ earlier that same year.26  Yet, the 
embargo should not be understood as an absolute one, in that it did not prevent the SPÖ 
from keeping the memory of February 1934 alive.  Adolf Schärf and Theodor Körner, 
both of whom had contributed to the Niemals vergessen! exhibition could still publically 
condemn the ‘fascist traitors’ for the ‘crime’ of 12 February 1934 in the pages of the 
Arbeiter-Zeitung, the official organ of the SPÖ.27  This was thanks to a ‘political culture of 
taboo’ that allowed the coalition partners their contrary views of the interwar years – and 
even, to an extent, to mobilize memories of the interwar period for political purposes – 
yet ensured that too much attention would not be drawn to particularly sensitive details, 
especially when they involved the architects of the Grand Coalition – Karl Renner’s 
‘applauding’ the destruction of Czechoslovakia, for example, or Leopold Kunschak’s rabid 
                                            
26 See: Viktor Matejka and Victor Slama, Niemals vergessen! Ein Buch der Anklage, Mahnung und Verpflichtung, 
(Vienna, 1946), 146–60. 
27 'Februar 1934: Niemals vergessen!', Arbeiter-Zeitung, 12 Jan. 1947, 1 and 'Tag des Gedenkens', 
Arbeiter-Zeitung, 12 Feb. 1946, 1. Theodor Körner (SPÖ) was mayor of Vienna from 1945–51 and the first 
Federal President of the Second Republic from 1951 to his death in 1957.  Adolf Schärf (SPÖ) was one of 
the architects of the Grand Coalition and is today considered one of the founding fathers of the Second 
Republic.  Imprisoned under the Ständestaat, he was a signatory of the Austria declaration of independence 
on 27 April 1945, Vice-Chancellor in the Grand Coalition from 1945–57 and Federal President from 1957 
until his death in 1965. 
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anti-Semitism. ⁠ 28   Ensuring ‘peace by deterrence’, these taboos, once established, 
‘functioned like hostages: do not dare violate my taboo, because I can violate yours’, and 
were soon firmly entrenched within the fabric of the Second Republic.29 ⁠ 
                                            
28 Anton Pelinka, 'Karl Renner – A Man for All Seasons', 116–17.  In the summer of 1938, Karl Renner 
published a propaganda book for the National Socialists, Die Gründung der Republik Deutsch-Österreich, der 
Anschluss und die Sudetendeutschen, in which he ‘unequivocally endorsed’ the Third Reich’s claim to the 
Sudetenland.  See, further: Peter Loewenberg, 'Karl Renner and the Politics of Accommodation: Moderation 
versus Revenge', Austrian History Yearbook, 22 (1991), 51–52.  Leopold Kunschak (11 Nov.1871–13 
Mar.1953) was a Christian Social politician and founder of the Christlichsozialen Arbeiterbewegung.  In 1945, he 
became the party chairman of the ÖVP.  On Kunschak’s anti-Semitism see: Bruce F. Pauley, From Prejudice to 
Persecution:  A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism, (Chapel Hill, 1992), 158–63.  On the subject of the historical 
culture of the Second Republic see, for example: Oliver Marchart, et al., 'Holocaust revisited – Lesarten 
eines Medienereigniesses zwischen globaler Erinnerungskultur und nationaler Vergangenheitsbewältigung', in 
ed., Mosche  Zuckermann Medien-Politik-Geschichte. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch 2003 für deutsche Geschichte 
(Göttingen, 2003), 318. 
29 Pelinka provides another example:  ‘Do not dare to make too much of Karl Renner’s “yes” to the Nazi 
plebiscite, because I still can attack the Austrian bishops for their behaviour’.  Anton Pelinka, 'Karl Renner – 
A Man for All Seasons' 118. 
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Figure 1: SPÖ Nationalrat Election Poster, 1959 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv und Grafiksammlung) 
 In the academic sphere analysis of the interwar years got off to a decidedly slow 
start.  Rigorous historical enquiry was hindered on a number of levels, not least by 
‘bureaucratic-political resistance’ and an academic environment in which not everyone 
had a vested interest in coming to terms with the recent past.30⁠  Initially, a lack of access 
to archival material led to a reliance on eye-witness testimony, political memoirs and 
                                            
30 Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg, 'Das große Tabu!  Historiker-Kontroversen in Österreich nach 
1945 über die nationale Vergangenheit', in ed., Jürgen Elvert Historische Debatten und Kontroversen im 19. und 
20. Jahrhundert. Jubiläumstagung der Ranke-Gesellschaft in Essen, 2001 (Stuttgart, 2003), 149. 
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other secondary materials published either during the Ständestaat and World War II or 
the immediate post-war period that were often either accusatory or exculpatory in tone.31  
Hence, Laura Gellott’s observation that the early historiography of the Ständestaat, 
particularly in the Anglo-American sphere, was often ‘highly polemical’, painted in ‘broad 
brush-strokes: fascism, clerical-fascism, dictatorship’ with a focus on ‘heroes or demons, 
martyrs or villains.’32  This was certainly true of the earliest Anglo-Saxon attempt at a 
scholarly assessment of the period.  In 1948, Charles Gulick published his 1900-page 
magnum opus, ‘Austria from Habsburg to Hitler’ a manuscript that had been thirteen 
years in the making.33  Gulick’s encyclopaedic treatment of the events of the First Republic 
remains an indispensable source of information for the student of the interwar period.  
Yet, ‘essentially an account of the policies and achievements of Austrian Social Democracy 
between the two world wars’ and its ‘violent suppression’ at the hands of a clerical-fascist 
dictatorship, its tone is unquestionably partisan.34  Indeed, Gulick made no attempt to hide 
the fact that he had taken sides, ‘planting both feet’, according to one contemporary 
                                            
31 From the conservative perspective, see, for example: Johannes Messner, Dollfuß, (Innsbruck, 1935); John 
Duncan Gregory, Dollfuss and his Times, (London, 1935); Kurt Schuschnigg, Dreimal Österreich, (Vienna, 1937), 
published in English the following year as, Kurt Schuschnigg, Farewell Austria, (London, 1938) and Kurt von 
Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem in Rot-Weiß-Rot. Aufzeichnungen des Häftlings Dr. Auster, (Zürich, 1946). From a 
Social Democratic/left-wing perspective: Otto  Bauer, Der Aufstand der österreichischen Arbeiter. Seine 
Ursachen und seine Wirkungen, (Prague, 1934), which was reprinted in 1947 and again in 1974, Otto Leichter, 
Österreich 1934. Die Geschichte einer Konterrevolution, (Zürich, 1935), Otto Leichter, Ein Staat stirbt. Österreich 
1934–38, (Paris, 1938), Julius Braunthal, The Tragedy of Austria, (London, 1948), Joseph Buttinger, Am Beispiel 
Österreichs. Ein geschichtlicher Beitrag zur Krise der sozialistischen Bewegung, (Cologne, 1953), also published in 
English the same year as, Joseph Buttinger, In the Twilight of Socialism. A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of 
Austria, (New York, 1953).  The most famous non-Austrian eye-witness account of Austria’s collapse is: 
G. E. R. Gedye, Betrayal in Central Europe. Austria and Czechoslovakia: The Fallen Bastions, (New York, 1939) 
See also: Oswald Dutch, Thus Died Austria, (London, 1938). 
32 Laura Gellott, 'Recent Writings on the Ständestaat, 1934–1938', Austrian History Yearbook, 26 
(1995), 208. 
33 Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, (Berkeley, California, 1948).  The German translation 
followed two years later and was immediately awarded a prize by the – SPÖ dominated – city of Vienna, for 
‘distinguished achievement in moral sciences’.  The Preise der Stadt Wien für Geisteswissenschaften.  See: 
Academic Senate: University of California, 'In Memoriam: 1985: Charles Adams Gulick. 1896–1984' 
http://content.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb4d5nb20m&brand=calisphere, accessed 10 Dec. 2012 
34 Walter Galenson, Review of: 'Austria from Habsburg to Hitler by Charles A. Gulick', The American 
Economic Review, 39, (1949), 761–65, 761. 
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reviewer, ‘firmly on the side of social democracy’. 35   Convinced that Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg, were ‘determined to perpetuate their own variety of Fascism’, they, along 
with Seipel, – ‘the evil genius of the republic’ – are condemned as the villains of the piece, 
deliberately destroying Austrian democracy and betraying the Social Democrats and the 
Republic in the process.36 
 In Austria, the situation was complicated by the prevailing political atmosphere.  
History-writing was, to a certain extent, put at the service of the emerging Austrian nation, 
although, as Hanisch notes, professional historians tended to avoid the hyperbolic 
‘anti-German Austrian nationalism’ of the immediate post-war period.37  Nonetheless, 
during the first two decades of the Second Republic the historian’s gaze tended to pass 
over the years 1918–45, focusing instead upon ‘earlier historical epochs’ of Austrian 
history, a development, which neatly fused with a burgeoning Austrian national identity.38  
Where attention did fall upon the interwar years, the tone tended to be conciliatory 
rather than confrontational, as in, for example, Heinrich Benedikt’s Geschichte der Republik 
Österreich, a collaborative piece first published in 1954, containing contributions from 
Walter Goldinger and Adam Wandruszka, and the first serious Austrian attempt at a 
history of the First Republic.39  Embracing the cohesive meta-narrative of the Second 
Republic, the emphasis was very much on the unfavourable circumstances of the First 
                                            
35 Ibid, 762.  The subtitles, ‘Labor's Workshop of Democracy’ and ‘Fascism's Subversion of Democracy’ 
give a good indication of the tenor of the narrative.  See also: Laura Gellott, 'Recent Writings on the 
Ständestaat, 1934–1938', 8. 
36 Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, 1858.  Ignaz Seipel, (19 Jul. 1876–2 Aug. 1932), a 
prelate and Christian Social politician, he was twice Chancellor of Austria, (31 May 1922–20 Nov. 1924) and 
(20 Oct. 1926–4 May 1929) and twice Minister for Foreign Affairs, (20 Oct. 1926–4 May 1929) and 
(30 Sep. 1930–4 Dec 1929). 
37 Ernst Hanisch, 'Dominanz des Staates', 56.  Hanisch asserts that this was in part as a consequence of 
the influence of the Gesamtdeutsch school on Austrian historiography’. 
38 Fritz Fellner cited in: Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg, 'Das große Tabu!', 148.  See also: Peter 
Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity. The Austrian Experience of Nation-Building in a Modern Society, (West 
Lafayette, 2001), 59. One thinks here of the work of academics such as Alfons Lhotsky, Erich Zöllner, 
Helmut Rumpler, Hanns Leo Mikoletzky, Adam Wandruszka and Rudolf Neck.  Nonetheless, some small 
inroads were made into the interwar period by the likes of Ludwig Jedlicka, hailed as the pioneer of Austrian 
Zeitgeschichte, during the fifties and sixties. 
39 Heinrich Benedikt and Walter Goldinger, Geschichte der Republik Österreich, (Vienna, 1954).  It was 
republished in 1977. 
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Republic; the prevailing atmosphere of mutual mistrust, the economic catastrophe, the 
threat from Nazi Germany and the violent political atmosphere.40  It is worth noting that 
this approach was the domain of a pre-war generation of historians whose formative 
years had been determined by the disorientating experience of civil war, the Anschluss 
and the Nazi regime, then emigration, reconstruction and the State Treaty, and who 
‘more or less supported the “Victim Thesis”’.41  During the early seventies, this approach 
was, somewhat disparagingly, denounced as Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung by a younger 
generation of predominantly left-wing historians, who objected to this quasi-consensus 
interpretation of the past, where ‘responsibility’ for the failure of the First Republic – the 
‘shared guilt’ thesis – was split between the two pre-war parties: or as Karl Stadler, a 
historian who had very close links with the SPÖ put it, ‘na ja, wir haben alle geirrt und 
daher ist es schief gegangen’. ⁠42  While it is certainly true that the work of professional 
historians such as Jedlicka and Wandruszka tended towards a more conservative 
interpretation of events, it would be a mistake to dismiss in its entirety the work done 
during this period.  After all, Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung was also about reaching some 
kind of consensus on divisive issues, or, as Gerhard Botz, who played a decisive role in 
                                            
40 With regard to the events of March 1933, Botz identifies a tendency to emphasize the fact that Dollfuß 
did not have antiparliamentary ambitions when he entered office in 1932.  See: Gerhard Botz, 'Die 
Ausschaltung des Nationalrates und die Anfänge der Diktatur Dollfuß' im Urteil der Geschichtsschreibung 
von 1933 bis 1973', in  Vierzig Jahre Danach. Der 4. März 1933 im Urteil von Zeitgenossen und Historikern 
(Vienna, 1973), 40–45. 
41 Ernst Hanisch, 'Dominanz des Staates', 63. The most prominent Austrian work of the period was 
Heinrich Benedikt and Walter Goldinger, Geschichte der Republik Österreich, edited by the conservative 
historian, Heinrich Benedikt and reprinted in 1977. 
42 The idea was, it appears, first mentioned by Karl Stadler on 23 October 1972 during the first 
symposium of the Wissenschaftliche Kommission: Ludwig Jedlicka, ed., Österreich 1927 bis 1938.  Protokoll des 
Symposiums in Wien, 23. bis 28. Oktober 1972, (Vienna, 1973), 43.  In 1972 Karl Stadler became the first head 
of the Dr.-Karl-Renner-Institut, the educational academy of the SPÖ.  He was a lifelong friend of the SPÖ 
politician Christian Broda, with whom he had been politically active during the 1930s.  Christian Broda, 
(12 Mar. 1916–1 Feb. 1987) was active in Communist circles during the interwar years and a member of the 
Kommunistische Jugendveband.  He was imprisoned for a few weeks in 1934 for communist activities and 
joined the SPÖ in 1945.  For more on Christian Broda and his relationship with Stadler see: Maria Wirth, 
Christian Broda. Eine Politische Biographie, (Göttingen, 2011), esp. 57–8.  For more on 
Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung and the issue of the ‘geteilte Schuld’ see: Thomas Angerer, 'An Incomplete 
Discipline'. See also: Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg, 'Das große Tabu!', 154. 
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developing the concept pointed out, about searching for ‘“historical truth”’ in the middle 
ground, between the two opposing interpretations of the period.43 
 However, despite the dominance of Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung in public and 
historical discourse, it did not completely supplant the adversarial, politicized narratives of 
the interwar years.  In 1973, Gerhard Botz identified, in addition to 
Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung, a number of alternative interpretations of the events of 
March 1933 in early post-war historiography.44  Although only investigated in connection 
to this singular event, his schematization is useful when extrapolated onto the literature of 
the period as a whole.45  There was what Botz calls the ‘väterlandische’ theory, based 
upon Ständestaat propaganda and Dollfuß’s own explanation of events and consistent with 
a catholic-conservative understanding of the period.46  With regard to the proroguing of 
the Nationalrat in March 1933, this meant maintaining that the parliamentary body had 
‘committed suicide’, leaving the Dollfuß government little choice but to rule by decree.  
This interpretation, or, in Botz’s words, ‘historical legend’ was advanced primarily by 
pre-war functionaries of the Ständestaat such as Friedrich Funder, editor of the 
Christian-Social Reichspost, Heimwehr leader and later Vice-Chancellor 
Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg, Guido Zernatto, another Heimwehr member, as well as 
Gordon Brook-Shepherd, a British historian and journalist and one of Britain’s foremost 
authorities in the field of Austrian history during the early post-war period.47  The second 
interpretation was the ‘social-democratic’ version of events.  This, like the ‘vaterländische’, 
catholic-conservative interpretation, was also a repetition of arguments that could be 
                                            
43 Gerhard Botz, 'Die Ausschaltung des Nationalrates und die Anfänge der Diktatur Dollfuß' im Urteil der 
Geschichtsschreibung von 1933 bis 1973', 40. 
44 The ‘Selbstausschaltung des Parlaments’, to use Dollfuß’s description.  Ibid, 31–59. 
45 Botz identified four differing interpretations of the events of 4 March 1933, three of which are dealt 
with here. The forth interpretation viewed the issue ‘according to constitutional law’. 
46 Gerhard Botz, 'Die Ausschaltung des Nationalrates und die Anfänge der Diktatur Dollfuß' im Urteil der 
Geschichtsschreibung von 1933 bis 1973', 35–37. 
47 Friedrich Funder, Als Österreich den Sturm bestand. Aus der Ersten in die Zweite Republik, (Vienna, 1957); 
Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg, Memoiren, (Vienna, 1971); Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Engelbert Dollfuss, (London, 
1961) all cited in: Gerhard Botz, 'Die Ausschaltung des Nationalrates und die Anfänge der Diktatur Dollfuß' 
im Urteil der Geschichtsschreibung von 1933 bis 1973', 36.  Guido Zernatto, (21 Jun. 1903–8 Feb 1943), in 
1934 made Bundeskulturrat, later State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery and General Secretary of the 
Vaterländische Front. 
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traced directly back to the 1930s.  According to the social-democratic account, Dollfuß’s 
intention to rule dictatorially had a precedent in the first use of the Kriegswirtschaftliches 
Ermächtigungsgesetz on 1 October 1932 and the emphasis was on increasing fascist 
tendencies within the government camp, the desire to smash Social Democracy and the 
workers’ movement and, ultimately, the political survival of the Christian Socials in the 
face of imminent electoral defeat at the hands of the Social Democrats and National 
Socialists.48 
 Therefore, despite its obvious drawbacks, some aspects of 
Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung were not completely without merit: while, in 1973, Botz saw 
it as an improvement vis-à-vis the previously dominant clerical-conservative and 
German-national interpretations of history, two decades later Angerer could point to its 
‘ability to go beyond the purely partisan traditions of writing history’.49  Indeed, the latter 
is an important point, in the face of a regression to ideological typologies, partisan 
point-scoring and escalating politicization that occurred during the seventies and, the 
traces of which remain, in one form or another, until the present day.  Politically-speaking 
Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung in the public sphere served its purpose, helping to maintain 
the careful balance of interests between the two political camps.  However, in both the 
public and the academic spheres, the lack of real debate on contentious issues had serious 
long-term consequences.  Muffled agreement and anodyne synthesis was no substitute for 
genuine academic consensus; the failure to confront areas of disagreement head on 
allowed them to metastasize within the Austrian body politic and public discourse.  This 
stunted the growth of an objective, apolitical historical tradition and stifled serious and 
scholarly debate. 
 By far the most serious consequence of these years was the blurring of boundaries 
between the political and historical spheres.  Before the advent of Zeitgeschichte as a 
serious academic endeavour, politicians had a significant influence on the tenor of any 
public debate.  From the earliest days of the Second Republic, the composition of 
                                            
48 Gerhard Botz, 'Die Ausschaltung des Nationalrates und die Anfänge der Diktatur Dollfuß' im Urteil der 
Geschichtsschreibung von 1933 bis 1973', 46–51. 
49 Ibid, 41 and Thomas Angerer, 'An Incomplete Discipline', 221. 
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historical exhibitions and commissions was determined by the demands of political 
consensus, rather than scholarly endeavour.  This started with the Niemals vergessen! 
exhibition of 1946, the mandate for which came from the Amt für Kultur und Volksbildung of 
the Gemeinde Wien, at that time under Viktor Matejka’s jurisdiction.50  According to 
Viktor Slama, the exhibition’s organizer, the mandate was given with ‘the consent of the 
three democratic parties’, one of which was, interestingly enough, the KPÖ.51  The 
exhibition’s political character is laid bare not only by the presence of a ‘political advisory 
board’ comprising of two representatives from each of the coalition parties but also by the 
fact that the list of contributors to the accompanying publication reads as a Who’s Who 
of post-war Austrian politics.52  It is perhaps also telling that it was a politician, the ÖVP 
Minister for Education, Heinrich Drimmel, member of the Heimwehr during the First 
Republic and a ‘pronounced conservative historian’, who organized the first symposium 
dedicated to the issue of Zeitgeschichte in December 1960, the purpose of which was to 
‘clarify problems of Austrian contemporary history’ for the classroom.53  The consequence 
was, as Lauridsen notes, the establishment of a ‘peculiarly Austrian environment for 
pursuing scholarly activity in the field of contemporary history’ where ‘institutional and 
personal ties to political parties and interest organizations’ were a common occurrence.54  
This resulted in an environment where scholars were ‘independent in theory, but in 
practice were enmeshed in such a network of commissions, conferences, subsidies and 
unwritten rules for scholarly conduct that hardly any were willing to stir up a reckoning 
                                            
50 On Viktor Matejka, see above text accompanying note 18. 
51 Viktor Matejka and Victor Slama, Niemals vergessen! Ein Buch der Anklage, Mahnung und Verpflichtung, 188. 
52 Contributors included, amongst others: Karl Renner (SPÖ), Leopold Figl (ÖVP), Adolf Schärf (SPÖ), 
Rosa Jochmann (SPÖ), Oskar Helmer (SPÖ), Karl Gruber (ÖVP), Lois Weinberger (ÖVP) and 
Nadine Paunovic (ÖVP), Alfred Missong and Johann Breithofer for the ÖVP, Erwin Scharf and Adolf Planek 
for the SPÖ and Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek for the KPÖ. 
53 Ernst Hanisch, 'Dominanz des Staates', 55; Anton Kolbabek, ed., Österreichische Zeitgeschichte im 
Geschichtsunterricht.  Bericht über die Expertentagung von 14. bis 16. Dezember 1960 in Reichenau, (Vienna, 
1960), 5. The political dimension was again evident almost a decade later, if less conspicuously, in an 
exhibition put together by the Austrian Staatsarchiv to mark the Republic’s 50th anniversary.  Its narrative, as 
far as the catalogue is concerned, appears to be classic Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung, the presentation of 
‘events’ without any accompanying analysis, and only a cursory glance at the most controversial episodes of 
the interwar years. The foreword to the catalogue was provided by the Federal Chancellor, Josef Klaus 
(ÖVP), first Chancellor of a post-war one party government. The catalogue was put together by Walter 
Goldinger. 
54 John T. Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right in Austria, 1918–1934, (Copenhagen, 2007), 26. 
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with the past for fear of the inherent consequences for the community of historical 
research.’55  To the present day, it is not unusual for historians to be engaged on a party 
political level in Austria.56  So much so, that some have deemed it relatively simple to 
determine the party-political affiliation of many Austrian historians.57  Or, as Berger 
Waldenegg noted in 2003, in Austria, everyone tends to know ‘wer ein “Schwarzer” oder 
ein “Roter” ist.’ ⁠58 
 During these early years, Austria’s party-political structure infiltrated the academic 
sphere and contemporary history’s nascent institutional landscape.59 ⁠  From the early 
sixties onwards, with a growing acceptance of Zeitgeschichte as a legitimate object of 
scholarly enquiry, research institutions dedicated to the study of contemporary history 
sprang up across the country.  According to Angerer, initially at least, ‘coalition history’ 
was entirely adopted by early institutionalized Zeitgeschichte.60  Yet, in time, each of these 
institutions claimed a different remit and, ultimately, a political-historical point of view.  
Of these, the most important included: The Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, 
established in 1959, whose intellectual focus hardly demands further clarification; the 
Institut für kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, established in Salzburg in 1962, which busied itself 
with investigating the role of the Catholic Church; the Dokumentationsarchiv des 
österreichischen Widerstandes established in 1963 ‘by ex-resistance fighters and 
anti-fascist historians’ who allied the institution with the ‘antifascist consensus’ of 1945 and 
the Ludwig-Boltzmann-Gesellschaft, formed in 1960 on the initiative of the Social 
Democrats, as a counter-weight to the conservative predisposition of Austrian 
universities. ⁠61  During its early years, the latter received most of its finance from the city 
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of Vienna and the Arbeiterkammer and during Kreisky’s long reign the state took over the 
lion’s share of the costs.⁠62   Most important is likely the Österreichische Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, established by Ludwig Jedlicka in 1961, the forerunner to the University 
Institute of the same name, which was founded a few years later in 1966 and was, until the 
1980s, ‘overwhelmingly engaged with the developments and conflicts of the First 
Republic’. ⁠ 63   Two projects established by Hertha Firnberg (SPÖ), Minster for the 
newly-formed Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research, – also a key player in 
the Wissenschaftliche Kommission – are also worthy of note: the first in 1970 dedicated to 
the ‘History of the Labour Movement’, followed in 1980 by a project entitled 
‘Contemporary History’.  Both of these ventures were charged with the same tasks; 
compiling a review of the particular discipline and, most significantly, stimulating new 
historical research.64  More than mere interest groups, these institutions and projects 
initially acted as academic counterweights, levelling the playing field and, to a certain 
extent, mirroring the balance of political power.65 
 The collapse of the ‘Grand Coalition’ in 1966 signalled the weakening of consensus 
politics and should have opened up the field for a more objective, open and impartial 
debate.  However, whilst the artificial unity of the post-war era did begin to slowly break 
down, the deep-seated fear of political conflict, initially at least, remained, as did the 
‘continuing inability’ to discuss the events of the interwar years in a sober and objective 
manner.66  Bruno Kreisky’s answer was the establishment of a commission dedicated to 
researching the history of Austria between 1927 – selected on account of the ‘July Revolt’, 
seen as a decisive milestone on the road to civil war – and the Anschluss of 1938, an idea 
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Boltzmann Institut für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung established in 1977, and the Karl von 
Vogelsang-Institut, which followed in 1980, dedicated to ‘researching Christian democracy in Austria’.  For 
further details see: Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg, 'Das große Tabu!'; Gerhard Botz, '"Eine neue 
Welt"'; Ernst Hanisch, 'Dominanz des Staates', 149. 
66 Robert Hoffmann, 'Neuere Literatur zur Geschichte Österreichs von 1927 bis 1938', Zeitgeschichte, 3 
(1975/76), 379. 
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that he had been harbouring since the early 1950s.67  Of course, the year 1927 was also 
highly convenient as a point of departure because it offered the Social Democrats a neat 
trajectory of right-wing violence (from Schattendorf to the Anschluss), while being 
agreeable to ÖVP-historians because it permitted the perspective that neither side had its 
radical fringes fully under control.  This meant no uncomfortable focus on Dollfuß for the 
ÖVP and, for the SPÖ, no unpleasant reminders about the fact that the Social Democrats 
had been noticeably keener on Anschluss than the Christian Socials all along.  The idea 
was taken up by Alfred Maleta (ÖVP), Second President of the Nationalrat, and finally 
realized after Kreisky assumed the Chancellorship of a single-party SPÖ government in 
1970.  The following year saw the launch of a joint project, the Wissenschaftliche 
Kommission des Theodor-Körner-Stiftungsfonds und des Leopold-Kunschak-Preises zur 
Erforschung der österreichischen Geschichte der Jahre 1927 bis 1938. ⁠68 
 The aim of the Wissenschaftliche Kommission was to investigate the events that had 
led to the catastrophe of 1938 – interpreted by some as ‘determining the facts’ – and 
under its auspices, eyewitness testimony was collected, the material available in the 
Staatsarchiv was sifted through and a series of conferences was held.  The commission’s 
findings were published in an attempt to bring them to the wider public.69  Kreisky had 
originally envisaged a commission consisting of three politicians and three journalists who 
had lived through the period, three young Austrian historians who had not, as well as 
three foreign historians.70  These twelve people would effectively pass judgement on the 
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events of 1918–38.  Although the rigid structure of the Wissenschaftliche Kommission was 
eventually relaxed, the principle was adhered to, with the two main parties equally 
represented, and the Communists granted a significantly lesser role, a calculation which 
ensured a ‘balanced treatment’ of the themes to be discussed.71  Thus, although certainly 
well-intentioned, there was an overwhelmingly political flavour to the project; it was 
hoped, as Maleta explained, that the commission would bring about better understanding 
between ‘the opponents of the past and the partners of the present’.72  In reality, this was 
nothing more than Koalitionsgeschichtsschreibung, albeit in slightly altered garb. 
 The work of the Wissenschaftliche Kommission spanned the best part of a decade, 
and had a significant influence on contemporary understanding of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg 
era.  To its credit, it certainly succeeded in stimulating debate, while also providing a 
fertile breeding ground for a younger generation of Austrian historians.  However, it also 
confirmed that the events of the First Republic could still not be discussed ‘independent of 
personal political posture’.73  The desire to ‘sit in judgement’ and apportion blame was 
never far from the discussion, even if professional historians attempted to remain above 
the fray.74  The attempt to guarantee that all political interest groups were equally 
represented was perhaps understandable, given the divisive nature of the issues being 
discussed.  Yet, one could also argue that this became part of the problem, in that the 
politicized atmosphere, contributed to by the active participation of politicians, 
nevertheless affected the character of the debate.  That is not to say that the state, the 
political parties or even individual politicians were deliberately using the Kommission to 
dictate the parameters of historical enquiry.  Rather, that such a highly-politicized, 
emotionally-laden atmosphere can hardly be expected to have provided a neutral, 
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value-free environment for academic research.  There were also wider implications, in 
that the ‘agreement’ to perpetuate an earlier practice and govern the structure of the 
Kommission to ensure political parity set a standard that has plagued public 
commemoration of divisive events ever since.75  For want of genuine consensus, the 
tradition of ‘equalizing’ political influence on historical projects to ensure a ‘balanced’ 
appraisal is still observed to the present day; an official event held on 12 February 2004 to 
mark the seventieth anniversary of the ‘February Uprising’ is a case in point.  The 
memorial service, which was held in the Austrian parliament, was jointly organized by the 
conservative Vogelsang-Institut and the left-wing Verein für Geschichte der 
Arbeiterbewegung.  Each organization nominated three historians to address the audience 
and, ultimately, present their point of view.76 
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 ‘Lernen S' bissl Geschichte, dann werden S' sehen, Herr Reporter!’ 
Despite all attempts to ensure ‘even-handedness’ in appraising the years 1927–38, there 
was, of course, no way of guaranteeing that the conclusions reached by the 
Wissenschaftliche Kommission would amount to a ‘balanced judgement’ of the period.  
According to one contemporary commentator, that the outcome would be anything but 
‘balanced’ was obvious to those who had ‘followed the conclusions reached by the 
historical profession since the mid-sixties, or who, on account of their political persuasion 
had always been of the opinion that the attack on democracy had come from the right, 
and not from the left’.77  During the late sixties and early seventies, with  ‘fewer historians 
– especially those on the “left”…willing to continue sharing in the orderly division of 
responsibility for the recent past’, and the emergence of a younger generation of scholars, 
the artificial unity of the post-era was beginning to break down.78  Rather than uphold the 
tenets of ‘coalition history’, Austria’s ‘68er’ generation, cut their academic teeth within the 
confines of the Kommission and set about challenging it from within.79  Taking their lead, in 
part, from US historian Charles Gulick, they launched into the field of labour history; 
Gulick’s book ‘Austria from Habsburg to Hitler’ would prove seminal for Austrian 
students during the 60s and 70s.80  Implementing new social and structural methodologies, 
and using in part, Austromarxism as a ‘theoretical armoury’ this ‘new generation of 
scholars, led by Gerhard Botz’ and inspired by ‘New Left historiography’ went to work on 
‘the interwar period, Austrofascism, the coming of the Anschluss and Austrian labour 
history’.81  With the Social Democrats now politically in the ascendancy, ‘coalition history’ 
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was openly challenged by a left-wing reading of the interwar period, a process, which had 
been encouraged by Christian Broda and Kreisky, during the sixties, before the SPÖ came 
to power.82  Strengthened by an ever-increasing majority at the ballot box, in 1974 the 
Kreisky government seized the opportunity and went ‘on the offensive’, with the 
unequivocal aim of ‘addressing’ [Aufarbeitung] the key issues of the interwar period, in 
particular, the February Civil War. ⁠ 83   The 1970s then, brought with them ‘greater 
partisanship’ in the historiographical debate ⁠ and culminated in a pronounced shift in the 
historical paradigm and, particularly where the February Civil War is concerned, socialist 
hegemony of the historical record84.  These were unquestionably important developments 
and viewing the period though this filter evidently contributed to our understanding of the 
era.  However, as Hanisch points out, while Social Democratic interwar politics was 
sometimes strongly criticized, this generation ‘overlooked the “Staatswiderstand” of the 
authoritarian Ständestaat against National Socialism’.85  Thus, historical accounts of the 
Dollfuß era were understandably influenced by the political and social climate of the time, 
which ultimately affected research interests, the way questions were formulated and 
ultimately the conclusions that were reached.  This is of course a phenomenon true of 
almost every generation of historians; the peculiar thing is, when it comes to the 
Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era, these conclusions have hardly been rigorously contested since. 
 For this first post-war generation of historians the central question was not why 
Austrian democracy had failed, but how it had been destroyed.  By whom was obvious. On 
4 March 1933, Dollfuß and his government exploited a procedural technicality in 
parliament to eliminate parliamentary democracy on the basis that parliament had 
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effectively ceased to function.86  In the course of a heated debate about a strike of railway 
workers the first president of the Nationalrat, Karl Renner, stepped down in order to be 
able to take part in the vote; the second president, the Christian Social Rudolf Ramek and 
the third, Sepp Straffner, member of the Großdeutsche Volkspartei (GDVP), followed suit, 
the last one without formally closing the session, a move not provided for in the 
parliament’s Standing Orders.  Dollfuß, seeing an opportunity to outflank the 
obstructionist tactics that had plagued his tenure, refused to reconvene it despite 
demands from the Social Democrats, the Greater Germans (GDVP) and Nazis to do so.87  
Instead, Dollfuß opted to rule by emergency decree against the expressed wishes of the 
Social Democratic, National Socialist and Greater German opposition.  When, on the 
15 March, the Social Democrats and Greater Germans attempted to reconvene they were 
prevented from entering the building by the police on Dollfuß’s orders.  Instead, ignoring 
opposition demands for the reinstatement of parliament and new elections, Dollfuß 
pressed ahead with his authoritarian course.  Over the following weeks and months, the 
party system and parliamentary institutions were systematically destroyed.  The 
constitutional court was eliminated, press censorship was introduced, the death penalty 
was reintroduced and political opponents were locked up in internment camps.  At the 
end of March the military arm of the SPÖ was disbanded, and in May and June the 
Austrian NSDAP, Styrian Heimatschutz and the KPÖ were banned.  This development, 
along with the formation of Dollfuß’s Einheitspartei, the Vaterländische Front, for all 
Austrians ‘loyal to the government’ in May 1933, culminated in the elimination of the 
remaining political parties, the Christian Socials included, and the February Civil War.88 
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 This interpretation stressed the fact that the road to dictatorship and the 
elimination of Social Democracy from the political process had been set in motion well 
before the ‘coup d’état’ of March 1933.  According to Leser, ‘after 15 July 1927 there was 
no turning back from the road leading inexorably to civil war and the tragedy of 
February 1934’. 89   Following this line of reasoning, the motive for shutting down 
parliament could not have been, as the Dollfuß government had argued at the time, to 
keep the Nazis away from the centres of power and thus, must have been intended to 
‘disempower’ Austrian Social Democracy.90  In his work on interwar Christian Socialism, 
Anton Staudinger identified anti-social-democratic elements within the party, which, having 
failed in previous attempts to limit the activities of their political rivals, willingly 
participated in the destruction of parliament and the establishment of dictatorial rule.91  
Seipel’s attempts to harness the power of the Heimwehr for the government camp, the 
demand for constitutional reform in favour of the executive branch through a broadening 
of the prerogatives of the President, Vaugoin’s instrumentalisation of the Bundesheer as an 
instrument of the Christian Social Party, the move towards authoritarian politics taken by 
the Vaugoin minority cabinet in 1930, not to mention the ever intensifying 
anti-social-democratic sentiment all suggested a creeping authoritarianism within the ranks 
of the Christian Social Party and a neat trajectory from July 1927 to March 1933.92  
Dollfuß’s increasingly ambivalent attitude towards democracy provided further evidence 
for this line if argument.93  Even if some Christian Socials harboured reservations about 
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Dollfuß’s strategy, the party ultimately aligned itself with the authoritarian course and was, 
on the whole – according to Gerhard Botz – ‘very pleased’ with the events of 
4 March 1933, as it finally gave them the opportunity they had been hankering after to 
alter the constitution.94  Peter Huemer pursued the theme even further, claiming, on the 
basis of a single case study of the jurist Robert Hecht that the destruction of Austrian 
democracy was the result of a systematic and wilful policy on the part of the bourgeois 
camp.95  Despite one German-American reviewer’s reservations about the insistence on 
‘destruction’ and the questionable political undertones, Huemer’s ‘pioneering study’ 
continues to underpin contemporary historical understanding of the period.96  To the 
present day, the verdict for some historians – Leidinger and Moritz, for example – remains 
unequivocal that it was Dollfuß who ‘destroyed Austrian democracy’.97 
 The problem with that is that while one could argue that as it was Dollfuß who 
took the executive decision not to reconvene parliament in March 1933 the collapse of 
Austrian democracy was ultimately his responsibility, such a monocausal assessment fails 
to consider other factors that may have contributed to its demise.  These factors included 
the abuse of the democratic process by all sides manifested in the fact that parliamentary 
deadlock was making government almost impossible.  By way of comparison, it is 
interesting that the collapse of Weimar democracy has been blamed on many, but the 
failure of Austrian democracy effectively blamed, in this instance, on one man.98 
 The role of Social Democracy was far less controversial.  Although scholars – even 
those close to the party – went to great lengths to acknowledge the mistakes made, 
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particularly by the party leadership, they were still inclined to portray them as ultimately 
the victims of the anti-democratic, authoritarian ‘salami tactics’ employed by the Dollfuß 
government. 99   As Norbert Leser, an academic celebrated for his critical take on 
Austro-Marxism and the SPÖ argued: 
There is no doubt that the bourgeoisie, by trying to exclude the social-democrats from all 
participation in the government, must bear the overwhelming responsibility for the developments 
culminating in civil war.  Nevertheless Austro-Marxism also contributed to its undoing, at least to the 
extent of providing the Heimwehr gratuitously with the sort of wild and violent statements which 
right-wing extremists would successfully employ to frighten the undecided and the gullible to active 
partisanship.100 
It was not just responsibility for the civil war that was laid firmly at the door of the 
Christian Social right.  While Leser conceded that the two sides shared responsibility for 
the collapse of Austrian democracy in the interwar period – a stance for which he, by his 
own admission, came under fire from within the party – the Social Democrats, he asserted, 
ultimately bore less responsibility than the government camp.101  Social Democratic 
propaganda also played a role:  ‘continually emphasizing the transitoriness and disparaging 
the institutions of the republic – which in fact it did its upmost to uphold’ Leser continued, 
‘allowed the middle classes to distort and misinterpret much of what it had to say on the 
subject of democracy and dictatorship’.102  He does not, however, offer his opinion on 
whether disparaging the institutions of the Republic in this way actually served to 
undermine it and its independence.  Instead, it was the ‘criminal’ provocation of the left by 
the government camp, which culminated in the February Uprising of 1934.103  Pushed on 
the defensive by a government propelled by an ‘unbridled lust for power’, a group of 
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Schutzbündler, failed by indecisive leadership within their own party, in an act of 
desperation, took matters into their own hands.  In this ‘glorious chapter’ in the history of 
the Austrian labour movement, seeing democracy and freedom under serious threat, they 
made a heroic – and ultimately futile – last-ditch attempt to defend it, making Austria ‘the 
one spot in Western Europe where the working classes found the courage and strength 
to resist fascism’, the author overlooking, it seems, the Spanish Civil War.104  Thus, in an 
act of ‘crass stupidity’, the Dollfuß government not only destroyed a reliable pillar of 
democracy but also deprived itself, it was claimed, of its most valuable ally in the fight 
against National Socialism while at the same time destroying the only possible foundations 
for a common defence strategy.105  In this manner, or so the argument went, the 
‘Austrofascist’ government paved the way for the National Socialist regime.106  All of these 
assertions can be found, in one form or another, repeated in assessments of the period up 
to the present day.107 
 Thus, in the Austria of the 1970s things were said in print – that apparently went 
unchallenged there – that would have raised eyebrows outside Austria.  Dollfuß, who 
never took the easy path of abdicating responsibility for the affairs of state and refused to 
sign over power to the Nazis even when he had a bullet in his chest, supposedly paved the 
way for the National Socialist regime and was responsible for the Nazi takeover, but 
Renner, in endorsing the Anschluss somehow resisted Hitler.  Of course, outside of 
Austria someone may have recalled that it was Dollfuß who had been shot by the Nazis, 
while Dollfuß’s opponent, Karl Renner, had rather conspicuously survived the Third Reich 
– unlike most of the leadership of German Social Democracy, who were, in fact, 
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und Kraft gefunden, dem Faschismus Widerstand zu leisten” Rudolf Neck, 'Der Februar 1934. Die politische 
Entwicklung', in ed., Ludwig Jedlicka Österreich 1927 bis 1938. Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien, 23. bis 28. 
Oktober 1972 (Vienna, 1973), 104–5. 
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murdered by the Nazis.108  This is not a question of favouring one side or another.  Rather, 
it is a question of putting historical events into the wider context of the fight against 
National Socialism in Europe in the 1930s and comparing the record of Austrian Social 
Democracy with that of Social Democracy elsewhere.  It is the question of whether the 
record of Austrian Social Democracy, despite having no sympathy with the Nazi cause, 
can be considered equal to that of German Social Democracy in resisting National 
Socialism before the takeover of Austria in 1938. 
 Just as the wider evidence remained unexamined so did the question of under 
which conditions Austrian Social Democracy would have been prepared to act as an ally of 
Dollfuß against Hitler.  It also failed to examine the assumption that democracy was the 
only basis for a defence against National Socialism.  After all, democracy made 
Czechoslovakia vulnerable to the Nazi onslaught and it was of course the ballot box that 
ensured Hitler could paralyse what was left of Weimar democracy through frequent 
elections.  These significant silences and omissions contrast sharply with the considerable 
energy expended in the attempt to undermine Dollfuß’s anti-Nazi credentials.  Since one 
could not deny that he had been killed by the Nazis, it was suggested that, engaged in a 
‘war on two fronts’, the Dollfuß government saw its main enemy in Social Democracy and 
not National Socialism.  According to Staudinger, Dollfuß’s key concern was, first and 
foremost, the elimination of the Social Democratic party, not the struggle against the 
Austrian Nazis.109  In the same vein, Everhard Holtmann maintained that preferential 
treatment was discernible in the judicial system, which seemed to be employed in favour 
of the NSDAP and to the detriment of the Social Democrats.110  The participants of the 
‘February Uprising’, for example, were treated more harshly by the courts than the Nazi 
                                            
108 On the failed Nazi putsch that ended in Dollfuß’s assassination see: Gerhard Jagschitz, Der Putsch: Die 
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putschists.111  Conversely, Dollfuß, the ‘Anschlussfreund’ was singled out for his apparent 
equivocation vis-à-vis the National Socialist movement.112  As Jagschitz argued, Dollfuß did 
not really fight National Socialism itself.113  Neck suggested that where Dollfuß and his 
circle did attack the Nazis, they did so, ‘time and again…on account of the socialist 
elements of their [the Nazis] programme’.114  Both Staudinger and Jagschitz maintain that, 
in the immediate aftermath of the elimination of parliament in March 1933, Dollfuß was, in 
fact, in favour of working with the National Socialists, however, his colleagues within the 
Christian Social Party rejected this strategy.115  Thus, while Dollfuß rejected the idea of a 
coalition with the Social Democrats outright, he appeared – in 1933 at least – willing to 
negotiate with the National Socialists on the issue, and was, ultimately, only prompted into 
rigorous action against the Austrian National Socialists by their terroristic activities.116 
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christlich-sozialen Partei' 94–5. 
116 See, Gerhard Jagschitz, 'Christlichsoziale Partei', esp. 76–77. ‘Auch die Ablehnung des 
Nationalsozialismus war bei der Mehrzahl der christlich-sozialen Mandatare stärker ausgeprägt als beim 
Dollfuß, den erst die terroristischen Methoden der NSDAP in Österreich zu rigorosem Vorgehen gegen die 
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Partei', 74. 
 Austrofaschismus? 
Somewhat inevitably, this renewed interest in the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era, coming as it 
did at a time when historical analysis across Europe and the United States was fixated with 
explaining the fascist phenomenon, induced – or rather, re-opened – a contentious debate 
about how the period should be categorized and defined; it was certainly anti-democratic, 
but was it authoritarian, totalitarian, fascist?117  For the Austrian left, which drew its 
political legitimacy from its ideologically anti-fascist posture, there was little room for 
doubt; the idea of ‘Austrofascism’ was sacrosanct, the lynchpin in a mythologized narrative 
of heroic antifascist resistance, which legitimized the claim that Austria – and thus the 
Social Democrats – had experienced two ‘fascist dictatorships’ during the twentieth 
century.  Thus Kreisky could declare in his memoirs that Austrian Social Democracy ‘was 
the first and only Social Democratic party in the world that at least made an attempt at 
resistance’.118  Maintaining this narrative was – and one could argue, still is – critical 
because it diverted attention away from the Austrian Social Democrats’ failure to offer 
decisive resistance to National Socialism.119  Thus, to this day Social Democratic circles 
fiercely defend an account of Austrian workers being, in February 1934, the first in Europe 
to take a stand against Fascism.  This account masks some difficult questions about why it 
was Dollfuß who was deemed to be the true enemy of the working classes, and not the 
National Socialists.  Conversely, those on the conservative right wishing to avoid 
discussion of an uncomfortable anti-democratic past, preferred to stick with the term 
Ständestaat, the official designation used between 1934 and 1938. 
 Transposed onto the academic community, the ‘Austrofascist’ debate remains a 
key historiographical fault-line; despite the vast literature on the subject there is no 
consensus on how the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg system of rule should be judged.  One reason 
for this lack of consensus is that, within Austria at least, the issue has largely been 
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investigated by historians from two separate camps; while the one side look for evidence 
to prove that it was indeed fascist, the other look for evidence that does not fit traditional 
fascist typologies.  This is compounded by the fact that definitions of both authoritarianism 
and fascism are in themselves disputed, and with shifting boundaries almost any 
interpretation is possible, which in part explains why, when it comes to describing the 
Ständestaat, there are just so many labels and descriptions to choose from.  While for 
some the Ständestaat is best understood as a form of authoritarian conservatism, as a 
‘conventional’ dictatorship, whether of the bourgeois, chancellorial, conservative or 
corporate kind, others argue that it was fascist to the core.  It is branded ‘clerical fascism’, 
‘competitive fascism’ (vis-à-vis National Socialism), ‘imitation fascism’ or ‘Austrofascism’ 
according to where one wishes to place the emphasis.  For those who are mindful of the 
evident disparities between the three systems, yet still wish to emphasize some loose 
ideological similarities, all is not lost; there is still ‘parafascism’, ‘protofascism’ and 
‘semifascism’, fascistoid and fascisant.  Thus, rather than helping us to an academic 
consensus, the literature leaves us with more questions than answers. 
The ‘Austrofascist’ school maintains that, even though, like traditional authoritarian 
dictatorships, it ruled through the Church, the civil service and the army, the 
Dollfuß-Schuschnigg system of rule was effectively closer to Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy in nature than it was to the authoritarian regimes of interwar Europe.  In the early 
1980s, claiming ‘blind spots’ in understanding of the period, in part, as a result of what was 
deemed to be selective academic research, Wolfgang Neugebauer, the ‘doyen of 
Austrofascist research’ and Emmerich Tálos, one of the most prominent proponents of 
‘Austrofascist’ theory, set out to analyse the establishment and implementation of the 
‘Austrofascist’ dictatorship.120  Tálos rejected the label ‘authoritarian regime’ as a ‘vague 
“residual category”’ lacking clear demarcation from fascist regimes.  He linked political 
changes in Austria with those of neighbouring countries and deemed that the Austrian 
system of rule fell somewhere between ‘the fascist prototypes, Italy and Germany’.  Tálos 
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maintained that, on account of three ideological indicators – occupational estates, 
anti-Marxism and the elimination of class warfare – the system of rule between 1934 and 
1938 could indeed be characterized as ‘Austrofascism’.121  The anti-Socialist sentiment of 
all three systems lies at the heart of this analysis, Hitler was anti-Socialist, Mussolini was 
anti-socialist and so was Dollfuß.  Arguing on the one hand, that the constant emphasis on 
Austria’s German character precluded a strict demarcation from Nazi Germany, and on 
the other, that Dollfuß had other choices than to establish a regime that Tálos claims was 
based on the Italian model, no-one, he maintains, forced Dollfuß down the path he took.122 
 Despite enjoying significant academic ‘air-time’ – due to visible and vociferous 
adherents – and thus a strong historiographical presence, the ‘Austrofascist’ thesis has not 
gone unchallenged.  Many scholars, within Austria and abroad, disagree with this 
assessment, either completely, or by degrees.  In the course of a recent debate about the 
use of the term Austrofaschismus in the text of a law concerning the rehabilitation of 
victims of the Dollfuß ‘regime’, Kurt Bauer appealed to the political and academic 
communities to ditch the use of ‘Austrofascism’ to describe the period 1933–38 once and 
for all.  Bauer’s argument was an altogether pragmatic one: pointing out that most regimes 
and ideologies are now known by the name that they gave themselves without issue – 
Communists, Italian Fascists, National Socialists, Anti-Semites – Bauer, no Dollfuß 
apologist by any stretch of the imagination, contended that there really was no 
conceivable problem with the use of the term Ständestaat, and that dogged insistence on 
‘Austrofascism’, in spite of the facts, was ultimately damaging for the whole debate.123 
 One of the main problems of the term ‘Austrofascism’ is that it was used as an 
ideological-political ‘Kampfbegriff’, first by the left during the First Republic to denote 
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those currents that were not National Socialist, but that they identified as ‘antidemocratic, 
right-wing extremist and fascist’, and later by the SPÖ, as a political weapon against their 
ÖVP opponents.124  As a pejorative epithet often used in political discourse for the 
purposes of moral condemnation, it cannot be simply separated from its political, 
emotional and moral baggage.  Tálos’s insistence that he uses the term ‘Austrofascism’ in 
an academic sense (as if the same could not be true for scholars using the term 
Ständestaat) is unconvincing and inconsistent; as Schausberger has rightly pointed out, one 
cannot claim ‘Austrofascism’ as an academic concept, while simultaneously dismissing 
Ständestaat as a political one.125  To understand the problem here, one must consider the 
function of such terms in Austrian society.  If a historian uses the term ‘Austrofascism’, 
he/she is effectively saying – ‘I adhere to the thesis that Dollfuß, the anti-Marxist, in 
destroying Austrian democracy paved the way for Anschluss and the Nazi regime’.  
Conversely, if someone uses the term Ständestaat, it generally means – ‘I adhere to the 
thesis that Dollfuß acted as a bulwark against National Socialism and sacrificed democracy 
in the struggle to prevent a Nazi takeover and ensure independence’.  Of course, one 
could theoretically use either term and not strictly adhere to either thesis, yet, it appears 
clear that while the term Ständestaat could be unshackled from any inherent value 
judgement – it does not exclude a ‘fascist’ interpretation – the term ‘Austrofascism’ simply 
cannot.126 
The problem with ‘Austrofascism’ is not just that it has proven to be a somewhat 
nebulous epithet but that its liberal application has, it could be argued, contributed to the 
obfuscation of historical reality.  Even if one concludes that there were ‘fascistic’ elements 
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to the Ständestaat, either in the form of fascist trappings – the Vaterländische Front, the 
Kruckenkreuz, or the internment camps – or in the form of the Heimwehr as a coalition 
partner, to label the whole system of rule ‘fascist’ seems to be to fall victim to a 
reductionist logic.  Whilst the Heimwehr certainly displayed unambiguous ‘fascist’ 
tendencies, they remained a subordinate ally in Dollfuß’s, overwhelmingly conservative, 
government.  Granted, they used their position to push Dollfuß on an increasingly 
authoritarian/fascist course, but one should also consider Dollfuß’s persistent and tireless 
attempts to outmanoeuvre his coalition partners and avoid implementation of their most 
radical demands.  The Austrian dictatorship also lacked some of fascism’s core tenets: an 
aggressive foreign policy, ultranationalism, the celebration of violence, revolutionary zeal, 
totalitarian aspirations, and, as in the case of Italy in Abyssinia and in National Socialism 
everywhere, in its virulent and ultimately murderous racism.  There is also the issue of 
intention; there is no evidence to suggest that before 1933 Dollfuß ever intended to seize 
power and establish a fascist-type regime, something that was demonstrably not the case 
for either Hitler or Mussolini.  As regards the external trappings – the Vaterländische Front 
and the Kruckenkreuz – as well as Dollfuß’s attempt to mobilize the Austrian community, 
again, the wider context in which Dollfuß decided to institute these measures needs to be 
considered.  The very real threat posed by Nazi Germany, pressure from their only 
half-dependable ally, Italy, to take Austria on a fascist course, no concrete offer of support 
from the West as well as the perceived need to unite Austrians behind some sort of 
banner (in the nation-building, rather than the ultranationalistic sense, the Ständestaat only 
ever claimed the Austrians were the better Germans vis-à-vis the Nazis, not the ‘master 
race’) all suggest a profound deviation from traditional fascist typologies. 
 Outside of Austria, one does not have to look far to find voices that challenge the 
blanket fascist label.  Among scholars of fascism, Stanley Payne identifies Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg as representatives of the conservative right and the Heimwehr as part of the 
radical right, seeing it as ‘a pre-emptive non-fascist authoritarian regime’.127  Philip Morgan 
views the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg system of rule as authoritarianism that co-opted the 
Heimwehr, which in his assessment was a strand of Austrian fascism.  Perhaps most 
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recently, Roger Griffin labels the Ständestaat – along with Horthy’s Hungary and Salazar’s 
Portugal – as para-fascist, a form of authoritarian and ultranationalist conservatism that 
adopted the ‘fascist style’, but never aspired to a its ‘ideological revolutionary vision of 
genuine fascism’.128  Although, even this brings with it its own problems; intended as ‘a 
corrective to the earlier indiscriminate branding of inter-war dictatorial regimes as 
“fascist”’, Kallis points out that the term para-fascism, ‘created as many definitional and 
analytical problems as those it aspired to resolve’ as it remains unclear ‘whether the 
distinction between the two categories of fascist and para-fascist regime refers to a 
difference of quality or simply degree’.129  Kallis himself also opts for a more nuanced 
approach, and deems Dollfuß’s strategy ultimately a defensive one; to co-opt the least 
radical component of fascism – the Starhemberg faction of the Heimwehr –‘under the 
tutelage of the conservative establishment’ in defence of the existing order against the 
threat posed by ‘the aspirations of a more extreme fascist agenda’ – internally, the 
Austrian NSDAP, and, externally, Nazi Germany.130  In Austria too, there are a handful of 
interwar specialists who, wary of the pitfalls, studiously avoid the term.  Helmut Wohnout, 
a ‘conservative’ historian, eschews both terms, opting for ‘chancellorial dictatorship’, 
arguing that Dollfuß was actually attempting to chart a ‘third way’ between liberal 
democracy and totalitarian dictatorship.131  Yet, it is not just ‘conservative’ historians – or 
‘ÖVPler’, to quote Bauer – who favour a more nuanced approach to the ‘fascist’ debate; 
Bauer points to Gerhard Botz’s description of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg period as ‘a 
half-fascist authoritarian dictatorship that developed over time’, Ernst Hanisch’s depiction 
of an ‘authoritarian regime with fascist trappings’, and even Oliver Rathkolb’s preference 
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for the designation ‘Dollfuß-Schuschnigg regime’.132  Even the social democratic scholar 
Norbert Leser rejects the term as ‘without scientific basis’133.  Nonetheless, the abject lack 
of consensus on the issue, as well as the considerable doubt cast on ‘Austrofascist’ theory 
has not stopped otherwise reputable historians from proclaiming in general works aimed 
at undergraduate students, that the system was a fascist one, as though it were stated 
fact.134 
 The question of whether we label the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg system of rule fascist or 
not is an important one, as the definitions that are used invariably impact the types of 
questions that historians ask of the evidence.  When the period is viewed solely through a 
‘fascist’ filter, certain aspects are illuminated, while others are obscured; similarities come 
into focus, yet differences, disparities and nuances are pushed further from view.  And in 
the debate about whether this was a fascist regime, these nuances are important, precisely 
because definitions of fascism are so malleable and open to interpretation.  On the one 
hand, as Berger Waldenegg argued, the answer to whether there were fascist movements 
in Austria or whether the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg system of rule itself was fascist, rather 
depends upon ‘what one understands fascism to be’.135  On the other, it is worth 
remembering that not all definitions of fascism are equally useful.  Passmore argues, for a 
concept to be useful, it must explain more about an object of study than others; it remains 
to be seen whether using the blanket term ‘Austrofascism’, or even viewing the 
Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era through a ‘fascist’ prism actually furthers our understanding in a 
constructive and quantifiable manner.136 
 It is only by removing the ‘Austrofascist’ filter that a differentiated picture comes 
into view.  In a series of articles published in the Austrian History Yearbook in the late 
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1990s, the late R. John Rath highlighted the incongruous fact that Dollfuß, – Rath opts for 
‘semifascist dictator’ – was, quite unlike Hitler or Mussolini, ‘seemingly a genuine democrat 
when he was appointed Chancellor in May 1932’.137  Rath’s contentions were reinforced 
by James William Miller in his pioneering work on Dollfuß’s ideological outlook and 
political world-view, which Miller convincingly demonstrates was based on an ‘elitist, 
authoritarian conception of democracy’ rooted in peasant tradition and ‘his own close 
study of agricultural cooperatives’.138  His revelations that Dollfuß saw co-operatives as an 
ideal model of democracy in action – when one joined one became responsible, not to 
one another as individuals, but to the co-operative as a whole – goes some way to 
explaining how Dollfuß could move from convinced democrat to authoritarian ruler within 
such a short space of time.139  Moreover, where adherents of the term ‘Austrofascism’ 
may see Nazi-inspired Führerprinzip – again, the argument goes, paving the way for the 
Nazi takeover in 1938 – Miller’s more nuanced approach discerns an elitist and 
hierarchical conception of democracy based upon co-operative principles, which 
emphasized the obligations of the individual members to the experts who lead them, i.e. 
the co-operative’s leadership. 140   Miller’s conclusion, that ‘Dollfuß’s political 
philosophy…cannot be understood if confined to or analysed according to liberal 
definitions of democracy or dictatorship’ ⁠demonstrates that to understand the Dollfuß 
years it is simply not enough to fall back on simplistic explanations of supposed Austrian 
imitation of Nazi Germany.141 
 Which leads us to the thoroughly questionable and all too common practice of 
comparing – and conflating – the Austrian Ständestaat with the genocidal National Socialist 
regime, an assessment that was initially propagated by socialist circles in the pre-Anschluss 
period.  While such an allegation is perhaps more understandable in the 
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ideologically-charged context of the early 1930s – although even then, the differences 
were obvious – its continued application by contemporary historians defies belief.  This 
was especially true after the Waldheim debate had reminded everyone of the Third 
Reich’s record – and of all the things the contributors to the ‘Austrofascist’ debate 
downplayed or ignored in their testimonials: Hitler’s war of aggression and attempted 
colonial conquest, the Nazis’ eliminationist anti-Semitism, the compulsory sterilizations 
and the euthanasia campaign.  That Dollfuß was demonstrably anti-Marxist is not under 
dispute, but when he said in March 1933 ‘Die braune Welle können wir nur auffangen, 
wenn wir das, was die Nazis versprechen und in Deutschland getan haben, was ohnehin 
gemildert wird durch verschiedene Richtungen bei uns, selber machen’, he was not talking 
about destroying Social Democracy à la Hitler, but about how to force the – weakened – 
Socialists into negotiations for reform of the constitution.142  He did not do what one of 
his Heimwehr cabinet colleagues suggested he do and actually try to defeat the National 
Socialists by ‘out-Hitlering, Hitler’.143  His behaviour was certainly anti-democratic, but to 
compare Dollfuß’s attitude – not to mention behaviour – towards the Austrian Social 
Democrats to the violent – and murderous – suppression of German Social Democracy 
by the National Socialists is inappropriate, potentially misleading and at the very least runs 
the risk of relativizing Nazi crimes. 
 Not only does this approach, in stressing the primacy of anti-Socialist ideology, 
understate – or at worst, ignore – the Dollfuß government’s anti-Nazi measures, it also 
obscures a more complex historical reality.  It is worth noting that according to the 
assessment of the British, French and Czech observers, the consensus in October 1933 
was that Dollfuß did not personally wish ‘to push matters to extremes’ with the Social 
Democrats, despite pressure from both the Heimwehr and Mussolini for the complete 
suppression of Social Democracy and for the establishment of a state along fascist lines.144  
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Instead, the evidence suggested Dollfuß was endeavouring to chart a middle course, 
refusing to institute against the Socialists those measures that they most feared and the 
Heimwehr most desired.145  Thus, it was Dollfuß who was generally credited outside Austria 
with the wish to hold ‘Heimwehr exuberance’ in check and the display of moderation in 
this regard was attributed ‘very largely to the influence of Dr. Dollfuss personally’146.  Even 
if one maintains that Dollfuß was acting under pressure from the European democracies 
to observe moderation towards the Socialists, the very fact that he accepted this advice 
surely signifies a fundamental divergence from the National Socialist model.
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 Haus des Proporzes147 
As a result of the Waldheim affair in the mid-eighties the First Republic was no longer 
accorded that same degree of scrutiny, and the debate moved on to other topics, despite 
the fact that few, if any, of these controversial issues had been satisfactorily settled.  
Rathkolb is right when he says, historians more or less agree on Dollfuß’ role as an 
anti-democrat, yet, there is little consensus on very much else.148  In a sense, part of the 
problem lies in the fact that the Dollfuß era resists easy categorization.  It sits uneasily 
between mutually irreconcilable historiographical definitions; the Dollfuß government 
harboured ‘fascist’ elements and yet was patently anti-Nazi, it resisted a Nazi takeover yet 
some of its members were actively collaborating in its own demise, it saw itself as 
culturally and historically ‘German’ yet not the ‘German’ avowed by the National Socialists, 
it behaved in an anti-democratic manner, yet in part to avert a legal takeover by the Nazis, 
sacrificing democracy but supporting independence. 
 Since the eighties, despite intermittent – and often valuable – contributions to 
overall understanding of the Dollfuß era little of the underlying tone and substance of the 
debate has changed.149  In 1995, Gellott identified a tendency towards ‘differentiation and 
integration’, and thus the appearance of more tempered appraisals and reasoned 
judgement in the historiography of the period.  She maintained that by the late 1980s, 
liberated from the constraints of long-established narratives, a younger generation of 
scholars had begun to challenge historical and societal orthodoxy and reappraise the 
legacy of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg regime and the Ständestaat era.150  Yet, Hanisch, on the 
other hand, is right to point out that the historical record, on the whole, still tends to 
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overlook the Ständestaat’s resistance to a Nazi takeover. 151   Moreover, Botz’s 
acknowledgment in 1990, that ‘“History” was and is highly political in Austria’ still holds 
true to the present day.152  As Bischof asks from the United States: ‘is there another 
country in EU-Europe where historians are close personal friends and intimates of the 
governing class?’ 153  Despite protestations to the contrary, contemporary history in 
Austria has still not managed to completely emancipate itself from state influence, a fact 
that is tangible in the composition of historical commissions, official publications, 
exhibitions and commemorations.154  The situation is best summed up the fact that, in 
2005, two exhibitions were necessary to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 
signing of the State Treaty.  The one "Österreich ist frei" – ‘more black’ according to Der 
Standard – was shown at the Schallaburg, in Lower Austria, ÖVP country to the very core.  
The other, "Das neue Österreich" –‘more red’– was held at the Belvedere, in the heart of 
still-Red Vienna.155 
 Despite the advent of a new generation of scholars, the siege mentality that 
permeated Austria’s historical profession has failed to dissipate completely.  For example, 
Gottfried-Karl Kindermann’s thesis, first presented in Hitlers Niederlage in Österreich in 
1984, of Austria under Dollfuß and the Ständestaat as the ‘erste Abwehrfront’ against 
National Socialism was highly controversial in Austria, dismissed wholesale as revisionism 
by some historians, Siegfried Mattl included: ‘Some refuse to give up.  For almost two 
decades, Kindermann has striven to re-write an – not unimportant – phase of Austrian 
history’.156  Mattl went as far as to dismiss Kindermann’s work Österreich gegen Hitler as an 
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old fable, arguing that the issue was effectively resolved in the 1970s when a ‘whole 
generation of Austrian historians settled the question of what led to the dismantling of 
democracy in 1933–34 and ultimately the Anschluss of 1938’.  Although there are a 
handful of scholars who, striving to separate history and politics, are more nuanced in 
their conclusions, the fact remains, and as Allinson pointed out in 2006, that ‘the 
“Austrofascist era” is still too sensitive to allow a wholly non-partisan, unemotional 
view’.157  Part of the problem is that too many historians interested in the era have a 
demonstrable political connection, despite the fact that what the subject demands is 
rigorous reassessment and thorough depoliticization.  The problem is not the quality of 
their work, but its credibility and the fact that it prevents the siege mentality from 
dissipating.  Moreover, it ensures that in some ways, historical research continues to 
follow the ideological battle lines of the 1930s, and in doing so, reinforces them.  At the 
same time, some academics have clearly become so accustomed to viewing the 
Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era through the distorted prism of a politicized historical tradition, 
that they very often fail to comprehend its significance.  That means a younger group of 
scholars who, instead of coming at the topic anew, accept the conclusions of the previous 
generation without question and thus reproduce narratives that have effectively not 
moved on since the 1970s.158  Thus, the literature dealing with the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era 
remains a historiographical minefield, often best read for its silences, rather than its 
revelations; even when reading the most recent literature on the interwar period, one 
would do well to keep an eye open for the insidious ‘partisan subtext’.159  The gravity of 
the situation is best illustrated by way of comparison with the material available on the 
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collapse of the Weimar Republic; measured against this excellent body of research, 
contemporary scholarship into the collapse of interwar Austria is wanting.  Not only is it 
full of gaps and littered with omissions and half-truths, much that has been written is based 
upon received wisdom, rather than demonstrable historical fact.  There is, for example, 
still no scholarly biography of Dollfuß, despite the fact that he is central to understanding a 
key period in interwar Austrian – and European – history.160  For Otto Bauer, this gap was 
only filled as recently as 2011, albeit with an excellent account of the man who was central 
to shaping interwar Social Democracy.161  This lack of attention would be less problematic, 
if it were not for the fact that the thirties were a key period in interwar European history, 
Anschluss a major Nazi foreign policy objective and the events of March 1938 a crucial 
milestone on the road that led to the Second World War. 
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 Chapter 2 
‘Der Staat, den keiner wollte’? 
Anschluss and the First Republic 
Understanding of the Dollfuß era has primarily hinged on a narrative that centres on the 
collapse of Austrian democracy as the key issue of the interwar period for Austria.  While 
it is true that some, mainly conservative, historians continue to emphasize the issue of 
Austrian independence as a key motivating factor for Dollfuß and his government, for 
others it is not even worthy of note.162  Yet, the events of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era can 
only be fully understood against the backdrop of Christian Social attitudes to the Austrian 
state.  By shifting the focus from a penchant for tinkering with democracy on the 
conservative right, to Christian Social attitudes towards Austrian independence before the 
advent of National Socialism in Austria, we are better placed to explain the weaknesses 
that undermined the Austrian state in its later struggle against the National Socialists and 
why the Christian Socials under Dollfuß followed the path they did in 1932–33. 
 In the weeks and months following the Anschluss the Nazis set out to destroy, 
once and for all, the very idea that Austria had ever had any right to an independent 
existence.  It was not a difficult task.  On the surface the Nazis’ claim was plausible 
enough; what Allied leaders had perpetrated in Versailles and St. Germain had been deeply 
unpopular in both Germany and Austria and the argument that the two countries had 
been denied the much-lauded right to self-determination in 1918 was impossible to refute.  
Had German-Austria not declared union with Germany in November 1918, only to have 
its hopes dashed in Paris?  Had the German-Austrians not demanded Anschluss in a wave 
of unofficial referenda over the following years?  Only with the Anschluss, the Nazis 
argued in the newly nazified Reichspost, once the principal newspaper of Catholic Austrian 
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opinion, ‘ist das letzte Glied der Kette, die die Verfasser der Friedensdiktate um das 
deutsche Volk schmiedeten, zerrissen worden’.163  However, as always, they had skilfully 
manipulated this historical reality to suit their purposes.  The humiliation and territorial 
dismemberment inflicted upon Deutschösterreich in Paris was used to argue that the 
burning desire of the Austrian-Germans to unite with their German brethren had been 
crushed by the Allies, forcing statehood upon a nation that did not want it.  Interwar 
Austria had been, they claimed, a Staat wider Willen.  The phrase was coined in 1940, the 
title of a book described by one observer as one of ‘the most “impartial” of the Nazi 
versions’ of the Anschluss.164  In 1962, Hellmut Andics reinforced the Nazi notion of a 
Staat wider Willen, in his book Der Staat, den keiner wollte an appellation, which has become 
common currency when talking about the First Republic.165  It was a ‘fact’ repeated by 
Kreisky in his memoirs: ‘Austria ‘was a state that could not live, but could not die, a state 
that no one actually wanted’.166  The idea that Austria was a state with ‘a strong tendency 
towards non-existence’ has permeated the literature ever since’.167 
  Der Staat, den keiner wollte is a misnomer, and a gross oversimplification of the 
facts.  The first thing to remember is that before 1918 no German-Austrian political party 
would have willingly chosen the collapse of the Empire and Anschluss with Germany – a 
handful of diehard Pan-Germans excepted.  However, in October 1918, with the war well 
and truly lost, the Habsburg Monarchy had begun to disintegrate..168  Remarkably, in 
advance of any formal commitment by the other nationalities of the Empire to 
independence, it was the German-speaking Social Democrats and the German Nationalists 
who officially abandoned the idea of a unified, multinational Austrian state, calling for the 
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abdication of the Emperor, the formation of a republic and union with Germany.169  The 
Christian Socials were caught off guard.  Loyal to the monarchy, they were especially 
reluctant to abandon the Emperor and were divided on the form that the future state 
should take.170  However, believing that collapse was imminent and faced with a potential 
coup by the Social Democrats and German Nationalists, they reluctantly agreed to 
consider their demands.171 
 On 21 October 1918, in response to the declaration of the Emperor’s Imperial 
Manifesto, the monarchy’s German-speaking deputies formed a ‘Provisional National 
Assembly’, at the same time agreeing to the formation of a German-Austrian state, yet the 
Christian Socials continued to defend the monarchist principle, and sought to avert the 
republic.172  The issue of German Bohemia and Moravia complicated matters.  It was for 
this reason that Karl Renner, himself a German Moravian, ‘appellierte an die 
Christlichsozialen, Österreich müsse den Anschluss an Deutschland beschließen, obwohl 
der “überwiegende Teil des Deutschen Volkes in Österreich” bisher “zu diesem 
Entschluss nicht gekommen sei”’.173  Retaining these areas only really appeared possible if 
Austria and Germany became a unified state.  Yet, ultimately, the Christian Socials lacked 
the ‘courage of their convictions’ to make a ‘decided stand either for the monarchy or 
against Anschluss’. 174   On 11 November, the Emperor announced his conditional 
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withdrawal from the throne, when he renounced ‘all participation in the affairs of state’.175  
With the Emperor gone the road was now clear to implement the Socialists’ proposal: the 
following day the National Assembly passed a unanimous resolution, which proclaimed the 
Republik Deutschösterreich [Republic of German-Austria] and, on Social Democratic insistence, 
declared its union with the new German Republic.176 
 The ‘German-Austria’ initiative was short-lived.  The Peace Treaty of 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye signed on 10 September 1919 by representatives of the Allies and 
the Republic of Austria prohibited an economic or political union between Germany and 
Austria without the agreement of the Council of the League of Nations.  Unnerved by the 
slightest suggestion of Pan-German sentiment, the treaty stipulated that the name of the 
state was to be ‘Österreich’ and not ‘Deutsch-Österreich’.177  The territories claimed by the 
Republik Deutsch-Österreich were dismembered in much the same manner as its name.  The 
fact that the German-Austrians in the South Tyrol and the Sudetenland had proclaimed 
themselves a part of Austria was completely disregarded: the contiguous German-speaking 
populations of the South Tyrol were given to Italy, whilst three million German-speakers 
in Bohemia and Moravia were subsumed within Czechoslovakia.  For the Allies this was 
considered a politico-strategic necessity, for many Austrians it was a humiliating and 
hypocritical fait accompli. 
 All of Austria’s political parties, regardless of their stance on a union with Germany, 
were outraged by the draconian terms dictated in Paris.178  Few Austrian politicians were 
convinced of the Lebensfähigkeit of an independent Austria and some had hoped that the 
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Allies would at least insist on maintaining a free trade policy in the Danubian basin, thus 
ensuring Austrian economic viability.  When the terms of the treaty revealed that this was 
not going to be the case, many argued that signing the treaty was tantamount to signing 
the country’s death warrant.179  With no monarchy, no empire and no assurance of free 
trade it was almost inevitable that the Anschluss idea would become more attractive as 
the most feasible solution.180  Moreover, the Paris Peace Treaties made Anschluss agitation 
worse, as prohibition merely served to make it all the more desirable.  Nevertheless, 
short of allowing the country to disintegrate, the Austrian government had little choice 
but to accept the terms; back in Vienna, the majority within the Nationalrat ‘bowed to the 
inevitable’ and ratified the treaty, although they did so under palpable protest.181 
 When faced with the reality of an independent existence, surrounded by unfriendly 
neighbours and with no provisions made to guarantee its economic future, it is hardly 
surprising that the inhabitants of the Austrian Hereditary Lands were swamped by a wave 
of ‘panic and despair’.182  Certainly, during the immediate post-war period, the outlook for 
an independent Austrian state appeared hopeless and for many Anschluss with whoever 
seemed ready to take them was the obvious answer.  There was clearly a strong desire 
for some type of union within Germany among certain sections of the population.  
However, it was not an ideal solution and by no means universally welcomed, as the vote 
of 12 November would otherwise appear to suggest.  In reality, the issue of whether 
union with Germany was in Austria’s best interests fundamentally divided Austria’s 
political elites.  Thus, while it is accurate to say that initially there was little enthusiasm for 
a small, republican state, this belies the fact that significant sections of Austrian society 
were equally unenthused about political union with Germany.  When examining the early 
interwar period one must be careful to distinguish between those who rejected the 
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concept of Austrian independence in its entirety and those who, lamenting the collapse of 
the Empire, were inclined to salvage something from it. 
 As one would expect, union with Germany remained at the heart of the 
Pan-Germans’ ideological programme throughout the interwar period.183  However, sheer 
force of numbers dictated that it was the Social Democrats, the state’s largest 
homogenous party, who were the decisive force behind the crusade.  For the Social 
Democrats, the proclamation of the democratic republic on 12 November 1918 was 
deemed a personal achievement, the culmination of decades of struggle against the 
anti-democratic monarchical system (this despite the fact that they had only really 
abandoned the monarchy when it was in its death throes).  Yet, somewhat ironically, 
despite claiming the Republic as the fruits of their own labour, the Socialists rejected the 
concept of an independent Austria outright.184  Like many during this period, they were 
convinced that the Alpine republic was too small to be economically viable.185  Indeed, 
Otto Bauer, party leader and first Foreign Minister, was so convinced of this fact that he 
insisted that the Social Democrats’ task in Paris was to convince the Allies that an 
independent Austria was incapable of existence.  However, there was much more to it 
than just economics; Anschluss with ‘Red’ Germany was a particularly attractive proposal 
to the Socialists, not least because the country was heavily industrialized, boasted a large 
proletariat and a well-developed Social Democratic tradition: ‘just by joining Germany, we 
shall live in a socialist commonwealth’, the Arbeiter-Zeitung declared on 
13 November 1918.186  The Austrian provinces, on the other hand, were predominantly 
agricultural, and since the farmers and peasants traditionally voted for the Christian Socials, 
the SDAPDÖ feared that they would never be able to attain power within an independent 
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Austrian state.187  However, with the merger of a centralized Austrian state with the 
German Republic, Austria’s conservative state capitals would have been assigned to 
provincial oblivion.  Thus, for the Social Democrats the democratic Austrian Republic was 
only a means to an end: Anschluss with the Socialist German Republic and, ultimately, 
victory over the capitalist system.188 
 For many of the same reasons and more, the Christian Socials did not share with 
their political adversaries, the enthusiasm for Anschluss.  Although they had voted for the 
Anschluss in 1919, it was a move that was due more to the lack of a unified position 
within the party, rather than a declaration of genuine conviction.189  Catholic circles were 
divided on the issue, with the Christian Social workers’ movement the chief source of 
opposition.190  Anschluss sentiment was also stronger in the provinces – the Salzburg 
faction, for example, supported union with Bavaria, although preferably outside both an 
Austrian or German framework – while opponents of union were ‘prominent in Vienna’, 
although such disparities were due as much to specific local concerns, as to ideological 
considerations.191  Yet, for those who considered Anschluss an option, the preference was 
for union with Catholic Munich, not Protestant Berlin.  In their Salzburg stronghold, the 
Deutschfreiheitliche and the Christian Socials both supported merging the province with 
Bavaria yet the Social Democrats rejected the proposal in favour of waiting for the union 
of the country as a whole.192  However, the idea of independence was also taking root; as 
early as 1918, a group of Christian Socials opposed to the proposed Anschluss had 
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‘formed around the composer Ludwig Bittner’, a group that included the ‘arch-Austrian’ 
author Hermann Bahr.193  Bahr’s involvement is hardly surprising, not least in light of his 
observation during August 1915, at the height of World War 1, ‘“daß wenn das Ergebnis 
des ganzen Krieges nur sein soll, uns zu einer deutschen Provinz, zum Vasallen 
Hohenzollerns zu machen, wir das hätten billiger haben können”’.194  Moreover, Anschluss 
with a Socialist Germany was hardly attractive to Austria’s Catholic right; ‘today’s 
Germany’, Ignaz Seipel, prelate and key figure in the Christian Social Party, argued, ‘with 
the terror of the Soldiers’ Councils and socialist dictatorship’ is not for us.195  Thus, 
despite regional inconsistencies, there was, generally speaking, far less enthusiasm for a 
union with Germany within the catholic-conservative camp, particularly for a union with a 
centralized German Republic ruled by a Social Democrat-dominated government in 
Berlin.196 
 Nonetheless, many of those who found the idea objectionable were prudent enough 
to avoid energetically opposing the Anschluss in public. 197   As the British Minister, 
Sir Walford Selby, later explained to London, any open manifestation of opinion against 
the Anschluss, whether economic or political was ‘rendered difficult’ by the presence of 
an ‘amorphous patriotism for the “great German nation”’.198  However, this did not stop 
them taking the opposite stance in private discussions.199  The Party’s true position is 
better revealed in the omission of the Anschluss issue from its electoral programme 
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published on 25 December 1918, and the fact that the party did not take part in Anschluss 
rallies held throughout the country on 11 May of the following year.200  In their manifesto 
of 1926, the Christian Socials demanded only ‘die Gleichberechtigung des deutschen 
Volkes in der europäischen Völkerfamilie und die Ausgestaltung des Verhältnisses zum 
Deutschen Reich auf Grund des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes.201  That the organ of the 
Christian Social Party, the Reichspost was nowhere near vehement enough in its Anschluss 
sentiment is evident from Seipel’s assurance to a German colleague that the paper had 
always espoused the Anschluss, and that no, it did not need any extra coaching in this 
regard.202  Yet, most telling is the fact that the Christian Social’s official stance vis-à-vis the 
Anschluss was obvious to the German Embassy.  In late 1920, the German Ambassador, 
Dr. Frédéric von Rosenberg, noted that under the prevailing conditions, no support for 
the Anschluss was to be expected from the Christian Social Party.  Caution was advised; 
as long as the Christian Socials were at the helm, the German Foreign Office would have 
to avoid any action which could be misused by Vienna to dampen the Anschluss 
movement, confirming Pauley’s conclusion that, the Christian Socials ‘paid at best lip 
service to the Anschluss idea when not actively opposing it’.203  Yet, some historians 
continue to present this information as if Anschluss sentiment were somehow equally 
shared between the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats.  Moritz and Leidinger, for 
example, maintain that, ‘like the Social Democrats, the Christian Socials also invoked the 
right to self-determination’.204  This appears to suggest that both sides were equally as 
responsible for fostering an Anschluss sentiment that would one day be abused by Hitler, 
an interpretation for which the evidence is inadequate. 
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 The Anschluss Plebiscites 
Which raises the question, just how popular was the Anschluss clarion call amongst the 
wider population during the early years of the First Republic?  On the surface there 
appears to have been widespread support for merger with Germany and it is easy to 
understand why the impression has endured that ‘practically all Austrians favoured union’ 
during this early period.205  The provincial separatist movements and the plebiscites in 
Tyrol and Salzburg appear to provide solid evidence of the strength of Anschluss 
sentiment.  On 24 April 1921, 97 per cent of the votes cast in an unofficial plebiscite in 
North Tyrol – a vote held against the wishes of the federal government – were in favour 
of union with Germany.206  A few weeks later Salzburg also went to the polls, again 
yielding a large majority in favour of a union with Germany.207  These results are often 
invoked as proof of overwhelming Anschluss sentiment, yet they are not quite the reliable 
indicators that they appear.  The plebiscite in North Tyrol is a case in point.  North 
Tyrol’s overriding concern was not Anschluss, but ending the Italian occupation of South 
Tyrol and restoring the unity of the province.  For this reason, Tyrolean elites remained 
intentionally irresolute, willing to pursue any policy that would achieve this aim.  Although 
they had provisionally ‘joined’ the Republic in November 1918, they vehemently asserted 
their autonomy vis-à-vis any decisions that could aversely affect this primary goal.  Up until 
mid-1919, the policy of the dominant Tiroler Volkspartei, was not Anschluss with Germany, 
which would have put paid to any hope of reinstating Tyrolean unity, but the creation of 
an independent Tyrolean state. 208   Thus, when Vienna declared the Anschluss of 
Deutschösterreich with Germany in 1918, Tyrol, which had only provisionally joined the 
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Republic, responded by threatening to withdraw from the state because of the question of 
German South Tyrol.209  Tyrolean elites unequivocally rejected the Anschluss policy of the 
central government, contemplating every conceivable alternative, including the possibility 
of an independent Tyrol linked in a loose union with Switzerland or Italy, or of a fusion of 
the ‘western provinces’.210  Some in the conservative camp supported the idea of a union 
between Tyrol and Bavaria, or even the creation of a south German state.211  Ultimately, 
and as Seipel correctly observed, in early 1919 at least, Vorarlberg and Tyrol would rather 
remain small, neutral states, or better still, unite with Switzerland, than be mutilated and 
join Germany.212 
 In late 1919, with the Anschlussverbot confirmed, Tyrolean tactics were deliberately 
reversed.  Now Anschluss with Germany – or rather Bavaria – appeared to the majority 
of the Tyrolean leadership to be their only hope of ever regaining South Tyrol and at the 
same time, escaping the prevailing economic misery.213  Yet, this still does not wholly 
explain the statistics.  The voter returns appear conclusive, yet, as Bielka points out, the 
plebiscite was accompanied by severe electoral fraud and voter manipulation and an 
accurate percentage figure of voter eligibility is, therefore, impossible to attain.  In addition 
to the massive propaganda campaign and not insignificant Reich German influence, ‘Ja’ 
ballot papers were pre-printed and provided at the polling stations and ballots were to be 
handed to an election official, undermining voter confidentiality.  In addition, voter 
eligibility rules were liberally conceived and, therefore, open to abuse.  Not only were 
those registered for the Nationalrat elections of October 1920 permitted to vote, but also 
those who registered themselves as living in Tyrol before April 1921, that is, less than a 
fortnight before going to the polls, as were all those Tyroleans who lived outside of the 
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state; a train was even chartered from Bavaria to mitigate the financial burden of travelling 
‘home’.214 
 As Bielka concludes, the question of whether the overwhelming majority of 
Tyroleans wanted Anschluss cannot be definitively proven, and, considering the 
circumstances surrounding the plebiscite it appears ‘very doubtful’ that this was the 
case.215  The situation was similar in Salzburg province, where democratic principles were 
also liberally violated.216  Again, the majority of the ruling elite supported Anschluss, but 
the circumstances surrounding the ballot make it an unreliable indicator of public 
sentiment, let alone pan-German attitudes.217  What is more, Salzburg can in no way be 
considered paradigmatic for the rest of Austria.  Salzburg, which had been independent 
until the early nineteenth century, had spent the shortest time under Habsburg rule; when 
it finally fell to Austria in 1816, part of the province, the Rupertiwinkel, had remained with 
Bavaria, which had ruled Salzburg during the Napoleonic years.  Therefore, for Salzburg, 
union with Bavaria was an entirely logical step that might actually restore the provinces 
historic borders.  Vorarlberg went to the polls on 11 May 1919, although here 80 per cent 
voted for union with Switzerland, towards which the province had always gravitated, both 
economically and culturally.218  The provincial movements do tell us that Germany – or 
rather, Bavaria – was the ‘obvious’ solution for some, but it was by no means the only one.  
They also tell us that Anschluss meant different things to different people, and that those 
who talked of Anschluss did not necessarily mean full political union.  This ambivalence 
was reflected in the observation of the British Minister, Sir Walford Selby, on the subject 
in 1934: 
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He [the Austrian] likes to toy with “Anschluss” ideas in the abstract and to consider the German as 
his natural blood-brother.  But, in point of fact, his kinship and friendship neither extend to nor 
include Prussia and – as was amply shown during the war – German thoroughness and brusqueness 
are abhorrent to the Austrian supineness and love of ease.  Consequently there is no desire, except 
among the desperate minority, to see Prussia dominating Vienna, and what the average Austrian 
nebulously hopes for  – if he gives himself the trouble to be precise – is a loose working partnership 
between Munich and Vienna in common resistance to Prussia219 
What can also be deduced is that the referenda were as much influenced by Austrian 
federal attitudes, as they were by a lack of confidence in the new Republic.  Provincial 
separatism was underpinned by an age-old aversion to rule from Vienna: under the Empire 
each Kronland had had its own diet and government and operated ‘independently’ of 
central rule, each looking to their own ‘capital’, and not to Vienna.220  Dynastic loyalty was 
what bound them together; remove the Emperor, who was also their local prince, duke or 
archduke, and there was no reason to defer to Vienna.  Joining Germany on their own 
terms, rather than as a centralized state in a deal negotiated from Vienna, could potentially 
ensure that their independent status as a ‘state’ could be maintained.  However, the same 
was true of rule from Berlin as it was from Vienna; regional patriotism was considerably 
stronger than any pan-German sentiment. 
 Despite the initially compelling statistics, overall, it appears doubtful that a qualified 
majority of Austrians would have supported Anschluss with Germany.221  From the sparse 
evidence available, it appears that the pro-Anschluss movement could only hope for a slim 
majority in the event of a plebiscite, and not the 75 per cent necessary, and that the 
number of Anschluss supporters in 1919 was not more than 50 per cent of the 
population.222  Even Otto Bauer, leader of the Social Democratic party had to admit that 
both the bourgeoisie and the peasantry wanted ‘an independent Austria fully capable of a 
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national life of its own’.223  More telling is Bauer’s admission that, because of the strength 
of the conservative opposition to Anschluss and the real possibility that the majority 
would have voted against the Anschluss, the Socialists did not dare to hold a referendum 
in 1919.224 
 Nonetheless, some kind of union with Germany was an appealing solution for 
broad sections of the Austrian population.  Why was it so alluring?  On the one hand, 
self-determination was the touchstone of the period, and as such, the demand for 
Anschluss – as a symbol of equality – was part of a much wider trend.  However, the key 
stimulus for most German-Austrians was economic, not nationalistic imperative.  At heart, 
the plea for Anschluss was not an ideological one, but a ‘counsel of despair’, a reflection of 
Austria’s desperate economic situation and the fundamental lack of faith in an 
economically independent Austrian state.225  After four years of war and a devastating 
peace settlement, Austria’s economy was in ruins.  With whole branches of industry at a 
complete standstill and the country deficient in natural resources, it is hardly surprising 
that such a dire economic situation did little to promote the idea of Austrian 
independence.226  Everyday existence was intolerable for the vast majority of the populace; 
October 1920 saw hordes of angry crowds on Austria’s streets demanding a plebiscite on 
the Anschluss issue within six months.227  Austria had been dealt a poor hand in Paris; 
trade channels that had developed over centuries were blocked off overnight and the raw 
materials that had fed Austrian industries were suddenly unavailable.  Austria’s supply of 
natural resources was highly imbalanced and inadequate, the country had no coal deposits 
and its agricultural output was insufficient to meet the needs of the population.228  The 
arbitrary redrawing of central European borders had cut the Austrians off from their 
traditional markets.  Her new neighbours were openly hostile, seeing the Austrian 
                                            
223 Cited in: S. W. Gould, 'Austrian Attitudes toward Anschluss', 228–29. 
224 See: Ibid, 227. 
225 Klemens von Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel, 112. 
226 See: Peter J. Katzenstein, Disjoined Partners:  Austria and Germany Since 1815, (Berkeley, California, 
1976), 144. 
227 See: Rolf Steininger, '12 November 1918–12 March 1938', 93. 
228 See: Peter J. Katzenstein, Disjoined Partners, 144. 
Chapter 2:  Anschluss and the First Republic  67 
 
Republic as the successor to the Habsburg Empire.  This enmity spilt over into the 
economic arena: obstructionist trade barriers were established by the successor states 
that destroyed centuries of economic integration, a development that, paradoxically, 
practically drove the Austrians into the arms of the Weimar Republic. 
 The economic distress that this caused took Austria to the brink of a humanitarian 
catastrophe; to observers and Austrians alike it seemed that the country would collapse 
before it had even taken its first steps.  As agricultural and industrial production had 
halted, and trade was non-existent, Austria became dependent upon the Allies for 
essential supplies.  Many Austrians were living in abject poverty and suffering from 
malnutrition, especially in Vienna and other urban areas.  Food and fuel were scarce; a 
British journalist described how ‘after two and a half years of peace, the Austrians [were] 
suffering privations unknown to us in the worst days of the war’.229  Carsten notes that ‘it 
was only with the aid of shipments of food and other commodities that the country was 
able to survive, however precariously, during the terrible winter of 1919–20’.230  This only 
confirmed the pre-existing belief that Austria could not survive as an independent state 
and this reliance upon international aid served to erode what little political autonomy the 
country may have been able to muster; few had dared to believe that an independent 
Austrian state would ever be viable economically, and this failing state was incapable of 
offering any proof to the contrary.231 
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 Das wahre Antlitz Österreichs? – The Seipel Legacy 
Austria may well have had an inauspicious start, but it is seldom sufficiently emphasized 
that, despite the odds, Austria did weather the post-war storm.  During the first two 
years of the state’s existence the two main parties managed to put aside their stark 
ideological differences long enough to enter into a series of red-black coalitions, the 
purpose of which were to negotiate the peace treaty and to establish the Republic’s 
constitutional and legal foundations.232  However, the Social Democrats failed to abandon 
Anschluss as their ultimate objective.233  It is not without irony, that despite the fact that 
they were not republicans at heart, the Christian Socials under Seipel’s stewardship were 
the first party to commit themselves unequivocally to a significant rescue attempt for the 
floundering state.  When, in October 1920, it appeared that the ‘class balance’ had shifted 
‘in favour of the bourgeoisie’, the Socialists left the coalition and Renner’s policy of 
co-operation came to an abrupt end.  Fearing a further extension of the coalition might 
compromise doctrinal purity and party unity, inducing, in Leser’s words, ‘the masses to 
transfer their allegiance to the communists’, the Socialists opted to remain in opposition.  
They refused to shore up a ‘bourgeois’ system that Austro-Marxist doctrine considered to 
be on the verge of collapse, preferring to wait for the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ that 
was promised by the Marxist model.234  Following the departure of the Social Democrats 
from the ruling coalition in 1920, all successive governments were dominated by the 
Christian Social Party.235  To obtain the parliamentary majority necessary the Christian 
Socials entered into a series of uneasy alliances, first with the Großdeutsche Volkspartei and 
later with the Landbund, both representatives of the German national Lager; again, to 
maintain the coalition, moderation in anti-Anschluss statements was the order of the 
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day.236  Though a small minority, the pan-German camp was now needed and ‘tactfulness’ 
in language, rather than genuine political concessions was the favoured Christian Social 
strategy for keeping them on board. 
 Hyperbole aside, there is more than a grain of truth in the statement that it was 
Ignaz Seipel, who, ultimately, ‘guided his little country out of the valley of despair’.237  A 
priest and theologian, Seipel had been at the centre of the imperial reform efforts and 
peace initiatives throughout 1917.  Although a staunch monarchist who had remained loyal 
to the House of Habsburg until the end, he proved himself to be exceptionally pragmatic 
as a politician in the post-revolutionary period.  In February 1919, he embarked on his 
parliamentary career for the Christian Socials, quickly becoming a political personality of 
considerable stature.  He was under no illusions about the likelihood of either the 
restoration of the monarchy or the approval of an Anschluss with Germany noting that 
‘salvation lies neither in melancholy thoughts about the past nor in fantastic dreams about 
the future’.238  As early as May 1919 he declared Bauer’s Anschluss policy ‘finished’.239  An 
‘Austrian patriot’, he was naturally inclined towards the revival of an independent Austria 
within a new supranational confederation that would unite the rival successor states of the 
old monarchy.  He was certainly no fan of union with Germany, for a number of 
fundamental reasons, not least because the concept of the German Reich, as the artificial 
‘westernisation’ of German nationhood – in a spiritual or philosophical, rather than a 
geographical sense – was anathema to him.  However, it was also because, as Stefan Zweig 
put it, as a ‘fanatical Old-Austrian’ Seipel stood ‘in deep rooted opposition to German, 
Prussian Protestant militarism’ as ‘incompatible with the traditional ideas of Austria and 
her Catholic mission’.240  Anschluss would invariably mean becoming ‘a province among 
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provinces under the leadership of Prussia’.241  To Seipel, this ‘westernized concept of a 
nation state’ was not only unsuited for the German context, it could not be the ultimate 
incarnation of German nationhood, precisely because Austria had undergone ‘a different 
historical experience’.242 
 Despite his ‘latent anti-“Anschluss” leanings’, some confusion still surrounds 
Seipel’s attitude to union with Germany, a confusion, which has certainly been fuelled by 
his deliberate ambiguity on the issue.243  As his biographer points out, Seipel ‘talked a great 
deal and compulsively about the Anschluss’ without, however, ‘speaking either for or 
against it’, a fact which is surely telling in itself.244  His watchword, ‘nothing against 
Germany, nothing without Germany’ had a clear double meaning, a fact which did not 
escape the attention of both the Wilhelmstrasse and the Quai d’Orsay, who suspected his 
Anschluss policy ‘to be a double jeu’.245  Sidestepping prickly questions, Seipel would often 
resort to drawing on divine providence as and when the situation demanded: ‘It is still by 
no means clear’, he declared evasively when challenged about his position, ‘where the 
Lord intends us German-Austrians to be, and that, surely, is what ultimately matters’.246  
Part of the problem also lies in the somewhat sophisticated nature of his argument: to 
Seipel, Anschluss ‘did not only mean “union with Germany”’ and was not considered 
‘antithetical to a Danubian confederation which would include non-German states’.247  
What is more, understanding of Seipel’s attitude has also been obscured by what one 
scholar has termed ‘the big lie’, the fact that the Nazis claimed him as one of their own, a 
Vorkämpfer volksdeutschen Denkens, ‘a pioneer of the German racial idea’ an interpretation 
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which is only borne out by a superficial evaluation of the facts.248  Yet, in many ways, 
Seipel’s position on Anschluss was plain to see.  According to Gehl, in 1927 Seipel 
rejected Stresemann’s initiative for a customs union because Seipel, ‘in contrast to 
Stresemann’ opposed Anschluss ‘for fundamental and not only tactical reasons’.249  Berlin 
thus waited for a change in Vienna, which came with Johann Schober in 1929.  Seipel then 
dropped the plan when he became Foreign Minister in the autumn of 1930, only for 
Schober to take it up once more when he became Foreign Minister under Otto Ender.250  
Ultimately, Seipel’s strategy was nowhere near as complex as it first appears; Anschluss 
was for Seipel, quite simply, ‘a last resort’.251 
 Seipel’s attitude towards union with Germany was based upon the belief that 
Altösterreich was by no means dead.252  ‘Austria’ and ‘Austrianism’ had not disappeared with 
the Empire; rather these concepts had taken on a different form, and the 
German-Austrians, the backbone of Altösterreich, now formed the last true bastion of the 
‘Austrian Idea’.  The Empire, he maintained, had been taken from them, but their 
‘homeland [Heimat], their ‘Austrianism’ had not.  Even the name Deutschösterreich, Seipel 
argued, was indicative of a großösterreichische mind-set; the notion of German-Austria, he 
reasoned, could only be understood in connection with the concept of a ‘Czech-Austria’ 
or a ‘Polish-Austria’.253  He was not, however, talking about monarchical restoration or 
the re-establishment of an Empire under German-Austrian leadership, but about Austria’s 
historical and spiritual mission, a mission which ‘might be placed before them once more, 
either as an Austrian, an eastern European, a central European or a pan-European task’.254  
It remained undecided in which direction Deutschösterreich would gravitate, ‘East or West, 
South or North’ as the Austrians still did not know where they could ‘best serve the 
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German people’.255  Where does the Lord want us in the future, he mused, what is our 
true cultural mission?  Not in a centralized German state, it would seem: all of these 
questions, Seipel suggested, point, almost assuredly, towards the Donauföderation.256  Here 
was the cloudy allegiance to the German nation to which the British Minister would later 
refer.  For Seipel the German people might well be best served if the Austrians remained 
outside Germany. 
Wenn wir das Leben unserer Nation in der Schaffung des Einheitsstaates nicht erschöpft sehen, dann 
können wir uns irgendwie auch damit abfinden, daß wir in einem deutschen Staat leben, der dem 
Deutschen Reiche nicht angehört. Daß es einen Vorteil hat, einen solchen deutschen Staat zu haben, 
das sehen wir gerade in diesen Zeiten, in denen wir beobachten müssen, daß die Deutschen, die 
ebensowenig wie wir zum Reiche gehören können und dürfen, die aber anderen Staaten zugeteilt 
wurden, nicht dieselbe Freiheit des nationalen Lebens haben wie wir257 
Thus, Austria should not ‘“abandon itself to pseudo national intoxication”, not least 
because, ’if ‘the German-Austrians were to join the German Empire it would only gain a 
couple of million more inhabitants’, but ‘Austria would have disappeared’ for good.258  This 
was particularly important because Seipel believed that the Austrian Germans, as the ‘the 
true heirs of the old Empire’, would ‘continue to “guard the imperial supernational [sic] 
ideal”, after 1918, much as they had done after 1866 and their separation from the 
‘Reich’.259  Seipel’s attitude reveals that the Austro-Hungarian Empire may have been 
physically wiped from the map in 1918, but deeply rooted historical memories and cultural 
consciousness were not so easily erased. 
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 Although he was not an authentic spokesman for the party as a whole, Seipel was 
the driving force behind persuading the Christian Socials to remain within the boundaries 
of the impoverished Republic.260  When he assumed the chancellorship in May 1922, the 
country was on the verge of complete collapse.  The unemployment rate had risen above 
20 per cent, inflation was at its peak, and political discontent was widespread; the 
population had taken to the streets en masse with their demand for Anschluss.  Seipel was 
to remain in office until 1929, during which time the country settled, if somewhat 
uncomfortably, into its independent guise.261  Shunning Anschluss as a guiding principle, 
Seipel’s foremost aim was to stabilize Austria economically.  He was convinced, in 1922 at 
least, that Austria could be saved.262  His first major accomplishment was the negotiation 
of the first Geneva Protocols in 1922.  On his initiative, the international community was 
asked to provide a loan to save Austria from financial collapse.  The money was 
desperately needed to help rehabilitate the country’s critically failing economy.  The 
international community agreed to a loan of 650 million crowns – after Seipel proposed 
annexing Austria to Italy, Czechoslovakia or Germany – although the conditions were 
austere and the Austrians would have to make vast sacrifices in return for this financial 
aid.263  The Austrians were bound to carry out strict financial and fiscal reforms, reaffirm 
their acceptance of Article 88 (banning union with Germany) and make a pledge to 
drastically reduce the number of state employees.264  Even the German Nationalists 
concurred with Seipel’s plan, agreeing that this was the only option available, although 
making the requisite protest in accordance with their political principles.265  The real 
problems came from the Socialists who were virulently opposed to outside assistance that 
would shore up the state.  They labelled Seipel a traitor to his own country for 
relinquishing financial control to foreign powers. 266   In September 1922, the 
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Arbeiter-Zeitung, the mouthpiece of the SDAP, accused Seipel of being a ‘“puppet of the 
Jews”’ who wanted to turn Austria over to the enslavement of Jewish international finance 
capital.267  According to Leser, Seipel’s efforts to ward off the currency crisis through the 
use of foreign loans was viewed in class terms, as an attempt by the bourgeoisie to regain 
the position it had lost in the aftermath of the war; the day of the signing of the Geneva 
protocols, 4 October 1922, was, Bauer said, ‘“Seipel’s revenge for 12 November 1918”’ 
(the day the Christian Socials had been forced by the Social Democrats to agree to 
proclaiming a republic and declaring Anschluss as the government’s aim).268  Yet, the fact 
remains, and as Leser also points out, the Social Democrats failed to persuade the nation 
of their alternative strategy of overcoming the economic crisis by the imposition of capital 
levies and the expropriation of indigenous capitalists.269  To others still, Seipel was a 
saviour for providing the country with a way out of its terrible predicament.  Whichever 
interpretation is accepted, the loans were eventually ratified by means of a compromise 
between the parties, saving the country from certain bankruptcy and helping to end 
post-war inflation.270 
 In retrospect, it is clear that these strict fiscal measures and Seipel’s dexterous 
administrative skills lent the adolescent Austrian state a degree of stability, even if 
Austria’s myriad problems were not miraculously solved.271  Under his leadership, the 
crown was stabilized, before being replaced by a new currency, a new National Bank was 
organized and an economic reconstruction programme was initiated.272  The reform 
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measures quickly bore fruit, which was reflected in the gradual but discernible 
improvement in the country’s economic stability.  By 1923–24, the upturn in Austria’s 
financial situation ‘was marked, although it did not proceed without continuous effort’.273  
That is not to say Austria experienced a remarkable economic renaissance, indeed, the 
pursuit of ‘deflationary economic policies’ demanded by the Western Powers ‘hampered 
the growth of Austrian industry and contributed to a high unemployment rate’. 274  
Ultimately, reliance on international credit and the ‘League’s budgetary and credit 
guidelines’ of 1924 and 1925 invariably had a ‘restraining effect upon Austria’s economic 
growth’.275  Moreover, the dependence on foreign loans meant that the Austrians had little 
freedom to control their own financial affairs.  However, there was little other choice and 
at least the loans gave Austria the tools to stabilize the economy and alleviate some of the 
worst problems that the country was facing.  Assessments of Austria’s achievements 
during this decade are ultimately divided.  The country was, after all, dependent on the 
international financial community for monetary assistance, budget deficits were a 
permanent fixture for most of the twenties and the economy was hampered by grave and 
perennial structural problems.276  Yet, some analysts point to the vast improvements that 
occurred, including the critical fact that Anschluss sentiment did decline as the 
psychological climate changed.277  Which raises the question, what was the Austrian 
attitude to Anschluss after a decade or so of independent rule?  Enigmatic as ever, 
according to the British Legation, writing as the year 1932 drew to a close: 
 No review of an Austrian year would be complete without some reference to the ‘Anschluss.’  It is a 
baffling subject to understand and perhaps still more to explain.  It is talked about so much and 
thought of so little.  It is attractive when forbidden or distant.  When near, as in the case of the 
abortive Austro-German Customs Union, it arouses all the latent antagonism of conflicting religions, 
mentalities and vested interests.  I feel it to be a bogey for the French and a will-o’-the-wisp for the 
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pan-Germans.  For the Austrians it is often a means of gentle and transparent blackmail.  Its most 
potent stimulant is the veto of the French; its most powerful check is tactless German striving; I may 
be mistaken, but I believe it to be not only difficult to explain, but still more difficult to realise.  As 
forbidden fruit, it always presents attractions to whose view chiefly distance lends enchantment; if 
offered as a gift, it would, I think, be declined.278 
Thus, the stage was set for the showdown with the National Socialists the following year.
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Chapter 3 
Kampfplatz ohne Spielregeln: 
The Dollfuß Government – 1932 
The Dollfuß government’s response to the challenge of National Socialism both at home 
and abroad can only be understood against the background of the wider political and 
economic catastrophe that the country faced.  Although the nature of the threat posed by 
the National Socialist movement was understood to be unique, the problem was 
considered part of a larger, multi-dimensional crisis.  On the one hand, there was the 
worsening economic situation.  The ‘Great Depression’ had hit the Austrian economy 
exceptionally hard, a situation that was compounded by the failure of the Creditanstalt, the 
country’s largest bank, in 1931.279  Under pressure from abroad, the Austrian government 
agreed to compensate the bank’s losses, which added a further budgetary burden to an 
economy already in the throes of a severe recession. 280   Added to this was the 
depression’s destabilizing effect on Austrian society as economic misery and rampant 
unemployment led to mounting public disorder.  Civil unrest escalated to such an alarming 
degree, that to some the breakdown of law and order appeared imminent.  Political 
polarization reached a hitherto unprecedented level as relations between the Christian 
Social government and the Social Democrat opposition deteriorated, bringing the 
Nationalrat to a standstill.  It was in the middle of this chaos that the National Socialist 
movement scored its first decisive electoral victory on Austrian soil. 
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 The parallels with the revolutionary chaos that had gripped the Weimar Republic 
were obvious to contemporary observers.  In Germany, democracy was in a stranglehold; 
in July 1932 the German Nazi party had become the largest party in the German Reichstag, 
trapping the centre parties, in the eyes of conservative Austrian onlookers, between the 
radical parties on the left and right.  At the same time, political violence had reached 
distressing levels.  For Austria, this was an ominous development.  One Viennese 
newspaper likened the country to ‘…a small house next to a larger, burning building’.  
Austria was facing a new and potentially life-threatening political crisis.281  Indeed, Austrian 
journalists and foreign observers alike ransacked the store of catastrophic imagery to get 
their point across.  With the Weimar Republic already half submerged by the ‘brown 
flood’, it looked to the British Foreign Office as through Austria too ‘might be carried 
away on a National Socialist wave’.282  The fear was well founded.  Although numerically 
speaking the threat posed by the National Socialists appeared to be nowhere near as 
serious in Austria as it was in Germany, in combination with the prevailing economic and 
political crisis, the electoral arrival of the Nazi movement was a devastating blow to the 
beleaguered Christian Social government.  Indeed, it is the success of the movement first 
in Germany, then in Austria and its subsequent impact upon Austrian politics that is key to 
understanding the stance of the Dollfuß government, and the proroguing of parliament in 
March the following year. 
 Traditional explanations of the events of 1932, particularly those that seek to place 
Dollfuß within a ‘fascist context’, tend to view Dollfuß’s early premiership as part of a 
narrative of escalating right-wing violence and anti-democratic sentiment that spanned 
1927–34.  While Tálos and Manoschek, for example, present the year 1932 as the ‘latent 
phase’ in the establishment of an Austrofascist system, Leidinger and Moritz emphasize the 
lack of resistance from mid-1932 onwards to the overthrow of the existing order and 
Socialist fear of the Heimwehr.  Vocelka maintains, that in Dollfuß many believed they had 
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found ‘the strong man’ they had been looking for.283  Thus, Dollfuß, who was supposedly 
anti-democratic all along, seized the opportunity to bypass parliamentary government in 
the spring of 1933 and rule by emergency decree with the intention of establishing 
dictatorial rule, an event that led inexorably to the complete destruction of Austrian 
democracy in 1934. 
 The tendency to view the period through an anti-democratic prism and to read 
history backwards from February 1934 has led to other factors being overlooked.  There 
were, it is true, right-wing groups waiting in the wings to destroy Austrian democracy and 
there was a tendency towards authoritarianism on the moderate right where loyalty to 
parliamentary democracy was tenuous.  However, to focus solely on the issue of 
democracy or on the deliberate destruction of democracy ultimately obscures our view of 
the period.  One of the most popular assertions about the Dollfuß era is that it was the 
move away from democratic principles to authoritarian rule that paved the way for the 
catastrophe of 1938 and Nazi rule, a notion originating in the interwar years and Socialist 
critiques of the period.  The argument is a spurious one.  It assumes that democracy alone 
provided the basis of defence against National Socialism.  It rather conspicuously ignores, 
for example, the evidence of the Saar, which voted overwhelmingly and by democratic 
means to become part of Hitler’s Empire, emphatically rejecting the idea of the status quo.  
That the democratic system would mean the Saar falling into the lap of the German Reich 
like ripe fruit, providing a victory that the Hitler government did not deserve was obvious 
to proponents of the Dollfuß government: ‘in einer gefährlichen Situation’ the Reichspost 
pointed out in May 1934, ‘ist eben die Demokratie tatsächlich eine Schwäche’.284  In the 
free city of Danzig, despite being under League of Nations control and with a small Polish 
garrison, the Nazis successfully took control of the Volkstag and Senate via the ballot box, 
after which they set about violently suppressing the political opposition.285 
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 It also ignores the evidence of what happened in Czechoslovakia, where in the 
parliamentary elections of 1935 the Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP), funded by Nazi Germany 
(the Czech Nazi party had been banned and many of its supporters now found a home 
among the SdP’s ranks), obtained 15.2 per cent of the total vote – 66 per cent of the 
German vote – to become the largest parliamentary party.  The election has since been 
interpreted as a referendum on whether Czechoslovakia should shift to an authoritarian 
system: due, in part, to Beneš skilful manoeuvring Czechoslovakia retained its democratic 
structure.286  Although there the existing coalition government, united, but only against 
the German minority, was in a position to ‘squeeze out’ the SdP – an option not available 
in Austria – the election allowed the Nazi party a platform in Czechoslovak politics, albeit 
surreptitiously, and, moreover, caused great difficulties to the coalition government now 
in a vulnerable position with a precarious majority (149 out of 300 seats) and ultimately 
precipitated the crisis that culminated in the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and 
Nazi annexation.287  Thus, although the tactics were different, the result remained the 
same. 
 It also bears repeating the earlier evidence of the Weimar Republic itself, where 
the Nazis used the weaknesses of the parliamentary system to come to power.  Ultimately, 
historians chose not to look at this when they argue that in Austria, democracy provided 
the surest defence against National Socialism.  Although a functioning democratic system 
might have helped Austria put up an effective defence against National Socialism, the 
evidence of the Saar, Danzig and Germany show us that it provided no guarantees.  
However, the elimination of parliamentary government and the refusal to call new 
elections bought the Austrians time by blocking the Nazis’ road to power for a number of 
years.  And ultimately the argument is academic because as the undermining of Austrian 
democracy by both the left and the right meant that the democratic process was not 
functioning at a level where it was capable of warding off the Nazi threat.  The events of 
1932 and the first months of Dollfuß’s premiership demonstrate that the real issue was 
                                            
286 See: David Kelly, 'A Democracy at the Crossroads: The Czech Extreme Right in the 1935 Czechoslovak 
Elections', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 15/3 (2002). 
287 See: (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/20376, paper R971/971/12, Foreign Office Memorandum. The German 
Minority in Czecholsovakia 8 Apr.1936. 
Chapter 3:  The Dollfuß Government – 1932  81 
 
not the destruction of Austrian democracy, but the fact that it was in crisis – the reality was 
that by the 1930s escalating political polarization had made governing the country 
‘practically impossible’.288  Only a healthy, functioning democracy would have stood the 
slightest chance of combatting the Nazi threat, and, on a federal level, Austrian democracy 
could not function because it was deadlocked.  The pitched battle for the ratification of 
the Lausanne protocols, at a time when the Austrian economy was on the brink of 
collapse, painfully exposed the limitations of the democratic decision-making process, as 
well as the triumph of political intransigence and ideological dogmatism.  The burgeoning 
Nazi movement laid bare this weakness and knew just how to use it to its own advantage. 
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Wählet die stärkste Partei Deutschlands – The Rise of National Socialism in Austria 
Although an ostensibly ‘Austrian’ phenomenon, it is a curious fact that without the 
meteoric success of their German confrères, Austrian National Socialism would have been 
consigned to historical oblivion.  During the 1920s, Austria’s indigenous Nazi movement, 
the DNSAP, the direct descendent of the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP), established in 
Bohemia in 1903 in the wake of the collapse of Georg von Schönerer’s deutschnationale 
Bewegung, was something of a political non-entity, marred by disunity and discord. 289  So 
much so, that in 1926 it split into two factions: the radical Hitlerbewegung, which professed 
its allegiance to Hitler, and the more ‘conservative’ socialist-orientated Schulz group, with 
both groups claiming to be the true representatives of the Austrian National Socialist 
tradition.  The split did nothing to garner support for either variant; in the parliamentary 
elections of April 1927, the NSDAP-Hitlerbewegung only managed to win a paltry 
27,000 votes and not one parliamentary mandate, while the Schulz group had already 
dwindled into political insignificance.290 
 While the tide of National Socialism swept across the German political landscape, 
Austrian National Socialism initially remained little more than a nuisance that, according to 
Eric Phipps, British Minister in Vienna, went almost ‘unheeded’ in Austria during 1931.291  
Austria’s relatively stable political structure had approximately 80 per cent of the vote 
traditionally going to the two largest parties, the Christian Socials on the right and the 
Social Democrats on the left.  The presence of an alternative ‘fascist’ movement in the 
Heimwehr, as well as a strong Catholic movement and a powerful and well-organized 
Socialist party all meant that during the late 1920s, National Socialism had struggled to find 
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an adequate foothold. 292   Leaderless and plagued by internal rivalries, the 
NSDAP-Hitlerbewegung proved itself no match for the Heimwehr, a right-wing paramilitary 
movement and the National Socialists’ main competitor.  However, within the space of a 
few short months the situation had changed dramatically prompting Eric Phipps, British 
Minister to Austria, to inform London in May 1932 that the Nazi movement was ‘acquiring 
an increasing hold over [Austria’s] electorate’.293 
 On the 24 April 1932, both Austria and Germany went to the polls in what would 
prove to be landmark elections in both countries.  With 75 per cent of the Austrian 
electorate balloted in the municipal and provincial elections, and roughly 33 million of 
43 million German voters in the provincial Landtag elections, it was clear enough that 
‘taken together the results would yield a clear picture of the political currents and 
opinions in both states’.294  In Austria, the elections heralded a major shift in the balance of 
political power.  The NSDAP notched up its first electoral success with 344,000 votes, 
taking 17 per cent in Vienna, 14 per cent in Lower Austria and 29 per cent in Salzburg, 
finally making the breakthrough to a mass party and entering into parliamentary 
government.295  A total of 29 Nazi representatives took up seats in the provincial diets.296  
The Nazis’ electoral success came largely at the expense of the ‘conservative bourgeois 
parties’.  Christian Social and Heimwehr losses were appreciable, even the Social 
Democratic Party suffered, but the Greater Germans, the so-called ‘Schoberblock’ and the 
Landbund were completely wiped out.297 
                                            
292 Unlike in Germany, there was no body of floating voters to be captured, a fact which helps shed some 
light on Botz’s observation that by 1932 ‘…there [had been] a slowdown of the upward trend suggesting 
that the party was approaching the limits of its electoral potential’.  See: Gerhard Botz, 'The Changing 
Patterns of Social Support for Austrian National Socialism (1918–1945)', in eds. Stein Ugelvik Larsen and 
Gerhard Botz Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen 1980), 214. 
293 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/15888 paper C4469/68/3, Sir E. Phipps, Political Situation in Austria and the 
growth of the National Socialist movement, 30 May 1932. 
294 The German Landtagswahlen took place in Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Anhalt and Hamburg 
(Bürgerschaftswahl) See: 'Der große Wahltag', Reichspost, 24 Apr.1932, 1. 
295 See: Gerhard Botz, 'Changing Patterns', 211. 
296 See: Ibid, 211. 
297 See: R. John Rath, 'The Democratic Prelude', 164. 
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 If the depression provided the Austrian NSDAP with the fertile soil it needed to 
flourish, it was the growing electoral successes of their German brethren across the 
border that gave the ailing Austrian Hitlerbewegung the boost that it so desperately 
needed.298  The obvious correlation between the success of the German party and growing 
support for its poor relations in Austria was clear to contemporary observers: as always, 
Austria’s political fate was seen to be tied to the course of events in Germany.  Here is 
Sir Walford Selby, who replaced Eric Phipps as British Minister to Austria in July 1933: 
At the end of 1932 there were many who thought the apparent decline of national socialism in 
Germany likely to be followed closely by a similar trend in Austria, this belief being shared at the time 
by leading Austrian politicians.  Yet, barely two months later, the overwhelming victory of Herr 
Hitler at the German polls has kindled a fire in Austria which the Dollfuss government has battled for 
the rest of the year to keep under control, with a growing realisation of the fact that, so long as it 
sweeps through Germany, the Nazi conflagration cannot be altogether extinguished in Austria, 
though it may be kept under by international co-operation.299 
In the immediate run up to the Austrian local elections in April 1932, Hitler and 
Hindenburg had twice stood in two rounds of the presidential elections in Germany.  
Although Hindenburg had beaten Hitler by a significant margin Hitler had still managed to 
amass almost 13.5 million votes in Germany – despite running against a nationalist icon of 
Hindenburg’s stature – and the impact upon the Austrian electorate was palpable.300  From 
the German example alone, where the upsurge in violent political radicalism was pushing 
the country to the brink of civil war, it was clear to those writing in the Christian-Social 
Reichspost that the Nazi breakthrough signified a ‘new emergency’ for Austria. 301  With the 
same trend, the ‘seismic’ radicalization of the right now discernible in both countries, 
                                            
298 See: Bruce F. Pauley, Forgotten Nazis, 49. 
299 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/18366, paper R1526/1526/3, Sir W. Selby, Annual Report on Austria for 1933, 
1 Feb. 1934, 1. 
300  The outcome of the German Presidential elections held on 13 March 1932 fell just short of an outright 
majority for Hindenburg.  As a result, a second round of elections were held on 10 April 1932; the second 
time round Hindenburg managed to gain the majority stipulated by the Weimar Constitution. 
301  'Der große Wahltag', Reichspost, 24 Apr.1932, 1; see also: 'Knapp vor einem Bürgerkrieg', Reichspost, 18 
Jul.1932, 1; 'Kein "rotes Oesterreich!"', Reichspost, 25 Apr.1932, 1. 
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Austria’s political life had entered stormy waters.302  Yet, while it was evident that Austria 
needed to be protected, it was not immediately clear how that could be done.303 
 A further, crucial factor in the Nazi movement’s rapid expansion was the 
disintegration of its native Austrian fascist competitors, the Heimwehr.304  Established as a 
paramilitary group in 1918–19, the Heimwehr was something of an ideological mélange, 
influenced by a variety of beliefs ranging from Italian Fascism and German National 
Socialism to indigenous philosophies espousing the return to a state based upon 
corporatist principles.305  These disparities were reflected in the fact that the movement 
was split into two opposing wings.  While the one was radical, German national and 
‘usually anti-government’, the other tended to be pro-clerical and conservative.  The latter, 
dominated by Ernst Rüdiger Fürst von Starhemberg, was close to the Christian Socials in 
Lower Austria and Burgenland and generally supported the Christian Social government.306  
During the twenties – and, indeed, on into the thirties – the Heimwehr received generous 
financial and military support from both Italy and Hungary in an attempt by the leaders of 
these two countries to push a more radical, rightist agenda in Austria.  Mussolini in 
particular was pushing for the destruction of Austrian Social Democracy.307  The ultimate 
result of this interference in Austria’s domestic politics was the elevation of the Heimwehr 
to the vanguard of Austrian politics following the riots of July 1927.  It was no coincidence 
                                            
302 ‘Das politische Leben unseres Staates gerät in immer stürmischere Bahnen’. 'Kein "rotes Oesterreich!"', 
Reichspost, 25 Apr.1932, 1. 
303 'Die Woche der Entscheidungen', Neuigkeits-Welt-Blatt, 26 Jul. 1932, 1. 
304 For background information on the Heimwehr movement see: C. Earl Edmondson, The Heimwehr and 
Austrian Politics 1918–1936, (Athens, 1978); Ludwig Jedlicka, 'The Austrian Heimwehr', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 1/1 (1966). 
305 Like the Austrian Nazi party the Heimwehr stemmed from of an area plagued by ethnic tensions. The 
Heimwehr movement came into being in 1918–1919.  A loosely unified militia, it originally acted as a defence 
force, protecting Austria’s borders against armed incursions, primarily from Hungarian and Yugoslav troops. 
See: Bruce F. Pauley, Forgotten Nazis, 73. In reality the various factions that sheltered under its umbrella 
agreed upon little but upon the rejection of parliamentary democracy and their ferocious aversion to 
Marxism.  Bruce F. Pauley, 'A Case Study in Fascism: The Styrian Heimatschutz and Austrian National 
Socialism', Austrian History Yearbook, 12–13 (1976–77), 251 See also: Ludwig Jedlicka, 'Austrian 
Heimwehr', 134–37. 
306 Bruce F. Pauley, 'A Case Study in Fascism', 251. 
307  See: R. John Rath, 'Deterioration of Democracy' and Ludwig Jedlicka, 'Austrian Heimwehr', 136. 
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that, with the Heimwehr at the pinnacle of its power in 1927–28, the NSDAP-Hitlerbewegung 
was at its lowest ebb. 
 As long as this proto-fascist competitor remained a relatively united force, it stood 
in the way of the National Socialists making any substantial electoral progress.  However, 
the Heimwehr’s star fell as quickly as it rose.  In the 1930 elections the movement tried to 
make the breakthrough into parliamentary politics but was sorely disappointed; even with 
Mussolini’s backing they only managed to win a paltry 228,000 votes (6.16 per cent of the 
total vote), which equated to a modest eight parliamentary seats.308  The ideological 
divisions within the movement had simply proved to be too deep to be overcome and the 
movement began to disintegrate into competing factions.  The on-going feud between the 
‘pro-Austrian’ wing of the Heimwehr around Starhemberg, Fey’s clique and Pfrimer’s 
National Socialist sympathizers escalated, culminating in Pfrimer launching a truly bumbling 
attempt at a coup d'état in 1931.309  The insurrection was a complete disaster and was 
easily extinguished by police and local gendarmes the following day.  Pfrimer’s failed march 
on Vienna sounded the death knell for the movement and the signal for the National 
Socialists to close in. 
 The National Socialists had made no secret of their objective to ‘capture the 
pan German “right”’ in Austria en masse and the trouble-stricken Heimwehr provided the 
perfect recruiting ground.310  The Austrian Nazi Landesinspekteur Theo Habicht’s strategy 
was to exploit the disillusionment within the Heimwehr’s ranks and persuade, if not the 
whole of the Heimwehr, then at least its largest wing – the pan-German Styrian 
Heimatschutz – to join forces with the Nazis.311  As Pauley notes, Habicht was aware that 
the key to absorbing the whole of the pan-German right in Austria was dependent upon 
                                            
308 This realisation initiated, at least in part, the call for a unified programme for the Heimwehr; the 
movement could not reply upon a solely negative platform and would need to ‘invent’ an ideology of its own.  
The result was the proclamation of the so-called ‘Korneuburg Oath’ in 1930, but even this ultimately failed 
to unify the party.  See: Ludwig Jedlicka, 'Austrian Heimwehr', 138.  See also: Bruce F. Pauley, 'A Case Study 
in Fascism', 261. 
309 R. John Rath, 'Deterioration of Democracy', 240–41. 
310 Bruce F. Pauley, Forgotten Nazis, 75. 
311 See: R. John Rath, 'The Democratic Prelude', 173. 
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winning over this latter faction.312  If Habicht’s strategy proved successful, it was likely that 
the rest of the pan-German right, as well as a part of the ruling Christian Social Party 
would follow suit.  The odds were with the National Socialists; pan-German, anti-Semitic 
and linked to a region of Geheimprotestantismus, the Styrian Heimatschutz was a 
particularly easy target.313  Within three weeks of Pfrimer’s abortive putsch the Nazis had 
begun the process of splitting the Styrian faction from the rest of the movement; the 
Styrian wing of the Heimwehr attempted to form a fighting alliance with the National 
Socialists, a step that inexorably led to the complete absorption of the pan-German wing 
of the Heimwehr within the Nazi ranks.314  The disintegration of the Heimwehr and the 
likely magnetism of the Nazis for the remaining sections of the movement played a central 
role in Dollfuß’s decision-making over the coming weeks and months. 
                                            
312 See: Bruce F. Pauley, Forgotten Nazis, 76. Theo Habicht (4 Apr.1898–31 Jan.1944) was Landesinspekteur 
of the Austrian NSDAP from 1931. 
313 Discussions between Hitler and Styrian representatives had taken place as early as 1926–27.  Ibid, 76. 
314 See: R. John Rath, 'Deterioration of Democracy', 241. 
  
Der Kampf um Österreich! – The Formation of the Dollfuß Government 
In early May 1932, just a few weeks after the Nazi’s electoral breakthrough, 
Engelbert Dollfuß was summoned by Wilhelm Miklas, the Christian Social Federal 
President and asked to attempt the formation of a workable government. 315   The 
expectation was, according to Jagschitz, that Dollfuß’s government would be a transitional 
one, until either the political situation had stabilized, or, as some within the Christian 
Social Party hoped, a ‘strong man’ emerged to take the helm of both the party and the 
state.316  The previous government, headed by Karl Buresch, had resigned on 6 May after 
just three months in office; Nazi gains in the municipal elections prompted the Nazis, 
Greater Germans (who hoped for an electoral pact with the Nazis) and Social Democrats 
to, in effect, join together to demand new elections, triggering a cabinet crisis and the 
government’s downfall.317  Buresch had attempted to forestall the crisis through the 
inclusion of a member of the Heimatblock, but had ultimately failed to save his 
government.318  A protracted cabinet crisis ensued, which was, according to the reports of 
the British legation, prolonged by the excessive demands made by the Heimatblock and the 
Greater Germans in return for their support.  Both Germany and Italy sought to influence 
Austrian domestic affairs to their own advantage: while the Italian legation purportedly 
backed Heimwehr demands for Rintelen as Chancellor, the German legation ‘was intriguing 
on behalf of Dr. Schober’ of the Greater Germans, ‘supporting, and possibly inspiring 
impossible pan-German demands’.319 
                                            
315 Wilhelm Miklas, (15 Oct.1872 – 20 Mar.1956) President of Austria, from 1928–1938.  Miklas refused to 
resign as Federal President despite Nazi pressure until 13 March 1938. 
316 Jagschitz maintains that Dollfuß was not considered that man.  Gerhard Jagschitz, 'Engelbert Dollfuß 
1892 bis 1934', in eds. Friedrich Weissensteiner and Erika Weinzierl Die österreichischen Bundeskanzler. Leben 
und Werk (Vienna, 1983), 197. 
317 See: (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16640, paper C749/749/3, Sir E. Phipps, Annual Report on Austria for 1932, 
1 Jan. 1933, para. 67. 
318 See: Ibid, para. 67. 
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 With the country on the verge of bankruptcy and a financial moratorium seemingly 
imminent, there was some urgency to end the government crisis.320  The previous year, 
Austria had appealed to the League of Nations for help in the form of a second tranche of 
the 1930 loan, to mitigate a crisis exacerbated by the collapse of the Creditanstalt, the 
country’s largest bank.321  The Creditanstalt was, according to one scholar, in today’s 
language considered ‘too big to fail’, and the Austrian government under Chancellor Ender 
had assembled a bailout package to rescue the bank, with the State guaranteeing the 
bank’s liabilities vis-à-vis the Austrian National Bank.322  However, this ultimately brought 
the government’s own creditworthiness into question and by 1932 the Austrian National 
Bank found itself, despite the exchange restrictions in place, ‘in a serious plight…with 
some among its directorate pressing the government to declare a moratorium’. 323  
International discussions about Austria’s financial quandary dragged on into 1932 without 
significant result.  On 9 May, in the very midst of the cabinet crisis, and with Austria 
‘perilously near a collapse of its currency’ the interim Austrian government – with Buresch 
acting as a caretaker Chancellor until a new government was formed – appealed, once 
again, to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for international assistance and 
advice.324  Discussions were organized to take place in Paris on 30 May, which were then 
transferred to Geneva on 12 June and Lausanne on 17 June.325  On top of all this, there 
was the on-going issue of the Creditanstalt, with foreign creditors expected to arrive in 
Vienna any day.  The Austrian economy was teetering on the brink of collapse and there 
was no government in place to co-ordinate a settlement. 
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 Dollfuß’s nomination was certainly not intended as a provocation to the left.  On 
the contrary, he was chosen to form a government precisely because he had ‘few enemies 
and many friends in all parties, including the Social Democrats’.326  As Dollfuß was ‘largely 
unknown’, at least on the national stage, and untainted by parliamentary squabbles – 
Dollfuß had never been a member of parliament and although a member of the Christian 
Social Party was not a ‘party politician’ – the hope was that he would be better placed to 
reach the compromises necessary to weather the storm. 327  He also enjoyed relatively 
good relations with the Social Democrats and agricultural circles.  There is certainly no 
evidence to suggest that he entered office intent upon attacking the left, or destroying 
Austrian democracy.  As Rath noted, everyone, including Dollfuß’s opponents, truly 
believed that he was a genuine democrat when he assumed the Chancellorship.328  Rath 
quotes Otto Leichter, a prominent Social Democrat, describing how Dollfuß ‘never grew 
weary assuring the Social Democratic political leaders…that nothing was farther from his 
thoughts than waging a war against the Social Democrats’.329 
 Yet, within the space of less than a year, Dollfuß had gone from being ‘one of the 
more non-partisan, moderate leaders of the Christian Social Party’ to the ‘gravedigger of 
Austrian parliamentary democracy.’330  Within two years, he had given the order to fire on 
the Karl-Marx-Hof with light artillery, earning the epithet Arbeitermörder and his position 
as one of the most controversial figures in Austrian contemporary history.331  Before 
James William Miller and R. J Rath in the 1990s, few historians – besides perhaps Jagschitz 
– questioned closely this striking transformation from democrat to dictator and the 
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contradiction that appeared to lie behind it.332  Consequently, despite the fact that these 
more nuanced appraisals of Dollfuß’s political development have been available for a 
number of years, blanket assertions about his motivations still permeate even the most 
contemporary literature.  In the light of current knowledge of the period, it seems 
extremely unreasonable to assert that Dollfuß was driven by a ‘unbridled lust for power’, 
or, a rehashing of the same basic idea, ‘motivated more by the preservation of power and 
ideological pretexts than domestic peace’, an allegation first made by his political 
opponents on the left and repeated in the literature up to the present-day.333  Indeed, we 
seem to have forgotten that from the perspective of 1933, Dollfuß was not viewed quite 
as unfavourably as one might otherwise suspect.  Selby’s assessment of Dollfuß, written in 
January 1934 is so striking that it is worth quoting in full: 
 ‘Undoubtedly the ablest man in Austrian public life, he is courageous and energetic, but possesses 
also sufficient suppleness to control his very discordant team of supporters.  Though an indifferent 
speaker, he has succeeded on impressing his personality on the country and abroad, (in which, of 
course, his diminutive stature was of considerable assistance), and is not really unpopular even with 
his opponents.  They are inclined to assert, however, that the mainspring of his policy is his desire to 
remain in power.  Though there may be a grain of truth in this, he is probably sincere in his belief that 
the complete “Gleichschaltung” of Catholic Austria would mean the lost [sic] of valuable elements to 
the German race’’334. 
One must surely ask if is it intellectually legitimate or academically judicious to assert that 
it was Dollfuß who – the suggestion seems to be singlehandedly – destroyed Austrian 
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democracy, let alone to insinuate that Dollfuß and Hitler were cut from the same despotic 
cloth?335  Perhaps, most importantly, we should wonder, when we focus solely on the 
‘destruction’ of parliamentary democracy in Austria as the key experience of the interwar 
period and the single cause of the Nazi takeover in 1938, if we are even asking the right 
questions. 
 As assessments of the Dollfuß era in many ways hinge on the fateful decision to 
invite the Heimwehr into government, it is a course of action that demands further 
clarification.  If Dollfuß’s ambitions were indeed democratic, why opt for a coalition with 
the ‘proto-fascist’ Heimwehr instead of the Social Democrats?  Would it not have been 
more responsible – not to mention democratic – to call new elections come what may?  
In terms of forming a coalition, Dollfuß was faced with two basic choices in May 1932.  He 
could attempt to form another ‘bourgeois’ coalition, as his predecessors had done, either 
with the participation of the Greater Germans, the Landbund or, as a last resort, the 
Heimatblock.  From his perspective, a coalition with the Christian Social Party’s former 
partners would have been ideal, not least because it would have meant avoiding making 
concessions to the Social Democrats and would have helped improve relations with 
Germany.  Fragmented, unpredictable and sponsored by Italy and Hungary, the 
Heimatblock was the least attractive option on the political right.  Alternatively, he could 
invite the Social Democrats into a ‘grand coalition’, a daring if politically suicidal, move.  A 
possible third ‘option’ – simply declining the President’s invitation to form a government – 
cannot be considered a genuine option at all.  Since the raison d’être of any political party 
is to achieve and maintain power, that course of action, unless finding a majority proved 
impossible, would have been illogical; if a coalition could be formed then it goes without 
saying that an attempt would be made to do so. 
 Throughout the 1920s, the Christian Socials had ruled the country in a ‘bourgeois’ 
coalition with the Greater Germans and the Landbund as junior partners.  Like any 
coalition, it was not all plain sailing; although they shared some programmatic overlap – 
primarily the rejection of Marxism – there were some serious points of contention, the 
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Greater Germans and the Landbund being anti-clerical in outlook, pan-German and 
ideologically wedded to the idea of Anschluss.  By the late 1920s, the fault lines had 
reappeared and the uneasy consensus had broken.  The rising tide of radicalism, starting 
with the growth of the Heimwehr in the aftermath of the Justizpalast riots in 1927 and 
exacerbated by the economic emergency and the arrival of the National Socialist 
movement, triggered an ideological crisis on the right of the political spectrum.  This 
sparked a generational conflict within the Christian Social movement while radicalizing 
their pan-German coalition partners. 336   On the one hand, support was haemorrhaging 
from the conservative right in favour of the more radical anti-Marxist parties, first the 
Heimwehr and later the National Socialists: in what ended up being the last Nationalrat 
elections of the First Republic in November 1930, the Christian Socials only won 66 seats 
– down from 73 in 1927 – against the Social Democrats’ 72, making the latter the 
strongest party, but not giving it an outright majority.337  On the other hand, relations 
between the Christian Social Party and the Greater Germans had deteriorated to such an 
extent that in January 1932 the decade-long coalition finally broke down for good, mainly 
due to pan-German opposition to the anti-Anschluss clause of the Lausanne loan as well 
as the radicalization of the party under its new leader, Hermann Foppa.338  In losing the 
support of the Greater Germans, the Christian Socials had lost the ability to form a 
majority government.  Dollfuß’s initial intention, like Buresch’s before him, was to try to 
bring the Christian Social’s erstwhile coalition partners back into the fold.  The enterprise 
proved unsuccessful; although Dollfuß could still rely on what was left of the Landbund for 
support, the Greater Germans, with the almost certain approval of the German legation in 
Vienna, rejected his proposal.  In February 1933, the German Minister in Vienna, 
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Kurt Rieth, refers to the fact that the Greater Germans took up the position of 
non-participation in government, ‘chiefly in the interests of German policy’.339 
 That only left Starhemberg’s Heimatblock – the political arm of the Heimwehr – as a 
viable coalition partner on the political right.340  Although Dollfuß was clearly cautious 
about the idea, having, according to Rath, ‘openly demonstrated his aversion for the 
Heimwehr’, there was some precedent for the Christian Socials working together with 
the Heimwehr movement, particularly the pro-clerical wing.341  There were, for example, 
ideological and material overlaps between the two groups, particularly in Lower Austria 
and Burgenland, where the more conservative faction of the Heimwehr, which ‘refused to 
accept accretions of fascist and German-national theories’, enjoyed a close relationship 
with the Christian Socials.342  Julius Raab, for example, a prominent member of the 
Christian Social Party joined the Heimwehr in Lower Austria, although, according to one 
academic, he did so at Seipel’s request.343  During the latter part of the 1920s, as 
prominent members of the Christian Socials moved ‘decidedly further to the right’, Seipel 
had attempted to forge closer ties with the Heimwehr, at the same time assimilating 
elements of their programme into his own.344  Exasperated by the dominance of ‘dogma’ in 
Austrian politics, Seipel became increasingly sceptical about the particular merits of 
Austria’s parliamentary democracy, deeming it nothing but a ‘sham democracy’ in that it 
represented the interests of the ‘party oligarchies’ rather than the countries citizens.345.  
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His despondency concerning the abuse of the democratic system induced him to become 
progressively more convinced of the ‘possible advantages of authoritarian rule’346.  Seipel 
hoped to gain control over the Heimwehr and thus use the movement’s strengths to the 
government’s advantage; in this regard, the Heimwehr was increasingly used as an 
instrument of domestic policy and as a defence force against the Social Democratic 
Schutzbund and the threat of internal disorder.347  Striving to support what he deemed to 
be the ‘constructive’ elements within the Heimwehr against the more radical fascist wing, 
Seipel tried to play a double game, supporting the Heimwehr with the one hand, whilst 
trying to keep them from getting too close to the centres of power with the other.  
Unfortunately, having steered the Austrian ‘“state coach” to the Right’ Seipel was, 
according to his biographer, unable to retrieve it from its ‘dangerous course’.348  Yet, 
although the decision to ‘toy’ with fascism was an ‘altogether irresponsible’ one, Seipel 
was ultimately, ‘not ready to abandon himself to it’.349  Thus, Klemperer argues, ‘to 
portray Seipel as a fascist…as is generally done by his various Marxist critics, detracts 
from a right understanding of his place in history’; in the final analysis, Seipel’s ‘clerical 
commitment to the Christian faith’ defied ‘a commitment to and an identification with a 
new secular counterfaith’.350  Nonetheless, this tradition within the Christian Social Party 
was not the primary reason why Dollfuß was ultimately willing to consider bringing in the 
Heimwehr. 
 Faced with a catastrophic economic situation and worsening political crisis, Dollfuß 
– the economist – was determined to form a strong government that would have room 
for manoeuvre, not one that would just ‘muddle along’.351  With the Greater Germans 
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refusing to co-operate, the only way of securing a workable ‘bourgeois’ government that 
would be capable of passing the necessary economic reforms was by bringing in the 
Heimatblock.  Suffice it to say, after two weeks of fierce negotiations, all that Dollfuß could 
achieve was a government with a flimsy one-seat parliamentary majority, the government 
with 83 seats, against an opposition with 82.352  To make matters worse, the severely 
unreliable pro-Nazi wing of the Styrian Heimwehr provided two of the government votes, 
putting the coalition in a wholly precarious position right from the off.353  Its prospects 
were, according to the British legation, decidedly ‘gloomy’; with a precarious majority of 
one, there was little expectation that the Dollfuß government would survive very long.354  
Indeed, the position of the government was initially so dubious that in his ministerial 
declaration Dollfuß, the British Minister observed, thought it necessary ‘to hold out an 
olive branch to the pan-Germans’. 355   In addition, the Heimwehr, even those of a 
pro-clerical and pro-Austrian bent, could not be completely relied upon as political 
partners, with some striving to undermine the government from the very start.  Even 
during the coalition negotiations with Dollfuß, some members of the Heimwehr were 
simultaneously negotiating with the National Socialists and the Italians about how the 
government could be overthrown356.  At this juncture, Starhemberg, who had been flirting 
on and off with the National Socialists for years, and had last met with Hitler just a few 
weeks before entering government, still harboured designs to ‘secure assistance from the 
National Socialists for his conspiratorial projects’.357  A few months later, Starhemberg and 
Rintelen were making plans to provoke a cabinet crisis and remove Dollfuß in a coup d'état 
if the Chancellor returned from Geneva without the Lausanne loan, convinced that in this 
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scenario Dollfuß would certainly try to inaugurate a red-black government.358  Indeed, 
Rintelen enthusiastically conspired with both the Heimwehr and the Austrian Nazis and was 
indefatigable in his attempts to replace Dollfuß as Chancellor.359 
 The Heimwehr was clearly not to be trusted.  Why then, did Dollfuß run the risk of 
inviting it into the corridors of power?  Was Dollfuß’s ‘lust for power’ or his antipathy 
towards the left to blame for the inclusion of the autocratic, rabidly anti-Marxist Heimwehr 
in his government?  The incorporation of the Heimwehr, so the argument goes, not only 
demonstrates that Dollfuß was already set on an autocratic course, it was also the catalyst 
for the destruction of Austrian democracy, which inexorably led to Nazi rule.  The fallacy 
of this line of reasoning is exposed by the fact that all the evidence suggests that at this 
point in time, Dollfuß was committed to the democratic system and the democratic 
process.  What is more, Dollfuß’s insistence that the participation of the Heimwehr in his 
government in no-way signified a long-term fascist course cannot be repudiated by the 
subsequent course of events.360  As far as Dollfuß was concerned, there simply was no 
grand plan to shut down parliament and destroy the opposition à la Hitler. 
 Some emphasize the fact that the Christian Socials were primarily motivated by the 
preservation of power for their own ends, fuelled, in part, by the realization that after the 
Nazi breakthrough in the regional elections, they would emerge as the losers in the event 
of national elections.361  For many commentators, the refusal to hold elections was solid 
evidence of anti-democratic intentions.  Yet, the calling of elections when tactically 
advantageous to the incumbent party is accepted practice within the democratic system, 
as long as there is a functioning government in place.  And whilst their unwillingness was, 
of course, partially motivated by their – quite natural – reluctance to hand over the reins 
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of government to their political adversaries, other factors were also at play; the Christian 
Socials had not simply ‘come to enjoy governing the country’.362  The suggestion that it 
was the ‘fear of losing power to the Socialists’ that made Dollfuß and Schuschnigg ‘play 
into the hands of a far more dangerous enemy’ is also misguided.363  Such an analysis 
ignores the complexity of the situation on the ground, for example the fact that losing 
power to the Socialists would have sounded the death knell for the Christian Social Party, 
which would have benefited the Nazis and destroyed the only other party willing to fight 
against National Socialism.  It would have been, Buresch argued, utter folly to hold 
elections at a time when the state was struggling to tackle serious economic problems and 
public order issues.364  This might sound like the standard excuse of right-wing politicians 
covertly harbouring anti-democratic intentions, yet, with one eye on Germany, the 
concern was not completely unwarranted.  It is certainly worth asking whether it would 
have been truly wise for the government to resign and call new elections after the 
German presidential elections of March 1932, or, at the latest after the federal elections in 
July 1932, when the National Socialists became the largest party in the Reichstag.  Although 
in April 1932 the Austrian Nazis had not yet reached the success of their German 
counterparts, in the wake of the municipal elections, they still ‘looked sufficiently 
formidable’ to unsettle the established parties.365  Moreover, there was no mistaking the 
political trend; the Nazi party was ‘gradually acquiring an increasing hold over’ the 
Austrian electorate.366  National Socialism presented the Austrian state with a demanding 
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domestic political problem whose only solution, the Reichspost argued, was to be found in 
solidity, stability and statesmanlike decisiveness.367 
 From Schuschnigg, we know that the impact of the Nazi breakthrough in 
April 1932 had hit government quarters like a ‘bombshell’.368   New elections would very 
likely have yielded a significantly weakened Christian Social fraction, destroying any chance 
of bringing a coalition together.  It would also have led to the entry of National Socialists 
into the Nationalrat, a fact that was later acknowledged by Oskar Helmer, a prominent 
Social Democratic politician.369  This did not seem to concern the Social Democrats who, 
publically at least, positively revelled in the Christian Socials’ loss to the Nazis in Vienna.370  
From 1897, the Arbeiter-Zeitung rejoiced that, until yesterday’s election, the substance of 
political life in Vienna had been the struggle between the Social Democracy and the 
Christian Socials.  Now, ‘our oldest, strongest, most powerful opponent’, the 
Arbeiter-Zeitung proclaimed, ‘is down for the count’.  The Christian Socials were 
disintegrating, the Greater Germans had been destroyed and the Heimwehr fascists were 
on the decline.371  A new opponent – the Nazis – had of course arisen in their place, riding 
on the national socialist wave in the Reich, but the Social Democrats remained optimistic; 
they would know how to handle them, after all, they had beaten the Christian Socials and 
now they would beat the Nazis.  With the German example before their eyes, the Social 
Democrats opted to play a dangerous game, banking on National Socialist gains to either 
split the Christian Socials and force what was left of the party into a centre-left coalition, 
or to create the conditions for the formation of an ‘unholy alliance’ with the Nazis under a 
Socialist-dominated government.372  Allowing the National Socialists into the Nationalrat to 
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face concrete economic problems should, Bauer argued, unmask their demagogy.373  So, 
while it is also true that some on the right, Seipel included, took pleasure in the results 
seeing it as a ‘shift to the Right’, the evidence suggests that misjudging the gravity of the 
situation was not confined to either side.374  Either way, the only real beneficiaries of new 
elections would have been the National Socialists, a fact that was confirmed in April the 
following year in the municipal elections in Innsbruck.375  There, the National Socialists 
emerged as the strongest party with 14,996 votes, almost as many as the combined total 
of the Social Democrats (9,932) and the Christian Social Tyrolean Volkspartei (9,394).  By 
this point, things had become so serious that the Austrian government would admit in 
private, if not in public, that ‘it could not hold elections without handing over the key of 
the Austrian citadel to the National Socialist party’.376 
 The German example played a crucial role, in particular the fact that in Germany 
the results of elections meant that Hitler could not be ignored in the ‘power-brokerage 
game’.377   During 1932, the Reichspost persistently drew its readers’ attention to the chaos 
that National Socialism – and Communism – had inflicted upon Germany. 378    The 
newspaper admonished in the run-up to the 1932 elections, that the exceptionally difficult 
circumstances that National Socialism had caused in Prussia and, through Prussia, for the 
whole of Germany, should serve as a serious warning to Austrian voters; in Germany, the 
Nazi movement had become such a ‘grave national-political problem’ that it had taken the 
country to the brink of civil war.379  It was certainly no secret that as soon as the Nazis 
were in control of the state apparatus of power they would use it dictatorially.380  Did this 
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fact influence the decisions made by the Dollfuß government?  A leading article published 
in the Reichspost in January 1933 confirms that the issue of whether, in light of subsequent 
Nazi gains, Papen’s decision to dissolve the Reichstag and call new elections in July 1932 
had been the correct one had certainly occurred to the Christian Socials.381  Would it not 
have been better, the guest author argued, if instead Germany had left a functioning 
Reichstag in place, say under Brüning, until the crisis was overcome, the unemployment 
rate had peaked and a gradual economic revival had returned?  The collapse of the 
Schleicher government just three weeks later merely confirmed that ‘the domestic conflict 
in Germany could not be solved by normal, constitutional means’; Schleicher only had two, 
somewhat theoretical ‘choices’, bringing the Nazis into the government or effecting a 
coup d’état.382  On 9 March 1933, in the midst of the parliamentary crisis Schuschnigg 
judged the situation that they found themselves to be in to be basically the same as that of 
Brüning two years earlier.383  Escalating political violence, coupled with the electoral 
results of April 1932 buttressed the fear that the Christian Socials, not unlike the German 
Centre, were trapped between the ‘twin poles’ of National Socialism and 
Austromarxism384.  It is in light of this, and in the hope that the radical commotion of the 
‘demagogues’ would only be temporarily popular, that, unlike their counterparts in 
Germany, the Dollfuß government resolved to weather the storm. 385   It was no 
coincidence that on 12 March 1933, in the immediate aftermath of the closure of the 
Austrian parliament against the background of events in Germany, the Christian Socials 
declared that they would now stand and fall as the Catholic, Austrian Volkspartei.386 
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Figure 2: Wird uns Dollfus retten?  Nazi rally poster, 1932 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv und Grafiksammlung) 
 If events in Germany were not warning enough of National Socialist tactics, 
following the April elections the Austrians experienced the National Socialists’ political 
repertoire first hand.  The admission of ‘Hitler’s Apostles’ into the chambers of local and 
municipal government provided a stark warning of the movement’s ability to incapacitate 
the democratic process.  That events in the Wiener Landtag – brawling between the 
National Socialist and the Social Democratic deputies – were a carbon copy of what was 
happening in the Prussian Landtag was not lost on those writing for the Reichspost.387  At 
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any rate, the Austrian Nazis had made no secret of their intention to enter the Nationalrat 
to destroy it from the inside.388.  The Austrian Nazi Landesinspekteur Theo Habicht’s 
instructions to National Socialist deputies were clear: 
He [the NS deputy] is not sent [into parliament] to act as a parliamentarian amongst 
parliamentarians, but as a fox in a chicken coop.  He is not to keep the peace but break it.  He is not 
to engage in ‘positive collaboration’ – i.e. prolong the lifespan of this System!  – Instead, he is to 
highlight its flaws and to see his whole mission in making sure that [the System] is eliminated as soon 
as possible. …He is sent into parliament to stake out, from the centre of the enemy camp, the 
opponent’s plans and to…frustrate them.389 
The veracity of this claim soon became apparent as the Wiener Gemeinderat and the 
Wiener Landtag, bastions of Socialist power, were brought to a standstill as a result of the 
Nazis’ obstructionist tactics.  Interjections and insults between the opposing political 
factions quickly degenerated into missile-throwing and even brawling between the 
representatives, which frequently spread to the public galleries and out onto the street.  
Indeed, the hostility became so serious that several delegates were actually wounded as 
the result of violent skirmishes between the National Socialists and Social Democrats in 
the Wiener Gemeinderat, prompting the Christian Socials to leave the room in a 
demonstration of protest against such ‘shameful’ behaviour.390  Furthermore, the Nazis’ 
election to these local bodies, according to the British Embassy, ‘secured them 
representation in the Federal Council, where their presence later in the year [1932] 
enabled them on one occasion to be a nuisance to the government’.391  That such 
unsavoury behaviour bolstered the opposition of the Dollfuß government to new 
elections was inevitable; the ‘Hitlerleute’ strangling Austria’s already conflict-ridden 
parliament was, without doubt, the last thing that the country needed. 
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 Historians tend to agree that at this juncture, a ‘red-black’ Grand Coalition would 
have provided the best possible defence against the Nazi threat.  Instead, Dollfuß chose to 
rule with a flimsy one-vote majority, a fact often presented as evidence of Dollfuß’s 
anti-democratic tendencies; if the threat posed by National Socialism was so ominous, and 
if the only way Austria could overcome its grave economic problems was in collaboration 
with the Social Democrats, why did he not invite them to join him in coalition?  Part of 
the reason was that the more conservative elements of the Christian Social Party would 
have almost certainly opposed a coalition with the Social Democrats, which would have 
led to defections towards the radical right.392  In his memoirs, Richard Schüller maintained 
that if Dollfuß had colluded with the Socialists, he would have alienated his supporters, the 
farmers, the urban Christian Socials, the clergy and the Heimwehr.393  Another reason that 
no official offer of a coalition was made in 1932 was because, as Rath points out, ‘the 
Social Democrats had made it more than clear that they would not accept such an 
invitation if proffered to them’.394  Several attempts had in fact already been made to bring 
the Socialists into the government following the onset of the depression, and all had failed.  
However, Otto Bauer, who dominated the Social Democratic Party, was not yet 
interested in ‘compromise politics’ and a coalition with the ‘bourgeoisie’. 
 Dollfuß’s immediate predecessors, Chancellors Ender and Buresch, had both 
attempted to restore some degree of co-operation between the government and the 
opposition, to no avail.395  In June 1931, faced with yet another governmental crisis, Miklas 
had called upon Seipel to form a coalition government in which all of the parties would be 
represented according to their parliamentary strength.  This would comprise 
four portfolios for the Social Democrats, three for the Christian Socials, and one each for 
the Greater Germans and the Landbund respectively, with Otto Bauer as 
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Vice-Chancellor.396  Seipel approached the Social Democrats with the proposal, but they 
refused for fear of being too heavily burdened by unpopular measures taken by the future 
government.397  Many historians now recognize that this was a serious mistake on the part 
of the Social Democrats. 398   In the aftermath of the Pfrimer putsch in 
September/October 1931 Chancellor Buresch, who, after the failure to establish an 
all-party coalition government a few months earlier, was charged with the formation of 
the government on the basis of good relations with the Social Democrats at a regional 
level, again invited the Socialists to join in a coalition, which they again refused.399  Should 
we have accepted Seipel’s offer?, asked the Arbeiter-Zeitung the following month. 400  
Despite the fact that the economy was in a parlous state, the answer was no on the 
grounds that they would not be entering government to serve the working classes, but to 
help the bourgeois government extricate themselves from the mess that they had got into 
over the past 11 years.  In opting to remain in opposition, the Socialists had, in the eyes of 
the Christian Socials, persistently refused to accept political responsibility for state 
affairs.401  It was really about time, mused Theodor Hornbostel, Political Director in the 
Bundeskanzleramt under Dollfuß, in the summer of 1931, ‘dass sich die gar nicht so 
spärlichen Männer zusammentun, die apolitische und parteilose, aber österreichische 
Patrioten ohne alles blöde und unwahre nationale Gefasel sind’. 402   So whilst the 
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observation that a grand coalition would have provided the most effective defence for the 
Republic is theoretically correct, the evidence suggests that, at this juncture, the Socialists 
were unwilling to settle for anything less than total power. 
 Faced with a rebellious support base and an intransigent opposition, Dollfuß first 
tried to seek a middle way.  In May 1932 he approached the Socialists, albeit unofficially, to 
find out if a government with him at the head could perhaps rely on the Socialists’ 
benevolent neutrality, pointing out that a refusal would leave him no choice but to bring in 
the Heimwehr.403  Rather than support the moderate Dollfuß, thereby freeing him from the 
necessity of reliance on the Heimwehr, the Socialists refused, opting instead to deal with 
the Heimwehr in their own way: they had recently prepared a military plan of action – via 
the Schutzbund – to be implemented in the event of a Heimwehr putsch.404  When Dollfuß 
finally presented his government to the Nationalrat, the reply from the opposition benches 
was an immediate vote of no confidence, which the government barely survived.405  This 
was only weeks after the presidential election in Germany had yielded the biggest results 
for the Nazis yet.  For that election the German Social Democrats had, to an astonishing 
degree, thrown their support behind Hindenburg in an attempt to prevent Hitler’s 
election.406  By March the following year it was increasingly clear that such missed 
opportunities had been a grave mistake; with Dollfuß now trapped in a coalition with the 
Heimwehr from which he could not escape and with the National Socialists baying at the 
door, only then did the Socialists begin to change tack, by which point it was far too late. 
 At this juncture, it is worth positing the question of what the consequences would 
have been if Dollfuß had failed to bring a government together.  Although the Social 
Democrats had emerged as the strongest party in the last Nationalrat elections in 1930, 
they did not achieve an outright majority and would not have been able to bring a 
governmental majority together either; a Socialist minority government, like a minority 
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Christian Social one, would also have been in trouble from the start. 407  The issue was 
obvious at the time, with the British legation confirming that the opposition were – one 
can assume the Social Democrats are being referred to here – ‘handicapped by the 
consciousness that they could not provide an alternative government’.408  What, though, if 
new elections had been called?  In this scenario, considering the turn of events in 
Germany and the local election results of the previous month, it is safe to say that the real 
beneficiaries would have been the Nazis, not the Social Democrats.  The simple fact is that 
the Social Democrats would have needed at least 83 seats to wield an outright majority 
and thus the ability to govern alone (which would still only put it in the same weak 
position as the Dollfuß government), yet they had never managed more than 72 in the five 
Nationalrat elections since 1919.  Whether such an electoral swing to the left was up for 
grabs at that point is highly unlikely.  Although the Socialists had come through the 
regional elections relatively unscathed, there were signs that the Nazis – and to a certain 
extent the KPÖ – were beginning to make inroads into the Socialist electorate.  Initially 
this occurred outside of their urban and industrial strongholds, in those areas where their 
electoral base and infrastructure was weaker, but by March 1933 support was beginning 
to crumble away from the Socialist camp, to varying degrees, throughout Austria.409  An 
outright majority in the Nationalrat was without doubt already well beyond their grasp.  
Finding coalition partners among the smaller, overwhelmingly anti-Marxist parties, was 
impossible, notwithstanding that they would have ceased to exist in the event of new 
elections.  Of course, theoretically, a minority Socialist government could have been 
supported by the rump of the Christian Social Party, but such a move would have 
demanded the Christian Socials commit political suicide, which would also have played 
straight into the Nazis’ hands.  Moreover, by this point, the debilitating ‘civil war psychosis’ 
noted by Renner in 1928, coupled with fundamental differences about the way in which 
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the crisis should be tackled, not to mention the issue of Austrian independence, made 
parliamentary compromise nigh on impossible.410  Above all, new elections would have 
meant the National Socialists entering the Nationalrat, rendering not only the fragile 
coalition system dominated by the Christian Socials unworkable, but likely any coalition 
unworkable, just as it had in Germany. 
 There is danger in reading history backwards.  The inclusion of the Heimwehr in 
the coalition was not a premeditated step towards dictatorship, nor was the formation of 
the Dollfuß government a ‘catalyst on the road to Austrofascism’.411  Rather, it is better 
understood as the result of a last-ditch attempt to tackle a severe political and economic 
crisis by persuading radical anti-system elements to lend their support to maintaining 
Austrian independence.  As Jedlicka pointed out back in 1966, winning over a section of 
the Heimwehr was actually one of Dollfuß’s tactical achievements.412  It is often overlooked 
that bringing the Heimwehr into government actually had a moderating influence, keeping a 
section of the movement away from the clutches of the Nazis that would have 
undoubtedly been absorbed by it, whilst preventing a section of the Christian Socials 
defecting to the radical right.  Those who suggest that, if it had not been for Dollfuß the 
Heimwehr would otherwise have sunk into political obscurity seem to miss the point.413  
Their followers would have gone over to the Nazis en masse, lending strength and 
legitimacy – not to mention arms, of which the Nazis were allegedly extremely short in 
1932 – to that movement; they would not have evaporated into thin air.414  As a direct 
result of being incorporated into the decision-making process, the Heimwehr started 
re-orientating their programme away from the National Socialists towards the 
government, and a more pro-Austrian stance, lending its legitimacy to the government and 
the Austrian state instead.  Thus, by winning over a section of the Heimwehr for the 
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Christian Social government, Dollfuß secured an ally – intractable, but an ally none the less 
– that was willing at that juncture to lend him some tentative support in shoring up 
Austrian independence. 415   There is no doubt that the Heimwehr were, at best, 
fair-weather friends.  The crucial issue was whether the alliance would last long enough 
for Austria to outride the storm.  And ultimately, as Pauley notes, ‘it is difficult to see 
what alterative he [Dollfuß] had under the circumstances’.416  In May 1932, no-one could 
have predicted the course of events in 1933 or 1934, let alone 1938. 
                                            
415 Jedlicka also makes this point.  Ludwig Jedlicka, 'Austrian Heimwehr', 140. 
416 Bruce F. Pauley, The Habsburg Legacy 1867–1939, (New York 1972), 129. 
  
‘Ich glaube an Österreich, ich halte Österreich für Lebensfähig’ – The Lausanne Loan 
Dollfuß’s key concern on taking office, and his government’s primary task, was solving 
Austria’s devastating economic crisis.  After all, Dollfuß was an economist, and in his 
inaugural speech, Austria’s financial problems loomed large.  Dollfuß was convinced that 
Austria was ‘viable’, if only Austrians would stick together during a time of severe 
economic hardship – rather than provoke one another – and declared his government’s 
central objective to encourage and promote Austria’s ‘will to live’.417  Its main priority was 
to put Austria’s financial house in order with the assistance of the League of Nations; the 
acquisition of the Lausanne loan was at the top of Dollfuß’s agenda, accompanied by the 
settling of the Creditanstalt issue418.  Not only did Austrians at home need to be convinced 
that Austria could survive, those abroad who were being asked to provide Austria with 
credit needed to believe in it too.  For that reason, Dollfuß argued that even though 
fulfilling one’s obligations was unpopular, Austria had to meet its financial commitments 
and adhere to its agreements if it were to win back confidence and trust.419  Seeing the 
root cause of Austria’s problems, including the threat posed by National Socialism, in the 
catastrophic economic situation, the economy would remain a primary focus throughout 
Dollfuß’s Chancellorship.420  ‘The economic crisis’, he argued at Christmas 1932, had 
unleashed movements that threatened ‘the fundaments of human society and culture’.421  
Resolving the economic crisis would, therefore, go some way towards bringing order to 
Austria, ‘once and for all’. 
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 When Dollfuß assumed office, the Austrian economy was in terrible shape.  
Dependent as it was upon export trade, the Austrian economy had proven to be 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of the depression: between 1929 and 1933 total 
production in Austria decreased by 38 per cent, exports fell by 53.3 per cent and imports 
by 42.5 per cent.422  The number of unemployed rose to 545,000 – a rate of 27 per cent – 
with only 57 per cent of those unemployed receiving any welfare subsidy at all.423  The 
financial emergency was compounded by the collapse of the Creditanstalt in 1931, 
provoking a crisis so serious that Ender, then Chancellor, feared that if the Creditanstalt 
problem were not solved, ‘law and order in Austria would collapse’.424  However, the 
severity of the crisis that it unleashed can only be explained against the background of 
Austria’s fundamental economic weakness during the inter-war period.  Dependent upon 
the international financial community for monetary assistance to keep it afloat, with 
budget deficits a permanent fixture and an economy hampered by grave and perennial 
structural problems, Austria was in no position to weather a storm like the Great 
Depression.425 
 Before we proceed, a few historiographical issues regarding the economic strategy 
and legacy of the Dollfuß government demand clarification.  As Jens-Wilhelm Wessel 
noted back in 2003, the adherence to orthodox economic policies and financial principles 
during the First Republic and the Ständestaat have been harshly criticized by many modern 
scholars, often arguing a direct connection between government policy, economic misery 
and the ‘apparent ease of the takeover of Austria by National Socialist Germany in 
March 1938’.426  Government policy, it is contended, remained wedded to orthodox 
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financial policy, and was too strongly oriented towards balancing the budget and monetary 
stability.  This led to a recovery that looked good on paper but meant austerity measures 
which alienated vast swathes of the Austrian population.427  Tálos, for example, contends 
that the strategies for solving the crisis, forced on the country by the Christian Socials, 
not only placed the burden on the wider population, but also led to the erosion of 
political support within the bourgeois milieu, manifested in the results of the 1932 
elections and the Greater Germans’ withdrawal from the coalition.428  The attempt to 
realize this policy against the backdrop of dwindling political support was, he argues, the 
point of departure for eliminating those institutions – parliament and the labour 
movement – that stood in the way. 
 This interpretation is problematic on a number of levels.  Following the same logic, 
one would have to charge democratic Czechoslovakia with paving the way for the Nazi 
takeover of 1938–39 by flagrantly mismanaging the economy, in particular worsening the 
impact of the economy in the Sudetenland.  As British officials in Prague noted in 1933, 
thoroughly politicized economic decisions, not least a policy of expropriation and 
‘Czechization’ motivated by the attempt to reduce the influence of the German minority, 
‘minimized the capacity of the state to handle squarely and fairly the intricate economic 
problems which arose in 1932’.429  However, this is a line not usually taken in histories of 
the interwar Czechoslovak Republic.  Moreover, as Wessel demonstrates, ‘while it is 
certainly true that the deflationary policy impeded recovery…the policy implications of 
the Ständestaat have been overestimated; long-term structural preconditions, 
circumstances and transformations were the primary determinants of economic growth.430  
In short, it is highly probable that nothing short of a miracle would have turned Austria’s 
fortunes around.  Besides, the granting of the Lausanne loan was contingent on the 
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implementation of strict fiscal and monetary reforms, which seriously limited Austria’s 
room to manoeuvre.  This made Austria heavily dependent on the good will of its major 
European creditors, who would certainly have opposed any drastic economic 
experimentation.  Of course, the Dollfuß government could have pursued a policy that 
was not based on foreign credit, but the choice at the time appeared to be a simple one 
between an international bailout and state bankruptcy.  Indeed, those who seek to 
condemn the Dollfuß government for the stance it took seem to assume that there were 
viable alternatives to the path taken.  Yet no credible evidence has emerged that there 
actually were any. 
 This interpretation also neglects the fact that the implementation of orthodox 
economic strategies to combat the depression was not restricted to Austria or to 
Austria’s conservative right.  Deflation was the initial response of most countries to the 
crisis of 1929; until at least 1934, for example, France’s conservative governments applied 
the ‘classic deflationary remedy’ to the crisis.431  In the aftermath of the First World War 
and the rampant hyperinflation that followed, the situation in Austria had been ‘even 
worse than in Germany’, fuelling an almost pathological fear of inflation also shared by the 
Social Democrats who initially supported a deflationary policy and budgetary austerity.432  
This helps explain why Social Democratic deputies voted in favour of a budgetary 
reconstruction law on 3 October 1931, even though it was clear ‘that Austrian workers 
would pay a dear price for balancing the budget’.433  Moreover, as Klingenstein noted, the 
Social Democratic counterplan put forward in July 1932 was not only ill-defined, 
unrealistic, and failed to take enough account of the facts, it hardly departed from that of 
the government in its main points.434  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is crucial to 
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note that, ideology aside, the economic policy decisions adopted by the Dollfuß 
government were taken with the genuine intention of stabilizing the economy and shoring 
up the Republic, not destroying it. 
 Convinced that only a long-term international aid effort could save Austria from a 
financial moratorium or economic collapse, in 1931 the Christian Social-led government 
had appealed to the League of Nations for financial assistance.435  The aid, in the form of a 
long-term loan, was to provide the basis for the restructuring of state finances in much 
the same way as it had done in 1922, and was, the Austrian government argued, ‘a vital 
prerequisite for the strengthening of the Austrian currency and the restoration of 
confidence’. 436  Yet, undoubtedly, it would come at a price, ‘the reestablishment of 
external custody of Austrian economic policy’, or, as some historians have sought to label 
it, a League of Nations Finanzdiktatur.437  For the Christian Socials the justification for the 
loan was simple: ‘a state can not and must not commit suicide’, a statement that was 
characteristic of the Christian Socials’ activist strategy and pro-independence stance.438  
However, the loan was not just a monetary issue, it was also seen as a foreign vote of 
confidence in Austria and the only real chance to secure Austria’s future; failure to obtain 
the loan and then ratify the protocols would undoubtedly have ‘serious repercussions for 
Austrian independence’.439  It was also of political importance.  Less than a year had passed 
since the Customs Union debacle, the covert attempt to co-ordinate trade relations 
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between Austria and Germany that had incurred the violent opposition of both France 
and its Czechoslovakian protégé.440  In that instance, both countries threatened to start a 
trade war, which ‘Germany and Austria, given the present circumstances, would barely 
survive two months’441.  This episode had seriously damaged Austria’s standing abroad and 
Austria needed to prove to the other European powers and particularly its nervous 
neighbours, that it was serious about maintaining its independence from Germany.  So 
while it is factually correct to emphasize – as Moritz and Leidinger do – that the Customs 
Union plan and apparent call for Anschluss – or at least closer ties between Germany and 
Austria – came at a time when the National Socialists did not yet rule Germany, it is 
immaterial because the international community were not about to countenance such a 
move.442  Thus, Dollfuß’s determination to bring together a coalition, and his decision to 
bring the Heimwehr into government as a last resort can only be fully understood against 
the backdrop of attaining the Lausanne loan for the purposes of stabilizing both the 
Austrian economy and the foreign policy situation: it is beyond doubt that leaving office, 
or calling elections during 1932 would have invariably meant ‘giving up the Lausanne 
loan’.443 
 The issue of the Lausanne loan immediately set Dollfuß at odds with the Social 
Democratic and pan-German opposition.  Neither group would countenance the idea of 
an international bailout and on similar grounds: the Social Democrats because of 
‘ideological economic’ as well as nationalist considerations, claiming a threat to democracy 
by ‘reactionary’ elements and fearful that it could bolster the Christian Socials’ position, 
the pan-Germans, in a bid to outdo their radical Nazi rivals, labelling the loan ‘national 
betrayal’ and a foreign dictatorship’ that would shackle Austria ‘to the chariot wheel of the 
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peace treaties’.444  Klingenstein notes that, although the Social Democrats attempted to 
frame their arguments in a way that would set them apart from the pan-Germans, the 
reasons were basically the same.  Thus, the loan was primarily rejected on political, not 
economic grounds; the anti-Anschluss clause, foreign control of the Austrian economy and 
what was ultimately perceived as a pro-French, anti-German course.445  Certain that 
Austria’s future was at stake, Dollfuß appealed to all, not just those who were friends of 
the government, ‘mutually conscious of the seriousness of the times, [to] lend a helping 
hand’ in delivering Austria from the immediate crisis.446  From the point of view of the 
government, Austria was a ‘ship in the most severe distress’ and radical action and 
responsible statesmanship were essential to avoid an imminent catastrophe.447  However, 
the attempt to revive the economy fell upon deaf ears, and the struggle against the crisis 
received little backing. 448   The opposition, whose ultimate objective was Anschluss, 
rejected the idea of going cap in hand to Geneva from the very beginning. 
 Opposition to the loan was not limited to domestic circles.  In Germany, the 
Austrian government’s decision to appeal to the League of Nations for assistance met with 
a bitter press campaign spearheaded by nationalist circles and accusations of a change of 
course in Austrian foreign policy.449.  In May 1933, the mouthpiece of Schuschnigg’s 
Ostmärkische Sturmscharen reminded its readers that following the signing of the Lausanne 
Protocols the previous year a ‘downright savage hate campaign against Dollfuß and Austria’ 
had been instigated from Germany, and not just from National Socialist circles, but also 
from ‘certain Zentrum circles and the Catholic Front!’ 450.  As a result, tensions between 
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the two countries became frayed, with ‘feelings towards “the brothers in the Reich”…not 
particularly cordial in government circles in Vienna’ during 1932.451  Having ‘mixed up too 
much in Austrian internal politics’ the legation staff, Rieth included, were unpopular with 
the Austrian government, and ‘Rieth’s own position was at one time a good deal 
compromised as a result.  His much too active, though clever first secretary, Dr. Clodius, 
was, at the request of the Austrian government, removed from Vienna’.452  Indeed, one 
Berlin newspaper observed that ‘the unprecedented abuse from the National Socialists 
that the Chancellor had to endure [during 1932] awakened something in Austria that in 
other countries one calls national feeling’.453  In an incendiary speech to the Austrian 
Nationalrat that was, according to the British legation undoubtedly ‘officially inspired’, the 
Christian Social representative Leopold Kunschak condemned the activities of Reich 
German emissaries agitating against the loan on Austrian soil, comparing them to the 
Russian agents that prior to 1914 were ‘awakening passions in the Balkans, sowing hatred 
and thirst for blood’454.  ‘Call off the hounds and put them on the leash’ he warned the 
German government, and leave the Austrians to their own affairs.455  Although, the 
legation continued, Dollfuß ‘subsequently endeavoured to explain that Herr Kunschak had 
been “misinterpreted” and had never attacked the German government’, the Federal 
Chancellery proceeded to issue an official communiqué drawing attention to the penalties 
laid down to deal with foreigners involved in acts of propaganda and provocation on 
Austrian soil, ‘hinting broadly that these penalties – which include expulsion – would be 
rigorously enforced’.456 
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 German support, or the appearance of support, was crucial to diffuse the 
objections of the Austrian pan-Germans to the anti-Anschluss clause.  However, the 
German government refused to get involved.  In an attempt to placate the German 
nationalists – and, of course, the National Socialists – Germany under von Papen 
undermined the Austrian government at home and abroad by refusing openly to support 
its request, despite the Austrians arguing that without the loan the collapse of the 
Austrian economy, and thus the state, was inevitable.457  In a private discussion between 
Dollfuß and Papen, Dollfuß attempted to win over the latter to participation in a League 
loan, but Papen refused on the grounds that he ‘took exception’ to the fact that Austria 
had to reaffirm the anti-Anschluss clause.458  Instead, the German delegation to the League 
withheld its vote, and as the Dollfuß government had hoped to use German backing to 
prevent extensive opposition at home, it presented the move as tacit acquiescence.459  The 
Greater Germans were not convinced, forcing Dollfuß to appeal on at least one occasion 
to von Papen to use his influence on the Greater Germans to encourage them to support 
ratification.460  Therefore, in short, rather than come to Austria’s aid, Germany, with an 
ostensibly Catholic statesman at the helm, publically undermined the Austrian 
government.461  Here we have the man who helped Hitler into the saddle the following 
year and was instrumental in bringing about the Nazi take-over of Austria in 1938, 
conspiring in effect with Austrian Social Democrats to undermine, if not end Austrian 
independence in 1932.  If we regard the company politicians keep as evidence of their 
character, as we do routinely do with Dollfuß and the Heimwehr, we surely cannot ignore 
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the strange alliance of Austrian Social Democracy with the man who ended democracy in 
Germany. 
 Thus, on Dollfuß’s return to Austria with the secured support of the international 
community, the bulk of the political opposition refused to ratify the loan, accusing Dollfuß 
of ‘national betrayal’.  The Heimwehr threatened to withdraw from the coalition, a move 
that would have caused the government to collapse; to prevent them from doing so 
Dollfuß acceded to Starhemberg’s demands, which as Lassner points out, included the 
position of minister for security for the Heimwehr. 462   The increasingly radicalized 
pan-German camp was intractable in its opposition to a loan which stipulated that Austria 
once again officially renounce Anschluss with Germany, this time until the year 1952.463  
However, the real stumbling block was the opposition of the Social Democrats, who 
played a reckless game, which really does deserve to be called deceitful, bitterly opposing 
the loan in Vienna, while secretly urging the French Socialist party to vote for it in Paris.464  
Rather than lend their support to the government, they accused the Christian Socials of 
having sacrificed the Anschluss and joined, once again, with the National Socialists in 
calling for the dissolution of parliament and new national elections.465  There is no record 
of Social Democrats in Germany joining forces with the Nazis in any shape or form at any 
time.  Austrian Social Democrats did effectively do so, however, and did so more than 
once.  While many historians maintain that Dollfuß’s reliance on the Heimwehr paved the 
way for the Nazi dictatorship, the literature is conspicuously silent on the issue of 
whether Social Democrat actions cannot be said to have smoothed the path for a Nazi 
take-over. 
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 The protocols eventually passed through the Nationalrat, albeit by the narrowest of 
margins.  Interestingly enough, Klingenstein draws attention to the fact that neither the 
pan-Germans nor the Social Democrats deployed their key weapon – denying the 
government a quorum by leaving the Chamber – to scupper ratification of the protocols, 
suggesting that they were aware that there was no viable alternative to the loan.466  Again, 
this is not an issue of left or right or of attaching blame to a particular ideology.  Rather, it 
is an issue of contrasting the record of Social Democracy in Germany, which sought to 
uphold the state even at the risk of losing elections, with that of Austrian Social 
Democracy, which did not. 
 Dollfuß’s efforts to achieve and maintain financial stability were looked upon with 
approval from abroad.  The British Legation deemed it a matter for congratulation that 
the Austrian government ‘resolutely continued to face its foreign obligations’ despite 
incessant pressure from its opponents and even in part from its supporters.467  To 
contemporary observers what was remarkable was that 1932 had ended without disaster.  
Not only praising Dollfuß, but contrasting him favourably with those around him, the 
British Minister observed how, ‘with a degree of courage and pertinacity unusual amongst 
Austrian politicians’, Dollfuß refused to be beaten by facts, ‘valiantly doing all he [could] 
economically to keep his country’s feet on the path of political independence’.468 
 Yet, at home Dollfuß could rely on little support.  In fact, it seemed that the 
opposition were doing everything in their power to render the situation as difficult as 
possible.  After months of wrangling and hand-wringing, – by the end of 1932 the 
Austrians had still not received any money – the Hirtenberg arms affair broke and landed 
Dollfuß in hot water at home and abroad.469  Tensions between the government and the 
opposition escalated when Social Democratic railway workers in Villach intercepted an 
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illegal arms shipment from Italy, intended for the Heimwehr.470  A clear violation of the 
Treaty of St. Germain, the transfer was exposed in the Arbeiter-Zeitung, unleashing the 
condemnation of the international community.  Although Dollfuß had not known about 
the illicit consignment, the revelation incurred the wrath of the Little Entente, particularly 
the Czechs, who pressured the Austrian government by refusing Czech participation in 
the Lausanne Loan, once again jeopardizing the credit that was imperative for the 
country’s short-term survival471.  The lessons of Lausanne and the Hirtenberg affair were 
undoubtedly bitter ones for Dollfuß and key turning points in his relationship with the 
Social Democrats.  The Social Democrats had not used quiet channels to get the arms 
confiscated without imperilling the loan; rather they were willing to sacrifice Austria’s 
economic survival in the interest of embarrassing the Dollfuß government.  This is despite 
the fact that, as Kindermann points out, the Schutzbund were also smuggling illegal 
weapons from Czechoslovakia.472  What is more, the battle for the Lausanne loan had 
made it painfully clear that the struggle for one vote could paralyze the whole 
parliamentary process.473  It is difficult to disagree that an ineffectual parliament with an 
intractable opposition was a ‘weak reed’ in the fight to ward off economic disaster and the 
National Socialist plague.474 
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Endgültig und restlos Ordnung machen! 
After the economy, a second key concern for the Dollfuß government was the 
maintenance of public order. 475  Political violence was a defining feature of Austrian politics 
throughout the interwar period.  Austria was a hotbed of militant political activism; 
marches, rallies and demonstrations were an almost daily occurrence and habitually 
turned violent.  The stark polarization of Austrian society between left and right, the lack 
of basic societal consensus and the subsequent political and parliamentary stalemate left 
no effective means of settling political, economic or societal disputes.  Violence and 
intimidation filled the void as the competing political factions searched for alternative 
methods to fulfil their political ambitions and prevent their opponents from gaining the 
upper hand.  The failure of the democratic process was exacerbated by the effective 
militarization of Austrian society through the formation of armed paramilitary 
organizations over which the State had no authority.  In the eyes of a contemporary 
American observer, the existence of these antagonistic private armies impeded peaceful 
political development and ‘made the task of the federal government extremely difficult’.476  
Government forces were outnumbered and outgunned.  The two largest militias, the 
Republikanischer Schutzbund, the militarized arm of the Social Democratic Party and the 
right-wing Heimwehr boasted memberships in 1927–28 of up to 95,000 and at least 
100,000 members respectively.477  They were joined in the melee on the country’s streets 
by the National Socialist SA (from 1931), as well as a number of smaller private armies, 
including the Frontkämpfer Association and the Communists.478  By way of comparison, 
the Treaty of St. Germain limited the Austrian army to a maximum of 30,000 men. 
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 The atmosphere on the streets worsened as the economic crisis took hold, 
echoing the waves of violence and civil unrest that were sweeping Weimar Germany.  By 
July 1931, there were reports that demonstrators were increasingly prepared to use 
violence against the police.479  There was a genuine fear within the Christian Social 
movement that law and order could collapse, and from 1931 onwards, the State 
authorities began routinely banning events, Communist gatherings having been consistently 
prohibited since 1929.480  The increasingly ominous tone on the streets was compounded 
by the sheer scale of political activity that the authorities had to deal with; during the first 
half of 1932, Allinson records 7,990 meetings in inns, 6,300 of which were of a political 
nature, 181 open air meetings and 308 public processions in Vienna alone, many of which 
would have been needed to be policed.481  Some ended in violent clashes between the 
armed rival factions.  Botz’s chronicle of political violence during the First Republic reveals 
how, from April 1932 onwards, hardly a week went by without a violent altercation 
between rival political factions, resulting in dozens of dead and seriously wounded on all 
sides.482 
 During his inaugural speech, Dollfuß appealed for calm on all sides, reasoning that 
the economy – especially the tourist economy – needed calm if it were to have a chance 
of recovery.483  Aware that a long-term, universal ban on rallies and demonstrations would 
raise constitutional objections, he pledged that provisions would nonetheless be made to 
ensure the preservation of public peace.484  However, he pointed out, the policing of rallies 
and demonstrations involved costs.  So, while every endeavour would be made to ensure 
that the right to free expression was upheld, the government would, he warned, if 
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necessary, clamp down on wanton excesses injurious to the economy.485  Again, this might 
sound like the standard excuse of right-wing politicians preparing to replace democracy 
with authoritarian rule, but consider that on that very same day armed National Socialists, 
Social Democrats, and Communists clashed in a town not far from Innsbruck.  In the 
‘Saalschlacht von Hötting’ one SA man was killed and over 30 others seriously injured.  The 
episode resulted in a ban on all National Socialist, Social Democratic and Communist 
demonstrations in the Tyrol.486 
 During 1932, the burgeoning Nazi movement took the political conflict on the 
streets to new heights.487  The evidence suggests that Nazis were involved in over 
90 per cent of all violent political clashes that occurred during that year.488  The Nazis not 
only treated the State authorities with contempt, they also deliberately goaded the 
Republikanischer Schutzbund by holding rallies and demonstrations in Socialist 
strongholds.489  The Nazi stratagem culminated in frequent and violent Zusammenstösse 
and a dangerous struggle between the ‘blue shirts’ and the ‘brown shirts’ for control of 
the street, a conflict, which following the Nazis electoral success, moved from the streets 
into the halls of government490.  The danger was obvious, as Schuschnigg later explained: 
When two private armies stand facing one another in a country, and the State is not in a position to 
disarm them both, from then on it is at the mercy of any flying spark; the issue is unavoidable and is 
only a question of time.491 
                                            
485 Ibid. 
486 'Schach jedwedem Terror!', Reichspost, 30 May 1932, 3. 
487 As Allinson notes, ‘attempts to prevent demonstrations and marches intensified in mid–1931 against the 
backdrop of a disastrous economic situation’.  Mark Allinson, 'Politics on the Streets: Popular Political 
Culture in the First Austrian Republic', Working Paper, (University of Bristol, 2007), accessed: 19 Dec. 2012, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1983/974, 21. 
488 Winifred R. Garscha, 'Nationalsozialisten in Österreich 1933–1938', in eds. Emmerich Tálos and 
Wolfgang Neugebauer Austrofaschismus: Politik–Ökonomie–Kultur 1933–1938 (Vienna, 2005), 104. 
489 The Republikanischer Schutzbund was formed in 1923 as a symbol of ‘proletarian resistance’ as well as to 
guarantee an armed alternative to the official federal Bundesheer, which was dominated by the ruling 
Christian Socials. 
490 'Wüste Raufereien im Wiener Gemeinderat', Reichspost 1 Oct. 1932, 1 and Barry McLoughlin, 
'Arbeiterschaft und die Gewaltpraxis der NSDAP', 58. 
491 Kurt Schuschnigg, trans. John Segrue, My Austria, (New York, 1938), 216. 
Chapter 3:  The Dollfuß Government – 1932  125 
 
Although it was the Nazi movement that was on the offensive, this was a worry, not least 
because there were signs that the Socialist leadership was losing its grip on the 
Schutzbund.492  As early as 1923, the issue of how the Schutzbund should respond to Nazi 
rallies revealed that discipline among the ranks of this armed formation could not be 
guaranteed by its leaders.  To the suggestion that the Schutzbund ‘should never disturb a 
Nazi rally’ the Schutzbund leader, Deutsch, replied that ‘The question was pointless, as the 
workers would never obey such a command’.493  
 In the eyes of the government, Socialist actions made matters worse on the 
grounds that, rather than encouraging the maintenance of law and order, they rose to the 
Nazi bait.  Both ‘Socialisms’ were deemed responsible for the escalation in violence; 
although the Nazis’ conduct was openly provocative, the Socialists responded with equal, 
and often violent, measure.  Social Democratic weapons were not used to safeguard their 
homeland from domestic and foreign enemies, it was argued, only in the service of the 
party.494  The Socialist response to the NSDAP-Gautage, held in Vienna just weeks before 
the clash in Simmering, was a case in point.495  The government had deemed that the safest 
solution was to allow the convention to take place, albeit only if certain conditions and the 
requisite safeguards were adhered to.  The Social Democrats and the Schutzbund, 
however, refused to honour the government’s decision.  Adamant that they were not 
going to allow Vienna to become a ‘brown’ city, the ‘blue shirts’ took to the streets with 
the intention of sabotaging the convention.  In the eyes of the authorities, this just made 
the situation worse, triggering a dangerous struggle for ‘control’ of the city.496  Not only 
did the Socialists belligerent behaviour threaten to inflame an already precarious situation, 
their counter-demonstrations, it was argued, actually managed to bring more attention to 
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the National Socialists than they would otherwise have enjoyed.497  The Christian Socials 
complained time and again about a lack of responsibility on the part of the Socialists for 
the affairs of State; they cited the ‘negligent and immature behaviour’ observed in the 
Wiener Landtag and Gemeinderat, and in the confrontational stance of the Social Democrats 
on the streets, which bolstered the impression that the Social Democratic Party was more 
concerned about petty partisan issues than the misery and suffering of the wider 
population.498  Whilst Dollfuß and sections of his government were fighting in Lausanne for 
the financial support that could shore up the country, the Schutzbund, the National 
Socialists and the Heimwehr were brawling in the streets, only to oppose jointly the loans 
in parliament upon Dollfuß’s return.  From the government’s point of view, the Social 
Democrats were no better than the National Socialists it was a ‘staatszerstörende Partei’ 
that put partisan interests above those of the state as a whole, which was never going to 
be a willing or reliable ally in the fight to maintain Austrian independence.499 
 The violent confrontation between the National Socialists on the one side, and the 
Socialists and Communists on the other escalated as the year progressed.  In 
October 1932, a group of armed Nazis attempted to storm the Arbeiterheim in 
Wien-Simmering; a Schutzbund contingent stationed in the building returned fire and the 
ensuing altercation resulted in four deaths and dozens of injuries.500  In response, Emil Fey, 
leader of the Vienna Heimwehr, who was appointed State Secretary for Public Security the 
following day, issued an order temporarily banning all parades and meetings for those 
groups involved, to wit, the Nazis, the Socialists and the Communists, a move that 
foreshadowed the ultimate prohibition of the Austrian Nazi party, the KPÖ and the 
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Schutzbund the following year. 501   Fey’s militant anti-Marxism and the fact that the 
Heimwehr was exempted from any restrictions were viewed as a severe provocation by 
the left and as evidence that the authorities’ motivation was not in the genuine interest of 
public order.  However, the measure did yield a moderate level of success, as the number 
of political clashes fell as a direct result.502  
 Yet, even with the Heimwehr represented in government, during 1932 it was the 
more moderate voices that clearly still held sway.  As Allinson notes, the 17 October ban 
was relaxed to allow marches to take place on 12 November, Austria’s republican holiday, 
‘with the strict proviso that no weapons of any sort could be carried’, entirely fair by most 
modern democratic standards.503  Yet, the government’s response is still interpreted as an 
attempt on the part of the Austrian authorities to repress a ‘vibrant’ democratic mobilized 
mass political culture.  Indeed, Allinson argues that the response of the government to 
political protest can be viewed as a diplomatic weathervane for the extent of democracy 
in the First Republic.  However, it is not just the response of the government that is telling 
here; one could also argue that the militarization of Austrian civil society, the use of 
paramilitary formations to further political goals and the constant threat of violence are 
equally useful as ‘weathervanes’.  Whether ‘the flowering of democracy’ or mass politics in 
action best describe the violent clashes and civil unrest that punctuated the period is 
highly debatable.  The militant political atmosphere of the First Republic was certainly not 
an extreme expression of the rough and tumble of the democratic political process, nor of 
a ‘vibrant form of civil society’; rather it was the manifestation of the abject failure of the 
democratic process and an unmistakable sign of a country struggling with a ‘latent civil 
war’.504  
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 The controversy surrounding Fey’s nomination, and the accusations of anti-Marxist 
bias, while important observations, have clouded the fact that in 1932 there was good 
reason to curb the activities of the paramilitaries, not least because there was too much at 
stake to allow the situation on the street to escalate out of control as it had in Germany.  
The question of whether the Schutzbund’s – and thus the Social Democratic – strategy of 
meeting violence with violence was a truly effective way of dealing with the Nazi challenge, 
or if it simply contributed to the general radicalization of the period is, incidentally, rarely, 
if ever, asked.  It also overlooks that the ultimate aim was the disbandment of the ‘illegal 
semi-military organisations’, – along with the inculcation of ‘patriotism, discipline and 
national spirit’, the state of affairs common to every functioning democracy – through the 
introduction of universal service, that is, the return of authority to the state apparatus.505  
This could sound like conventional nationalist posturing, if the speaker was not 
Alfred Jansa, from 1935 the de facto Chief of the Austrian Armed Forces, a staunch 
anti-Nazi who was responsible for drawing up detailed plans for the defence of Austria in 
1935 in case of a German invasion.  It was Jansa who said ‘there must be no doubt in 
Germany about our firm [unbeugsamen] resolve [to fight]’.506  Dollfuß had sent Jansa as 
military attaché to Berlin in June 1933 with instructions to support the Austrian Minster 
Tauschitz to establish a reasonable relationship with Germany.507  On his return to Austria 
two years later he had become convinced that there could be no reasonable relationship 
between Austria and Germany while Hitler was still at the helm, and that the only options 
were to fight or to capitulate unconditionally.508 
                                            
505 Memorandum by the military attaché of a conversation with General Jansa: (TNA): (PRO), FO 
371/15893, paper C9361/7665/3, Sir E. Phipps, Austrian View on the French Disarmament Plan, 4 Nov. 1932. 
506 Wolfgang Greber, 'Die Abwehrschlacht an der Traun, die nie stattfand', Die Presse [online edition], 29 
Feb. 2008, accessed: 19. Dec. 2012.  For further details, see: Jansa. Alfred, Ein österreichischer General gegen 
Hitler. FML Jansa – Erinnerungen, (Vienna, 2011). 
507 See: Witness Feldmarschalleutnant Alfred Jansa, Guido Schmidt, Hochverratsprozess, 217.  
Feldmarschalleutnant was the second-highest rank in the old Habsburg Army.  In 1920 the Austrian 
Bundesheer adopted German army ranks and badges of rank.  In 1933 the old Habsburg ranks, uniforms and 
insignia were reintroduced. 
508 See: Witness Feldmarschalleutnant Alfred Jansa, Ibid, 217, 220.  Jansa was removed from his post after 
Hitler posed Schuschnigg an ultimatum on Obersalzburg in February 1938.  Jansa offered his resignation on 
16 February although he had actually been asked to vacate his post the previous month. 
Chapter 3:  The Dollfuß Government – 1932  129 
 
 Thus, while the Heimwehr’s anti-Marxism and Dollfuß’s deteriorating relationship 
with the Social Democrats remain undisputed, it was not the only motivation for the 
disbandment of the Schutzbund the following March.  In exempting the Heimwehr from 
both the prohibition on holding rallies and, later, the disbanding of the paramilitaries – the 
KPÖ was banned in May 1933, the Nazi party in June – the government’s response was 
clearly partisan.  What other course of action could Dollfuß have taken?  What would 
have happened if he had exempted the Schutzbund from the ban?  Not only would the 
Heimwehr not have stood for it, the Schutzbund could not have been automatically relied 
upon voluntarily to keep the peace.  As for the Heimwehr, Dollfuß was simply not in a 
position to force the neutralization of his coalition partners, however desirable an aim.  
That would have to wait until 1936.  It was only then that Schuschnigg would find himself 
in a strong enough position owing to, according to British sources, ‘the growth in 
efficiency of the army and the introduction of universal service’ to finally disband this last 
paramilitary formation by absorbing it into the Vaterländische Front.509  In 1932 Dollfuß 
desperately needed to keep the Heimwehr in his pro-Austrian front, though it is worth 
noting that ultimately Schuschnigg did carry out their promised move against the 
Heimwehr: on 10 October 1936 all paramilitary organizations were finally dissolved.510 
 This, of course, raises the question of why Dollfuß actually entrusted Fey with the 
role in the first place, a move that saw a militant opponent of the Social Democrats 
promoted to the centre of the state apparatus.511  He did so, quite simply, because of 
intense pressure from the Heimwehr, which threatened to withdraw its support for the 
government, sabotaging the League of Nations bailout package – the raison d'être of the 
Dollfuß government – if their demands for concessions, which included entrusting a 
member of the Heimwehr with the security portfolio, were not met.  Forced into a corner, 
Dollfuß attempted to outmanoeuvre the Heimwehr by approaching the Greater Germans 
once again with the request to support his government – this time, asking von Papen in 
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Germany to intervene via the German Minister to Austria, Kurt Rieth – but the Greater 
Germans, once again, refused. 512   Without Heimwehr support, the government was 
doomed, the loan imperilled and Austria’s independent existence threatened; with no 
room to manoeuvre, Dollfuß conceded to their demands. 
 As 1932 drew to a close, and with an economically hard winter approaching, it was 
deemed particularly important that the government prevent anything that could 
exacerbate the prevalent militant political atmosphere.513  Increasingly, the thoughts of the 
government turned to a thoroughgoing de-politicization of the public domain to deal with 
the unrest.  Again, this might sound like the standard excuse of right-wing politicians keen 
to disempower their political rivals but this ignores that this was a state in real trouble: 
Austria really had become a tinderbox just waiting for a spark.  Parliamentary deadlock 
had made solving the root of the escalating crisis, the disastrous economic situation, nigh 
on impossible.  The experience of Lausanne – where, despite the real threat of state 
bankruptcy and even collapse, the opposition had refused to help the Christian 
Social-dominated government for party-political reasons – shows us that there was some 
truth in the Christian Social claim that Austria was being held to ransom by a ‘wild party 
fanaticism’, which put the interests of the party above all else:  Austrian politics had 
become a ‘Fahnenfrage’, rather than about ruling in the best interests of the state.514 
 The Christian Socials’ response involved, in part, reclaiming the public arena for 
the perpetuation and celebration of the Austrian idea.  This was exemplified in the debate 
surrounding whether or not the government should allow the Social Democrats to hold 
their annual rally to mark the proclamation of the Republic on 12 November, bearing in 
mind the tense atmosphere on the streets and the fact that the Nazis intended to hold a 
rally the same day.515  Although under pressure from the Heimwehr to ban the march, as 
well as being visibly angry at the Social Democrats following, as it did, in the immediate 
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wake of a particularly acrimonious fallout with Otto Bauer during a debate in the 
Nationalrat, Dollfuß was of the opinion that the march should be allowed, albeit under 
certain conditions to ensure the maintenance of law and order.516  However, the palpable 
desire to put an end to the march was not simply about disenfranchising the Social 
Democrats; there was a wider issue at stake.  Such rallies, which should be something in 
which all parties could participate, were no longer, Schuschnigg argued, held in celebration 
of the Austrian state, but rather republican holidays had been usurped by political parties 
– meaning the Social Democrats – for their own purposes and had become purely party 
affairs.517  He was correct in his assertion – every 12 November, the Social Democrats 
called their supporters out onto the streets, yet they did so to celebrate the ‘revolution’ 
of 1918, the fall of the monarchy and declaration of a Republic, not the declaration of the 
Austrian state, which remained a mere means to an end, the end being Socialism.518 
 For the Christian Socials the answer to the problems that Austria faced was not to 
be found in caustic and divisive party politics – at which the Nazis evidently excelled – but 
in rallying the population to uphold an independent Austrian state that was otherwise 
heading towards catastrophe; the wellbeing of the state, the Reichspost argued, had to take 
precedence over egocentric party interests.519  And while one could argue that the 
Christian Socials’ interest in maintaining Austrian independence was also ‘egocentric’, the 
fact remains that putting the survival of the state above individual party interests is a 
fundamental precept of any functioning democratic state.  Ultimately, it is against this 
backdrop that the government’s declaration on the proroguing of parliament just a few 
months later, in the wake of the Nazi ‘Machtergreifung’ in Germany, is best understood: 
Es geht ums Ganze!  Bei Gott nicht um Personen oder deren kleine Interessen.  Auch die Parteifrage 
ist keineswegs im Vordergrund.  Oesterreich steht auf dem Spiel.520 
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Chapter 4 
‘...Auf so unsichere Kantonisten kann sich Oesterreich in 
seinem Daseinskampf nicht verlassen’: 
Relations with the Social Democrats 
The issue of whether the fight against Social Democracy undermined the struggle against 
National Socialism is central to assessments of the Dollfuß era.  It is important because it 
is argued that Dollfuß’s overriding antagonism was towards the left, and that the 
government’s failure to distinguish National Socialism as the ‘real’ danger ultimately 
destroyed Austria’s capacity to defend itself against the Nazi threat.521  In launching a ‘war 
on two fronts’, against Socialists on the left and the Nazis on the right, Dollfuß, it is 
charged, actually weakened the Austrian state and in crushing Social Democracy he wilfully 
destroyed the only credible ally in the fight against National Socialism.  Moreover, while 
Dollfuß was uncompromising in his refusal to work together with the Social Democrats, 
he was, it seems, willing to do a deal with the Nazis and apparently even to bring them 
into government.522  Contrary to the claims of those who see the Dollfuß government as a 
‘defensive bastion’ against Nazi Germany, this interpretation maintains that Dollfuß and his 
government initially saw the National Socialists as allies in their anti-Marxist struggle and 
that the attempt to come to terms with them was motivated by the ideological parallels in 
their respective programmes.  Mcloughlin, for example, suggests that the aim of the 
Dollfuß government was to smash the Social Democrats and come to an agreement with 
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the Nazis523.  And as Maderthaner puts it, ‘it is one of those ironies of history that it was 
Dollfuß’s untiring efforts to reach an agreement that revealed almost a family closeness 
[familiäre Affinität] between the Christian Social right and the National Socialists – in 
marked contrast to the policies pursued against the Social Democrats’.524  Thus, there are 
two issues at stake here.  The first is why Dollfuß refused to work together with the 
Social Democrats as that provided, by all accounts, the only hope of protecting Austria 
from a Nazi takeover.  The second is why Dollfuß instead chose to negotiate with the 
Austrian NSDAP, and why – or indeed whether – he was ultimately prepared to do a deal 
with Hitler. 
                                            
523 See: Barry McLoughlin, 'Arbeiterschaft und die Gewaltpraxis der NSDAP', 66. 
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Eine staatsbejahende Partei? 
Although Dollfuß had been on reasonable terms with the Social Democrats before 
assuming the Chancellorship, relations between the government and the opposition 
were immediately tarnished by the vote of no-confidence and only deteriorated as the 
year 1932 progressed.  The experience of Lausanne, followed by the Hirtenberger 
affair as well as the provocative stance of the Christian Socials’ junior coalition 
partners, the Heimwehr, certainly contributed to the escalating alienation between the 
two parties.  While the Social Democrats became increasingly agitated by the presence 
of the Heimwehr in the government and alarmed at the use of anti-democratic 
measures to combat the economic crisis, Dollfuß and the Christian Socials became 
increasingly frustrated with the dogged intransigence demonstrated by the left toward 
the catastrophic problems that the state faced.  Nonetheless, the lines of 
communication between the two groups remained open, with negotiations taking place 
between the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats in August 1932, including 
personal negotiations between Dollfuß and Bauer.525  However, in the autumn the 
conflict erupted, taking on a very personal note when, in the course of a particularly 
rancorous parliamentary debate, Otto Bauer accused Dollfuß of being an opportunist; 
Dollfuß retorted that Bauer had always been a ‘Bolshevik’, and had never truly 
professed himself to democracy.526  Dollfuß never forgave Bauer the insult. 
 This acrimonious exchange points to the deep ideological barriers impeding an 
agreement between the two parties.  In the language of Austrian political Catholicism, 
the term ‘Bolshevik’ was frequently used to refer to Socialists and Communists alike.527  
Of course, the problem with this interpretation is that we know that the Social 
Democrats were not ‘Bolsheviks’ in the manner that the term is today understood.  
Yet it must be remembered that Austrian Social Democracy was much more heavily 
influenced by Marxist thinking than, for example, the interwar British Labour Party.  
Austro-Marxist policy, while not synchronized with that of Moscow, remained 
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committed to the revolutionary character of Marxism and occupied a mediating 
position and a ‘third way’ between Soviet Bolshevism and Western revisionist 
socialism. 
 This meant that Austro-Marxism appeared radical in its aims, while cautious in 
its methods: capitalism had to be endured for the time being, but the ultimate 
objective was, the Arbeiter-Zeitung declared, its complete overthrow.528  Indeed, Social 
Democratic rhetoric was far more radical than that of the German Social Democrats, 
in part to take the wind out of the Communists’ sails, the result of which was an 
Austrian Communist party that was electorally insignificant during the interwar years.  
Indeed, it was this ‘verbal radicalism’ which some argue successfully prevented a split 
within the Austrian Social Democratic movement.529  The problem was, Otto Bauer’s 
talk of the ‘collectivization of the means of production’, the socialization of industry 
and large estates, the formation of agricultural collectives and the elimination of private 
agricultural trade, may have been ‘as far as contemporary Marxism was concerned, a 
relatively moderate form of socialization’ but it was still radical enough to alarm the 
Christian Social electorate, who, quite naturally, took the Austro-Marxists at their 
word.530  As the Reichspost pointed out in October 1932, the Social Democrats had 
themselves admitted during the election campaign that they had adopted or realized 
ninety per cent of the Communists’ programme.531 
 This election slogan cannot simply be explained as political posturing to weaken 
the Communists’ appeal.  The Social Democrats’ commitment to the Marxist model, 
the championing of the revolutionary class struggle and the expropriation of capitalist 
property, as well as the allusions to a proletarian dictatorship in the ‘Linz Programme’ 
of 1926 were bound to be perceived by the bourgeoisie as a declaration of class war.  
Interestingly enough, Christian Social assessments of the German Social Democrats 
differed sharply.  Unlike the Austro-Marxists, the Reichspost argued, German Social 
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Democrats, on the whole, fiercely rejected ‘Bolshevism’.532  A ‘staatsbejahende Partei’, it 
continued, the German Socialists had willingly sacrificed their own popularity to 
participate in the reconstruction efforts of the post-war period.533 
 The ‘July Revolt’ of 15 July 1927 only served to confirm bourgeois suspicions.  
It began in response to the acquittal of three members of the right-wing Frontkämpfer 
association for the shooting of two bystanders, a war invalid and an eight-year-old boy, 
during an altercation with members of the Republikanischer Schutzbund in Schattendorf, 
Burgenland, earlier that year. 534  In Vienna, a spontaneous demonstration against the 
verdict – accompanied by a general strike – caught political leaders on all sides, as well 
as the police, off guard and quickly escalated out of control.  Perceiving parliament to 
be under threat, mounted policemen charged against the crowd.  Some of the crowd 
then stormed the Wiener Justizpalast, setting it alight.  A heavy-handed police response 
resulted in approximately 90 fatalities.  In eyewitness Elias Canetti’s words, it was, ‘the 
closest thing to a revolution that I have physically experienced.  Since then, I have 
known quite precisely that I would not have to read a single word about the storming 
of the Bastille’.535 
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Figure 3: Vienna, 15 July 1927 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv) 
 
Figure 4: ‘The closest thing to a revolution that I have physically experienced’.  The burning of the Justizpalast 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv) 
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Dollfuß’s accusation about Bauer’s commitment to the democratic system also 
demands further examination.  While Dollfuß’s actions in March 1933 and then 
February 1934 provide firm evidence that he had given up on democracy, the question 
of what future for democracy the Social Democrats themselves envisaged also needs 
to be asked.  For many Social Democrats, democracy was not the ultimate goal but a 
transitional phase and the democratic Republic, declared on 12 November 1918, a 
means to an end: the end being Socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.536  
‘Jetzt gilt es, die Machtmittel, die uns die Demokratie gibt, zu gebrauchen für die 
Ueberwindung der Kapitalsherrschaft!’ the Arbeiter-Zeitung declared on 
13 November 1918, the day after two people died when red guards attempted to 
storm parliament during the declaration of the Republic.537  As Hanisch notes, for Otto 
Bauer, democracy was not about the ‘peaceful equalization of social interests’.538  It 
was not about sharing power with the bourgeoisie, but securing a majority over them 
and using this majority to topple the capitalist system.  In the event of the seizure of 
power by a proletarian majority in democratic elections, the workers, Bauer argued, 
might well have to defend their newly conquered position against the deposed 
bourgeoisie.  Indeed, a democratic parliament could have to resort to dictatorial or 
even terrorist measures in the face of sabotage and active resistance on the part of the 
bourgeoisie.  One could call this a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, Bauer continued, 
yet it would not be the same as a Bolshevik dictatorship, he maintained, on the 
grounds that it would not be against democracy, but a ‘dictatorship of democracy’.  
Yet one simply cannot use a word like dictatorship and at the same time claim you are 
a democrat.  And as Hanisch observes, when Bauer talks of a ‘dictatorship of 
democracy’, he is only thinking of the seizure of power for the proletariat by 
democratic means – he is not thinking about the possibility that these representatives 
of the proletariat would be voted out of office, an attitude that invariably contributed 
to the fear among the bourgeoisie that Social Democracy would not only ‘burn down 
the churches and seize the farmers’ land’ if it came to power, but also rob them of 
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their political rights.539  In the light of such statements Social Democratic commitment 
to democracy seemed to their Christian Social contemporaries no more than skin 
deep. 
 
Figure 5: The proclamation of the Republik Deutschösterreich on 12 November 1918 
(Rudolf Konopa, Wien Museum, Karlsplatz) 
 This impression was exacerbated by the provocative and intimidating presence 
of the Republikanischer Schutzbund, the increasingly autonomous armed wing of the 
Social Democratic Party which was maintained to guarantee the Socialists’ political 
security in Vienna, but symbolized to the inhabitants of Döbling or the Innere Stadt the 
constant and unrelenting threat of violent action, just as the Viennese Social 
Democrats looked anxiously at the ‘black army’ ranged against them in the Lower 
Austrian countryside. 540   In reality, extremist ideology, revolutionary propaganda, 
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inflammatory Marxist rhetoric and threats of armed resistance contrasted with relative 
moderation in practical affairs, but led the Austrian middle-classes to fear a proletarian 
revolution if the Socialists ever came to power.541  While scholars are certainly aware 
of the psychological impact of the ideological and rhetorical excesses of the left upon 
their bourgeois opponents, as well as the fact that there was a genuine fear of Socialist 
rule amongst Austria’s middle classes, the impact has often been downplayed or has 
been discussed as though the phenomenon had no bearing on Dollfuß’s actions.542  
Ultimately, the Socialists’ strategy of fusing ‘sober Realpolitik with revolutionary 
enthusiasm’ was implemented to disastrous effect.  While many may consider the 
theory of a slow revolution towards a socialist society a respectable one, it was a 
barrier to compromise with the bourgeoisie, precluding, for example, the formation of 
a coalition government with the Christian Socials.  Moreover, whilst it may be clear to 
the historian that the revolutionary rhetoric of the Austro-Marxists concealed a more 
temperate beast, this was simply not so obvious to the frightened middle classes of the 
thirties, whose memories of the Russian revolution and, even closer to home, 
revolutions in the Soviet Republics of Bavaria and Hungary in 1918–19, were still very 
real. 
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‘So reimen sich heute Nationalsozialismus und Marxismus in Österreich zusammen’ 
There was a further reason for the deterioration in relations between the Christian 
Socials and the Social Democrats; the two ‘Socialisms’ appeared to have joined forces.  
Rather than coming to the aid of the beleaguered government, the Socialists and the 
Nazis were seen to be working together in ‘an unholy alliance’ to bring it down.543  The 
Reichspost noted how: 
Im niederösterreichischen Landtag, wie im Bundesrat, im Stadtschulrat wie in den kommunalen 
Ausschüssen, zum Teil auch in den Bezirksvertretungen stimmen Marx-Sozialisten und 
Hitler-Sozialisten miteinander, daß es eine Freude und ein Skandal ist.  Sie schreien einander zwar 
ins Gesicht, und fletschen grimmig die Zähne – derlei macht sich gut fürs Publikum – aber beim 
Abstimmen sind sie Brüderlein und Schwesterlein, sind sie beide Sozialisten und halten gegen die 
Antimarxisten zusammen.544 
Even allowing for a degree of political posturing on the part of the Christian Social 
Party, this accusation is not so easily dismissed.  On numerous occasions the Social 
Democratic leadership followed a strategy that dovetailed with that of the Nazis: the 
joint call for new elections in April 1932 – despite the fact this would bring the Nazis 
into the Nationalrat – their common stance on Lausanne and their unqualified public 
opposition to the Dollfuß government.  The perception that the Nazis and ‘Sozis’ were 
working together against the government continued into 1933, fuelled no doubt by the 
fact that on 18 March 1933 (in the days following the proroguing of parliament), the 
Social Democrats had, together with the National Socialists the Styrian Heimatschutz 
and the Greater Germans (both of whom were now displaying increasingly pro-Nazi 
tendencies), passed a vote of no confidence in the ‘clerico-fascist’ government in the 
Bundesrat.545 
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 In effect, the Socialists aligned themselves with the National Socialists; the two 
opposition parties shared a common goal – bringing down the Dollfuß government – 
and thus, a common enemy.  As the Reichspost noted in May 1932, ‘the National 
Socialists political watchword “Down with the Dollfuß government!”’ was scarcely 
different to that of the Social Democrats. 546   This does not negate the Social 
Democrats’ rejection of National Socialism as an ideology, yet it does suggest that they 
were not averse to the idea of joining forces with the Nazis, or at least using them for 
their own ends, if it meant scuppering Dollfuß. 547  Their reckless behaviour towards 
the Nazis and the threat they posed certainly confirms McLoughlin’s conclusion that, 
during 1932, Social Democratic activists did not attach enough importance to the 
struggle against National Socialism.548  It also raises a number of important questions 
about the way in which historians judge the period.  Could one not also argue, on the 
basis of such evidence, that the Social Democrats were also, to a degree, ambivalent 
towards the National Socialists, a charge that is often brought against Dollfuß?  And 
does the proximity of aims between the two parties challenge explanations that trace 
the drift towards National Socialism within the Social Democratic milieu solely back to 
the alienation caused by the actions of the Dollfuß government?  In his memoirs, for 
example, Kreisky maintained that the events of February 1934 were such a heavy blow 
to the Social Democrats and the working classes that it was considered the key 
confrontation of the era, as opposed to Hitler’s invasion in 1938.549  Thus, Kreisky 
argued, a certain tendency, above all amongst the militant wing of the Social 
Democratic party to ‘hanker after the brown shirts’ could be explained ‘as a form of 
revenge borne of defeat’ and the belief that Nazis would get rid of ‘the Dollfuß-regime’ 
once and for all. 550   While there may be some truth in this explanation, the 
synchronicities highlighted make it unlikely that this was the only factor at play.  After 
all, Kreisky himself admitted that the German national sentiment of the Nazis ‘did not 
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bother us in the same way as the clericalism of the blacks’.551  Whilst time and again 
historians raise the question of which opponent the government saw as their main 
adversary, the National Socialists or the Social Democrats, – and often get it wrong – 
they fail to ask the very same question of Austrian Social Democracy.552  Not out of 
some misguided attempt to ‘balance’ the books, but because historians are duty bound 
to pose such questions, even when, – indeed especially when – the answers prove 
difficult. 
 In Austria, this perception was compounded by the fact that, in the eyes of the 
bourgeois right, the ‘Hitler-Sozialisten’ and the ‘Marx-Sozialisten’ shared considerable 
common ground. 553   On the one hand there were the perceived programmatic 
overlaps between the two movements – the socialism in National Socialism epitomized 
in anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois and revolutionary sentiment.  On the other there was 
the fact that both were historically deutschnational in outlook, and, therefore, staunchly 
pro-Anschluss.554  Hence, Dollfuß’s assertion that the Nazis were, in essence, an 
amalgam of socialism and German nationalism: ‘Rot und Blau gemischt ergibt Braun’.555  
The latter meant that the primary concern of the government – the maintenance of 
Austrian independence – was fundamentally at odds with the policies espoused by both 
the Social Democrats and the National Socialists.  Here, the Reichspost: 
Es hat eine Zeit gegeben in der Austromarxisten wie Nationalsozialisten einander zublinzelnd 
versicherten, sie seien bereit, “sich mit Tod und Teufel zu verbinden”, um zu verhindern, daß 
Oesterreich ein selbständiger Staat bleibe, und zu erzwingen, daß es ein “Bestandteil” der 
deutschen Republik werde.556 
Only when the Republic became the Third Reich, the Reichspost charged, did the 
Austrian Social Democrats decide to – temporarily – shelve their plans for Anschluss.  
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Yet the Social Democrats still rejected on principle the ‘Austrian idea’ espoused by the 
Dollfuß government, the Arbeiter-Zeitung declaring at the end of February 1933: 
Wir deutschösterreichischen Sozialdemokraten sind nicht wie die Christlichsozialen, 
österreichische Partikularisten.  Wir sind nicht wie Sie gesonnen, der großen Schicksals- und 
Kulturgemeinschaft des Deutschen Volkes die bodenständige Spezialität eines “österreichischen 
Menschen” entgegenzustellen.557 
The strength of feeling within the Socialist party on this issue is demonstrated by the 
fact that, according to Utgaard, even post-1945 with the crimes of Nazism exposed to 
the world, ‘many in the Socialist Party were against Hurdes’ conservative vision of 
creating “unconditional Austrians”’; Hurdes was the ÖVP Minister for Education from 
1945–52 and ‘a leading proponent of “Austrianism”’.558  Many years later, the failure of 
Austrian Social Democracy to recognize the necessity of the defence of Austrian 
independence also from the point of view of the existence of an Austrian nation was 
deemed a critical mistake.559  In 1933, this did nothing to dispel the impression that the 
Socialists could not be relied upon to fight for Austrian independence: ‘Auf so 
unsichere Kantonisten kann sich Oesterreich in seinem Daseinskampf nicht 
verlassen’.560  Hence, the Christian Socials’ argument that the conflict was not simply 
between left and right, but between those who were ‘aufbauwillig’ and those who were 
set on destroying the Austrian state.561 
 The issue of Austrian independence is central to understanding the mounting 
political hostility during 1932 as well as Dollfuß’s reluctance to rely on the left for 
support, and yet, it is almost wholly overlooked in accounts of the period.  Those who 
argue that a Social Democratic government, or Social Democratic participation in 
government could have saved Austria from the Anschluss do not consider one crucial 
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fact: unlike the SPD in Germany, the Austrian Social Democrats were not the Austrian 
Republic’s ‘last loyal prop’ and unlike their rivals, the Christian Socials, they didn’t even 
come close to accepting the idea of an independent Austrian state during the interwar 
period; indeed they were actively working to dismantle it.562  That Anschluss remained 
a central tenet of the Austrian Socialists’ programme through to the 1940s has been 
obscured by the ostensible ‘removal’ of the Anschluss clause from the Socialists’ 
programme in 1933 in response to the growing threat of Nazi Germany: in actual fact, 
Anschluss with a free and peaceful Germany remained the party’s objective.563  Or, as 
Otto Bauer responded to the news of Anschluss in 1938: 
die Parole, die wir der Fremdherrschaft der faschistischen Satrapen aus dem Reiche über 
Österreich entgegensetzen, kann nicht die reaktionäre Parole der Wiederherstellung der 
Unabhängigkeit Österreichs sein, sondern nur die revolutionäre Parole der gesamtdeutschen 
Revolution.564 
On 1 April 1938, the Auslandsvertretung der österreichischen Sozialisten (AVOES), 
established by Otto Bauer, Friedrich Adler and Joseph Buttinger, declared in the 
Brüsseler Resolution the Anschluss an irrevocable fait accompli, which should remain in 
place after the fall of the Hitler regime, a stance that should shed some light on the 
Social Democrats actual level of commitment to Austrian independence since the 
apparent renunciation of Anschluss in 1933.565  And although the war years initiated a 
change in attitude towards Anschluss within the Social Democratic party, not all Social 
Democrats were equally convinced. 566   Friedrich Adler, for example, son of 
Viktor Adler, one of the founding fathers of the Social Democratic movement, 
remained committed to the Brüsseler Resolution even after the Moscow Declaration of 
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1943 and on into the post-war period.567  Despite the official party line avoiding any 
discussion of the ‘national question’ after 1945 – Otto Bauer, its leading proponent, 
had died in 1938 – the großdeutsch tradition lived on within sections of the party until 
at least the 1960s. 
 This surely raises a wider question of whether the Socialists’ relentless 
pro-Anschluss propaganda during the twenties, as well as their failure to endorse the 
state from its inception, or to take political responsibility for it thereafter, actually 
prepared the ground for the National Socialists, handing them a population receptive 
to their ‘Anschluss’ rallying cry.  That Bauer himself was certainly aware of this 
outcome is evident from his assertion, ‘that we [the Social Democrats] have created 
the desire for Anschluss in this people’.568  Although Mihli’s study makes it markedly 
clear that it was thanks to Social Democracy that the Anschluss idea became the First 
Republic’s raison d'être, when discussing the factors that contributed to the collapse of 
the Austrian state, contemporary historians tend to prefer to emphasize the lack of 
democratic government as the main contributory factor.569 
 The fierce anti-clericalism of both movements also played a key role.  During 
the First Republic a ferocious Kulturkampf raged between the Austrian Social 
Democratic movement and the Church, a struggle that was primarily played out in the 
social arena – school reform, abortion, divorce, cremation – a position that softened 
considerably post-1945.570  So bitter was the conflict, that even Socialists have since 
admitted that the zeal with which Austrian Social Democracy pursued their 
anti-clerical goals in the interwar years made the Social Democrats appear to be 
‘half-Bolsheviks’ to the middle-classes.571  This was, the Reichspost noted, the primary 
reason why Catholics rejected ‘Hitler-Socialism’ and ‘Marxian-Socialism’ in equal 
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measure. 572   In addition, both groups were virulently anti-Habsburg and had a 
pathological fear of restoration.573  Hitler’s intense dislike of all things Habsburg is well 
documented and hatred of the Habsburgs among Social Democratic circles was so 
strong that they deemed Anschluss with Nazi Germany ‘no worse than a position of 
vassalage to Fascist Italy, union with counter-revolutionary Hungary or a Habsburg 
Restoration’.574  Unsurprisingly, this attitude did not sit easily with the pro-Habsburg (if 
not necessarily pro-restoration) posture of broad sections of the Christian Social Party, 
as well as the strong monarchist tendencies within the Heimwehr.  Interestingly enough, 
in his study of the Völkische Beobachter’s attempt to woo Austrian workers after the 
Anschluss, Schwarz details how anti-clericalism in general, opposition to the Catholic 
Church in particular, and opposition to the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy 
were all useful propaganda tools in the fight to win over Austrian workers.575 
 This failure on the part of the Social Democrats to adequately assess the nature 
of the Nazi threat continued past the Nazi takeover in Germany on 30 January 1933.  
In September of that year, Karl Renner was still arguing that the Austrian Socialists 
were ‘fortunate’ to be faced with two ‘fascisms’ that were fighting one another.  ‘We 
must tell the workers’, he continued, ‘that we are dealing with two types of fascism, 
and that they are both as bad as one another’, and we ‘must establish which one of 
them will be better for us’.576  This in September 1933.  In Austria, the Nazis had 
responded to the political checkmate of March 1933 with a bombing campaign and a 
wave of terror, generously supported with ammunition and supplies from over the 
border.  In Germany the Reichstag had long since burnt down, all civil liberties had 
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been suspended indefinitely, the ‘Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil 
Service’ had been passed, removing Jewish and ‘politically unreliable’ civil servants from 
state service, as had the ‘sterilization law’, the first stage of the Nazi eugenics 
programme, not to mention the fact that the SPD had been banned, all trade union 
property seized, and a not insignificant number of Social Democratic functionaries 
arrested and carted off to impromptu concentration camps.577  By this juncture the 
Socialists had a good idea about what exactly this entailed.  If anyone was still in any 
doubt, just one month earlier the Reichspost had published a report on life in a German 
concentration camp.  In it a camp inmate, beaten until his teeth fell out, described how 
the ‘hell’ of life in the camps, the beatings and violence and summary executions were 
in no way exaggerated.578 
 Whatever the Dollfuß ‘regime’ was, it was not of the same ilk as the 
murderous Nazi regime.  There is no convincing comparison to be made between the 
situation in Nazi Germany and that in Austria in September 1933 and, on some level, 
the Socialists must have recognized this.  In March 1933 Otto Bauer himself was of the 
opinion that the policy of the Christian Social Party and the Chancellor was ‘controlled 
by their fear of the rise of the National Socialists’.579  For that reason, and as the British 
Minister pointed out, during 1933 ‘a certain amount of private bargaining between 
Dr. Dollfuss and the Socialist leaders took place’ and that ‘rather than sacrifice the 
Chancellor and themselves to the Nazis – the Socialists preferred to offer no 
resistance to Major Fey and his more anti-Socialist colleagues in the Cabinet’.580  Yet 
this did not manifest itself in concrete public support.  Of course, the Social 
Democratic leadership were also on the horns of a dilemma, for if they abandoned 
their verbal extremism against the Dollfuß government they too risked losing some of 
their support base to the Nazis and the KPÖ.  They were very much aware that 
Dollfuß was walking a political tightrope, trying to keep his cabinet together, so much 
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so that he felt ‘unable to speak officially with the Social Democrats’ because previous 
discussions with Danneberg had enraged the Heimwehr.581  Dollfuß was ‘walking on 
eggshells’ as Renner put it; always ‘evasive’, Dollfuß maintained that he had to 
manoeuvre, but always with the assurance that ‘afterwards, they would be satisfied 
with what he had done’.582  The fact remains that, although parliamentary government 
had been suspended and basic democratic freedoms curbed, Dollfuß was actually the 
dam between a Heimwehr or a Nazi dictatorship and, in the case of the latter, the total 
annihilation of the left.  Dollfuß’s exceedingly difficult position also saw him trapped by 
the Heimwehr extremists in his cabinet and pressured by Italy to push to extremes 
measures against the Socialists.  He had little room to manoeuvre.  If he negotiated 
with the left, his anti-Nazi front would collapse like a pack of cards and he would be 
lost.  Without the Heimwehr he was lost, and without Dollfuß, the British Minister 
argued, the struggle against Hitlerite Germany was lost; ‘were [he] to disappear there 
would be no one to take his place’.583 
 Although under pressure to keep the Heimwehr in government during 1932 on 
account of the Lausanne loan, for the Dollfuß government, the Nazi Machtergreifung in 
Germany and the almost immediate assault on Austrian sovereignty was a 
game-changer.  From this point on, keeping his government afloat became of 
paramount importance for Dollfuß.  A representative of the British Foreign Office 
concluded in April 1933 that there were ‘only two present alternatives to Dr Dollfuß’ 
government’: 
The first would be some government in which the Austrian Socialists participated or had the 
upper hand.  Such a government would presumably govern by parliamentary methods but they 
could not conceivably keep Austria on the straight and narrow financially and the ensuing 
economic and financial chaos would surely play into the hands of those who desire to alter the 
present frontiers of Europe, if necessary by force.  The only other alternative that I can see 
would be a dictatorship following upon a Heimwehr or Nazi coup d'état.  On the whole peace and 
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stability are less likely to be endangered by the continuance of Dr Dollfuß’ present regime than 
by a change in either of the directions indicated above.584 
The problem was, that now he was stuck on this path, the further Dollfuß proceeded 
down it, the narrower it became.  Essentially held to ransom by his coalition partners, 
throughout 1933, Dollfuß tried to extricate himself from the Heimwehr’s grip without, 
however, sending them into the arms of the Nazis.  In the wake of a mass Heimwehr 
rally held at Schönbrunn Palace in May 1933 to commemorate the liberation of the city 
from the Turks – an official government event and ostensibly public demonstration of 
solidarity between Dollfuß and Starhemberg – Dollfuß began to support Schuschnigg’s 
Ostmärkische Sturmscharen as a potential counterweight to the Heimwehr. 585  The 
formation of the Vaterländische Front on 20 May 1933 can also be understood as an 
attempt to diminish the Heimwehr’s monopoly, with rumours surfacing that Dollfuß 
intended ‘to attempt to arm and equip the “patriotic front” in order to do without 
Heimwehr support’ – this was finally realized with the formation of the Frontmiliz in 
October 1936. 586   Bärnthaler reveals how the Heimwehr were suspicious of the 
Vaterländische Front from the beginning, Starhemberg initially instructing the 
Heimatschutz not to show support for the movement.587  And in early 1934, when, 
according to British sources, Dollfuß was put under pressure by the Heimwehr to 
dissolve the Christian Social Party – the British Minister reveals how the Heimwehr 
mobilized 8,000 men in Tyrol to ensure that their demands were executed –, he 
responded to this pressure from his recalcitrant coalition partners by appealing ‘for the 
support of “those sections of the population which for class-war reasons have hitherto 
stood aloof from the government’s followers,”’ – to wit, ‘the workers’, to which, ‘the 
Social Democratic leaders issued a not unfriendly reply’.  Unfortunately, the 
Ambassador notes, ‘the subsequent course of events [the February ‘civil war’] nipped 
in the bud any possible further attempts at rapprochement’.588  Despite the fact that 
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the desire to reduce the direct influence of the Heimwehr can be understood as a 
positive development, some historians have chosen instead to portray the removal of 
power from the Heimwehr in 1936 from an anti-democratic perspective, suggesting that 
their elimination led not to an opening up of the ‘system’ but to greater concentration 
of power with the Chancellor.589 
 By the autumn of that year, Dollfuß was being pushed on an increasingly rightist 
course.  On 11 September, Dollfuß, spurred on by Mussolini, announced in his 
infamous Trabrennplatzrede on the occasion of a mass meeting of the Vaterländische 
Front, the formation of a ‘social, Christian, German state’, to be formed ‘on a 
corporate basis with a strong, authoritarian leadership’.  Later that month, the 
Heimwehr succeeded in forcing the Landbund out of coalition, significantly weakening 
Dollfuß’s basis of support.590  According to one Heimwehr source, Starhemberg told 
Dollfuß ‘that unless he formed a non-party government and dismissed Winkler and 
Vaugoin the Heimwehr would cease to support the Vaterländische Front591.  In the weeks 
that followed, an internment camp was set up in Wöllersdorf to detain Nazi agitators 
– this was its primary function until the Schutzbund revolt the following year, a fact that 
is not adequately echoed in Austrian public consciousness which sees it as a camp set 
up to detain Social Democrats.592  Its first inmates, 11 Nazis, were received on 
17 October 1933. 593   As one author, writing in the publication of the 
Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes notes, in Wöllersdorf 
detainees were not starved, tortured or murdered and mentally ill inmates received 
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medical attention.594  This is an important distinction that is brushed aside by those 
who seek to maintain arguments that the Austrian ‘regime’ was milder than its Nazi 
counterpart are factually irrelevant. 595   Certain of these measures being taken 
‘ostensibly for the purpose of holding in check Nazi activities’, were giving rise to much 
discontent among the Socialists, who naturally watched these developments with 
concern. 596   Arguing that Dollfuß had fallen under the Heimwehr’s influence, the 
Socialists threatened armed resistance if certain steps were taken against the Socialist 
administration, the trade unions or the political parties, despite ‘fully realising that this 
might result in throwing the door open to the Nazis, and lead to the Nazi domination 
of Austria’.597  The British Foreign Office counselled restraint, ‘in the hope that some 
diversion might occur to relieve the present tension, which was’, Selby argued, ‘in the 
main due to Hitler’s agitation and Hitler’s determination to become master of 
Austria’.598  Dollfuß, he pointed out, was manoeuvring in a very difficult position, there 
was simply no-one else capable of holding the Austrian situation, and any precipitate 
action on the part of the Socialists could have disastrous consequences and might 
easily lead to civil war.  The Austrian Socialists were clearly ‘on the horns of a 
dilemma’; they had to choose between the danger of a gradual whittling away of their 
rights and privileges by Dollfuss, or the prospect of a complete annihilation by 
Hitler’.599 
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 Dollfuß did not enthusiastically concede to Heimwehr demands.  Pushed by 
them towards greater persecution of the left, Dollfuß was deemed by British observers 
to be endeavouring to steer a middle course; he had, for example, not instituted those 
anti-Socialist measures most feared by the Socialists and more desired by the 
Heimwehr, such as driving ‘the “reds” out of the Town Hall’.600  In addition, he had not 
prohibited the Trade Union congress or the Socialist meeting in Vienna.601  Selby was 
of the same mind as his French and ‘even’ his Czech colleagues; that although Dollfuß 
was ‘strongly Catholic and anti-Marxist’ he did not wish to push matters with the 
Socialists to any extremes.602  Indeed, he was ‘generally credited with a wish to hold in 
check Heimwehr exuberance’, trying both to curb and control their anti-Marxist 
excesses and to keep them away from the real centres of power; ‘the moderation 
displayed’ was deemed largely ‘attributable to the influence of Dr. Dollfuss 
personally’.603  In the cabinet reshuffle of September 1933, forced by the Heimwehr, 
Dollfuß took ‘the key portfolios of Public Security and Defence’ a move which 
Karl Renner interpreted as ‘a manoeuvre on Dr. Dollfuss’s part to withhold from the 
Vice-Chancellor, Major Fey, the instruments through which the latter might give rein 
to the Heimwehr fascist tendencies which he represented’.604  Not only were Heimwehr 
demands not met in the reshuffle, the army, gendarmerie and the police were no 
longer in their hands.  Fey, who was dismissed from his role as for Minister for Public 
Security, was made Vice-Chancellor, but was not authorized to represent Dollfuß in 
these two areas in his absence.  According to Habicht, writing in December 1933, the 
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Heimwehr leaders were ‘furious at Dollfuss’, for ‘increasingly depriving them of 
influence’.605 
 The Socialist leadership’s failure to communicate the difference between the 
intentions and ethos of the Dollfuß government and those of the Nazi regime to their 
supporters proved to be a catastrophic mistake.  Indeed, it could be argued that in 
conflating the two they actually obscured the danger posed by National Socialism.  
Again, this is something that historians often fail to pick up on.  Although some within 
the Socialist camp realized the need for a unified party line, the Socialist leadership 
failed to get the message across that, without a shadow of a doubt, the Nazis were 
their primary enemy and that the ‘brown plague’ presented the greatest danger.606  
Fear, not of the Nazis, but of a Heimwehr putsch, coloured their response.607  In the 
public arena the party leadership played a dangerous double game.  According to the 
British Embassy, while it was undoubtedly true that, of the two ‘fascisms’ with which 
Dr. Bauer was faced, he ‘naturally’ preferred ‘the milder Austrian type of Dr. Dollfuss 
rather than the brutal brew of Hitler’, this did not, however, ‘prevent him from 
pouring public abuse on the Chancellor, whose collaboration he seeks in private to 
secure’.608  Again, the historiography of the period has largely failed to emphasize this 
point with anything like the clarity of understanding achieved by Phipps. 
 Although another contemporary, Karl Kraus, was in no way an archetypal 
proponent of an alleged ‘right-wing-legitimist-clerico-fascist regime’ swathed in a 
black-gold nostalgia for the lost Empire, this was something that he also picked up on.  
An acerbic critic of old Austria, Kraus was initially no fan of the ‘irksome’ right-wing 
coalition.609  Yet by June 1933 he was praising Dollfuß’s policy as, ‘surprisingly good and 
energetic’, only to astound his readers in July 1934 by declaring his support for Dollfuß, 
declaring,  ‘I fully agree with Dollfuss that parliamentarianism is ineffective against the 
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resurrection of Wotan, democracy fails when faced by the mystery of Blood and Soil’.  
He then launched a blistering attack on the Socialist leadership and their ‘intellectual 
imbecility’, now dictating instructions from their Czech fastness, having left the country 
in the wake of the February Revolt.610  The Socialist leadership, he charged, had failed 
to grasp that the Dollfuß government was by far ‘the lesser evil’.  Here, Kraus 
presenting the view from Brünn[Brno]: 
Die Bestialitäten des Austrofaschismus stehen denen, die der Hitler-faschismus in Deutschland 
begangen hat, in keiner Weise nach.  Nur ein Unterschied besteht zwischen dem schwarzgelben 
und dem braunen Terror: der Hitlerfaschismus bekennt sich wenigstens zynisch zu Gewalt und 
Grausamkeit.  Der Austrofaschismus begleitet alle seine tierischen Schurkereien mit pfäffischen 
Reden über Versöhnung, Friedfertigkeit und Christentum!611 
And that makes Dollfuß more dangerous than Hitler, Kraus mused?  ‘What would have 
happened’, he asks, ‘“over there” [in Germany] if machine guns had been fired from 
Socialist party offices, bearing in mind that a single shot fired in self-defence triggered 
the massacre in Köpenick’.612  The British Embassy concurred with Kraus, certain, that 
if Hitler landed the fish he had been angling for, ‘the Socialists would find that Hitler’s 
little finger, as in the case of Rehaboam, would be thicker than Dollfuß’ loins’.613  To 
Kraus, the ‘two-fascisms’ tactic – we will not join with the ‘black’ or with the ‘brown’ 
fascists; All fascism is our deadly enemy – was an incredibly short-sighted strategy on 
the part of the Socialist leadership.614 
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A United Front? 
What, then, are we to make of the Social Democrats willingness, albeit only if certain 
circumstances were met, to support the Chancellor in his fight against National 
Socialism?  With the proroguing of parliament, the Social Democrats changed their 
stance on co-operating with Dollfuß; conscious that he had been outmanoeuvred, 
Otto Bauer was now ready to negotiate.  In mid-March 1933, he approached the 
Christian Socials with a proposal that both parties work together against the National 
Socialists.  His offer was as follows: ‘peaceful democratic government shall be ensured 
for a period of one to one and a half years by a government in which the Social 
Democrats shall take part or which they shall tolerate even without representation in 
the Cabinet.  In the course of this period national socialism will lose its powers of 
attraction…It will then be possible to hold elections without national socialism 
becoming too strong in Austria’.615  Dollfuß rejected Bauer’s offer on two grounds; 
firstly, any co-operation with the Social Democrats would accelerate the flow of 
Christian Social voters towards the National Socialists and secondly, the Starhemberg 
Heimwehr would go over to the National Socialists if he turned them out of 
government.616  Both fears were warranted, the prevailing consensus being that the 
National Socialist movement had already infiltrated the Christian Social Party and 
Catholic Action; since Seipel’s death, Schmitz argued, we cannot say what the party is 
thinking and what its intentions are.617  Dollfuß knew, the British Minster observed, 
that compromise with Socialism, ‘was the best way of uniting his enemies’.618  Instead, 
Dollfuß declared himself willing to restore parliamentary government if the Social 
Democrats declared themselves willing to vote for far-reaching constitutional reforms.  
The nature of these reforms was not clear, but the Social Democrats suspected that 
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he would demand emergency decree powers for the Federal President on the model 
of article 48 of the German Constitution, something to which the Social Democrats, 
Bauer maintained, would never agree on the grounds that it would make it possible to 
establish fascism in Austria by ‘legal’ methods.  The Social Democratic position 
remained the same up until 1938; the workers would only participate in defending 
Austria against Nazi Germany if its democratic rights were restored, in stark contrast 
to the ‘Popular Front’ strategy advocated by the KPÖ.619  The problem was a return to 
democratic rule also held the door open to the Nazis. 
 On the surface, Bauer’s offer appears to have offered a way out of Dollfuß’s 
predicament that could have provided a democratic solution to the National Socialist 
threat.  Yet, was it realistic?  The British Minister certainly did not think so;  
‘Dr. Bauer’, he wrote to London, ‘cannot seriously imagine that his adversary, 
Dr. Dollfuss, will make the moves suggested in the memorandum’ for ‘if he tried to 
pursue such a policy in present circumstances he would soon be ploughing a lonely 
furrow in a non political field, for nobody in the Christian-Social party would follow 
him as such a course before the elections would spell suicide for that party in favour of 
the National Socialists’.620  Although there is no way of proving if this would have 
actually been the case, we can say that this was a sentiment often repeated: 
…denn ein Zusammengehen der Christlichsozialen mit den Sozialdemokraten würde von großen 
Teilen der nichtmarxistischen Bevölkerung einfach nicht verstanden werden und es würde 
zweifellos eine starke Abwanderung aus dem christlichsozialen Lager zum radikaleren 
Nationalsozialismus bringen, der den entschiedenen Kampf gegen den Marxismus predigt. 621 
As the key thing holding Dollfuß’s disparate coalition partners together was 
anti-Marxism – the Landbund was pro-German so difficult to co-opt under the 
‘Austrian’ banner, unlike parts of the Heimwehr – Dollfuß could not conclude a formal 
alliance with the Social Democrats without bringing his government and therefore his 
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party down.622  If this happened, the Nazis would benefit and Austrian independence 
was imperilled.  So, in an effort to ‘keep [the Christian Socials’] peasant electors 
faithful’, and thus keep them from the clutches of the Nazis, Dollfuß played a tactical 
game which involved ‘seeming (perhaps only outwardly) to oppose and destroy 
“Marxist” socialism in Austria’.623  It was for that reason, Dollfuß admitted to the 
British Minister, that he ‘had to have, as it were, two fronts, one for the purposes of 
combating national socialism and the other for political purposes.’624.  ‘His connexion 
with the Socialists’ – Dollfuß attempted to take the Social Democrats with him – was, 
he added ‘of course, designed to serve the first-mentioned of these’.625. 
 As for the Social Democrats’ offer of a coalition, Bauer, Phipps argued, in 
making the offer and promptly informing Beneš thereof, was merely ‘manoeuvring for 
position’ as he had the previous summer, ‘when he opposed the loan in Vienna and 
urged Socialist support of it in Paris’ in the hope of inducing France and Great Britain 
to intervene on behalf of the Socialists, for whom he ‘affects a sweet reasonableness 
that would soon drop if the old, Red, palmy days returned’.626  Even allowing for the 
possibility that the British Minister could have been misguided in his assessment, the 
fact that, the day before this memorandum was written, the Social Democrats had, 
together with the National Socialists, the Styrian Heimatschutz and the Greater 
Germans passed a vote of no confidence in the government in the Bundesrat, certainly 
suggests that the Socialists had not given up on the idea of bringing the government 
down, even if that meant working together with the Nazis to do so.627  Not only was 
Bauer asking Dollfuß to effectively destroy his own party – a not altogether 
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unfavourable development from the Social Democratic perspective – he was also 
insisting that he sacrifice the Heimwehr in return for the uncertain support of a party 
that had made it its primary objective to bring his government down.  This was a 
gamble that Dollfuß felt he could simply not afford. 
 Central to Dollfuß’s rejection, however, was undoubtedly the increasing show 
of support being afforded him and his circle by Mussolini; Rome was, Joseph Wirth 
informed Bülow at the beginning of April, now ‘watching over the political 
independence of Austria with the greatest attention’.628  A sea-change was taking place 
in Austria; ‘the leadership of Dr. Dollfuß is emerging strongly’, he counselled, ‘he and 
his circle of friends display a very strong attitude’, and are ‘being strongly supported by 
Italy’.629  Yet, Dollfuß was not sidling up to Mussolini in the hope of finding an ally 
against the Social Democrats, or for support in establishing a ‘fascist’ regime.  Rather, 
he looked to Mussolini for support against the obvious threat posed to Austrian 
independence by National Socialist Germany.  Mussolini, the British Minister noted, 
was the key to the Anschluss problem.  For Anschluss to occur it would be necessary 
for Hitler and Mussolini to come to an understanding, ‘for it was hardly to be 
supposed that the former would indulge in a policy of prestige which would not only 
provoke the latter, but would possibly ally him with France in opposing an extension of 
the German Reich to the Brenner’.  In March 1933 Mussolini had made it patently clear 
to Hitler that ‘Italy could never permit Anschluss’, the Italian Ambassador warning the 
German government that it ‘should not encourage too much the cause of national 
socialism in Austria’.630  As such, he had for the time being, locked the door on such a 
solution. 
 Dollfuß could hardly oust the Heimwehr from the government and enter into a 
coalition with the Social Democrats without antagonising Mussolini and, without doubt, 
losing the one ally deemed critical to preventing Anschluss in the process.  Bringing the 
Socialists into government severely limited Dollfuß’s foreign policy options, a fact that 
was obvious to the eagle-eyed Germans: ‘a black-red coalition in Austria – which 
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anyway would hardly be expected to maintain itself in the long-run – would have to be 
aligned with France and the Little Entente; for an Italian-Hungarian or Legitimist 
orientation cannot very well come into consideration for a government under Social 
Democratic leadership’.631  And, as we have seen, a foreign policy leaning on France 
and the Little Entente would hardly have been popular at home.  The Socialists’ 
suggestion was that Austria should instead ‘observe the strictest neutrality’, a 
neutrality that would be underwritten ‘by treaties which shall preserve us [Austria] 
from being drawn into conflicts of the two groups of states and which shall guarantee 
the inviolability of our soil in case of such conflicts’.632  This was all well and good in 
theory but hardly likely to work in practice.  Austria could not hope to stand up to 
Nazi Germany alone, and this would have left her isolated and thus an easy target for 
Nazi aggression.  Moreover, a policy of absolute non-alignment would have been 
useless at preventing Anschluss as its success would have depended upon Germany 
respecting Austria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and refraining from 
interference in her domestic affairs.  Italy would, the British Minister assumed, 
continue to support Dollfuß and the Heimwehr in their fight on two fronts against the 
Socialists and the National Socialists, as, he believed, would France.  Not seeing ‘any 
other reasonable policy in present circumstances for them to follow’, he hoped the 
same would be true of ‘His Majesty’s government, in a spirit of doubtless benevolent 
neutrality’.  ‘The choice’, he maintained, did not lie between Dollfuß and a 
parliamentary regime on the British model.  Rather, it was ‘confined to Dr. 
Dollfuss…flanked by an Austrian fascism…with Austrian faults perhaps, but 
nevertheless adapted to this easy-going country, and national socialism, with all its 
Prussian harshness and brutalities…Which should we prefer to put the question is, I 
think, to answer it’.633 
 Mussolini was then, in the eyes of contemporary diplomatic observers, the 
lynchpin in the Anschluss issue.  If the British – and the French – observers on the 
ground believed that the only chance Austria had of staving off the Anschluss was by 
keeping Italy and Germany from coming to an understanding, then it follows that 
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Dollfuß’s decision to accept Mussolini’s backing was a logical one.  If Austria were 
going to withstand the Nazi onslaught for any length of time, she would need foreign 
backing.  As British policy towards Austria was one of ‘sympathetic inaction’, and the 
French were equally as unwilling to act on her behalf, Dollfuß was left with little choice 
but to trust Mussolini’s promise to protect Austria, by military means if necessary.634  
Yet, Mussolini had a price and that price precluded an accommodation with the Social 
Democrats, something that the other powers appeared willing to accept.  Support 
from Rome meant pushing Dollfuß on a more rightist course in Austria but there were 
simply no other credible alternatives other than keeping Mussolini on-board.  It also, at 
this juncture at least, precluded an accommodation with Nazi Germany, Rome, having 
apparently stated that ‘she was not in a position to protect Austria further if the latter 
committed herself too far…with respect to Germany’.635  That is not to say that 
Dollfuß simply threw his lot in with Mussolini.  On the contrary, his over-arching aim 
was to remain as flexible and independent as possible, all the while striving to keep 
countries like Britain engaged and interested in Austria’s fate. 
 It is all well and good claiming, as Tálos does, that no one forced Dollfuß to 
establish a regime on the Italian model and that Dollfuß could have instead gravitated 
towards the democracies, France, Great Britain and Czechoslovakia, but only when 
the interpretation is a realistic one.636  And here we have the representative of one of 
those democracies telling us in March 1933 that there was effectively no other choice 
than the course that Dollfuß was following and that France, although urging Dollfuß 
not to push matters with the Socialists, was basically in agreement.  ‘I continue to 
believe,’ Phipps’s told London, ‘that Dr. Dollfuss is well-advised in pursuing his present 
course, for any undue weakness to the left would merely play into the hands of the 
National Socialists on his right’.637  This meant Dollfuß had to tread a narrow path, the 
British Foreign Office noted, in a certain dilemma, ‘for if he compounds with the 
Socialists, he offends the Italians, and if he maintains his severity towards them he 
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offends the French’.638  It was necessary for Dollfuß to continue courting Paris because 
an indication had again been conveyed to him in Paris ‘that he was still dependent on 
Socialist goodwill for the French tranche of the loan’.639  Yet too pro-French a course 
and he would not be able to take the country with him and would have opened himself 
up to attack from the Nazis.  As for the Czechoslovaks, one can assume they would 
have taken their lead from France.  In any event, by October that year their position 
was unequivocal, the Czechoslovak government declaring itself ‘entirely in favour of 
Dr. Dollfuss’ and intended ‘to support him by all the means in its power’.640  Thus, it is 
difficult to see how one could seriously maintain that, given the internal situation and 
the external parameters, a coalition with the Social Democrats or the retention of 
parliamentary democracy offered Dollfuß a feasible solution.  In the summer of 1933, 
Dollfuß was in an almost impossible situation, for ‘if he retained [British] moral support 
by placating the Socialists, he would lose the far more concrete support which he is at 
present receiving from Mussolini, who insists upon his following an anti-Socialist 
policy’.641  Moral support from countries such as Britain and France was all well and 
good, but was simply not enough tête-à-tête with Hitler. 
 The record of Austrian Social Democracy in the twentieth century is, in many 
ways, a distinguished and impressive one.  Its interwar social and house-building 
programmes were not only visionary, they were without parallel elsewhere in Europe.  
Likewise, after 1945, Austrian Social Democracy carried its share of government 
responsibility more consistently than almost any Social Democratic party in Europe.  If 
the Second Republic turned out to be a conspicuous success story, it was not least due 
to the role of the SPÖ after 1945. 
 It is, therefore, legitimate to say that in the period 1932–45 Austrian Social 
Democracy fell short in an otherwise distinguished record.  Because of the almost 
tribal nature of Austrian politics, which has almost unavoidably infected understanding 
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of the period, any criticism of the role of Social Democracy in the 1930s and early 
1940s is generally regarded as evidence of die-hard sympathy for Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg.  It is therefore useful to bear in mind the international context and to 
compare the record of parties in Austria with those in other parts of Europe.  From 
this it becomes clear that German Social Democracy had an impressive record in not 
making the slightest concessions to the emerging Nazi party, or any moves that may be 
mistaken even as agreement with parts of the Nazi agenda.  Austrian Social Democracy, 
however, did not achieve anything like this clarity on the issue, although it is obvious 
that its leadership had no sympathy for the Nazi cause. 
 It is also clear that significant sections of the Social Democrats ‘went over’ to 
the National Socialists in 1938, a point freely acknowledged by Austrian historians.  
Indeed, there are fine studies that have even charted the potential post-war 
ramifications of the significant number of Nazis that found refuge within the SPÖ.642  
However, the sheer mass of evidence makes it difficult to dismiss both these 
ideological ‘migrations’ as a case of a few rotten apples.  Nor should we be too ready 
to see in this solely a reaction to the stance and actions of the Dollfuß government and 
Ständestaat.  It is difficult to imagine a German equivalent of a leading Social Democrat 
like Karl Renner giving Hitler advice on how to undermine Czechoslovakia in the wake 
of the Anschluss, an issue quite separate from the Ständestaat but intimately bound up 
with the deutschnational ethos of Austrian Social Democracy, an ethos that may well 
have fatally weakened the party’s ability to muster an effective response to the 
National Socialists.  It is also hard to imagine a German equivalent of someone like 
Bernaschek, the man who started the fighting in February 1934, who, having eventually 
made it to safety in exile, actually chose to come back to Austria after the Anschluss.  
It is worth considering how many leading German Social Democrats ‘returned’ to the 
Third Reich from safety in exile.  Moreover, Bernaschek’s grim fate – murdered by the 
National Socialists in the grizzly final days of the Third Reich – should not blind us to 
the fact that he was murdered as a result of panic and not on account of an act of 
‘resistance’.  It should also not obscure the fact that he and his collaborators in Linz 
had hoarded weapons with the intention of using them, and that they did use them – 
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against the wishes of the Social Democratic leadership – against the Dollfuß 
government; at a time, moreover, when the Christian Socials were still governing at a 
regional level in Upper Austria in coalition with the Social Democrats.  Bernaschek and his 
companions very conspicuously did not hoard weapons or seek to obtain weapons to 
use against the National Socialist regime after 1938.  If we are to celebrate the impressive 
record of Austrian Social Democracy before and after the fateful years of 1933–45 we 
must be ready to mention inconvenient truths about the intervening years.  Moreover, 
we must also be willing to use these inconvenient truths to test our judgements of the 
actions of Dollfuß and his government. 
  
Chapter 5 
‘Hier wird auch der Nationalsozialismus sein “Halt” 
finden’: Negotiations with the NSDAP 
Where then, did Dollfuß himself stand on the issue of National Socialism?  Can his 
government be understood as a bulwark against the Nazis, as conservative circles 
would have us believe?  On one level this question is easy to address as the anti-Nazi 
activities of the Dollfuß government are relatively well documented; not only did he 
block their parliamentary road to power, the Nazi party was banned, their 
headquarters were raided, curfews were imposed, weapons seized, the death penalty 
was reimposed for terroristic activities, Nazi adherents were locked up or deported to 
Germany and pro-Nazi elements were purged from the state apparatus.  From these 
actions alone, one can assume solid anti-Nazi credentials.  Yet, in his 2006 assessment 
of the negotiations that took place between the Dollfuß government and the National 
Socialists from February to May 1933, Kurt Bauer concludes that Dollfuß was ‘anything 
but a “principled opponent” of National Socialism’, and was only prevented from going 
further in the direction of a coalition with them by the escalation of violence on the 
part of the Nazis, the growing resistance of the Heimwehr and the outright rejection of 
such a course by members of his own party.643  In short, he appears to be suggesting 
that far from rejecting the movement, Dollfuß, in his willingness to enter into 
negotiations, initially harboured some degree of sympathy for the Nazis. 
 Those like Bauer, who seek to demolish ‘Christian Social-conservative myths’ 
of Dollfuß’s anti-Nazi stance, point to the fact that, instead of working together with 
the Social Democrats within a democratic framework, Dollfuß chose instead to 
suspend parliament, disempower the opposition and then attempted to come to terms 
with the Nazis.644  Bauer seeks to demonstrate how, despite clear signals from Social 
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Democratic leaders that they were prepared to work together with Dollfuß against 
the National Socialists, Dollfuß chose instead to court the Austrian NSDAP at home, 
while building bridges with the new Nazi regime in Berlin.645  From this he concludes, 
quite understandably, that the repeated attempts to ‘come to terms’ with either the 
Nazis or ‘allegedly moderate German Nationalists’ clearly demonstrate Dollfuß’s 
‘ambivalent’ attitude vis-à-vis National Socialism.  Thus, he maintains, Schuschnigg’s 
signing of the – in his view, fatal – July Agreement with Nazi Germany in 1936, was 
nothing more than a continuation of Dollfuß’s previous attempts to come to an 
arrangement with the Nazis.646  On the basis of this ‘dubious and ambivalent handling 
of the National Socialists’, Bauer draws the traditional narrative line from Seipel, 
through Dollfuß to Schuschnigg, that culminates, inexorably, in the events of 
March 1938; in short, responsibility for the Nazi takeover lies with the ‘Austrofascist’ 
government, which paved the way for the National Socialist regime. 
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‘Das, was in Nationalsozialismus…gut und gesund ist, das ist altes, christlichsoziales 
Programm’ 
Dollfuß’s efforts to open lines of communication with the Nazis, which began in the 
immediate wake of the Nazi seizure of power in Germany in January 1933, pose an 
immediate problem of interpretation: was Dollfuß seeking a genuine understanding 
with the Nazis, was he attempting to appear to be seeking an understanding with the 
Nazis, or was he in fact searching to find some way of neutralizing the Nazi threat?  In 
February 1933, Dollfuß, spurred on by Hungary and Italy, approached the new German 
Chancellor to propose a closer relationship between Vienna and Berlin.  The first 
meeting between representatives of the Christian Socials and the Austrian NSDAP was 
held at the beginning of April 1933, a few weeks after the proroguing of parliament, 
and was followed by two private meetings between Habicht and Dollfuß on 27 April 
and 4 May.  Dollfuß rejected Habicht’s terms – the offer of a coalition, amongst other 
things – and the stalemate dragged on into the summer.  Persistent rumours of a Nazi 
putsch and a possible incursion from German territory throughout August, coupled 
with increasing tensions within the government camp, provided the backdrop for 
renewed attempts in September to ease the tension between the government and the 
National Socialists at home and abroad.  On 12 September, Dollfuß laid down his 
conditions to the German Minister in Vienna, a move that was followed by an aborted 
attempt to meet with the German Foreign Minister, Konstantin von Neurath, in 
Geneva at the end of the month.647  Then, in October, with Vice-Chancellor Fey once 
again independently seeking a compromise with the Nazis, Dollfuß consented to an 
attempt at mediation by Hermann Foppa and Franz Langoth who, as representatives of 
the now essentially defunct pan-Germans, were engaged in a Kampfgemeinschaft with 
the Austrian NSDAP.  These talks also ended in deadlock, Dollfuß changing tack in 
mid-November, declaring that he was prepared to negotiate with Germany, but that 
he could not accept Habicht as a negotiating partner after all. 
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 The autumn brought renewed attempts to circumvent Habicht and deal directly 
with Berlin.  At the end of October, Schuschnigg travelled to Munich to meet with 
Heß with the aim of preparing the ground for a meeting between Dollfuß and Hitler, 
only to discover that Dollfuß had been misinformed, and that Hitler had not 
authorized any such meeting.  The following month Dollfuß sent two more emissaries 
to Germany, Max Hohenlohe and the Political Director Theodor Hornbostel, again in 
the hope of coming to a direct agreement with Berlin.  Dollfuß persisted with this line 
until mid-December, when the visit to Germany of the Italian Under Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Fulvio Suvich, prompted concerns that Italy might be changing 
course.648  Dollfuß responded by resuming negotiations with Habicht, on the condition 
that Hitler designated Habicht his official representative.  A meeting was scheduled for 
8 January 1934 but abandoned at the last minute due to Heimwehr opposition.  A 
further hiatus ensued, broken only by an offer to Frauenfeld of a place in the cabinet in 
May 1934, and negotiations between Dollfuß and Neubacher in June, which, like all 
previous attempts at breaking the deadlock, ended in failure. 
 Why, if Dollfuß’s overriding objective was to prevent a Nazi takeover of 
Austria, was he so ready to negotiate with both Habicht and Hitler?  Knowing what 
had happened in Germany, why would he even consider bringing the Nazis into his 
government?  The traditional explanation focuses on perceived ideological affinities 
between the Austrian right and National Socialism.  Bauer, for example, underpins his 
argument by attempting to establish some broad ideological parallels between the 
National Socialists, Dollfuß and sections of his government, the implication being that it 
was these underlying ideological affinities that were behind Dollfuß’s attempts to come 
to terms with the Nazis.  Bauer argues that Dollfuß, strongly motivated by 
anti-Semitism and anti-Marxism, was anything but a principled opponent of National 
Socialism.  Bauer finds grounds for this argument in Dollfuß’s political socialization 
alone: not only his seminary education, membership of the Cartellverband (CV), the 
Deutsche Studentenschaft and the Lower Austrian Bauernbund, but also his early 
connections with the catholic-national Deutsche Gemeinschaft, of which Seyß-Inquart 
and other leading Nazis were also members.649  Although some Christian Socials would 
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have entered into a ‘pact with the devil’ against the National Socialists, in Bauer’s view, 
Dollfuß was definitely not one of them.  Rather, Dollfuß’s primary concern was the 
defeat of the Social Democrats, and Dollfuß, he claims, would have gladly won over the 
Nazis as allies in this struggle. 
 Bauer makes an important point, highlighting an aspect of Dollfuß’s political 
evolution that demands examination, yet his interpretation is not necessarily 
persuasive.  The problem is, in part, that the paucity and limitations of the available 
documentary evidence make reconstructing Dollfuß’s motives difficult.  The historian is 
faced with the challenging task of piecing together a consistent narrative on the basis of 
evidence that is not only fragmentary, but also fraught with pitfalls.  Dollfuß, for 
example, left few personal written records.  However, some of those who did leave 
records – Rintelen, Starhemberg, Langoth and Winkler – were political adversaries 
(and pretty shady individuals every one of them) and therefore need to be approached 
with more than the customary degree of caution.  The picture is further complicated 
by the fact that Dollfuß could not ‘entirely rely upon his colleagues in the cabinet, their 
scrupulous honesty, or their loyalty to himself and the Austrian idea’, which led to 
constant manoeuvring, saying different things to different people and changing his 
emphasis according to the interests of his audience.650  Speaking to the British Minister 
in September 1933, Dollfuß insisted that, 
an over-great importance should not be attributed to the details of his policy, i.e., whether they 
represented a tendency somewhat more to the Right one day, or somewhat more to the Left 
another, but that the main fact of the situation should be borne in mind.  That was, he 
said…Austrian independence should be maintained.651 
Indeed, it was only through his ‘exceedingly skilful juggling’ of the interests of not only 
the rival parties within his coalition (Christian Socials, Heimwehr, Landbund), but also of 
the rival factions within these parties, often vis-à-vis the parties outside of government 
(Social Democrats, Greater Germans and Nazis), that Dollfuß managed to keep his 
government afloat.  The fact that Dollfuß was continually on the move, navigating a 
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path between the competing factions in Austrian – and international – politics, doing 
clandestine ‘deals’ with rival coalition partners and constantly trying to outplay the 
conspirators in his own cabinet all make it difficult for the historian to judge exactly 
what Dollfuß was up to.  It is ultimately because of the ambiguous nature of the 
evidence that two contradictory interpretations of Dollfuß have emerged, the 
anti-Nazi ‘hero’ versus the opportunistic collaborator.  The lack of conclusive evidence 
invariably means that there are weak points in the arguments on both sides; the 
historian, in the absence of new documentary evidence, is left to make a judgment on 
the basis of probability. 
 Bauer’s basic premise that some degree of ideological affinity between Dollfuß 
and the National Socialists underpinned Dollfuß’s efforts to come to an arrangement 
demands re-examination.  On the surface, it is a compelling narrative.  Dollfuß’s 
anti-Marxist stance is well-documented.  He was, if Bauer is to be believed, also 
demonstrably anti-Semitic and the issue of his ‘political socialization’ certainly raises 
important questions.  One assumes that what Bauer is alluding to here is that, as a 
student in the wake of the First World War, Dollfuß had been strongly 
‘Catholic-National’ in orientation and a supporter of Anschluss with Germany.652  As 
such, he had moved in circles that made principled opposition to National Socialism 
doubtful, in particular the Deutsche Gemeinschaft, a secret organization set up as a 
mediating institution between Catholics and Nationals that was anti-Marxist, 
anti-Liberal, anti-Masonic and anti-Semitic in orientation, together with such notorious 
personalities as Arthur Seyß-Inquart – the Verräter Österreichs – and 
Hermann Neubacher, first Nazi Mayor of Vienna.653  The Deutsche Gemeinschaft was an 
ostensible breeding ground for future Nazi sympathizers.  Karl Wache, its 
deutschnational principle private secretary (and Dollfuß’s superior) dedicated his 1933 
publication Deutscher Geist in Österreich to Hitler.654  After Wache was ousted in the 
early 1920s as a result of a power struggle between the Catholic and National wings, it 
was, according to Rosar, Dollfuß in his capacity as secretary who maintained the 
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connection with the national Erneuerungsbewegung in the Reich.655  On the basis of 
evidence presented in the case against Seyß-Inquart at the Nuremberg Trials, the 
Deutsche Gemeinschaft was portrayed as ‘conceived and founded upon principles which 
later became those of the Nazi Party’ and Dollfuß, on the basis of a letter written by 
Seyß-Inquart to Himmler dated 19 August 1939, as ‘a very active anti-Semitic’.656  Yet, 
on closer inspection, the argument is not entirely persuasive.  One must consider what 
we know about Dollfuß’s formative years, the development of his ideological 
worldview and how that makes sense of his later behaviour as Chancellor, particularly 
vis-à-vis the National Socialists. 
 Assessments of Dollfuß’s formative years are principally based on the 
conclusions presented by Jagschitz in his 1967 thesis and, indirectly, by 
Wolfgang Rosar’s monograph on Seyß-Inquart, the Deutsche Gemeinschaft and the 
Anschluss question.657  In his thesis, Jagschitz charts Dollfuß’s development from a 
pro-Austrian, pro-Habsburg position on the eve of the First World War, to a 
pro-Republican, pro-Anschluss position in the years that followed it.  In the light of the 
prevalence of Anschluss sentiment in Austria at the time, and despite not having 
demonstrated ‘national’ sympathies before the war, it hardly comes as a surprise that 
Dollfuß would have supported some sort of Anschluss with Germany, particularly in 
the early post-war period.  Although the Austrian Catholic circles whence Dollfuß 
came were, overall, less enthusiastic about union with the German Reich, they were, 
as we have seen, by no means united on the issue.658  While the Christian Socials 
initially supported the Anschluss declaration, albeit with palpable reservations, the 
Christian Social worker’s movement, for example, rejected it.  This disagreement 
extended to the student milieu in which Dollfuß played an active role.  The Katholische 
Studentenbewegung, for example, was initially pro-Anschluss, but against an 
unconditional and centralistic ‘Prussian solution’ to the question, an important 
qualification, while the Austrian CV corporations underwent a ‘smooth transition’ 
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from Habsburg loyalty to pro-Anschluss sentiment, organizing Anschluss rallies, 
sometimes together with the pan-German and freiheitlich students.659  This sentiment, 
however, gradually waned as the recognition of Austrian viability, and with it, Austrian 
self-assurance grew: Jagschitz notes how, from 1919, CV policy on the Anschluss 
question was no longer clearly defined, and, by 1929, only stressed solidarity with 
Germans outside Austrian borders.660 
 According to Jagschitz, Dollfuß followed this general trend and was 
pro-Anschluss during his time as a student.  This is corroborated by one of Dollfuß’s 
contemporaries, Erwin Domanig, who affirmed that Dollfuß was, in contrast to the 
majority of Catholic students who were Christian Social in orientation and decidedly 
‘Austrian’ in outlook, an enthusiastic supporter of Anschluss with Germany during his 
time in the Katholisch-Deutscher Akademikerausschuß. 661   Trusted by their national 
opponents, he was often selected to represent Catholic students at Anschluss rallies.662  
This brings us to an important milestone in Dollfuß’s ideological development that may 
have influenced his outlook later as Chancellor; closer to the ‘national’ wing of the CV, 
he played a keen role in furthering Catholic-National co-operation at a time when 
more active collaboration was being pursued for a number of different reasons by both 
sides.663  Dollfuß’s interest in this field invariably led to his participation in the Deutsche 
Studentenschaft, established in 1919 as an autonomous, national and cross-party 
umbrella organization uniting the General Students’ Committees of all German 
universities, including those in Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia – although as 
Jagschitz notes, a lack of evidence means that the question remains as to Dollfuß’s 
actual role.664 
 This ideological playground, and particularly Dollfuß’s membership in the 
Deutsche Gemeinschaft has played a central role in assessments of his later response to 
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the National Socialist threat.  His formative ideological landscape, encompassing a 
penchant for building bridges to the pan-Germans, Catholic-National proclivities, and 
questionable intellectual company all seem to suggest a neat thread from his student 
days to his willingness to negotiate with the Nazis in the spring of 1933.  Yet, this is 
neither the whole picture nor does it decisively disprove the premise that Dollfuß was 
a ‘principled’ opponent of National Socialism.  When impelled to choose between the 
‘Catholic’ and the ‘National’, Dollfuß, unlike characters such as Seyß-Inquart, ultimately 
opted for the former; Jagschitz notes how, with the split in the CV in a Catholic and a 
National direction, Dollfuß was compelled towards the Catholic, pro-Austrian line.665  
And while some of his associates from the Deutsche Gemeinschaft continued to agitate 
for Anschluss (together with the leading Social Democrats) under, for example, the 
auspices of the cross-party Österreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund, formed by Neubacher in 
1925, Dollfuß’s position on the issue appears to gradually moderate.666  Jagschitz notes 
how his support for Anschluss persisted after his studies, when Dollfuß continued to 
advocate some kind of union with Germany for reasons of agricultural policy.  
However, following a general trend away from radical Anschluss sentiment that was 
particularly distinctive within Catholic circles, Dollfuß drew nearer to the idea of some 
kind of harmonization [Angleichung] between the two countries as the term Anschluss 
became increasingly associated with the complete and unconditional absorption of 
Austria by the German Reich.667  By 1932, having pushed through the Lausanne loan 
against the fierce opposition of pro-Anschluss circles on the left and right, Dollfuß’s 
rejection of Anschluss is clear: 
Wir wollen nicht aus Mitleid von unserem großen Brudervolk aufgenommen werden, sondern 
wir wollen vorerst unser Haus selbst bestellen, um dereinst als freier selbständiger deutscher 
Staat frei und unabhängig aus eigener innerster Ueberzeugung über unser weiteres Schicksal zu 
entscheiden.668 
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On the surface this may not appear to be a decisive renunciation of Anschluss, yet, in 
an environment where any open manifestation of opinion against the Anschluss was 
exceedingly difficult, Dollfuß’s choice of the word Brudervolk made his position 
unambiguous.  Dollfuß did say different things to different people: in London for 
example, Dollfuß emphasized the neighbourly nature of Austro-German relations, 
speaking of Germany as ‘unserem größten Nachbarstaat, mit dem uns Sprache, 
Geschichte und kulturelle Entwicklung verbinden’.669  Yet at home, in front of an 
audience infused with an ‘amorphous patriotism for the “great German nation”’, he did 
not speak, as the Social Democrats did, of the ‘großen Schicksals- und 
Kulturgemeinschaft des Deutschen Volkes’ but of ‘two states linked by the ‘engsten 
Blutbande und die ältesten historischen Gemeinsamkeiten’. 670  To Dollfuß, who saw 
himself first and foremost as an Austrian, Germany was a ‘Bruderreich’ and Austria and 
Germany cousins.671 
 If the Anschluss angle does not then stand up to closer examination, the charge 
that there was a potential convergence of ideological interests as regards anti-Semitism 
is even more seriously overplayed.  Bauer puts forward just two pieces of evidence to 
make his case.  The first is an article in the Reichspost that welcomed, in principle, the 
Nazi boycott of Jewish businesses of 1 April 1933, which Bauer appears to use to 
prove the anti-Semitic tendencies prevalent on the Catholic right.  How exactly this 
relates to negotiations with the Austrian NSDAP and, ultimately, attempts to 
normalize relations with Nazi Germany, however, is unclear.  Unless, of course, the 
suggestion is that palpable anti-Semitic sentiment from within government circles was 
somehow behind Dollfuß’s attempts to ‘come to terms’ with the Nazis.  If so, it is a 
curious argument.  To take a non-Austrian example, it has never been suggested that 
fervent Polish anti-Semitism – not to mention Piłsudski’s distain for parliamentary 
democracy – played a role in the decision to come to terms with Nazi Germany and 
the signing of the German-Polish non-aggression pact of January 1934. 
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 The prevalence of anti-Semitic sentiment on the Austrian right is not under 
dispute.  However, the Reichspost’s stance on the German boycott must surely be 
considered against the backdrop of the traditional role of anti-Semitism in Austrian 
politics, and not just against the yardstick of Nazi policy.  As Pauley has pointed out, in 
the First Republic ‘all of the major political parties…were anti-Semitic to one degree 
or another’ and each used anti-Semitism as a political weapon ‘in order to embarrass 
its enemies’.672  While Catholic circles denounced Jews ‘in very traditional terms’, 
seeing Jews as revolutionaries and extreme modernists ‘determined to secularize 
society by undermining the Catholic faith’, Social Democrats and Communists – 
although neither included anti-Semitism in their official programmes – ‘often used 
anti-Semitism as a club with which to embarrass their capitalist enemies’, while being 
careful to give the impression that they were ‘opposed only to Jewish capitalists’.673  
The rise of the Nazi party in Germany threatened to appropriate this issue from all 
parties, leaving the Austrian Nazis in the ‘enviable position’ of being able to say, from 
1933 onwards, that ‘their comrades in Germany were actually doing something about 
the “Jewish Problem”, whereas Austrian anti-Semites had ‘seldom done more than 
talk’.674  Indeed, the appropriation of traditional Catholic anti-Semitic slogans by the 
Nazis – who also, as Pauley reminds us further, appropriated the anti-Semitic 
caricatures and rhetoric of the left – posed a particular problem for Catholics and the 
Christian Socials, for whom anti-Semitism remained a significant integrating factor.675  
They could, Pauley observes, ‘only quibble’ with Nazi theory or run the risk of 
contradicting ‘centuries of their own beliefs’.676 
 That the article discussing the boycott of Jewish businesses was not an attempt 
to sidle up to the Nazis is obvious because this ‘great gesture’ was actually presented 
as a failure on the part of the ‘gentlemen in Munich’.677  Rather, this was an – ultimately 
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ineffectual – attempt to ‘re-appropriate’ one of the Christian Social’s traditional 
political tools, and more directly, an appeal to their own support base.  This is further 
confirmed by Pauley’s important observation that anti-Semitism almost disappeared 
from the pages of the Reichspost between 1926–30, only to reappear with the onset of 
the economic crisis and the meteoric rise of the Nazis.678  Which brings us to Bauer’s 
second piece of evidence, the references to ‘Jewish Marxism’ in a speech made by 
Dollfuß at the general assembly of the Katholische Männerverein and reproduced in the 
Reichspost on 3 April 1933, which, Bauer claims, challenges interpretations that 
maintain that there were no areas of overlap between Dollfuß and the National 
Socialists.679  The logic is seductive in its simplicity: this speech proves that Dollfuß was 
clearly an anti-Semite, which surely attests to some degree of ideological kinship with 
the National Socialists. 
 This interpretation is problematic in a number of ways.  Firstly, anti-Semitism 
was widespread throughout Europe in the interwar period and found across the length 
and breadth of the political and social spectrum.  Therefore, it does not automatically 
follow that those who shared such beliefs, in whatever form, sympathized with 
National Socialist ideology.  Secondly, and more specifically, the portrayal of Dollfuß as 
driven by anti-Semitism is wholly unpersuasive.680  Although there are suggestions of 
anti-Semitic attitudes from the early post-war years – in 1920, for example, Dollfuß 
submitted a proposal to the general assembly of the CV on behalf of the Catholic 
fraternity Franco-Bavaria that members only be accepted if they were of 
‘German-Aryan descent’ – scholars have been generally cautious about reading too 
much into this.  Jagschitz, noting, for example, the influence of Dollfuß’s sponsor during 
the period, the dean of the theological institute at the University of Vienna, 
Nivard Schlögel – and co-sponsor of the proposal – concludes that Dollfuß was not a 
‘strong anti-Semite’ and one could not talk in any way of pronounced – and enduring –
 anti-Semitic beliefs.681  Other evidence appears to back this claim.  While Jagschitz 
notes how Dollfuß worked in the office of a Jewish lawyer during his studies and that 
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during his time in the Landeswirtschaftskammer he provided positions for Jews, 
Walterskirchen points out that during his time as Chancellor, one of his most 
important legal advisors, Robert Hecht, was of Jewish descent.682  Of course, this 
opens them up to the ‘some of my best friends are Jews’ counter-argument, which 
declares that close personal relations do not necessarily rule out racism.  However, in 
the light of Dollfuß’s later ideological development, this remains unconvincing; as 
Walterskirchen observes, this brief period was in no way symptomatic of Dollfuß’s 
later attitude towards Jewry. 683 
 Thus, perhaps a more interesting question is why both Dollfuß and Schuschnigg, 
considering the extent of anti-Semitic sentiment across Austrian society, in particular, 
the quite obvious lure of the Nazis’ radical anti-Semitism on ‘the inherently 
anti-Semitic and impoverished youth of Austria’ and despite an ideological background 
which apparently predisposed them towards anti-Semitic beliefs, rather than 
instrumentalize the issue, chose not to play the anti-Semitism card.684  Although 
concerns were raised, for example, with the British Foreign Office, that the Austrian 
government might be tempted to ‘connive at some persecution of the Jewish 
population in Austria with a view to disarming the hostility of the National Socialists’, 
this never came to pass.685  In his 1992 study on Austrian anti-Semitism, Pauley 
remarked that, although anti-Semitism was tolerated in Austria during the 
Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era, neither Dollfuß nor Schuschnigg personally resorted to 
anti-Semitic statements, consistently assuring foreign visitors and Jewish groups of their 
opposition to it, a stance that on occasion expressed itself as concrete support.686  This 
is confirmed by Königseder, who notes that the constitution of the Corporate State 
introduced by Dollfuß in May 1934 guaranteed unrestricted civil rights and religious 
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freedom for Austria’s Jewish citizens, and that four Jews were appointed to high 
government bodies to represent them.687  Pauley was in a narrow sense wrong since 
Bauer has found one instance, but it is just one quotation.  This must be weighed 
against the fact that, just a few weeks later, Dollfuß declared in public that he would 
not discriminate between different categories of Austrian citizens. 688   The single 
instance therefore where Dollfuß refers to ‘Jewish Marxism’ is, on balance, not enough 
to overturn Pauley’s otherwise well-grounded thesis. 
 There were, of course, political advantages to curbing the worst anti-Semitic 
excesses, especially as a tool for putting some ‘ideological distance’ between an 
Austrian state under authoritarian rule and the National Socialist regime.689  This, it 
could be argued, had a restraining influence, as neither Dollfuß nor Schuschnigg could 
afford to be seen to be propagating anti-Semitic policies in the eyes of the rest of the 
world.  Now, the weight of international opinion invariably had some impact on policy; 
Pauley notes how American diplomatic protests about Nazi anti-Semitic violence at the 
University of Vienna – albeit against American students – led to Dollfuß taking a much 
harder line, culminating in the revocation of the University’s academic autonomy, 
which had until then prevented the police from entering the building to restore 
order. 690   However, the argument that the Dollfuß government refrained from 
anti-Semitism because of international opinion is ultimately unconvincing; in the light of 
such patent worldwide indifference to the plight of the Jews as that displayed at the 
Évian Conference of 1938, it seems doubtful that serious objections from abroad 
would actually have been forthcoming if the Ständestaat had genuinely attempted to 
play the anti-Semitism card, especially considering that Poland, Hungary and Romania 
all did so during the 1930s without encountering the slightest diplomatic problems. 
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 Ultimately, there is no definitive evidence as to whether Dollfuß was in fact a 
closet anti-Semite during his time as Chancellor.  He did not it is true, launch a bold 
ideological counter-crusade and anti-Semitism still thrived in Austria throughout his 
Chancellorship.  This could all have been a clever ruse, pretending he was not an 
anti-Semite for the sake of international opinion.  However, Pauley for one does not 
think so, arguing that, on the basis of a lack of any evidence to suggest otherwise, 
neither Dollfuß nor Schuschnigg can be dismissed as ‘cynical opportunists’.691  On the 
contrary, he cites the American Minister as being ‘“much impressed with [the 
Chancellor’s] sincerity” when he denounced the “gross stupidity” of Nazi students 
who attacked their Jewish classmates’.692  That anti-Semitism was tolerated in Dollfuß’s 
Austria has to be weighed against, for example, the fact that Jewish newspapers – and 
the political factions they represented in the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde – enjoyed 
relative freedom until 1938, while ‘overly anti-Semitic and nazi party newspapers’, as 
well as all other political parties were prohibited.693  Rabid anti-Semites, such as 
Kunschak and his Christian Social Freiheitsbund, were tolerated, but, at the same time, 
vocal campaigners against anti-Semitism and National Socialism, like the 
Harand-Bewegung were also allowed to flourish, the two groups co-existing under the 
umbrella of the Vaterländische Front.694  Moreover, during the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era, 
despite the ‘delicacy of their position with regard to Germany’ Austria had taken in 
German-Jewish refugees.  According to British documents, some 400–600 German 
Jews had taken refuge in Austria which undoubtedly had something to do with the 
government’s policy to ‘discourage all campaigns against the Jews’, despite the 
prevalence of anti-Semitic sentiment within the wider population.695  In the light of the 
strength of anti-Semitic feeling in Austria and the successful manipulation of this 
sentiment by the Nazis, that this tactical equivocation on the part of the 
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Dollfuß-Schuschnigg governments can be ascribed to ambivalence on the issue of 
anti-Semitism, as Königseder suggests, seems doubtful.696 
 What can be said is that, as a direct result of their stance, both Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg enjoyed the almost unanimous support of the Austrian Jewish 
community.697  This is significant, not least because, as Pauley reminds us, in Austria, as 
in Germany, Jewish support was considered a political liability, rather than an asset.698  
The support of the Jewish community, or even the mere absence of anti-Semitic 
measures, was also a weapon to be used against Dollfuß (and Schuschnigg), opening 
them up to politically injurious accusations of ‘philo-Semitism’, not only from their 
opponents, but also from their supposed allies.  For example, a Nazi propaganda leaflet 
– mimicking the Vaterländische Wandzeitung format used by the Austrian government – 
dropped onto Austrian territory sometime in November 1933 exhorted the 
inhabitants of Oberndorf bei Salzburg to: ‘Stick with Dollfuß, Fey and Vaugoin! 
International Jewry will surely thank you for it’. 699   At home, Dollfuß’s public 
declaration that he would not discriminate against different groups of Austrian citizens 
was deemed by Rost van Tonningen, at that time representative of the League of 
Nations in Vienna and a personal friend of Dollfuß, as ‘being calculated to render the 
Austrian government unpopular in view of the intense anti-Jewish feeling amongst large 
numbers of Austrians’. 700   And, in July 1933, an article was published in the 
Bauernbündler attributing to Dollfuß the intention of restricting the participation of 
Austrian Jews in certain professions and of taking other repressive measures against 
them, causing Dollfuß to issue a rebuttal in the Austrian press.  There was, the British 
Minister observed, ‘little doubt that the article was…a ‘stab in the back’ for Dr. 
Dollfuss with the probable instigator his Vice-Chancellor, the pro-German Landbund 
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leader, Franz Winkler.701  Dollfuß’s moderation on this issue was not without political 
risks for him.  And if he had been, as Otto Bauer claimed, an opportunist, exploiting 
Austrian anti-Semitism would have been an obvious place to start. 
 Dollfuß’s attempts to find a way out of the impasse in which Austria found itself 
because of the rise of National Socialism in the spring of 1933 cannot be simply 
ascribed to some kind of underlying ideological kinship with the Nazis.  Such a 
conclusion ignores that, although Dollfuß may have started on a similar path to that of 
his Burgbrüder in the Deutsche Gemeinschaft, he neither endeavoured to make National 
Socialism compatible with Catholicism and Austrian sentiment, as did 
Catholic-Nationals such as Seyß-Inquart, nor did he support National Socialism as a 
vehicle for the realization of the Reichsgedanke as did other Catholic intellectuals – 
Jagschitz lists the likes of Hugelmann, Kralik, Eibl, Nadler, Srbik, Wolf and 
Glaise-Horstenau.702  He was not seeking to build bridges to the Nazis, rather, he was 
investigating how the threat that they posed could best be neutralized.  Fraternal 
bonds were not strong enough to prevent, for example, Karl Wache, Dollfuß’s former 
superior at the Deutsche Gemeinschaft, from being removed from his post as 
Oberstaatsbibliothekar at the University of Vienna in May 1934 for Nazi activities by a 
Federal Chancellery under Dollfuß’s command.703  And even if one traces Dollfuß’s 
anti-Nazi stance to the movement’s escalating violence in the spring of 1933, rather 
than earlier, this still sets him apart from those who went over to the Nazis.  
Ultimately, Dollfuß may have tried to put this formative ‘bridge-building’ experience to 
good use, employing his connections to these circles when he was Chancellor in an 
attempt to neutralize the effectiveness of Nazi penetration into Austria and to solidify 
his own position – he was even willing to meet with Habicht and Hitler to discuss Nazi 
demands –, but this can only be understood against the backdrop of Dollfuß’s primary 
motivation: the maintenance of Austrian independence, as exemplified in his 
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exceptional efforts in 1932 to push through the Lausanne Loan against the wishes of 
nationalist circles on the left and the right. 
 Dollfuß’s opposition to a Nazi takeover in Austria was primarily on the grounds 
that this would spell the end of Austrian independence: ‘Wenn es den Nazi gelingt, 
dann ist Österreich nur so ein Staat wie Hessen usw’.704  This, along with Dollfuß’s 
apparent willingness to do a deal with the Nazis has led some historians to the claim 
that Dollfuß did not really fight National Socialism itself.705  This slightly convoluted line 
of thought does not seem entirely cogent since the end of Austrian independence was, 
after all, a core Nazi aim.  Moreover, this interpretation also downplays the 
importance of those ideological factors that made National Socialism unpalatable to 
Dollfuß and his Christian Social colleagues.  Besides, Dollfuß’s catholic-corporatist 
worldview hardly fitted the revolutionary character of the Nazi movement and its 
violent radicalism, epitomized by Röhm’s marauding brownshirts, not to mention 
Hitler’s talk of a ‘National Revolution’ as his ‘presidential’ government transformed 
into a totalitarian dictatorship.706  Indeed, for many on Austria’s catholic-conservative 
right, the parallels with Soviet Russia were palpable.  Thus, the rejection of National 
Socialism was, in part, based on the premise that ‘Bolshevism’ and National Socialism 
were in fact two sides of the same revolutionary coin, the one ‘red’, the other 
‘brown’.707  National Socialism, the Christian Social Reichspost maintained, was simply 
the Bolshevism of the right, a hodgepodge of unemployed half-communists and 
Prussian generals.708  This interpretation was based on the fact that what scared the 
Austrian bourgeoisie about ‘bolshevism’ – dictatorial rule, censorship, the dominance 
of the party, political violence – were the same things that made National Socialism so 
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distasteful.  With the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany the parallels 
multiplied as the movement was deemed to move from ‘pseudo-nationalism to 
bolshevism’.709  National Socialist brutality and violence, the use of murder, terror and 
intimidation as political weapons appeared to mirror political methods common to 
Soviet Russia; according to the mouthpiece of Schuschnigg’s Ostmärkische Sturmscharen, 
the only difference was the language spoken.710  Dollfuß himself echoed this sentiment 
when, on 2 May 1933, he pronounced the ‘German Reich can order its affairs how it 
sees fit’, but ‘we desire neither international socialism nor brown socialism’, a 
somewhat audacious statement for an Austrian Chancellor supposedly wishing to 
remain on good terms with the Reich. 711  The message was certainly not lost on the 
pro-Nazi Wiener Neueste Nachrichten, which declared Dollfuß the first Austrian 
Chancellor openly to denounce the Anschluss; ‘it is clear that when he talks of 
“independence on all sides” he means, not independence from undue foreign influence 
in Austrian policy…but the “deepening of the frontier at Passau”’.712 
 However, for those on Austria’s catholic-conservative right, one issue stood 
out above all others: a fanatical, shared anti-clericalism that ‘threatened the very 
foundations of human society and culture’. 713   With its ‘hatred of Rome’ and 
‘kulturkämpferische sonority’, National Socialism trumped even the godless language of 
the Communist press’.714 
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Figure 6: Kann ein Katholik Nationalsozialist sein? 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv und Grafiksammlung) 
A Catholic, the Reichspost maintained, could be neither a Marxist nor a National 
Socialist, a view repeated in Kunschak’s Neue Zeitung, which repudiated the claim that 
a good Catholic could vote National Socialist.715  A ‘godless movement’, National 
Socialism and Christianity were as ‘incompatible as fire and water’ in the same way that 
Marxism and Christianity were incompatible; both movements stood in opposition to 
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Christian moral teaching.716  If in doubt, the Catholic knew where to turn for guidance: 
Roma locuta est, the Reichspost pronounced in February 1931.717  Of course, this line of 
argument became problematic after the Vatican signed a concordat with Nazi 
Germany. 
 The argument that Dollfuß was motivated to come to an arrangement with the 
Nazis because of a convergence of ideological interests has only limited explanatory 
power.  Just because Dollfuß was ‘anti-Marxist’, it does not follow that he would have 
welcomed or approved of Nazi rule.  What is more, ideological overlap of some kind 
or another was almost inevitable.  An eclectic ideology, National Socialism borrowed 
from both the left and the right, which invariably meant, as one scholar observes, that 
‘some of the ideas of fascism and national socialism reveal affinities and overlaps with 
more acceptable ideologies, such as liberalism, conservatism, syndicalism and 
socialism’.718  By the same logic, any ideological or programmatic overlap could be 
understood as ideological kinship with the Nazis.  However, one would never claim 
that the Socialists were Nazi sympathizers because they shared Anschluss as a 
common goal, or because of palpable ideological overlaps in their programmes – 
anti-capitalism, pan-Germanism, anti-clericalism and anti-bourgeois sentiment – or 
because the Nazis, as mentioned earlier, in linking anti-capitalism with anti-Semitism, 
had appropriated the anti-Semitic caricatures and rhetoric of the left. 
 If we apply the same standards to the Social Democrats that we apply to 
Dollfuß and the Christian Socials, then how are we to evaluate Karl Renner’s 
connivance with the Nazis in the spring of 1938, and his voluntarily placing himself at 
the Nazis’ disposal, via Hermann Neubacher for their plebiscite propaganda?719  In 
1931, Renner had assured Neubacher that he could be relied upon in the ‘struggle for 
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self-determination’ and, as Nasko points out, he remained true to his promise when 
the Nazis marched in seven years later. 720   On 12 November 1928, the 
10th anniversary of the declaration of the Republic, Renner had – along with other 
leading Social Democrats including Seitz, Körner, Austerlitz, Bauer and Deutsch – 
pledged his allegiance to ‘Großdeutschland’ in Der Anschluss, the mouthpiece of 
Neubacher’s Österreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund (Dollfuß, incidentally, did not).721  The 
point is not simply that Renner was pro-Anschluss, but the manner in which his actions 
are assessed: if politicians are to be judged by the company they keep – as Dollfuß 
frequently is – how are we to understand Renner’s relationship with Neubacher, the 
man who was to become the first Nazi mayor of Vienna, and who, incidentally, despite 
dealings with leading Social Democrats like Renner, did not ‘hesitate to attack socialism 
and stigmatize the leaders of the Social Democratic party…as theoretical and Hebraic 
Marxists’? 722  If Dollfuß’s actions are deemed to be the result of an ideological 
convergence of interests with the Nazis, in particular vis-à-vis the Social Democrats, 
then the same must hold true for Renner vis-à-vis those who did not support 
Anschluss. 
 Renner is not the only example on the left.  There is also the case of 
Richard Bernaschek, the Schutzbund commander who triggered the ‘civil war’ in 
February 1934.  Having escaped from his Austrian prison in April 1934, Bernaschek 
fled, with Nazi assistance, to Munich, along with two Social Democratic comrades, 
Otto Huschka and Franz Schlagin.  This was something of a propaganda coup for the 
Nazi regime and, keen to capitalise on it, Bernaschek was accorded an official welcome 
by the Mayor of Passau and provided with generous financial support.  In Bavaria, 
Bernaschek visited the Austrian Legion, an armed paramilitary unit of Austrian Nazi 
‘refugees’ amassed on the Austrian border.723  While his two associates converted to 
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National Socialism, Bernaschek met with Habicht, positing the possibility of 
collaboration between the Social Democrats and the National Socialists, infamously 
proclaiming that ‘das Programm der Nationalsozialisten steht uns [the Social Democrats] 
näher’ 724 .  Even though the Social Democratic leadership rejected Bernaschek’s 
declaration, one could credibly argue that Renner’s and Bernaschek’s behaviour was as 
much an expression of a shared ideological heritage and the convergence of common 
interests with the Nazis as it was the result of political pragmatism or the desperation 
of defeat.  And yet, Bernaschek has gone down in the eyes of one historian at least, as 
‘a man of moral courage, integrity and perseverance, but one who was politically naïve’, 
not as someone whose actions were in part shaped by ideological kinship with 
National Socialism. 725  The same is true of Renner: no stone is left unturned in the 
quest to explain his motivations, yet ideological sympathy for the Nazi programme is 
never one of them. 726   The point here is, if we accept – quite rightly – that 
circumstances played a part in the conduct of individual Social Democrats, are we not 
duty bound to do the same for Dollfuß? 
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Why negotiate? 
The Nazis’ ‘seizure of power’ in Germany was a real game-changer for the beleaguered 
Dollfuß government.  While during 1932 Dollfuß’s energies were consumed with 
tackling the economic crisis, on 30 January 1933, the nature of the problem that the 
Austrian government faced changed profoundly.  It was assumed in Christian Social 
circles that Nazi agitation in Austria would increase as a result of the movement’s 
victory in the Reich, yet within weeks the situation had become ‘intolerable’.727  In the 
run-up to the Reichstag elections in Germany on 5 March, Austria was flooded with 
Nazi propaganda, according to Dollfuß, a ‘prelude’ of what was to come.728  To make 
matters worse, the Reich also started to put economic pressure on its neighbour, 
Phipps reporting to London that ‘since Herr Hitler became Chancellor, Germany had 
been daily selling her Schilling credits cheap in Zürich, and thus pressing hard on 
Austria’s currency.729  Against this backdrop, Austria’s parliament tumbled headlong 
into crisis, paralyzed on 4 March as a result of a procedural hitch.  Rather then 
reinstate it, Dollfuß, we know, opted to temporarily rule by decree in the hope of 
pushing through alterations to the constitution.  These would possibly include a body 
representing the Länder and the Stände that could be given primary legislative authority 
over economic issues, leaving parliament as the battleground for cultural and 
socio-political questions. 730   As the country’s serious economic problems were 
deemed to be responsible for the allure of National Socialism, particularly amongst 
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Austria’s impoverished youth, circumventing parliament in this manner would allow the 
government a way of tackling the economic crisis, and thereby weakening the Nazis’ 
appeal, although it was obviously anti-democratic.731  On 7 March, the government 
promulgated its first authoritarian measures, limiting the freedom of the press and 
implementing a ban on marches and public rallies, a move that was overwhelmingly 
motivated by the spectre of the ‘Nazi wave’ that was threatening to engulf the 
country.732 
 In the spring of 1933, Dollfuß approached the new German Chancellor offering 
to steer a course in harmony with gesamtdeutsch interests and a few weeks later he 
entered into discussions with the Austrian NSDAP.  The reason why ultimately lies in 
the fact that the Nazi movement now posed an immediate and palpable threat to 
Austrian independence.  The Austrian NSDAP had powerful allies abroad, and if the 
government fell and, with German help, the Nazis were to seize the state apparatus in 
Austria, Anschluss would inevitably follow.  Calling new elections was, therefore, out 
of the question; an issue on which Dollfuß refused to budge in all his discussions with 
both the Austrian Nazis and the German Reich.733  ‘Hitler and the Nazis think they are 
clever’, Dollfuß observed, ‘they won’t do anything to initiate Anschluss, but demand 
new elections so that it happens automatically’.734  However, the government could 
not simply sit back in the face of escalating agitation on the part of the Austrian Nazis.  
The problem was that a strong line against the Austrian NSDAP would potentially 
bring the Dollfuß government into conflict with its powerful German neighbour.  
Austria, which was already undergoing a severe domestic crisis of its own and had no 
reliable backers abroad, could simply not afford to be on bad terms with Germany, let 
alone provoke open conflict.  This would make it difficult to keep his pro-German 
coalition partners, the Landbund on board: by mid-March 1933 there were already 
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credible rumours of negotiations taking place between the Landbund and the 
NSDAP.735  Moreover, it would sit uneasily in a country with widespread pan-German 
sympathies.  It was a battle that, in the long run, Dollfuß could not hope to win.  This 
was obvious to contemporary observers; any contest between Austria and Germany 
would invariably be an unequal one, Phipps observed, ‘if left “tête-à-tête” with 
Germany it [was] obvious that Austria must sooner or later succumb’.736  Dollfuß’s 
objective then was to play for time; to keep the reigns of government in his hands until 
the Nazis had discredited themselves in Germany.  It was, after all, not inconceivable 
that the Hitler government would fall.  Thus, Austria needed to find a way of riding out 
the Nazi storm in the hope that it would quickly subside. 
 One such strategy for diffusing the threat was, counter-intuitively, to be seen to 
be seeking a rapprochement with Germany.  Despite viewing National Socialism with 
‘deep mistrust’, Dollfuß’s initial aim appears to have been to maintain normal, cordial 
relations with Germany, as far as this was possible. 737  This decision was a perfectly 
understandable one, if one remembers that at this early stage there was real hope, and 
not just in Austria, that governmental responsibility would have a restraining influence 
on Nazi radicalism and coerce Hitler into more statesmanlike behaviour.  Thus, in 
February 1933, following a friendly exchange of telegrams on Hitler’s ascension to the 
Chancellorship, Dollfuß, under severe French pressure in the wake of the Hirtenberg 
Affair, approached von Papen, now Vice-Chancellor – via Erwin Wasserbäck, press 
attaché at the Austrian Legation in Berlin – with the suggestion that Germany step in 
and cover the French tranche of the Lausanne loan, which France was threatening to 
withdraw.  According to Wasserbäck, who recorded the event in a memorandum the 
following year, in return for German help, Austria would steer a foreign policy course 
that was in line with pan-German interests.  Hitler’s response demonstrated that the 
new German regime was not inclined to play by the rules: he not only rejected the 
Austrian proposal outright, he violated the sanctity of Austrian sovereignty by 
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demanding Dollfuß’s resignation and new elections.738  Such an ultimatum, Wasserbäck 
responded, was out of the question; the furthest the Austrian government could go 
would be including the Greater Germans in the government.739 
 This event has since been construed as the first of many attempts by the 
Dollfuß government to ‘do a deal with the Nazis’.740  Yet, to assess Dollfuß’s offer 
objectively, one must consider the context in which it was made and what exactly 
Dollfuß was promising.  Firstly, it is worth remembering that at this juncture, Dollfuß, 
the Austrian Foreign Office, indeed the diplomatic corps of all the European powers 
were still thinking along traditional lines of diplomacy as regards relations with 
Germany; no-one yet knew what to expect of Hitler once he was in power.  Across 
Europe the attitude was very much ‘business as usual’ and there was no reason for 
Austria to behave any differently.  After all, no-one could predict how long the new 
regime in Berlin would last; Hitler could very well have been ousted from office before 
the year was even out.  Indeed, many contemporary observers – George Messersmith, 
America’s Consul-General in Berlin amongst them – doubted the Nazis ability to hold 
on to power once confronted with the realities of government, with opinions divided 
well into 1934 on the issue of how long the Nazi system would hold out.741  Secondly, 
there is nothing eminently suspicious in Dollfuß’s attempts to cultivate better relations 
with Germany.  Dollfuß approaching the new Chancellor as he had von Papen the 
previous year – and, interestingly, this time through von Papen – was really nothing out 
of the ordinary as regards Austro-German relations; Germany should have been a 
natural ally in the face of French pressure over the Hirtenberg Affair.  Moreover, there 
were some signals that Berlin might be amenable to discussing the issue.742  Thirdly, 
there was nothing much new in Dollfuß’s offer; rather it was a rehashing of Dollfuß’s 
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original proposal to von Papen the previous year when he had sought help for Austria 
in the form of German participation in the League loan. 
 Which brings us to the issue of what Dollfuß was offering in return for German 
support.  The conveniently vague promise to steer a foreign policy course in line with 
pan-German interests – it was in no way made clear what that would actually entail – 
was hardly sensational given the fact that no Austrian government would want to 
appear to pursue a foreign policy that went against pan-German interests, even if this 
were palpably the case.  Dollfuß was not promising to sacrifice Austrian interests to 
German ones, nor was he suggesting tethering Austria’s foreign policy to that of 
Germany’s.  We know that in the spring of 1933, Dollfuß’s overriding intention was to 
maintain Austria’s independence in all directions, Hornbostel noting at the time that 
Austria 
...überhaupt keinen ‘Kurs’ im landläufigen Sinne aufweist. Sicherlich aber auch keinen 
französischen Kurs seit Lausanne.  Österreichische Außenpolitik beschränkte sich nach wie vor 
darauf, Österreich durch eine anpassungsfähige und elastische ‘Neutralität’ nach allen Richtungen 
hin am Leben zu erhalten.743 
This was publically repeated by Dollfuß in Salzburg on 6 May 1933: ‘Das einzige Ziel 
unserer Außenpolitik kann nur sein, die Unabhängigkeit nach allen Seiten zu sichern 
und dazu beizutragen, daß für die weitere Gestaltung des Schicksals unserer Heimat 
niemand anderer als wir selbst die Entscheidung zu treffen haben’.744  Moreover, 
Dollfuß was certainly not suggesting a pro-Nazi line; pan-German and Nazi interests 
were not the same thing, especially not in February 1933, despite Nazi propaganda 
telling us otherwise.  It is also worth remembering that he was not even proposing a 
pan-German course with a Nazi-dominated government, but with a government 
dominated by national conservatives with a leading Catholic statesman who was close 
to President Hindenburg holding the offices of Vice-Chancellor and Reich 
Commissioner of Prussia – at this juncture only three members of Hitler’s cabinet, 
Hitler included, were affiliated with the NSDAP.745  Rather, Dollfuß was simply seeking 
to re-establish, or to appear willing to re-establish, better relations with Germany – 
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with an obvious nod to those of a more moderate ‘national’ bent at home –, an 
objective that can only be understood against the backdrop of the estrangement in 
Austro-German relations caused by Lausanne and the perceived pro-French course of 
the previous year. 
 Wasserbäck’s suggestion that the Greater Germans could perhaps be invited to 
join the government is significant if only because Dollfuß had been pursuing this 
objective since entering office the previous year.  Dollfuß reminded the Christian 
Social Party Executive just a few weeks earlier that he had ‘attempted to reach an 
accommodation with the Greater Germans for the past half a year’, also to no avail.746  
He had, it will be recalled, even approached the German government on several 
occasions for help in persuading that party to support his government, also to no avail.  
So, not only was Dollfuß offering his German opponents something that he himself 
wanted, but this was also completely in line with previous policy and can hardly be 
considered a genuine concession to the Nazis or even to the German Reich.  The 
Greater Germans, however, played a wider role in Dollfuß’s attempt to improve 
relations with Germany.  According to the German Minister in Vienna, Kurt Rieth – a 
suspicious character, who, after the ‘Machtergreifung’ in the Reich, not being a Nazi, felt 
he had to be ‘more Catholic than the Pope’ – by remaining aloof, the Greater 
Germans were exerting ‘invisible pressure’ on the Austrian government, and that this 
was behind the ‘unceasing efforts’ of Dollfuß and some leading Christian Socials – and 
even some within the pendent leadership – to draw closer to Germany once more.747  
This development was looked upon with approval by the German legation in Vienna, 
which ascribed the Greater Germans a central role in furthering German policy 
interests in Austria, the ‘trump card’ in advancing the German point of view.  Clearly 
mistrustful of the Dollfuß government and cognizant of the fact that its ‘great weakness’ 
was mainly due to the non-participation of the Greater Germans, Rieth essentially 
encouraged Berlin to continue assisting that party in holding the Dollfuß government 
to ransom.  Instead of supporting Austrian efforts to maintain stability and 
independence, Rieth appeared to advocate the Greater Germans remaining aloof ‘until 
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conditions enable them to join a bourgeois government’ thereby maintaining the 
pressure on the Dollfuß government, with the expressed intention of influencing 
political developments in Austria in a direction favourable to German interests; 
amongst other ways, by counteracting the pro-French and pro-‘Italo-Hungarian’ 
tendencies in Austria’s foreign policy and ultimately pushing Austria towards a more 
pro-German course.748 
 Hitler’s ill-mannered reply to Austria’s initiative did not bode well for the 
Austrian government, and was followed by increasingly vociferous attacks against the 
Dollfuß government from over the border, which naturally emboldened their Austrian 
counterparts to greater acts of rebellion.749  It was against this backdrop that Dollfuß 
sanctioned the establishment of contact with the Austrian Nazis.  The paucity of 
sources means that establishing Dollfuß’s motivation for doing so is difficult.  It is not 
clear whether he was seriously considering bringing them into a coalition, attempting 
to outmanoeuvre his political opponents (and even allies) at home and abroad, 
searching for a way out of the impasse that his government found itself in, or merely 
playing for time. 
 One of Dollfuß’s likely motivations in talking to the Austrian Nazis was to 
investigate whether there was any way of diffusing the potential for coming into 
serious conflict with Berlin.  This can be inferred from Dollfuß’s report to the 
Christian Social Party Executive following his first meeting with Habicht at the end of 
April: the ‘advantage’ of accepting Habicht’s offer – a ‘black-brown’ coalition under 
Christian Social leadership and elections in the autumn – was an alleviation of the 
government’s position vis-à-vis the German Reich.750  The question was, Dollfuß 
continued, whether this would actually prove advantageous and whether it would 
actually alleviate the present situation?  The answer was clearly no; a coalition was, he 
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reasoned, ‘out of the question’.  The failure to fight the Nazis would mean that the 
Christian Socials would not be able to shield their supporters from them and the 
result would likely be the collapse of the Dollfuß ‘Front’.  Yet Dollfuß did not believe 
the Nazis should be rejected outright: ‘Strikt nein zu sagen halte ich nicht für gut, 
sondern sozusagen Bedingungen stellen’.  If, for example, the Nazis were prepared to 
strengthen the anti-Marxist course, this could possibly be discussed.  Does that mean 
Dollfuß was genuinely open to a coalition with the Nazis?  Not necessarily.  The 
reasoning could very likely have been tactical; why say no when you can say maybe, 
especially when it is highly unlikely that your conditions will ever be met?  Moreover, a 
‘blunt rejection’ would hardly help ease the escalating tension with Berlin.751 
 Dollfuß’s conversation with the Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya in 
late March provides some further clues.  Dollfuß was hoping to pressure the Socialists 
into agreeing to a radical overhaul of the constitution, and the knowledge that he could 
combine with the Nazis was, Dollfuß told Kánya, his strongest weapon.752  However, 
the fact that Dollfuß suggests to Kánya that he would no doubt eventually pursue a 
settlement with the Nazis, thus giving Kánya the impression that Dollfuß ultimately 
anticipated a ‘brown-black’ coalition, should not be taken at face value.  Not only do 
we have no way of proving or disproving whether this was the case, on 6 April, 
Dollfuß contradicted this contention when he declared in a meeting of the Christian 
Social Party Executive that abandoning his coalition partners the Heimwehr and the 
Landbund to rule with the Nazis was out of the question.753  Indeed, at no point does 
Dollfuß appear willing to abandon the Heimwehr in favour of the Nazis.  The only thing 
he would realistically consider at this juncture was the Nazis reinforcing the 
government ‘Front’, although this was somewhat academic as it was ‘unlikely that the 
Nazis would give up their fight against the bourgeois parties’. 754  One can only 
speculate as to why Dollfuß found it necessary to give the Hungarians this impression; 
the answer possibly lies in the fact that Hungary and Italy were, at this point, actively 
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petitioning Hitler to rein in the Austrian Nazis and support the Dollfuß government.  
Dollfuß could work on the assumption that Kánya’s account of their conversation 
would reach Mussolini in Rome.  We cannot, therefore, be certain that Dollfuß was 
genuinely seeking an understanding with the Nazis as he may simply have been using 
Kánya to get a message through to Mussolini. 
 There was also an economic dimension to Dollfuß’s decision to talk to the 
Austrian Nazis, at least in the spring of 1933.  In their meeting at the end of April, 
Habicht made it clear to Dollfuß that Austro-German commercial policy would be 
dependent on relations between the Austrian government and the Austrian NSDAP.755  
Habicht’s threat can only be wholly understood against the backdrop of 
Austro-German trade relations during the previous year.  In March 1932, Germany 
had offered Austria unilateral trade preferences, but as of the spring of 1933 and 
Hitler’s ascension to the Chancellorship, the negotiations for a commercial treaty 
between the two countries had not been concluded.  In February 1933, Dollfuß noted 
how the negotiations had come to a standstill, but he remained of the opinion that a 
good outcome was possible.756  Dollfuß continued to push for the conclusion of the 
treaty until at least mid-May, even though, by that point, it was obvious that the Nazis 
were spoiling for a fight and the attitude taken by the German government towards 
Austria was already deemed ‘quite intolerable’.757  On 13 May, Hans Frank, the Nazi 
Minister for Justice for Bavaria, had arrived in Vienna against the expressed wishes of 
the Austrian government to take part in the Nazi Türkenbefreiungsfeier; Frank was 
eventually expelled from Austria by Dollfuß, having been informed on his arrival in 
Vienna that his presence in Austria was not desired by the Austrian government.  On 
the one hand, the motivation for pursuing the treaty was economic:  Germany was by 
far Austria’s most important trading partner.  The British Minister pointed out that 
                                            
755 Dollfuß speaking to the Christian Social Party Executive, 3. May 1933: Ibid, 242. 
756 Dollfuß speaking to the Christian Social Party Executive, 21 February 1933: Ibid, 119.* 
757 Sometime around 15 May, Tauschitz, the Austrian Minister in Berlin, asked Ministerialdirektor 
Ritter of the German Foreign Ministry when it would be possible to take up the negotiations; clearly 
embarrassed, Ritter could only splutter, ‘yes, it is very difficult’.  (ÖstA), (AdR), (AA), (ÖVB 1 Rep.), 
Berlin Gesandtschaft, Karton 15, Tauschitz to the (BKA), z1.126/pol 15 May 1933, ‘Besuch der 
deutschen Minister in Wien’ (Karl Ritter, specialist for economic and commercial matters at the 
German Foreign Ministry).  Dollfuß’s reasons for telling Frank his visit was not desired are explained in: 
(TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16641, paper C4481/2092/3, Sir E. Phipps, Austro-German relations. Visit by 
Hans Frank, 16 May 1933. 
Chapter 5:  Negotiations with the NSDAP  197 
 
‘Austria knew that, in the long run, it could neither do without Germany nor cut itself 
adrift, in trade with a country whose share in this country’s imports and exports is in 
the neighbourhood of 20 per cent in each case.’758  Yet, there was also a strategic 
element to it.  Signing such a treaty would be seen as the practical realization of 
friendship with Germany – and thus, albeit obliquely, German endorsement of the 
Austrian government. 759   Hence, Dollfuß’s announcement to his Christian Social 
colleagues on the 20 April that he was contemplating travelling to Berlin, the ostensible 
purpose of this visit being to sign the Austro-German commercial treaty.760  His 
suggestion met with disapproval from some of his colleagues because they thought it 
would be seen as ‘bowing before the Swastika’.761  This may well have been good 
political advice, yet perhaps it was not such a foolish move on Dollfuß’s part after all.  
Ross points out that a refusal to sign the treaty, the negotiations for which were 
almost complete, put Hitler in a difficult position as it was impossible to conceal that 
the conclusion of the treaty was being refused for purely political reasons.762  Dollfuß 
was likely trying to pin the blame for the breakdown in negotiations on Hitler, thereby 
ensuring that Hitler could not pin the blame on him.  At home and abroad Dollfuß was 
then in a position to say that he was not the one being unreasonable. 
 Although avoiding conflict with Germany was Dollfuß’s primary concern, there 
were also internal pressures at play.  His Landbund coalition partners, for example, 
were not fundamental opponents of the Nazis, which may have put pressure on 
Dollfuß to at least appear willing to keep the lines of communication open.763  Dollfuß’s 
contact to the Landesinspekteur of the Austrian NSDAP, Theo Habicht, ran through 
Anton Rintelen, his Minister for Education, who had, by his own account, maintained 
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contact with Habicht throughout the spring of 1933 with Dollfuß’s knowledge and 
approval.764  Although we have no reason to doubt Rintelen’s claim that he did so with 
Dollfuß’s knowledge, Rintelen’s account needs to be approached with caution; he was, 
after all, very much following his own agenda and would have undoubtedly remained in 
contact with Habicht with or without Dollfuß’s blessing.  Rintelen was certainly not 
someone that Dollfuß could trust, on the contrary he was, as Neck pointed out in 
1975, Dollfuß’s most dangerous rival in the Christian Social Party.765  Deemed by 
Dollfuß’s supporters as of ‘doubtful loyalty’, Rintelen had long had his eyes on the 
Chancellorship and his ambition to oust Dollfuß, whether with the help of the 
Heimwehr or the National Socialists became an open secret as the year progressed.766  
This raises the question of why Dollfuß would trust him to mediate with the Nazis.  
We have no way of verifying what Dollfuß’s motives were here, or what kind of 
pressure Rintelen was bringing to bear on him.  However, from the British Minister, 
we do know that Rintelen was, along with Winkler, one of the most influential 
members of the cabinet, and therefore not someone Dollfuß could easily control or 
ignore.767  We also know he was an ardent advocate of reaching some kind of 
accommodation with the Nazis, claiming in his wartime memoirs that he threatened to 
resign from the cabinet if the conflict with the National Socialists were not 
reassessed.768  Even allowing for a degree of grandstanding – his memoirs were 
published in Germany in 1941 – we have no reason to doubt Rintelen’s growing 
pro-Nazi sentiments and his desire to bring about an understanding between the Nazis 
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and the Austrian government.  We know from Richard Schmitz that the first meeting 
between the Christian Socials and the National Socialists that took place in early April 
was ‘facilitated’ by Rintelen.769  Most conspicuous is the fact that Rintelen left the 
cabinet just a few weeks after these negotiations had taken place. 770  While Rintelen 
maintained in his post-war memoirs that he resigned, Dollfuß suggested that he was 
actually ousted from the cabinet, telling the British Minister that he got rid of Rintelen 
because of his intrigues with the Nazis.771  One of Dollfuß’s strategies at this juncture 
may have been to keep a channel open to the Austrian NSDAP, but only on his own 
terms.  Rintelen’s departure from the cabinet also highlights a fundamental problem 
with judging what happened during this period; one cannot be sure why Rintelen left 
the cabinet, was he ousted or did he resign?  We do know that a few months later 
Dollfuß went even further, effectively ‘banishing’ Rintelen  – the ‘jackal’ as the British 
Minister saw fit to describe him – to Rome, possibly with the hope of ‘immunising 
him’.772  Rintelen’s appointment to be Austrian Minister at the Quirinal was said to be 
on the personal wishes of the Chancellor; there he could be ‘more conveniently and 
effectively “looked after”…the first move in an astute game of internal politics’. 773  Put 
into context, Dollfuß’s sanctioning of Rintelen’s communication with Habicht in the 
spring of 1933 looks less like an explicit political objective and more like a tactical 
manoeuvre in a complex and murky political game. 
 Rintelen’s personal motives notwithstanding, as a consequence of his mediation, 
and at the Nazis’ request, sometime in late March, early April a committee of Christian 
Socials – Rintelen the facilitator, Schuschnigg and Buresch – met with Habicht and 
Proksch. 774   Habicht proposed a Christian Social-National Socialist coalition, on 
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condition that the Heimwehr be excluded from government and that new elections be 
called.  The discussions ended in stalemate, with the Christian Socials rejecting the 
Nazis’ proposal.  Not only were new elections out of the question – this would only 
benefit the National Socialists and the government knew it – but also on the grounds 
of loyalty to their Heimwehr partners.  This demonstrable gesture was met with open 
disparagement, with Habicht pointing out that ‘the other party [the Heimwehr] was, to 
his knowledge, not so modest on the issue of loyalty’.775  Rather, the Heimwehr, who 
were negotiating separately with the Nazis, were talking about jumping ship.776 
 Thus, Habicht’s comment perhaps hints at another key motivation for the 
meeting and a link that Bauer does not make in his article – the Heimwehr looked like 
they might be preparing to abandon the government and throw in their lot with the 
Nazis.777  This would hardly have come as much of a surprise as sections of the 
movement, including Starhemberg himself, had been openly flirting on and off with the 
National Socialists for years.  A participant in the Beer Hall Putsch in Munich in 1923, 
Starhemberg had met with Hitler in the summer of 1930 and discussed the possibility 
of an alliance between the Heimwehr and the NSDAP in Austria; the Nazi leader made, 
by his own admission, ‘a great impression’ on him.778  That same year, in the wake of 
the Nazi electoral breakthrough in Germany, Starhemberg had also met with Himmler 
and again discussed the possibility of co-operation between the Heimwehr and the 
NSDAP.779  And as late as April 1932, just weeks before entering into coalition 
negotiations with Dollfuß and despite publically criticising the National Socialists, 
Starhemberg had travelled to Berlin where he conferred with Nazi leaders and met 
with Hitler for the last time.780 
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 The flirtation did not end with the Heimwehr’s adoption of governmental 
responsibility.781  The threat of an understanding between the Starhemberg Heimwehr 
and the Nazis was a serious one and in the spring of 1933 the air was once again rife 
with rumours of a Heimwehr putsch.782  On 9 March, the Heimwehr’s pro-Nazi wing, the 
Styrian Heimatschutz formalized co-operation with the Austrian NSDAP by joining 
them in forming the Pan-German Front.783  In a secret meeting held the following day, 
Starhemberg declared that an agreement with the Nazis was necessary if the collapse 
of the Heimwehr was to be avoided.784  Dollfuß was bound to have known something of 
the extent of Starhemberg’s duplicity.  Aigner’s comments to the Christian Social Party 
Executive on 22 March about the machinations going on ‘behind the back of the 
Federal Chancellor and the government’, make it clear that he was well aware of the 
negotiations between the Heimatschutz and the NSDAP, as well as rumours that 
Starhemberg was willing to resign if he posed an obstacle to the union of those two 
groups.785  He also knew about a meeting that took place on 13 March in Berlin 
between Hermann Göring and the two Heimwehr leaders, Franz Hueber – Göring’s 
brother-in-law – and Waldemar Pabst, to discuss bringing the Austrian NSDAP into 
government, as the meeting was reported in the pro-Nazi Deutschösterreichische 
Tages-Zeitung (Dötz).  As we know that Dollfuß had no intention of abandoning the 
Heimwehr in favour of the National Socialists – that would have been jumping out of 
the frying pan into the fire, the aim was always to keep them in –, Dollfuß’s decision 
that the Christian Socials enter into their own negotiations with the Austrian Nazis 
only to demonstrably reject their conditions, must be understood, in part, as a tactical 
                                                                                                                                
sage Ihnen daher ganz offen, daß ich mich mit aller Energie den Bestrebungen der österreichischen 
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manoeuvre on the domestic chessboard and not as an attempt at a genuine political 
realignment. 
  
 
All Roads Lead to Rome – The Search for Allies 
Hueber met Göring again on 5 April at Starhemberg’s behest, which led to rumours of 
a plan to oust Dollfuß and instigate a government of national concentration – Nazis, 
Styrian Heimatschutz and the national fraction of the Heimwehr – all with Italian 
agreement.  This information prompted, at least in part, Dollfuß’s snap decision to fly 
to Rome to meet with Mussolini at Easter 1933.786  He had originally planned to travel 
after Easter with the aim of concluding the negotiations for the Austrian concordat, 
but this was, according to Richard Schmitz, hurriedly brought forward on account of 
pressure coming from Berlin and ‘certain news’ of ‘plans to flood Austria with National 
Socialist propaganda, to overthrow Dollfuß and make the Anschluss by peaceful means 
– all of this apparently with the knowledge and approval of Mussolini and the 
Vatican’.787  Thus, the sole motivation for Dollfuß’s trip was to find a way to stave off 
the escalating Nazi threat.  In Rome, Dollfuß set about ensuring that Mussolini would 
not betray Austria to Hitler; ‘it was desirable’, the Secretary-General of the Federal 
Chancellery told Phipps, ‘that the latter should not derive his impressions of things 
Austrian solely from the German Ministers now in Rome’.788 
 The Vatican’s stance vis-à-vis National Socialism was critical to the Austrian 
government: if the Holy See proved to be too accommodating to Hitler, and if Nazi 
Germany was seen to publically receive the Pope’s blessing, the Austrian government 
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would lose a key justification for rejecting National Socialism.  Thus, the news, on 
7 April, that von Papen was on his way to Rome to initiate discussions for a concordat 
between the Holy See and Germany that would ‘anchor the new government to 
Christian principles’ was viewed with serious alarm by the Christian Socials, who 
feared that the Vatican would sacrifice Austria in the clamour to come to an 
arrangement with the Reich.789  They had watched with concern as the Holy See 
resigned itself to events in Germany, the destruction of political Catholicism and the 
realities of Nazi rule.  The danger was that it would take the same attitude towards 
Austria, abandoning the Christian Socials in the same way that it had the 
Partito Popolare in Italy as part of the agreement surrounding the 1929 Lateran Treaty, 
or as it was about to abandon the Centre Party as a condition of the Reichskonkordat.790 
 Dollfuß set about convincing Pacelli and the Pope that the continued existence 
of the Christian Social Party in Austria was in Rome’s best interests.791  Germany may 
have already fallen to the Nazis, but Austria, a ‘bulwark of German Catholicism’, 
remained in demonstrably Catholic hands – not only was Dollfuß willing to sign a 
concordat, he was planning to integrate it into the new constitution.792  However, 
Dollfuß argued, it was vital that the Vatican maintain its support for political 
Catholicism in that country.  In Austria the National Socialists were the spiritual heirs 
of the Los von Rom movement and, for this reason, it was crucial that the Church 
refrain from displaying any kind of tolerance towards the Nazis, as without the internal 
restraint imposed by the Church, Austria’s youth, he warned, would go over to the 
Nazis.793  Rather, he stressed, the Vatican should support the Christian Socials, a point 
that was made ‘repeatedly’, and ‘in various ways’ to ensure that the message came 
across.794  Moreover, he sought to impress on Pacelli that the removal of the clergy 
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from German political life, for which, Dollfuß learned, Göring and von Papen were 
lobbying ‘with fine words and promises’, would be a disaster if it were implemented in 
Austria.  Although, he insisted, no-one there was advocating politics being led only by 
the clergy, this ran the danger of fostering alienation towards the Church within the 
Christian Social Party.795 
 The Vatican’s response was, at this juncture at least, reassuring.  Concerns that 
it would abandon Austria, that it would adopt a wait-and-see attitude out of 
consideration for Germany, or would simply sit back and see who came out on top 
were, according to Dollfuß, unfounded.796  The Christian Socials need not have feared 
that the Vatican would try to push them into an accommodation with the Nazis.  
Rather, he was given to understand by the Vatican that it was his decisive action that 
had saved Austria from the fate of both Italy and Germany, where the Catholic parties 
had fallen victim to the new regimes; in short, the Vatican had not abandoned political 
Catholicism in Austria, as it had elsewhere, because of the satisfactory course that 
events in Austria had taken.797  As far as the Vatican was concerned, Bolshevism was 
the key political issue; everything that so much as bordered on it was considered ‘das 
Übel’ and would find no understanding.798  Thus, it was not only pressure from 
Mussolini that precluded an accommodation between Dollfuß and the Socialists; to 
keep the Vatican onside, the Austrian government would have to had maintained its 
strongly anti-Socialist stance.  Those who argue Dollfuß should have sought a coalition 
with the Social Democrats ignore the fact that an objection from Rome to such a 
proposal would have destroyed the Christian Social Party and that its destruction 
would have meant the collapse of the Dollfuß government, a development which 
would only have benefited the Nazis. 
 The Austrian concordat, like the Reichskonkordat had a clear legitimising 
function; by signing it, Dollfuß argued, ‘the Holy See had further indicated its 
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recognition of an independent and self-supporting Austria’.799  Yet, it had also signed a 
concordat with Nazi Germany and Dollfuß needed a clear signal to the 
German-speaking world that, despite this, the Vatican had not abandoned Austria or 
the Christian Socials, and that it would continue to provide the Austrian government 
with tangible moral support.  Troubled by rumours that Hitler and his entourage were 
planning to participate in the Katholikentag scheduled to be held in Austria in 
September that year, Dollfuß requested that the Vatican send a papal legate – ideally 
Pacelli himself – as a ‘guest of the government’, the idea being to have someone with 
enough legitimacy to eclipse Hitler.800  However, as the Katholikentag was a purely 
ecclesiastical affair over which the government had no real jurisdiction, Dollfuß invited 
Pacelli to the Staatliche Türkenbefreiungsfeier that was being held at the same time.  Yet 
this was more than just about a potential propaganda coup; in the escalating conflict 
between ‘Catholic’ Austria and ‘Godless’ Nazi Germany, it was crucial to communicate 
to the Catholic population of Austria that the Holy See was behind the Dollfuß 
government. 
 The problem was, it turned out that it was not altogether clear whose side that 
was.  Despite Dollfuß promising extensive concessions that would allow the Church 
major influence in state affairs, the Vatican continued to push its own agenda, even 
when this meant weakening Dollfuß in his fight against the National Socialists.  
Complaints from the Vatican about the speed at which the ratification of the Austrian 
concordat were progressing – ratification required the consent of the Nationalrat but 
parliamentary rule had been suspended – compared unfavourably with the palpable 
ease with which the Reichskonkordat was pushed through; the Austrian concordat was 
signed first – on 5 June – but was not ratified until 1 May the following year.  In a 
striking coincidence, the ratification of the Reichskonkordat took place on 10 September, 
coinciding with the Allgemeine Deutsche Katholikentag being held in Vienna – which the 
Nazis had already done their best to sabotage with their Tausend-Mark-Sperre – an 
event used by Dollfuß as a platform for the proclamation of his Christian Corporate 
State.  This was a real embarrassment for Dollfuß, who, in a speech before the 
                                            
799 Dollfuß’s statement on his return from his trip to Rome to sign the concordat.  (TNA): (PRO), FO 
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Cardinal Legate that very same day, attempted to pacify the Vatican by emphasising the 
fact that although the Austrian Treaty had not been signed, this was nothing but a 
mere formality, as, in practice, the Austrian concordat was already in effect.801 
 Worried that Reich German success in achieving a concordat with the Vatican 
would look like a victory for National Socialism, Dollfuß requested that the Vatican 
make it clear through its press that the agreement was between the Holy See and the 
German Reich, not with National Socialism, and at the same time emphasize the 
‘special relationship’ between Austria and the Catholic Church. 802   The Vatican 
responded reluctantly, agreeing to a display of public approval vis-à-vis Austria, but 
refusing to speak out against National Socialism in the manner that the Austrians had 
requested. 803  Instead, with the Austrian concordat still not ratified, the Vatican 
escalated its own demands.  Pacelli, in response to wishes put forward by the Austrian 
bishops, started pushing for the negotiations to be re-opened on the issue of 
confessional schools – as provided for in the Reichskonkordat –, a demand that became 
more emphatic in the wake of the February civil war.  Otherwise, Bishop Waitz – who 
was unhappy with the concordat – argued, the Nazis could maintain that they would 
go further towards meeting Catholic requirements than the Christian Social Austrian 
government. 804   Sensing Dollfuß’s weakened position, the Vatican pushed for 
improvements to the concordat, arguing that the changed political circumstances now 
meant that the path was finally clear to fulfil those of the Vatican’s wishes that were 
originally rejected due to parliamentary considerations.805  Although the Austrian 
government initially refused to modify the concordat that it had already signed, it 
ultimately conceded to these further demands, as it was hardly in a position to refuse. 
 No matter how wide-reaching the concession, it was all to no avail.  The 
Church ultimately decided to pursue the same policy towards the Christian Socials as 
it had in Germany towards the Centre; in December 1933, in a move ‘universally 
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regarded as a severe blow to the Christian Social Party, which [did] not seem to have 
even been consulted beforehand’, the Austrian Episcopate announced a ‘temporary’ 
withdrawal of permission for the Catholic clergy to take part in public life.806  Not only 
did this undermine the beleaguered Austrian government and provide ammunition to 
its Nazi opponents, it indicated that the Vatican had effectively withdrawn its support, 
a conclusion that the Christian Social press attempted to head off by ‘recalling the 
numerous pronouncements of Catholic dignitaries in favour of the present régime’.807 
 However, on his return from Rome in mid-April, Dollfuß’s hand was, for the 
time being, strengthened and Dollfuß agreed to a face-to-face meeting with Habicht to 
investigate what it would take for the Austrian Nazis to cease their agitation against 
the Dollfuß government.  Habicht suggested a coalition under Christian Social 
leadership and new elections in the autumn, with the assurance that the Austrian Nazis 
would commit themselves to a coalition even if they won more mandates in that 
election, and that they would not direct their election campaign against the Christian 
Socials. 808  The Chancellor would be a Christian Social, as a Nazi would cause 
difficulties abroad.  The offer was laced with a barely-concealed threat: Austria’s 
relationship to Germany, Habicht warned, would be dependent on the government’s 
relationship with the Austrian NSDAP, and that there were only two choices for 
relations between the Christian Socials and the Nazis, war or peace.809 
 Dollfuß returned to the Christian Social Party Executive and informed them of 
Habicht’s terms.  In his article, Bauer suggests that Dollfuß’s ‘carefully implied 
possibility’ of a coalition with the Nazis, which demonstrated his ‘ambivalent stance 
vis-à-vis the National Socialists’, was vehemently rejected by the party’s heavyweights, 
Bauer agreeing with Goldinger’s conclusion that the Party Executive arrested [deutlich 
bremste] Dollfuß in his attempts to build bridges to the Nazis.810  The first thing to say 
is that the nature of the evidence – Dollfuß’s report to the Christian Social Party 
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Executive – allows, because of its odd syntax, in parts at least, for seriously divergent 
interpretations and it is impossible to say with any certainty what Dollfuß is actually 
saying.  Yet two points are wholly unambiguous.  Firstly, Dollfuß was clearly not taken 
in by Nazi blandishments: the advantage of Habicht’s offer, Dollfuß noted, was the 
possibility that it might ease the tensions with Berlin, yet he does not really believe 
that this would actually happen.811  Secondly, it suggests that Dollfuß recognized the 
danger posed by the Nazi movement while it was growing and would not countenance 
a deal with the Nazis while they were in a position of strength: ‘wenn die NS einmal 
sehen daß sie über eine Gewisse Grenze nicht hinwegkommen, werden sie es sich 
überlegen’.812 
 Thus, Dollfuß appears to be suggesting to the Christian Social Party that it must 
somehow hold out until the Nazis realize that they will not be able to make further 
headway and are forced to reconsider their position, perhaps with the hope of then 
drawing some of them in after they had become more amenable due to lack of political 
progress.  However, this does not mean that Dollfuß was ambivalent towards the 
Nazis; he was not seeking a coalition with them, on the contrary, he was trying to find 
a way of neutralizing the threat that they posed and a way of weathering the storm.  
He rejected the idea of co-operating with them when they were in a position of 
strength precisely because he knew that the Nazis’ objective was to destroy the 
Christian Social Party, his government and the Austrian state.  He was under no 
illusions about why the Nazis wanted a coalition.  Hence his conclusion, ‘daß in der 
gegenwärtigen Lage, so freundlich das Angebot aussehen möchte gegenüber der 
Christlichsozialen Partei, dieses Angebot auf Koalition nicht in Frage kommen kann.'813  
However, as parts of the government ‘Front’ thought that the Nazis could be co-opted 
and might question the wisdom of ruling out any form of contact, Dollfuß avoids a 
clear statement that there would be no co-operation under any circumstances – ‘strikt 
nein zu Sagen, halte ich nicht für gut’ – to retain maximum strategic flexibility in every 
direction.814  This had the particular advantage of leaving the impression open to the 
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Germans that Dollfuß might one day be ready for an understanding with the National 
Socialists. 
 The result of turning down Habicht’s offer was an escalation of tension 
between the Dollfuß government and the Austrian Nazis on the one hand, and Nazi 
Germany on the other.  Believing that a coalition with the left would bring down his 
government and destroy the Christian Social Party, Dollfuß tried to get out of the 
impasse without handing the reigns of power to the Nazis.  As a show of strength, 
Dollfuß came out strongly against the Austrian Nazis.815 
Diejenigen täuschen sich, die glauben, die Regierung durch ihre Terrorakte von innen oder außen 
stürzen zu können. Wir haben die Machtmittel, die uns zur Verfügung stehen noch lange nicht 
eingesetzt.  Aber wenn es not tut, den Burgfrieden im Lande zu sichern, dann werden wir auch 
vor dem Äußersten nicht zurückschrecken.816 
However, suppression alone was not a long-term solution and did nothing about the 
immense pressure coming from the North.  As the Austrian Nazis were absolutely 
dependent ‘upon the incumbents of power in the Reich’ a more effective strategy was 
to cut the party off from its source.817 
 In a conversation with Rieth in July 1933, Dollfuß enquired, ‘whether the Reich 
Chancellor and the Reich government would decide to leave the local [Austrian] 
National Socialist party to its own devices, without continuing to provide it with moral 
and material support’.818  According to Rieth, Dollfuß felt he was ‘in a position to cope 
with local National Socialism if the latter felt it was no longer supported by the Reich’.  
On the surface this may appear naïve – revealing your strategy to your opponents – 
but what Dollfuß actually seems to have been doing is emphasizing the solidity of his 
position, with particular reference to the recent strengthening of the Vaterländische 
                                            
815 The escalating terror campaign was an admission, the Reichspost claimed, of their weakness in 
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Front.  Rieth also mentions how Dollfuß still cherished the ‘illusion’ of being able to 
suppress the Austrian Nazis by force through the Heimwehr on the one hand, and push 
through a constitutional reform with the help of the Social Democrats that would 
eliminate parliament and make elections impossible for at least a year, on the other.  
Illusion or not – and Rieth was forced to note that the struggle against the Austrian 
Nazis had been carried on ‘in recent weeks here with unprecedented severity’ – 
Dollfuß’s message was clear: his position was not a weak one and he intended to hold 
out.  It would also have been clear to the German Foreign Office at this point that 
Austria also had the other ‘Powers’ on her side: the same month the British made 
representations in Berlin on Austria’s behalf.  Thus, Dollfuß’s aim was, as always, to 
‘bring about more friendly relations between the two governments’ all the time 
suggesting that, if the Reich would desist in its support for the Austrian Nazis, a 
solution to the conflict was possible.  As it was, Rieth explained, Dollfuß was ‘not yet 
ready for an understanding with the National Socialists here to say nothing of yielding 
to their demands.’819 
 The situation remained unchanged throughout the summer, the Germans 
refusing to take the ‘hint’ and refrain from pressurizing Austria.  It was obvious to 
contemporary observers that Dollfuß could not withstand the pressure from Germany 
indefinitely; ‘unless some diversion occurs to relieve him’ Selby noted ‘he must 
succumb.’820  No diversion was forthcoming.  Instead, Mussolini began to change 
course.  Having exhausted all options in Berlin, he began pushing Dollfuß for an 
understanding with the NSDAP, seeing this as a way of bringing them under control, 
rather than helping them to power. 821   Nonetheless, by September there was 
dissatisfaction in the Austrian Foreign Office, the Director-General telling the British 
Minister that he considered the Italians to be ‘playing a double game’822.  This meant 
extra pressure on Dollfuß from Italy at a time when he was already in a dangerous 
position, ‘at the mercy of every internal manoeuvre of Austrian parties and politicians 
                                            
819 Minister Rieth to State Secretary Bülow, July 1, 1933, No. 346,Ibid 619–21. 
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arising out of the pressure coming from the North.’ 823  In September, tensions 
between the Heimwehr and the Landbund came to a head, forcing the latter out of the 
cabinet, significantly weakening Dollfuß’s position.  By October, the Heimwehr, 
including the Vice-Chancellor Fey were once again engaged in discussions with Habicht 
about a Heimwehr–National Socialist government. 824   By November, Dollfuß was 
‘fearful, lest Austria should be sacrificed to a Franco-German agreement or to British 
and Italian efforts to reach a compromise with Germany’.825  In addition, increased 
pressure from Mussolini – and the Heimwehr – to take a stronger anti-Socialist stance 
had alarmed the Social Democrats who were threatening armed intervention if Dollfuß 
did not change course.  It is against this backdrop that Dollfuß agreed to meet with the 
Greater-Germans Franz Langoth and Hermann Foppa, representatives of the Nationale 
Kampffront formed between the Greater Germans and the Nazis, in the autumn of 
1933. 
 Foppa and Langoth’s intention was to bring about an understanding between 
the Dollfuß government and the NSDAP.826  Dollfuß’s main objective in speaking to the 
two men was to investigate if it were possible to attain a détente in relations with the 
German Reich.  During their first conversation – the record for which stems from 
Langoth – Dollfuß enquired into how the Kampffront proposed bringing about a 
settlement between Austria and the German Reich.  Dollfuß appeared amenable, in 
principle at least, to their suggestion of bringing representatives of the Kampffront into 
the government yet what is not clear is whether Dollfuß was seriously considering such 
a concession, or was merely manoeuvring and playing for time.  Otherwise, why 
suggest during the course of the conversation that the Socialists had told him they 
would give their consent for a ‘comprehensive Ermächtigungsgesetz for five years’?827  
What is clear from  the questions that Dollfuß posed is that he was trying to find a way 
of getting what he wanted – an easing of tensions with the Reich – and neutralizing the 
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Nazi threat: who did they have in mind as representative of the Kampffront, would it be 
a Nazi, if so, who did they envision?828  ‘Müßte also die NSDAP als solche wieder in 
Erscheinung treten’, he enquired?  For this very reason, Dollfuß suggested, the idea of 
a settlement with the Kampffront as a whole was more attractive than a settlement 
with the NSDAP alone.829  New elections remained out of the question, as did 
abandoning the Heimwehr, a stock excuse used by the Christian Socials to explain why 
they could not accede to Nazi demands.  Dollfuß was perhaps even hoping to be able 
to win some of the Greater Germans back for the government camp:  ‘Es ist mir 
besonders sympathisch, wenn Ihre Kreise mit in Frage kommen, die Sie die nationalen 
Belange Österreichs schon so lange verteidigen’.830  However, in rejecting Habicht as a 
negotiating partner, Dollfuß’s ultimate objective becomes clear.  ‘Ich muß daher 
wünschen, daß Sie die Verbindung mit Heß und Hitler suchen’: what he really wanted 
was direct negotiations with Berlin.831 
 In mid-November Dollfuß once again changed tack, telling the two emissaries 
that although he was ready for negotiations he ‘did not wish to conduct them through 
Munich’ (and thus Habicht).832  Instead, Dollfuß insisted that the conflict could only be 
resolved through a direct agreement with Berlin.  This attempt to circumvent Habicht 
was entirely tactical.  On the one hand, rejecting Habicht as a negotiating partner was 
an attempt to avoid strengthening Habicht’s position or legitimizing the methods that 
he had used in the fight against the Dollfuß government.  It could also help to isolate 
the Austrian party from the German one, which would make it easier to control.  
However, more important were the potential benefits of getting Hitler to come to the 
negotiating table.  Not only would that confirm Austrian government claims that Nazi 
Germany was responsible for the parlous state of relations between the two countries, 
it would have meant de facto recognition of the Dollfuß government and Austrian 
independence by Nazi Germany.  Moreover, Hitler, unlike Habicht, had to consider 
how his actions were interpreted abroad and was far more likely to sacrifice the 
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Anschluss as a foreign policy goal – even if superficially – than the Austrian Nazis who 
had nothing to lose.  Thus, what Dollfuß wanted was a direct and official approach 
from the German government.  This would be advantageous to the Austrians, as it 
would confirm their argument that the conflict was one between ‘two German states 
of a kind covered by formal conceptions of international law’ and therefore a foreign 
policy issue, as opposed to Nazi Germany’s argument that it was ‘ a dispute between 
the Austrian government and a historical movement of the whole German people’.833 
 Dollfuß’s motivation for pursuing an agreement with Nazi Germany – with the 
knowledge of the British Foreign Office – was, in part, the hope that the cessation of 
hostilities would give the Austrian government some breathing space and room to 
manoeuvre.834  It can also be understood against the backdrop of events further afield.  
During the early years of the Nazi regime, Hitler strove ‘to keep Germany’s relations 
with its neighbours correct, if not cordial’, a policy that contrasted sharply with the 
treatment accorded Austria.835  Keen to convince the world of his peaceful intentions, 
Hitler began laying the foundations for an understanding with Poland that would 
normalize relations between the two countries and bring the almost decade-long 
German-Polish customs war to an end.  On 2 May 1933, in a meeting with the Polish 
Minister in Berlin, Hitler attempted to allay Polish fears by claiming that he was 
sympathetic to Polish nationalist aspirations and that he ‘recognized Poland as a 
political entity with a right to exist’.  Soon after a joint communiqué was issued 
wherein Hitler ‘“laid stress on the firm intention of the German government to 
maintain their attitude and their actions strictly within the limits of existing treaties”’.836  
This rapprochement culminated in the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 
January 1934 and ushered in ‘a certain superficial cordiality’ that ‘prevailed through 
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1938’ when the two countries ‘cooperated in the dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia’. 837   Hitler attempted a similar strategy vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia; 
Smelser notes how, ‘already in February of 1933, Hitler assured Mastný, the 
Czechoslovak Ambassador to Berlin, that no contacts existed between the NSDAP 
and the Sudeten radicals, and emphasised his desire to be a good neighbour’.838  Later 
there were also rumours of a possible nonaggression pact between Germany and 
Czechoslovakia – as well as Yugoslavia – along the same lines of that which Germany 
was negotiating with Poland and this despite the fact that the Czechoslovak 
government was instituting similar suppressive measures against the DNSAP as the 
Austrian authorities.839 
 Poland did not sign a non-aggression pact with Germany because she was taken 
in by Nazi guarantees, but because it offered her some breathing space.  It was clear to 
Piłsudski that the pact did not end Poland’s conflict with Germany, it merely gave 
Poland some respite; ‘after that’ he maintained, ‘we must be ready to defend 
ourselves’.840  The Poles were certainly aware that the Nazis could not be trusted to 
keep their promises, the Polish chargé d'affaires in Vienna admitting in November 1933 
that ‘if Austria goes the agreements they have signed with Germany will not be worth 
the paper on which they are written’.841  The same would have been true for Dollfuß 
and his associates.  Nazi Germany’s willingness to negotiate with former enemies such 
as Poland proved problematic for the Dollfuß government; not only did it further 
legitimize the Nazi regime, it highlighted the Dollfuß government’s inability to get Nazi 
Germany to the negotiating table and seemed to suggest that it was the Dollfuß 
government that was ultimately responsible for the state of relations between the two 
countries.  This perhaps explains why the Nazi press in Germany felt it necessary to 
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suggest that the signing of the pact with Poland was ‘very uncomfortable’ for 
government circles in Vienna and was viewed with ‘displeasure on the Ballhausplatz’.842 
 A handful of further attempts to break the deadlock between Austria and Nazi 
Germany followed before Dollfuß’s assassination in July 1934, the most significant of 
which were the aborted talks with Habicht that were due to take place in early 
January 1934.  All of them failed, not least because Nazi conditions – a repeal on the 
ban on the National Socialist movement in Austria and the ‘testing of the people’s will 
by a general election’ – ran directly counter to Austrian demands and would have 
opened the floodgates for the Nazi movement in Austria.843  Throughout Dollfuß’s 
position remained in principle the same: ‘namely, the recognition of the independence 
of Austria and no interference in the internal affairs of Austria’.844  Any solution to the 
conflict, the Federal Chancellery maintained, was dependent on the demonstration of 
the ‘determination and unceasing endeavours of the German government and leader 
or, what is the same thing, the leaders of the N.S.D.A.P. to regard and treat the 
National Socialist movement in Austria as an Austrian movement’.845  This would have 
meant Nazi Germany cutting off all support for the Austrian party and a cessation of 
the propaganda flooding in from the Reich.  Dollfuß and Schuschnigg clearly hoped that 
if these parameters were genuinely met the Austrian authorities would be in a strong 
enough position to keep the Austrian Nazi party – it was common knowledge that it 
was riven by internal rivalries – suppressed.  The fact that all political parties had been 
eliminated in Austria offered the Austrian government a convenient excuse about why 
the Austrian Nazi party could not be allowed to operate as an independent body.  
Thus, Schuschnigg’s comment to Heß in October 1933, that he ‘could easily conceive 
of collaboration with the Austrian National-Socialists’ should not be read as a naïve or 
malicious attempt to do a deal with the Nazis but an attempt to neutralize the threat 
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that they posed.  Such ‘collaboration’ he added, would only take place if the Austrian 
Nazis ‘were ready to become members of the united Austrian front’ where, cut off 
from Nazi Germany, they could perhaps be co-opted, or at very least controlled.846 
 Interpretations which suggest that Dollfuß’s – and later Schuschnigg’s – 
willingness to talk to the Nazis demonstrates a ‘dubious, ambivalent and calamitous 
handling of the National Socialist threat’ fail to spot that there are a multitude of 
explanations for adopting such a strategy none of which involve ideological 
ambivalence towards the Nazi movement or the genuine intention to of bringing them 
into government.  While it is true that Dollfuß was prepared to sit down and consider 
Nazi demands – at a time when most of Europe was actively engaged in appeasement – 
the possibility that he was actually exploring ways to neutralize the Nazi threat without 
handing them the keys to the Austrian citadel also needs to be considered. 
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Chapter 6 
‘Rückkehr nach Potsdam’: The Prussian Paradigm 
The image of Hitler, statesmanlike in civilian dress, obsequiously bowing before an aged 
Field Marshall von Hindenburg resplendent in Prussian parade uniform and Pickelhaube, 
has proven to be the most enduring image of the ‘unholy alliance’ between National 
Socialism and Prussian militarism.  On the 21 March 1933, sixty–two years to the day on 
which the first Reichstag of Bismarck’s newly founded German Empire had been 
inaugurated, Hitler and Hindenburg ascended the steps of the Garnisonkirche in Potsdam 
to celebrate the state opening of the newly elected Reichstag.  Before the vault of 
Prussia’s ‘greatest’ king, Frederick II, and next to the Kaiser’s jarringly vacant throne, 
Hindenburg, the Prussian military and monarchical tradition personified, bade Hitler and 
his government to overcome the divisions of the Weimar era and lead Germany 
towards national renewal, in the ‘spirit of Potsdam’.847 
 The ‘Day of Potsdam’ was a ‘Meisterstück der Regie’, reassuring to worried 
traditionalists and conservatives and conferring legitimacy on the new Nazi-led 
government.848  Magnificently choreographed, the freshly appointed Propaganda Minister 
pulled out all the stops to ensure that his message, of the unassailable bond linking the 
Prussian tradition and the ‘new Germany’, was hammered home.  As the seat of power 
of the Prussian kings, Potsdam, adorned in a sea of swastikas and Imperial 
Schwarz-Weiß-Rot, validated the allusion of Hitler’s much-lauded ‘Third Reich’ as the 
natural and legitimate heir to the ‘Second Reich’ of the Hohenzollerns.  Moreover, the 
Garnisonkirche, altar of Prussia’s military monarchy and resting place of both Friedrich 
Wilhelm I. and Friedrich II, proved to be an ideal backdrop for the ritualistic union of old 
and new, past and future, radical and reactionary, a potent symbol of the fusion of 
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National Socialism and Prussianism.849  The narrative was beautiful in its simplicity: 
Frederick the Great – Bismarck – Hitler. 
 In Austria, as elsewhere in Europe, Hitler’s initial display of political restraint was 
welcomed with cautious relief.  Nonetheless, judgement, the Reichspost counselled, 
should be reserved; although events were, ‘in a sense reassuring’, it was ‘still wholly 
uncertain’ where the German revolution was heading. 850   At the same time, the 
symbolism of the event had much wider implications and, in Austria, as in parts of 
Catholic Germany, the Prussian-Protestant associations of the spectacle in Potsdam 
were met with palpable unease.851  For those on Austria’s conservative right, ‘Potsdam’, 
as the centre of Prussian power and traditional counter-pole to Catholic Vienna, held a 
deep – and overwhelmingly negative – cultural and historical meaning.  Thus, to some 
observers the ‘lesson’ of the ‘Day of Potsdam’ was all too clear: ‘daß Deutschland ein 
vergrößertes Preußen werden soll, daß dort die verhängnisvollen Ketten der 
Zentralisation geschmiedet werden’.852  As the resurrection of the Protestant-Prussian 
paradigm of 1871, Hitler’s Third Reich and his National Socialist movement were 
regarded as the modern manifestation of an old foe. 
 That the nineteenth-century Austro-Prussian relationship is key to understanding 
the Austro-German conflict of the interwar period is rarely observed.  This is by no 
means surprising due to a pronounced tendency, particularly during the early years of 
the Second Republic, to view the First Republic as an historical aberration: Der Staat, den 
keiner wollte, hermetically sealed between the collapse of the Empire and the tardy 
(re)birth of the Austrian nation in 1945.  As Utgaard has noted, ‘the First Republic, 
Austro-fascist government, union with Nazi Germany, and World War II’ all ‘amounted 
to a collective massive rupture from the Habsburg past.’ 853   Moreover, Austrian 
politicians, keen to present the Second Republic as the natural successor to the 
Habsburg Empire, were not averse to both the First Republic and the Nazi era being 
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depicted as some sort of accidental glitch, a stance, which has had profound implications 
for understanding of the period.  Substantial continuities between the Empire and the 
First and Second Republics have been downplayed in favour of presenting the years 1918 
and 1945 as marking an unmitigated break with the past.  While recent years have seen 
– in particular – Austrian historians go to great lengths to break down the psychological 
barrier of 1945 and incorporate the years 1938–45 into the broader sweep of ‘Austrian’ 
history, there is less certainty about how to include the abortive First Republic in 
Austria’s ‘national’ historical continuum. 
 As a result, the year 1918 continues to mark a clearly defined historical caesura, 
severing the First Republic from its Imperial predecessor.  Yet, the physical scale of the 
Empire’s collapse obscures the fact that the Österreichische Länder – that is, those areas, 
which went on to form the core of the modern Republic of Austria – had formed the 
nucleus of the Habsburg Monarchy for centuries.854  Unlike Germany, the Austrian state 
had a clear legal antecedent, of which the First Republic was ‘the new, sharply reduced 
incarnation’. 855   Unfortunately, historical reality was eclipsed by a memorable, if 
spectacularly uninformed remark:  ‘L’Autriche, c’est ce qui reste’, Clemenceau – 
allegedly – quipped and seven hundred years of uninterrupted Habsburg rule became 
meaningless overnight.856  Of course, the very idea of a ‘Stunde Null’ is misleading;  
‘Austria’ did not cease to exist on 11 November 1918, and start again from scratch the 
following day.  There was, of course, an obvious – and undoubtedly traumatic – political 
break.  Yet, there were also clear continuities between Empire and Republic, not least 
because leading political personalities – Ignaz Seipel, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer to 
name just three – straddled the divide.  Likewise, under the Empire all the Kronländer of 
Austria had their own diets and they were, therefore, fully ‘prepared for provincial rule’ 
in November 1918. 857   Major institutional, political, religious, societal and cultural 
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continuities such as these, not to mention more intangible continuities in mentalities, 
identities and affiliations should not be overlooked. 
 Re-affirming the connections between Imperial and Republican Austria is 
important, not least because, during the First Republic, National Socialism was perceived 
through an historical frame of reference.  Within conservative-catholic circles – whence 
the Dollfuß government ultimately sprang – National Socialism was rejected, in part, on 
the historical basis that it was ‘an intrinsically Prussian phenomenon’.858  While the 
German variant was viewed as the political and spiritual heir to the narcissistic, 
megalomaniac Kingdom of Prussia, the Austrian movement, for what it was worth, was 
deemed to be nothing more than Schönererian radicalism in slightly altered garb.859  
Preussenseuchler to a man, their language was that of Los von Rom, their allegiance was to 
Berlin and their aims were those of Schönerer’s Alldeutschen: the destruction of the 
Austrian state and unification with a Prussian-dominated German Reich.  As such, the 
Austrian government’s struggle against National Socialism needs to be situated within a 
broader historical context, as a somewhat belated manifestation of an unresolved 
historical dispute.  To Austria’s catholic-conservative right, National Socialism was the 
contemporaneous resurgence of Austria’s natural and historical rival, which was 
threatening, once again, to enslave all of Germandom under its yoke. 
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‘It is a war of life and death, which will not be ended for a long time’ 
For the purposes of setting a context, a short survey of the roots of the 
Austro-Prussian conflict is useful here.  These roots are to be found in the early 
eighteenth century with the rapid economic, political and military expansion of the 
Kingdom of Prussia, the Hohenzollerns’ determination to claim their place in the sun, 
and the Habsburgs’ determination to prevent it.860  However, it was Frederick the 
Great who really lit the fuse; his unscrupulous land grab in Silesia sparked a nine-year 
conflict with Austria (which ultimately spilt over into the Seven Years War) and a 
lifelong feud with Maria Theresia.  The loss of Silesia to the Hohenzollern upstart was 
something that the Empress and the House of Habsburg would never be able to forget.  
Up until this point, the Habsburgs, Holy Roman Emperors since the fifteenth century, 
had enjoyed unquestioned political, military and cultural pre-eminence within the 
German lands and the Central European sphere; from now on, as Fredrick 
mischievously noted, Austria ‘must now share its authority in Germany with us’.861  
The seed of German duality, sown during the Reformation, sprouted into a ‘bitter 
struggle over almost everything states contend for in international politics’; the 
‘Catholic Emperor in Vienna’ was now faced with ‘a Protestant anti-Emperor in 
Berlin’.862 
 Although Napoleon’s antics appeared to provide a degree of respite, the 
collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, coupled with the portentous rise of German 
nationalism, only complicated matters further.  Austrian and Prussian ambitions 
remained ‘mutually incompatible’.863  Vying for influence, the two powers fundamentally 
disagreed on the form and direction that the successor to the Holy Roman Empire, the 
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German Confederation, should take.  Both asserted their inherent right to 
pre-eminence within the Confederation and both claimed to be the sole, legitimate 
heir of the Holy Roman tradition: the Austrian Empire claimed the gold and black 
colours and the double-headed eagle.  During the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the Austrian Empire managed to maintain its dominant position as senior partner 
within the Confederation, yet, with both states ploughing ‘the same narrow furrow’, 
tensions continued to mount.864  Prussia pressed ahead with its anti-Austrian policy in 
an attempt to expand its influence within the German lands.  Austria, as ‘the moving 
spirit of German opposition’ responded by checking Prussian expansion at every turn, 
inciting Bismarck to complain that: ‘every deceit would be practised, now as then, in 
order to prevent Prussia from reaching a higher standing in Germany and to keep her 
under the pressure of her geographical position and the unfavourable Federal 
Constitution’. 865  In due course, the Zollverein of 1834, from which Austria was 
excluded, bore fruit.  Austrian roadblocks were circumvented ‘by unifying Germany 
first in the economic sphere’, hastening the drive towards political and ‘national’ 
centralization, and ultimately forming the foundations for a north German state under 
Prussian control.866 
 If the revolutions of 1848–49 did not quite bring the ‘national’ issue to a head, 
the fallout certainly exposed the fundamental differences in Austrian and Prussian 
attitudes towards the ‘German problem’.  As Bischof observes, ‘in an age of intensifying 
nationalism Austria’s universal “European” foreign policy clashed with Prussia’s 
determination to unite Germany in the kleindeutsch solution’.867  Recognizing the 
existential threat posed to the multi-national Austrian Empire, the House of Habsburg 
stood in strict opposition to the budding idea of a German nation.868  Proponents of 
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the ‘unity of the German governments’, as opposed to ‘German unity’ the 
‘supranational Viennese court’ were staunch advocates of the ‘Habsburg solution’ to 
the German question, based upon the Universalist ‘Reichsidee’.869  Although, as Hamann 
reveals, this attitude was discernible in all German dynasties, even, to a degree, within 
the Berlin court, the fact remains that escalating German nationalism offered an 
increasingly promising vehicle for the realization of Hohenzollern aims.870  In an 
attempt to weaken Austria’s pre-eminence, Prussia threw itself behind Radowitz’s 
kleindeutsch Prussian Union.  Schwarzenberg countered with a ‘third way’, proffering  
‘Großösterreich’ and the prospect of an economic Mitteleuropa as a solution to the 
problem.871  Nothing, ultimately, came of either proposal; the Frankfurt Parliament 
collapsed and the Confederation was restored to its pre-1848 form.872 
 Despite this temporary success, the tremulous equilibrium of Austro-Prussian 
relations had been decidedly shaken.  In 1850, war between the two powers had been 
narrowly avoided.  To Bismarck, whose star was on the rise, conflict between the two 
German states had become – if somewhat conveniently – inevitable: ‘German dualism 
has for a thousand years, off and on, settled our mutual relations by internal war, and 
since the time of Charles V, it has done so at regular intervals once a century.  In this 
century, too, war alone will set the timepiece of history at its right hour’.873  By the 
mid-1850s, that time was fast approaching, first with the Neuchâtel affair when Austria 
refused to acquiesce to Prussian demands for Confederation support and again in 1859 
when ‘dieser schmähliche Auswurf von Preußen’, as Franz Joseph described his 
northern cousins, repaid the compliment and refused to come to Austria’s aid against 
the Italians.874  The publication of the ‘Army Order of Verona’ leaves no room for 
doubt that Franz Joseph squarely – not to mention publicly – placed the blame for the 
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Italian debacle at the door of the treacherous Prussians.875  However, it is perhaps the 
personal anecdote which best portrays the lack of sentimentality which governed 
Austro-Prussian relations during the period.  At the beginning of the decade feelers 
had been put out about a potential marriage between Franz Joseph and Princess Anna 
of Prussia, a political alliance which would have gone some way towards mending 
fences between the two Houses.  It is telling that Regent Wilhelm did not approve of 
the plan and the young Austrian Emperor received a polite rebuff in Berlin.876 
 With Bismarck’s appointment as Minister President, Austro-Prussian tensions 
reached a tipping point.  An advocate of confrontation with Austria, he persistently 
contested ‘Austria’s historical and factual seniority in German affairs’, in an attempt to 
strengthen Prussia’s position and establish Berlin as the ultimate arbiter within the 
German zone.877  ‘As long as Bismarck remains’, the Austrian Emperor observed, 
‘there will be no respite’.878  It is one of those ironies of history that Bismarck was no 
sympathizer of the nationalist cause; his ‘primary loyalty was to Prussia, and its dynasty, 
the Hohenzollerns, not to the German national idea’.879  Nonetheless, unification 
proved to be a convenient vehicle for Prussian expansion and German nationalism a 
useful tool, a fact that was not lost on the Viennese court.880  In Austria, Prussian 
tactics were observed in a thoroughly negative light: ‘Die Tollheiten und 
Schändlichkeiten der Preußen haben sich ganz bis ins Unglaubliche gesteigert; sie 
stacheln ohne Scham und Scheu die Italiener gegen uns auf – das hat aber das Gute, 
daß hier die letzten Illusionen endlich schwinden’.881 
 The Austro-Prussian war, when it came, was no brotherly scuffle: the decisive 
battle, Königgrätz, involved 450,000 soldiers and was, as Hamann has pointed out, ‘the 
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biggest military encounter of modern history to date’. 882   It proved to be an 
unmitigated disaster for the Austrians, who suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands 
of Prussian troops.  The wider consequences were equally devastating; the German 
Confederation was dissolved, the southern German states were pulled more tightly 
into Prussia’s sphere of influence and Austria was forced to surrender its historic claim 
to leadership of ‘Germany’.  Although, as Franz Joseph somewhat sardonically 
remarked, ‘we are pulling out of Germany whether it is demanded of us or not.  In 
view of the experience that we have had with our beloved German allies, I consider 
this to be a blessing for Austria’.883  Nonetheless, retaliation was considered, at least 
until the Franco-Prussian war destroyed any chance of luring the southern States from 
Prussia’s orbit.  With the Prussian coup d'état of 1871 Austria was left with little choice 
but to acquiesce to the inevitable: the establishment of a ‘German Reich without 
Austria’ under Prussian tutelage. 
 Ignominiously ‘dethroned’, the Habsburgs could only look on as the mantle of 
‘Germandom’ was appropriated by their Hohenzollern rivals.  On a political level, 
Protestant Prussia had ‘triumphed’; Austria had surrendered its claim to supremacy 
within Germany and had re-orientated its focus towards the Balkans.  Yet, the cultural 
and historical battle lines remained drawn; rather than unifying the Germans in a 
nation state, Bismarck had merely succeeded in splitting the German cultural zone, if 
somewhat unequally, in two.  The two rival ‘German’ traditions, the one ‘universal’, 
the other ‘national’ lived on, despite the Prussian fait accompli.  Austria remained the 
‘true’ successor to the Holy Roman Empire; centuries of common history had ensured 
that the Holy Roman Reichsidee and the österreichische Staatsidee were inextricably 
entwined.  This was why, in 1871, Franz Joseph did not even consider surrendering the 
Imperial Regalia, symbols of the Holy Roman Empire, to the Hohenzollerns and 
Berlin.884  To Vienna, the very idea of a ‘German’ nation state was a contradiction in 
terms.  Germany had always been greater than the sum of its parts, making Bismarck’s 
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kleindeutsch Empire a crafty slight of hand, Großpreußen by another name.  ‘German’ – 
in a dynastic and cultural rather than a national sense – was so central to the Austrian 
idea, that discarding it was simply not an option, It was also completely unnecessary: in 
multinational Austria, ‘German’ had always been a universal concept, not a national 
one.  As the ‘true Germany’, the ‘better Germany’ – according to its supporters –, 
Habsburg Austria naturally became a focal point for those who disagreed with 
Bismarck’s ‘blood and iron’ politics and ‘opposed Wilhelm II’s strident Teutonic 
sentiment’, for those who, although they saw themselves as German, saw the salvation 
of Germany in a universal, supranational Empire under German leadership, and not in a 
narrow, nationalistic ideal. 885   This was a line of argument repeated during the 
Ständestaat. 
 Bismarck’s new ‘German Empire’ was viewed with anything but friendliness in 
the Viennese court. 886   With Austria’s sizeable German-speaking population, an 
expansionist – and inherently treacherous – Prussian-Germany presented a constant 
threat to the independence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.887  Suspicion of Berlin 
was all-pervasive.888  The Prussians found their most strident opponent in the figure of 
Crown Prince Rudolf, the heir to the Austrian throne.  His mistrust of Bismarck is well 
substantiated, as is his barely disguised contempt for Prince Wilhelm (later Wilhelm II), 
that ‘hard-bitten Junker and Reactionary’, to whom he saw himself as a political 
counter-pole.889  Indeed, as Hamann notes, the differences between the two allies were 
personified in the differences between the heirs to the throne.890  To Rudolf, who 
denounced the Austro-Prussian alliance, Prussia was not an ally but an adversary, 
asserting that  ‘Prussia’s whole history, excepting Sedan, is nothing but either the 
leisurely sawing off of or the sudden seizure of a piece of Austria, which invariably falls 
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to Prussia’.891  His sentiments were clearly shared – or rather preceded – by those of 
Archduke Albrecht, a solid pillar of anti-Prussian sentiment in the Viennese court.  A 
veteran of the war of 1866, Albrecht’s hatred for this ‘demonic power’ could hardly be 
concealed. 892   In 1875, Archduke Johann Salvator had gone so far as to publicly 
advocate war with Germany.893  Then there was Archduke Franz Salvator, who, by his 
own admission, ‘couldn’t stand the Prussians’; ‘Not all Germans are Prussians’ replied 
the otherwise apolitical Empress Elizabeth, who clearly understood exactly what he 
meant.894 
 Franz Joseph’s disinclination towards his Hohenzollern counterparts is also well 
attested, although with his ingrained sense of propriety and monarchical decorum, his 
antipathy can be difficult to spot.895  Indeed, Franz Joseph is often admonished for 
failing to grasp Berlin’s true ambitions, yet there are numerous indicators that this was 
not the case.896  Concerned about the potential appeal of the new Reich upon his 
German subjects, the Emperor remained deeply mistrustful of Prussian motives, even 
after the two powers had become allies, and was constantly irritated by Prussian 
intrusions into Austria’s domestic affairs.  This was the key issue in the ‘frosty’ first 
meeting between the two monarchs in Ischl in the summer of 1871 and a constant 
cause of disagreement up until 1918.  When pressed by Franz Joseph to refrain from 
inciting Austria’s German subjects, Kaiser Wilhelm I dared to suggest that if the 
legitimate demands of the Germans in Austria were met they would not look towards 
Germany.897  Outraged by such blatant interference, the Austrian Emperor refused 
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outright Germany’s offer of a Customs, Post and Telegraph union and ‘an extended 
commercial treaty’.  It obviously took a fair amount of persuasion to convince the 
Emperor of the necessity of a second meeting with his Prussian counterpart, who 
begrudgingly acknowledged the necessity with an unequivocal lack of enthusiasm: ‘If 
you consider a further meeting absolutely necessary, then I would oblige’. 898  
Nonetheless, he remained adamant that any possibility of a future meeting was 
conditional on the Germans ceasing all talk of Austria’s domestic issues and of a 
defensive alliance.899 
   For a while the Emperor remained reticent about engaging with Berlin; in 
response to Andrássy’s exhortations to repay the compliment and visit Germany, the 
Emperor retorted that he would ‘very happily take the waters at a bathing resort’, but 
was really not very fond of the idea of visiting Berlin.900  However, faced with an 
uncertain future and continuing fears of a German-Russian détente, the need to find a 
modus vivendi with the new Reich was obvious.901  Indeed, as early as 1871, it was 
clear that the Empire only had two real options: it could either ‘arm or wait’ and live in 
constant conflict with ‘Prussian-Germany’, or it could make a ‘serious attempt’ to 
make sure Austria was on as good terms as possible with what was currently ‘the most 
imperious power in Europe’.902  Viewed from this angle, rapprochement was practically 
a foregone conclusion.  Nonetheless, it was still very much conditional.  The 
Austro-German ‘friendship’ would be upheld, according to Andrássy, ‘as long as 
Germany did not threaten Austria’s existence or interests’. 903   Nonetheless, the 
Emperor remained ‘deeply distrustful’ of both Bismarck and Wilhelm I’s motives and in 
particular, of their Russophile tendencies.  He was ‘disconcerted to hear of a Prussian 
scheme to buy a controlling share in the Austrian Southern Railway; a line of vital 
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strategic importance’ during the meeting of the three Emperors, and ‘as late as 1874 
he vetoed an exchange of information on torpedo development with Berlin’.904 
 Still smarting from Prussian treachery the previous decade, this could be 
dismissed as short-term sour grapes on Franz Joseph’s part, if it were not for the fact 
that over the following decades this underlying friction never really disappeared.  
Although on the surface relations appeared cordial, they were undermined by a 
fundamental – and probably mutual – lack of trust.  Franz Joseph could never be 
entirely certain of Germany’s commitment to the alliance and was unconvinced that 
Austria could truly rely upon German support. 905  As time went on it became 
increasingly clear that Austrian interests were not Germany’s top priority.  Time and 
again, Austria-Hungary would find it necessary to remind the Germans of the bilateral 
nature of their alliance and that they were not prepared to sacrifice their own 
interests.906  Tensions in the Balkans seemed to confirm Austrian suspicions of the 
mercurial attitude of the Wilhelmstrasse and the Bulgarian crisis of 1885–87 put a 
massive strain on Austro-German relations, exposing the widely conflicting interests of 
the two powers and the diaphanous nature of German commitment to Austrian 
interests in the Near East.907  In 1887, Germany warned Austria-Hungary directly that 
it would not fight on its side if it were to get into a war with Russia over Bulgaria.908  
As late as 1902, the Emperor was ‘extremely annoyed’ by a speech in which Bülow 
said that the continuation of the Triple Alliance was not an absolute necessity for 
Germany.909  Indeed, even Bülow’s infamous ‘Nibelungentreue’ speech was intended to 
quash claims that Germany’s response to the annexation crisis had been somewhat 
ambivalent.  As Brigitte Hamann has pointed out, any talk of a close friendship between 
Germany and Austria-Hungary would be wholly misplaced.910 
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 This wariness only intensified with the ascension of Wilhelm II to the German 
throne.  Bismarck, despite his ‘unscrupulous lack of consideration with regard to 
Austria’ was someone the Emperor could at least deal with, and with him at the 
German helm, the preservation of the alliance could be halfway ensured.911  Wilhelm II 
on the other hand, with his ‘informal manner’ and ‘discourteous, less than diplomatic 
jokes’ was deeply unpalatable to the old Emperor.  Franz Joseph’s alleged 
condemnation of the Kruger Telegram as ‘careless and irresponsible’ could just as 
easily be taken as an illustration of his attitude towards the German Kaiser himself.912  
According to the Austrian military attaché Count Joseph Stürgkh, the Austrian 
Emperor could tolerate Wilhelm II’s company only with difficulty and, although he 
‘appreciated’ and ‘valued’ his ally highly, ‘preferred to do so in the abstract’.913  The 
feeling was evidently mutual.  The German Kaiser had so little respect for his Austrian 
ally that it bordered on contempt.914  His derision was not confined to the Emperor: 
Austrian stupidity was, in his opinion, ‘unfathomable’, the Cisleithanian Germans 
‘hopeless bovines’; an opinion obviously shared by German diplomats who habitually 
described the typical Austrian as ‘pessimistic’, ‘lethargically complacent’, ‘weak, idle, 
indecisive, lacking in both self-confidence and political flair’.915 
 However, this enmity was as much about politics as it was about personality.  
As allies, the Hohenzollerns could simply not be trusted.  The first foreign visit 
undertaken by Wilhelm II after taking office was not to Vienna, but to St. Petersburg, 
Austria’s archenemy.916  Of course, the German Kaiser attempted to sweeten the pill, 
affirming the ‘exemplary relations’ between the two countries, which made a hasty visit 
to Austria superfluous, although with a subtext so obvious it is unlikely that the 
Austrian Emperor was overly convinced.917  When the German Kaiser finally did 
decide to grace Vienna with his presence, the visit proved to be an unmitigated 
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disaster, ‘unsatisfactory in every regard’.918  The Emperor, knowing his guest only too 
well, launched a pre-emptive strike, detailing Crown Prince Rudolf to ensure that 
Wilhelm was not left to travel around Vienna unaccompanied and stir up trouble.919  
Nonetheless, despite such precautionary measures, the German Kaiser still managed 
to infuriate the Austrian Emperor with his unsolicited interference into Austria’s 
domestic affairs: conferring the Order of the Black Eagle on Kálmán Tisza, the 
Hungarian Prime Minister whilst demonstratively ignoring Eduard Taaffe, the ‘pro-Slav’ 
First Minister of Cisleithania.920  It remains unclear whether this early experience was 
the real reason why the Austrian Emperor, citing the wish to keep the affair as private 
as possible, declined Wilhelm II’s participation at Rudolf’s funeral the following year.921 
 Wilhelm’s opening visit set the tone for the rest of their relationship.  The 
pressure from Berlin was unrelenting.922  Through support for pan-German groups and 
student fraternities, via the Los-von-Rom movement, by means of the press, or simply by 
letting their displeasure be known through their conspicuous absence from the 
Ballhausplatz, the Wilhelmstrasse was merciless in its endeavour to exert influence on 
policy decisions taken in Vienna and to maintain a pro-German course in foreign 
affairs.923  They pulled out all the stops to maintain the spectre of German nationalism 
in Cisleithania, curb Czech ascendancy, and, ultimately, ensure that Vienna remained 
dependent upon Germany.924  Both Bismarck and Wilhelm II found any ‘pro-Slav’ 
tendencies in Vienna highly objectionable.  In response to Austria’s pro-Polish 
concessions in Galicia, Bismarck retaliated by increasing the harshness of the 
Kulturkampf in Polish districts of Prussia, an action which served to exacerbate tensions 
between the two countries.925  For Wilhelm II, it was the Czechs who really riled him; 
on hearing of yet another anti-German demonstration in Prague in 1898, he bitterly 
                                            
918 Ibid, 169. 
919 See: Ibid, 167. 
920 See: Ibid, 168. 
921 See: Ibid, 170. 
922 See: Berthold Sutter, 'Der 'Zweibund' 1879', 50–52. 
923 See: Ibid, 149. 152. 
924 See: Ibid, 150–52. 
925 See: Bascon Barry Hayes, 'Bismarck on Austrian Parliamentarianism, 1867–1890', Austrian History 
Yearbook, 2 (1966), 68. 
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regretted that he could not send the Kaiser Franz Regiment to ‘dash the Bohemians’ 
brains out’.926  Any such meddling incensed the Austrian Emperor.  In December of 
that same year a personal letter from Wilhelm II prompted an uncharacteristic 
outburst in which the Emperor warned Graf Eulenburg, the German Ambassador, that 
‘being constantly walked all over was simply not acceptable’, the clearest reminder that 
the alliance was a bilateral one.927 
 In many ways, the tensions of war exposed the fallacy of ‘Nibelungentreue’ once 
and for all.  It was because of ‘personal antagonism between the Austrian and German 
military leadership’ that ‘the Berlin and Vienna general staffs failed to start 
joint-operations planning’ in the run-up to the war.928  The onset of hostilities hardly 
helped matters: Within months of the declaration of war ‘general hostility between the 
two high commands had risen, not declined’, leaving one historian to remark that ‘the 
first five months of the war had produced only conflict and hostility within the camp of 
the Central Powers’.929  There were ‘fundamental disparities between Falkenhayn and 
Conrad’ in the high command, so much so that just a few months into the war Conrad 
had ‘become a complete Germanophobe’, describing the Germans, most tellingly, as 
‘our underhanded enemy’.930  The feeling was clearly mutual: Austrian defeat in Serbia 
in December 1914 was attributed by the German military to ‘Austrian “sloppiness” 
and “coffee-house ways”’.931  By 1917, the Habsburg Monarchy was merely fighting for 
its own survival.  The Sixtus-affair, and Emperor Karl’s secret – and ultimately abortive 
– attempt to negotiate a separate peace with France provides unequivocal evidence of 
the lengths that the new Emperor was willing to go to in order to break the ‘brotherly’ 
bonds that bound the Habsburg Empire to Imperial Germany.  It is difficult to disagree 
with the observation that the Austro-German wartime alliance was ‘one between 
“secret enemies”’.932  However, again, it is an anecdote which best conveys the abject 
                                            
926 ‘”Er hatte gewünscht, dem Kaiser von Österreich sein Kaiser-Franz-Regiment schicken zu können, 
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928 Günter Bischof, 'Historical Roots', 71. 
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lack of mistrust between the two allies, even during the war.  In 1915, Franz Joseph 
refused to send the Imperial Insignia to Aachen to be displayed in an exhibition 
celebrating 100 years of Prussian rule in the Rhineland.  The Germans had no choice 
but to commission a replica.933 
 The Austro-German relationship was an uneasy ‘friendship’.  Based upon 
‘mutual interests’ rather than genuine sympathy, it demanded constant and careful 
nurturing.  Yet, curiously, the traditional image of Austro-German relations between 
1871 and 1918 is one of close allies bound in dynastic – and nationalistic – solidarity.  
The Dreikaiserabkommen (1873), the Zweibund (1879), the Dreikaiserbund (1881) and 
the Dreibund (1882), not to mention the annual dynastic shindigs, all appear to suggest 
that, with Prussian victory and the ‘resolution’ of the ‘German Question’, deep-seated 
Austro-Prussian animosity and mistrust – forged over many, many decades – simply 
ceased to exist.  However, this was demonstrably not the case.  Past hatreds 
continued to influence Austrian policy and perceptions throughout the Bismarckian 
and Wilhelmine periods and on into the Republican era.  Reading between the lines, a 
different picture emerges, a picture which leaves us, as indeed it did more 
contemporary observers, ‘strongly in doubt whether or not Austria ever act[ed] in 
entire harmony with Berlin’.934  They were ‘profound’ and ‘natural’ enemies; fratricide, 
rather than fraternity was the red thread that ran through Austro-Prussian (German) 
affairs. 
 For those blessed with an eye for contemporary realities, the truth behind 
Austro-German relations was self-evident in the run-up to the First World War.  An 
examination of Austro-German relations written in 1917 makes this patently clear, 
when the author reveals that ‘Austro-German history as written has been dominated 
by the memory of 1866, by the jealousy, suspicion and hatred of Prussia which it has 
been supposed was transferred in 1871 to the new Empire’.935  The same article also 
gives a clear indicator of why this insight was consigned to oblivion; ‘such an 
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assumption’ the author claims ‘was definitely negatived by the war of 19I4’.936  In a 
nutshell, our perceptions have been fundamentally obscured by the cataclysm of  
1914–18.  The Allies, as well as Anglo-Saxon historians, felt they had been duped into 
believing that past hatreds ‘continued to influence [Austrian] policy’, only to discover 
that these conclusions, once ‘plunged into war’ were ‘directly opposed to the actual 
relations revealed by the outbreak of war’.937 
Pan-Germanism required for its preparation so great a length of time and demanded for its 
adequate execution so perfect a correlation of effort between the two countries; the part of 
each was so dependent upon the work of the other; each must necessarily be so thoroughly 
convinced of the other's dependability; and both so entirely staked upon the issue their destiny as 
nations, that the fundamental fact of their relations must have been for some considerable period 
that degree of mutual faith which the great scheme, of whose existence we are now thoroughly 
assured, made so decidedly essential.938 
In 1917, the logic was reasonable.  Written during the apogee of nationalism, and in 
the death throes of a war that had devastated the continent, wiping out a whole 
generation of young men, it is perhaps to be expected that Austro-German relations 
were read through a ‘pan-German’ prism.  However, for the present-day observer, it 
is clear that Austro-‘German’ relations during 1871–1918 were determined, on both 
sides, by Realpolitik, not nationalist sentiment. 
                                            
936 Ibid, 578. 
937 Ibid, 578–79. 
938 Ibid, 578. 
  
 
Hoch Hohenzollern! 
The focus on the alleged ideological overlaps between National Socialism and the 
catholic-conservative right has overshadowed the fact that the Christian Socials’ rejection 
of National Socialism had a concrete historical precedent.  The conflict between the 
Christian Socials and the Austrian NSDAP on the one hand, and the Austrian government 
and the Nazi government in Germany on the other, were both understood as a 
continuation of two separate but interlinked historical conflicts which had shaped Austrian 
politics during the late Imperial period.  History, it seemed, was repeating itself.  While the 
Nazi regime in Germany was interpreted as the resurgence of the kingdom of Prussia, the 
Austrian NSDAP was cast in the role of the National Socialism’s political and spiritual 
predecessor, the Pan-Germans.939  ‘Austrian loyalists’, it was argued, – meaning the 
Christian Socials – had faced this enemy once before in the decades leading up to the First 
World War.  The Austrian Nazis, the Reichspost declared, were the dispossessed 
‘remnants’ of Schönerer’s Alldeutsche and K. H. Wolf’s splinter group the Deutschradikale 
Partei.940 
Die uns heute vorwerfen, daß wir Gegner eines Zusammenschlusses mit Deutschland sind, sind meist 
diejenigen, die den Bismarckkopf im Knopfloch tragen, die Verehrer jenes Preußentyps, der 
Oesterreich aus dem deutschen Staatsverband hinausgeworfen hat.941 
Only the name, it was argued, and its colours, had changed: ‘Pan-German’ had become 
‘National Socialist’, while cornflower blue – which, it was claimed, was handed over to the 
‘Marxists’ and their blue-shirts – had been exchanged for the Prussian colours and the 
brown shirt. 942  The worst of the Schönererian ethos, however, the intolerance of 
                                            
939 Österreichischer Heimatdienst, Die zweite Gefahr: Ein Weckruf an alle Österreicher, (Vienna, 1933), 11. 
940 ‘Ueberresten der Alldeutschen’.  'Reinigungsprozesse', Reichspost, 17 Jun.1932, 1–2; Österreichischer 
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compatriots with divergent views, and their intense loathing of Austria and all that it stood 
for, had been handed on.943  By presenting the Austrian Nazis as the heirs to the 
Pan-German tradition, the Christian Socials historicized and legitimized their opposition to 
the Nazi movement.  Viewed from this angle, Christian Social rejection of National 
Socialism was a logical and natural stance. 
 For the adherents of the conservative-Catholic right, socialized under the Empire, 
this was no great leap of the imagination.  Hitler’s admiration for Schönerer, later lauded 
as the ‘herald and pioneer of the Greater German Reich’ was well documented in Mein 
Kampf.944  Yet, even without Hitler extolling Schönerer as his role model, and Wolf and 
Stein as the ‘pioneers’ of a ‘Greater Germany’, to the Christian Socials the connections 
with the pan-German movement were obvious.945  A seminal feature of late Imperial 
politics, the conflict with the pan-German movement was deeply embedded within the 
Christian Social Party’s historical memory.  In 1933 ‘the brawling Alldeutschen in the 
Viennese Parliament, and the furore of the academic youth at the time of the language 
decrees’ had in no way been forgotten, not to mention that Schönerer had died as 
recently as 1921 and Wolf and Stein were still alive.946  A fanatical admirer of Bismarck and 
the Hohenzollerns, Schönerer had been the figurehead of the Pan-German movement in 
Austria during the late Imperial period.  Like Hitler, Schönerer had been a ‘formidable 
orator’ who also roused enthusiasm amongst the young.947  Virulently anti-Habsburg, 
anti-Catholic, anti-Slav and anti-Jewish, Schönerer, again, like Hitler, rejected the ‘slavicized’ 
Austrian Empire, viewing the German Reich as the cure for all Cisleithanian ills.  Placing 
‘Hohenzollern above Habsburg’ he proposed the organization of Bohemia as a purely 
                                            
943 ‘Das schlimmste aber vom Geist Schönerers, das sich auf den Nationalsozialismus übertragen hat, ist 
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Chapter 6:  The Prussian Paradigm  239 
 
German province, launched the Los von Rom movement, which advocated the conversion 
of Austrian-German Catholics to Lutheran Protestantism, and called for the 
German-speaking provinces of the Empire to break away and join the German Reich.948 
 The ideological overlap between Schönerer’s dogma and Hitler’s was self-evident: 
the entrenched loathing of the Habsburgs, the Catholic Church, and the multinational 
‘Austrian’ idea and a united Germany dominated by Prussia and controlled from Berlin.  
Little wonder that the call for de-Austrianization – a process that had, ironically, occurred 
in the successor states of the Habsburg Empire in the early post-war period – had been 
taken up by the Nazis.949  Like Hitler, Schönerer had also been extolled as a demigod by 
his followers.950  Not only did the two movements share a number of fundamental aims 
with the German Reich – the most obvious the union of Austria (and Bohemia) –, there 
were also marked similarities in both political ethos and strong-arm tactics.  As one 
commentator noted: 
Der Nationalsozialismus hat in der einstigen Alldeutschen Partei Oesterreichs eine programmatische 
und ideelle Verwandtschaft.  Die politischen Ziele, die Rassentheorien, die Einstellung zur 
Katholischen Kirche, die versuchte Wiederbelebung heidnisch-germanischer Kultformen, die 
hoffärtige Verkündigung einer besseren Sittlichkeit, welche die “Liguorimoral” überwinden müsse – 
alles haben wir in Oesterreich genau so wie heute in den Reden und Schriften des 
Nationalsozialismus, schon einmal mit demselben Pathos und einem nur durch die Staatsmacht in 
Schranken gehaltenen Terror von der Alldeutschen erlebt.951 
The two movements were deemed to be cut from the same terroristic cloth, even if the 
NSDAP took the unsavoury methods of the Pan-Germans to new heights.  The agitation 
tactics and techniques used by the Austrian NSDAP were understood as a throwback to 
those once employed by Schönerer, Wolf and their supporters.  There was a time, the 
                                            
948 'Die ewig Gestrigen', Sturm über Österreich, 2 Jun.1935 5; Andrew Gladding Whiteside, Austrian National 
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Reichspost recalled, when the Christian Socials could not gather in public without some 
violent intrusion by the Pan-Germans.952  During both periods, Austria’s universities had 
served as breeding grounds for radical German nationalist sentiment.  The radicalization of 
student fraternities during the 1890s led to violent clashes between German and non-
German students, hostility that was spurred on by Schönerer’s erstwhile comrade 
K. H. Wolf.953  Stefan Zweig described how, ‘above all else’, Hitler ‘took from the German 
Nationals the beginning of a ruthless storm troop that blindly hit out in all directions, and 
with it the principle of terroristic intimidation’. 
What the S.A. men, who broke up meetings with rubber clubs, attacked their opponents by night and 
felled them to the ground, accomplished for the National Socialists was provided by the Student 
Corps…who, under the cover of academic immunity, instituted an unparalleled campaign of violence, 
and were organised as a militia to march in, at beck and call, upon every political action. …On the 
occasion of every ‘Bummel’...blood flowed. …Whenever this tiny though loud-mouthed party of the 
German Nationals wished to obtain anything by force in Austria, they sent this student storm troop 
on ahead.954 
 The parallels were of course, no coincidence; the early National Socialist 
movement hailed from Bohemia and had its roots in the German nationalist milieu, which 
gravitated around Schönerer.  The complex web of Bohemian politics was – due, at least 
in part, to its influence on Hitler as a young man - to provide much of the ideological 
content for the NSDAP.  Indeed, the impact of late Imperial Pan-German politics on Hitler 
cannot be underestimated.  As Evans reminds us, Hitler was the ‘living embodiment of the 
ethnic and cultural concept of national identity held by the Pan-Germans’.955  Due to its 
proximity to Bohemia, Linz, where Hitler grew up, had been a hotbed of pan-German 
politics during the Imperial era, and it is almost certain that Hitler would have been 
                                            
952 ‘Es war so weit, daß geraume Zeit die Christlichsozialen in Wien, in der von Dr. Lueger verwalteten 
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influenced by the Schönererians, who were well represented in the town.956  Hitler’s own 
assertion that, on his arrival in Vienna, his sympathies were ‘fully and wholly on the side of 
the pan-German tendency’, is confirmed by Hamann, who demonstrates that his 
predilection for pan-German politics was already visible during his years in Linz. 957  
Contemporary observers came to the same conclusion.  ‘In their ideas and technique’, 
noted Stefan Zweig in his autobiography, ‘Hitler, also a border Austrian, had his origin.  
He took over the cry “Los von Rom” from Georg Schönerer’.958  He may have criticized 
Schönerer’s tactics, but in one issue he was their one true heir: in his hatred of ‘old 
Austria’.959 
 The Christian Socials were lent further legitimacy by their historical opposition to 
the pan-German movement.  Had not the ‘great Austrian’ Karl Lueger, the father of the 
Christian Social movement, fought the exact same fight when he had taken on the 
traitorous ‘Preußenseuchler’ Schönerer and Wolf?960.  Had not he and most of his party 
‘thoroughly despised’ the Alldeutschen? 961 .  The conflict with the Pan-Germans had 
dominated Christian Social politics during the final decades of the Habsburg Empire.  
Although under Lueger the Christian Socials had ‘demonstrated ‘creative flexibility’ on the 
national question, their opposition to the Alldeutschen was indisputable.962  Unowsky notes 
how, ‘already on 4 January [1898], the Christian Social Reichspost labelled Pan-German 
nationalists “anti-Austrian-German-Radicals” who distanced themselves from the emperor 
and desired above all “to become a vassal state of the German empire”’963.  There was no 
doubt about where Lueger stood on the ‘German’ issue.  As a young man, Lueger almost 
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caused a riot at a student demonstration held at the University of Vienna during the 
Franco-Prussian war in support of the North German Confederation, when he 
‘denounced the North German colours as “the product of despotic arbitrariness”’.964  In 
later years, as his biographer observes, Lueger remained ‘a consistent Austrian 
nationalist…conscious of his nation’s centuries-old heritage as separate and distinct from 
that of Germany’965.  As such he was dedicated ‘to a specifically Austrian form of German 
culture, neither bound to Reichsdeutsch values nor in sympathy with the extremism of the 
Sudeten Germans966.  Thus, the Christian Socials could rightfully refer back to Lueger and 
his fight against the Schönerianer to legitimize both their rejection of the Nazis and their 
defence of Austrian independence.  At the same time, however, Hitler claimed Lueger’s 
legacy as his own.967  Yet, what Hitler admired in Lueger was his political prowess, not his 
politics968.  As Hamann notes, it was Lueger’s ‘outstanding personality’ and ‘talent as an 
orator’, not his party, that ‘thrilled and stimulated’ the young Hitler969.  To Hitler, Lueger 
was an ‘astute tactician’ endowed with a political shrewdness that Schönerer, the 
‘visionary’, simply did not possess970. 
 The Christian Socials certainly hoped that at least one historical parallel would 
prevail.  It is an irony of history that Schönerer enjoyed little long-term political success – 
Hitler’s obvious approbation excluded – and that the radical Pan-Germans ‘for all their 
dramatic extremism…enjoyed only modest popularity’. 971   Only in the Bohemian 
Crownlands, the ‘Urheimat of nationalism in Austria’ as Seipel put it, fuelled by the 
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simmering Czech-German nationality conflict, did his radical German nationalist agenda fall 
on moderately fertile soil.972  It is no coincidence that it was here that Schönerer’s, Wolf’s 
and Stein’s electoral districts were located.973  Nonetheless, by 1900 his star was on the 
wane and in 1907 the introduction of ‘universal’ male suffrage sealed its fate.974  The 
Alldeutsche Vereinigung – as well as the man himself – finally melted into political 
insignificance, gaining just three seats in a Parliament of 516.975  During the early 1930s, 
this fact offered a faint glimmer of hope and was used to downplay the significance of the 
Nazi movement.  Schönerer’s Pan-German movement, it was pointed out, had raised a 
furore, but had not had a lasting impact.  The connotation was obvious: with any luck, the 
National Socialists would share the same fate976 
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Im Stechschritt zum Einheitstaat 977 
It was Hitler, the ‘ex-Austrian’, who provided the ideological link between Bohemia and 
Berlin.978  According to Heinrich Mataja, it could not be heedlessly ignored that the 
founder and leader of the National Socialist party was an Austrian, and that a movement 
which had captivated a substantial section of the Reich German populace – although, he 
pointed out, not nearly the ninety-two per cent claimed – hailed from an Austrian mind.979  
It was all the more significant as it was not exactly characteristic of their Reich German 
‘compatriots’ to willingly acknowledge the inherent value and talents of the Austrians, let 
alone subordinate themselves to ‘Austrian’ rule.980  In the case of Adolf Hitler then, an 
exceptional combination of circumstances must have prevailed for this to be the result.981  
The fundamental issue was an historical one and, to some extent, one of semantics.  It was 
the difference between the German nation (all ‘Germans’ regardless of state citizenship), 
and the German state.  In Bismarck’s kleindeutsch German Reich, Mataja argued, the term 
‘German’ was primarily used to refer to the citizens of the German state, rather than as a 
‘national’ concept.  Yet, ‘German’ had a far broader meaning, and as both Austrian citizens 
and ‘ethnic’ Germans, with Czechs, Poles and Slovenians as fellow citizens, and Reich 
German compatriots, the Austrians were only too aware of the distinction.  The 
German-Austrian, who truly understood the Austrian Empire, was a German-minded 
Austrian patriot.  He who did not truly understand, lost the bond, either with his state, or 
with his people.  Thus, Mataja argued, the national concept of ‘Germandom’, uncoupled 
from the state, could only have been introduced into the German Reich by an Austrian, 
albeit one who had lost this ‘bond’.  In a country now ripe, as, due to the humiliation and 
consequences of defeat in the aftermath of the World War, Germany was, for the 
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broadening of ‘Germandom’ from a concept of state to a concept of nationality, Hitler’s 
idea ignited a flame in German hearts athirst for a redemptive word, a spark, which set 
the country ablaze.982 
 Nonetheless, if, as Mataja claimed, the ‘gesamtdeutsch’ nucleus of National Socialism 
was of Austrian origin – albeit misappropriated –, in its aims, methods, ethos and 
inspiration, National Socialism was viewed by many Austrians as an explicitly 
‘Prussian-Protestant’ phenomenon.983  In its arrogance, militarism and chauvinism the Nazi 
movement represented everything – to Austrian eyes at least – that was negative about 
the ‘Prussian tradition’.  Even if Hitler was born in Austria, its spiritual Heimat was 
‘Hinterpommern, Pommern und Mecklenburg, das östlichste Preußen und jene Gebiete 
von Sachsen, von denen übergroßes Elend die Sprichwörtliche sächsische Helle fernhält’, a 
fact seemingly verified by the results of the Presidential election of March-April 1932, as 
well as the predominance of Protestants within Nazi ranks.984 
 This was useful to the Austrians in two ways: on the one hand, the Austrian Nazis 
could be portrayed as a ‘foreign’ phenomenon’, as an import from Northern Germany 
rather than an indigenous Austrian movement.985  Thus, the Austrian government could 
wish the Germans well in their choice of government while delegitimizing the Austrian 
Nazis’ claim to extend that rule to Austria; ‘what is elemental in the Reich is imitation in 
Austria’986.  On the other hand, Nazism could be rejected as a Prussian phenomenon, and 
therefore the antithesis of all that was considered ‘Austrian’.  The ‘un-Austrian’ crassness 
of National Socialist propaganda was a case in point; the exaggeration in mass persuasion 
and execution, the ultra-Americanism, the suffocation of thought in noise and colour, in 
fireworks, parades and propaganda was deemed to reflect, indeed surpass, the spirit of 
                                            
982 See: Ibid. 
983 See, for example: Ibid; Aigner, 'Oesterreich und die Hitler-Diktatur', Reichspost, 26 Feb. 1933, 4–5, 4. 
984 'Warum nicht nationalsozialistisch?', Reichspost 20 Apr. 1932, 1–2; 'Gleichschaltung auch der Kirchen?', 
Reichspost, 8 Apr.1933, 1–2. 
985 ‘Der Nationalsozialismus ist, wenn sein Trommler auch ein ins Deutscher Reich hinüber gewechselter 
gebürtiger Oesterreicher ist, auf österreichischen Boden ein Fremdgewächs, Import aus Norddeutschland’.  
'Das Anschlusstolle Oesterreich', Sturm über Österreich, 12 Aug. 1934, 2. 
986 ‘Was im Reich Urkraft ist, ist in Oesterreich Imitation’.  'Unterschiede', Reichspost, 30 Mar. 1933, 1–2. 
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Berlin.987  After the Nazi takeover of power, the parallels multiplied as Germany fell prey 
to Prussian hubris.988  The Dollfuß government charged, via its newly-formed propaganda 
section, that in its aggressive ‘Königgrätzer Politik’ the new Nazi regime in Germany was 
mimicking the perfidious behaviour of Austria’s erstwhile Prussian rival.989  Indeed, even 
the Nazi assault on the rule of law was explained with recourse to Prussian megalomania: 
Es gibt kein Wolkenkuckucksheim eines göttlichen objektiven Rechtes! …Die Rechtsbegründung 
vermittelt dann einzig und allein die Macht…Die Botschaft ist nicht neu.  Sie erstand aus dem Seite 
des friderizianischen preußischen Militärstaates und wurde vor mehr als hundert Jahren im Sinne 
einer pantheistischen Weltbetrachtung durch Hegel zu einem großen staatsphilosophischen System 
geführt, das seitdem mit tausend Adern die preußische Geschichts- und Staatsauffassung 
durchgezogen hat.990 
This impression had little, if anything, to do with Hitler’s posturing in the Garnisonkirche.  
Rather, the mise-en-scène in Potsdam merely added more fuel to the fire, as did the 
objections of the German nationalist press in Germany to Dollfuß’s attempts to ‘interfere 
with the decrees of fate, an attempt to reverse the course of history and to stay “the 
inevitable victory of the spirit of Potsdam over the Hapsburg spirit”’991.  As early as 1931, 
the Reichspost had contended that the masses were streaming into Hitler’s movement 
through two giant gates.  While the Socialist throng poured in through the one, through 
the other poured the Nationalist hordes, dreaming of the Sanssouci-Ideal of Fredericus 
Rex.992 
                                            
987 ‘…die nationalsozialistische Propaganda, in ihren großzügigen, aber krassen Formen, das Auftrumpfen in 
Massenwirkung und Technik, der Ueberamerikanismus, das Ersticken des Denkens in Lärm und Farben, in 
Feuerwerken, Paraden und Propagandaschriften, das ist nicht unsere Art, das entspricht viel eher dem 
Berliner Wesen, und übersteigert auch dieses’. Heinrich Mataja, 'Was bekämpfen wir am 
Nationalsozialismus?', Reichspost, 10 Jan. 1934, 3–4. 
988 See: 'Preussengeist ist Deutschlands Ruin', Sturm über Österreich, 29 Oct.1933, 4. 
989 Österreichischer Heimatdienst, Die zweite Gefahr, 17. 
990 'Wolkenkuckucksheim', Reichspost, 26 May 1933, 1–2. 
991 Rumbold citing an article that appeared in the nationalist Kreuz Zeitung (Neue Preußische Zeitung), 
(TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16638, paper C 5848/420/3, Sir H. Rumbold, Situation in Austria, 21 Jun. 1933. 
992 ‘Hitlers großes Lager hat zwei riesige Tore: durch das eine strömen die Massen das Nationalismus, die 
Träume von Sanssouci-Ideal des Fredericus Rex’.  'Der Katholik im Staate', Reichspost, 8 Oct. 1931, 7.  ‘Das 
Wort, daß Gott immer mit den stärksten Bataillonen ist, stammt ja von dem Preußen König Friedrich dem 
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 In Austria, the ‘Third Reich’ was situated along a longer historical trajectory, upon 
which Weimar was presented as a mere interregnum.  In the months following Hitler’s 
ascension to ‘Bismarck’s throne’, the piecemeal abolition of federal autonomy, the 
aggressive centralization of state power, not to mention the rabidly anti-clerical attitude of 
the new Nazi regime were all interpreted as the resurrection of the Protestant Prussian 
paradigm of 1871.  It was, the Reichspost argued, the Prussian Kings who had first 
instigated the drive towards a unitary German state. 993   Piece by piece, through 
appropriation, border adjustments and annexation, Prussia had resolutely pursued its goal 
for control across northern and central Germany.994  In the aftermath of 1866, this 
‘Prussianizing’ crusade had continued unabated.  The sovereignty of the German states had 
been further eroded, and Germany’s historically federal structure, undermined.  It was no 
coincidence that the Prussian colours, not the national Black-Red-Gold were raised above 
the ‘Second Reich’.995  Now the process was complete: Bismarck’s federal state had given 
way to a Greater Prussia, which was masquerading as the ‘Third Reich’.  Sixty-seven years 
after it was brutally expelled from the ‘Reich’, Austria was once again good enough to 
bear the costs for further Prussian expansion; that was the real reason why it was now 
being called, ‘in allen Tonarten’ Heim ins Reich.996 
 Nazi ‘Gleichschaltung’ was understood as a continuation of this historic, Prussian 
crusade; the natural progeny of the Hohenzollern Empire, the new Nazi regime had taken 
up where the ‘Second Reich’ had left off.997 
Sie Lügen, wenn Sie singen: „Deutschland über alles“, denn ihnen geht nur der Staat Groß-Preußen 
über alles. ... Denn Deutschland ist nicht Preußenland, nicht Bayerland, nicht Schwabenland allein, und 
                                                                                                                                     
Großen, den gerade die Nationalsozialisten jetzt wieder als ihren Helden und Heros verehren.’  'Wahltag im 
Deutschen Reich', Neuigkeits-Welt-Blatt, 5 Mar.1933, 2. 
993 'Im Stechschritt zum Einheitsstaat', Reichspost, 11 Mar. 1933, 1–2. 
994 See: Ibid. 
995 See: Heinrich Mataja, 'Was bekämpfen wir am Nationalsozialismus?', Reichspost, 10 Jan. 1934, 3–4. 
996 Jetzt, da dieser Prozeß vollendet und die Umwandlung des Bismarckschen Bundesstaates in einen als 
“Dritte Reich” verkleideten Großstaat Preußen vollzogen ist, wäre das vor 67 Jahren aus dem Reich brutal 
hinausgeworfene Österreich wieder gut genug, die Kosten einer weiteren Vergrößerung Preußens zu tragen.’  
Österreichischer Heimatdienst, Die zweite Gefahr, 15. 
997 'Im Stechschritt zum Einheitsstaat', Reichspost, 11 Mar. 1933, 1–2. 
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auch nicht Österreich allein, sondern alles Land zusammen „soweit die deutsche Zunge klingt“ und 
man „deutsche Lieder singt.998 
Within weeks, Germany’s historic federalism had been destroyed, ‘flattened by the steam 
roller of unification’, de facto, if not de jure.999  Although the Weimar Constitution had 
not been officially annulled, and despite the fact that Hitler had expressly rejected the 
prospect of excessive centralization in his governmental declaration, the Reichspost noted 
with increasing alarm, that within a matter of days the German states had been reduced to 
mere provinces of Prussia, their Landtage ‘gleichgeschaltet’ and their sovereignty all but 
terminated.1000  Yet, they warned, the centralizing drive of the regime would not stop 
there.  The Nazis’ intention was not only to abolish state sovereignty, but also to 
obliterate historical state boundaries; Germany would then be repartitioned along ‘tribal’ 
[Stamm] lines.1001  Particularly telling to the Austrian observer was the fact that the 
‘Prussia-Reich’ dichotomy had finally been eliminated, in that, henceforth, the office of 
Statthalter for Prussia was to be performed by the Reich Chancellor.1002  In effect, this 
meant that the Prussian Statthalter commanded superiority over all other governors.1003  
The Reich government was, at the same time, the Prussian government, which meant that 
Prussia remained a great power, the uncontested arbiter of a highly centralized German 
state 1004 .  The Nazis had succeeded, where Bismarck had baulked, establishing 
‘Prussian-Germany’, governed directly from Berlin.1005 
                                            
998 Österreichischer Heimatdienst, Austro-Nazi ohne Maske: Ein Gang durch den braunen Lügenwald; 15. Juli 
1927–14. Mai 1933, (Vienna, 1933), 24.  The latter reference is to ‘Des Deutschen Vaterland’, a song written 
by Ernst Moritz Arndt in 1813 shortly before the Battle of Leipzig. 
999 'Im Stechschritt zum Einheitsstaat', Reichspost, 11 Mar. 1933, 1–2. 
1000 See: 'Das Ende des deutschen Föderalismus', Reichspost, 8 Apr. 1933, 1. 
1001 'Der deutsche Einheitsstaat', Reichspost, 9 Apr. 1933, 1–2. 
1002 See: Ibid. 
1003 See: 'Das Ende des deutschen Föderalismus', Reichspost, 8 Apr. 1933, 1 
1004 ‘…die Reichsregierung ist zugleich preußische Regierung und ihr sind die Statthaltereien und damit auch 
die Landesregierungen der außerpreußischen Länder unterstellt’.  See: 'Der deutsche Einheitsstaat', 
Reichspost, 9 Apr. 1933, 1–2. 
1005 See: 'Das Ende des deutschen Föderalismus', Reichspost, 8 Apr. 1933, 1 
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 The implications were clear: Anschluss would spell the end of Austrian sovereignty 
and Austria would share the same fate as Bavaria and the other southern and central 
German states, which had been ‘gleichgeschaltet’ despite all assurances to the contrary.1006  
What the Nazis really wanted, the government press claimed, was to make Austria a 
‘Prussian colony’, a mere province within Prussian-Germany.1007  Like these states, Vienna, 
the imperial capital, they predicted, would be provided with a Statthalter [Governor] 
appointed by Berlin.  Austria would have to content herself with an impotent provincial 
Landtag and the federal provinces would be wiped from the map.1008  Indeed, one 
commentary reads like a prophecy of what was to come: 
Genau so würde Österreich im Falle des Anschlusses und der Machtübername durch den 
Nationalsozialismus zu einer bloßen Vogtei Berlins degradiert werden, mit einem von draußen 
geschickten „Landesinspekteur“ als Reichskommissar oder Reichsstatthalter an der Spitze, mit 
ebensolchen „Gauinspekteuren“ für die Bundesländer und mit österreichischen Landes- und 
Gauleitern als österreichischen Anhängseln.  Im Bälde wurde es dann weder ein Nieder- und 
Oberösterreich, noch ein Steiermark und Salzburg, noch ein Tirol und Vorarlberg, noch ein Kärnten 
und Burgenland geben. Schwamm drüber und Streusand drauf! 1009 
Yet, to Catholic Austria it was the rekindling of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, which offered the 
most striking parallel.  Hitler’s anti-Catholicism had been noted early on.  He was likened 
to Ulrich v. Hutten, ‘Martin Luther’s messenger’, a comparison that seemed to be 
confirmed by the preponderance of Protestants within the Nazis’ ranks.1010  The Nazi 
assault on German Catholicism and its institutions, the violence against Catholic priests, 
the de facto revival of the Kanzelparagraph, the ‘indiscriminate and brutal’ liquidation of 
Catholic organizations, the persecution of the Bayerische Volkspartei and the Zentrum all 
                                            
1006 ‘…Österreich genau so „gleichzuschalten“ wie sie, allen gegebenen Zusicherungen zum Trotz, Bayern 
und die übrigen süd- und mitteldeutschen Bundesstaaten „gleichgeschaltet“ haben’.  Österreichischer 
Heimatdienst, Die zweite Gefahr, 20. 
1007 'Die Vaterländische Front und ihre Gegner ', Vaterländische Front, Feb. 1934, 6–7,  See also:  'Ein kleiner 
Rückzug in der Anschlußfrage', Reichspost, 27 May 1933, 3. 
1008 See: 'Der deutsche Einheitsstaat', Reichspost, 9 Apr. 1933, 1–2. 
1009 Österreichischer Heimatdienst, Die zweite Gefahr, 21. 
1010 'Im Zeichen des Hakenkreuzes', Reichspost, 4 Feb. 1931, 1–2; 'Gleichschaltung auch der Kirchen?', 
Reichspost, 8 Apr.1933, 1–2. 
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harked back to an earlier era.1011  However, with the attempted Gleichschaltung of the 
Churches, this renewed attack was not simply the triumph of Protestantism over 
Catholicism, but a heathen Kulturkampf against the whole of Christianity, indeed against 
Christ himself: ‘The denial of divine law, the war against Christian denominations, 
the…party dogma is nothing less than the new edition of Voltaire’s call to arms, “Ecrasez 
l’infame”’.1012  With Germany fallen victim to the ‘bragging Prussians’, Austrians, Sturm über 
Österreich argued in October 1933, were faced with a clear choice: ‘entweder 
Anerkennung des Nationalsozialismus und Preisgabe unserer christlich-deutschen Kultur 
oder aber Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus bis zum Äußersten’.1013 
 The ‘Prussian paradigm’ was a particularly useful propaganda tool for the 
Dollfuß government, primed for domestic consumption.  The Austro-Prussian reference 
would not have been lost on an interwar Austrian audience, regardless of their political 
affiliation; Austrians’ may not have been sure who they were or where they belonged 
during this period, but they certainly knew that they were not Prussians.  What separated 
them – or what Austrians perceived separated them – was laid down by 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal, albeit anecdotally, in the Vossische Zeitung in December 1917.1014  
While Prussia, he declared, was an artificial construction, competent and efficient, where 
the highest ‘authority’ was the crown, Austria had developed naturally, was more devout 
and its subjects ‘had faith’ in their monarchy.  The Prussians, Hofmannsthal suggested, 
were arrogant, self-righteous and pedantic and, unlike the Austrians, who had been steady 
throughout the centuries, lacked historical awareness.  Austrians, on the other hand, 
nonchalant and self-indulgent, avoided conflict, showed more humanity and appeared 
unworldly, perhaps even effeminate when set against the self-assurance and vigour of the 
average Prussian. 
                                            
1011 'Der Kulturkampf in Deutschland entbrannt!', Reichspost, 23 Jun. 1933, 1. 
1012 Heinrich Mataja, 'Der Kulturkampf im Deutschen Reiche', Reichspost, 7 Feb. 1934, 2. 
1013 'Klarheit!', Sturm über Österreich, 1 Oct. 1933, 4; 'Preussengeist ist Deutschlands Ruin', Sturm über 
Österreich, 29 Oct.1933, 4. 
1014 See: Hugo von Hofmannsthal, 'Preuße und Österreicher. Ein Schema', in ed., Herbert Steiner 
Gesammelte Werke in Einzelausgaben: Prosa III (Frankfurt a. Main, 1952). 
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 The cultural stereotypes outlined by Hofmannsthal outlived the Imperial era.  The 
wartime experience in particular played a crucial role in forging and confirming Austrian – 
and invariably also ‘Prussian’ – prejudices, a fact substantiated by both Austrian and Nazi 
sources.  In Kraus’s Die letzten Tage der Menschheit – like Hofmannsthal’s musing, also the 
product of the uneasy wartime partnership – negative Prussian stereotypes abound; 
separated by language, the ‘clinical, single-minded, ill-mannered Prussian’ is juxtaposed 
against ‘the artistic, peaceable, genial Viennese’.1015  Yet such comparisons were not always 
in the form of caricature, nor necessarily explicit.  A seemingly innocuous article published 
in the Reichspost in 1930 comparing the three rococo palaces, Versailles, Sanssouci, 
Schönbrunn has far deeper implications.  In fact, the article only really makes sense against 
the backdrop of Austro-Prussian stereotypes.  Not merely palaces, the author argued, 
they were architectural epitaphs: ‘drei Herrscher, drei Nationen, drei Temperaments’ set 
in stone.1016  In Protestant Prussia, the author declared, the gentle arches and dainty 
flourishes of the rococo were out of place.  While Sanssouci, ‘feels infinitely weary’, 
Schönbrunn in its ‘lachende goldgrüne Helligkeit’ exudes all the qualities of the Austrian 
character.  This is such a key passage that it is worth quoting it in full. 
…die sich unbekümmert über Probleme hinwegsetzt, ohne sie vollends zu lösen, ...die trotz ihrer 
leichten Art das Leben zu nehmen, die Reife hat, das Leben zu verstehen und ihm deswegen seinen 
Lauf läßt.  Es liegt in Schönbrunns Charakter, daß es sich mit der Zeit abfindet und nicht...wie 
Sanssouci, einen Schleier des Vergessenwollens um sich schlägt.  Das ist Temperamentssache. Ein 
Stich ins Kokett Nonchalante die Gloriette, mäßigt die gelbgrüne Breite des Schlosses, das 
Aristokratie besitzt, jedoch eher die italienische, patrizierhafte Aristokratie, das sich ungarische 
Feudalität beherbergt und deutsche Lauterkeit, kurz, das – österreichisch ist.1017 
                                            
1015 Karl Kraus, Die letzten Tage der Menschheit. Tragödie in 5 Akten mit Vorspiel und Epilog, (Frankfurt am Main, 
1991); Eva Philippoff, Die Doppelmonarchie Österreich–Ungarn. Ein politisches Lesebuch (1867–1918), 21. 
1016 Kurt Weigl, 'Schlösser der Weltgeschichte', Reichspost, 11 Nov. 1930, 1–2. 
1017 Ibid. 
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Figure 7: Türkenbefreiungsfeier, Schönbrunn, 14 May 1933 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv) 
 These stereotypes permeated the fabric of interwar Austrian society.  As the 
British Minister observed, although the Austrian ‘likes to toy with “Anschluss” ideas in the 
abstract and to consider the German as his natural blood-brother’, in point of fact, his 
kinship and friendship neither extended to nor included Prussia.1018  When an associate 
argued that Germany remained a threat to peace – in 1928 – precisely because of the 
‘unfortunate character of the Reich Germans’ [read Prussian], a character, which was 
deemed ‘quite foreign to us Austrians’, Seipel also conceded ‘the understandable aversion 
to the uncongenial characteristics of the Prussian nature’. 1019   Seipel’s successor as 
Chancellor, Schuschnigg, also remarked on the fundamental differences between the 
Austrians and the Prussians, denn der Oesterreicher unterliegt ganz anderen 
                                            
1018 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/18366, paper R1526/1526/3, Sir W. Selby, Annual Report on Austria for 1933, 1 
Feb. 1934, 2, para., 9. 
1019 D. W. Bauer to Seipel, (24.07.1928) Paul R. Sweet, 'Seipel's Views on Anschluss', 321–23. 
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Milieueinflüssen als der Norddeutsche.  Seine Art sich zu geben ist liebenswürdiger, 
weicher, scheinbar schwächer’.1020 
 The Dollfuß and Schuschnigg governments instrumentalized this widespread 
antipathy and the Habsburg past, on the one hand to lend a basis to an Austrian identity 
vis-à-vis that espoused by National Socialism and on the other to counteract the draw of 
Anschluss and the attraction of Nazi Germany.  Sturm über Österreich reminded its 
audience that the Austrian’s wartime experience of ‘Der Kamerad Piefke’ had been less 
than positive.  The paper dared Hitler to send one of his north German comrades to pay 
a visit to an Austrian veterans’ association, just to see how he would be received: ‘Der 
Kamerad Piefke wird, wenn er sich dort vorstellt und ‚mal jroßartig auspacken will von 
den bravourösen Leistungen der kaiserlich deutschen Requisitionskommanden” in den mit 
österreichischem Blut eroberten Gebieten, so manches Interessante zu hören 
bekommen’. 1021   Indeed, in Sturm über Österreich the ‘Nazi-Prussian’ character was 
somewhat standard subject matter during the Dollfuß-era and the Ständestaat.  Here a 
rather unflattering portrait from the autumn of 1933 to demonstrate why, according to 
Sturm über Österreich, it was imperative that Austria remain free of Nazi Germany: 
Der Preuße will immer recht haben, immer gescheiter sein als alle anderen, jeden belehren und 
kommandieren, im Privatverkehr, wie in der Politik. Das wissen alle Leute auf der Welt, nur der 
Preuße selber will es nicht wissen. Darum bringen die Preußen auch immerfort Unheil über das 
deutsche Volk.  Wir wollen als Österreicher an den Folgen dieser Verstocktheit nicht mitleiden.  
Darum brauchen wir keinen Anschluß an ein Nazi-Preußen-Deutschland. Wir wollen keine Heloten 
und Sklaven der Preußen werden.  Für ihre politisch-diplomatischen Sünden wollen wir nicht büßen 
helfen.  Wir wollen frei bleiben und der Welt zeigen, es gibt auch bessere und konziliantere Deutsche 
als die Nazi-Preußen sind1022 
However, the instrumentalization of the Austro-Prussian narrative cannot simply be 
ascribed to opportunism on the part of the Austrian government.  This overlooks the fact 
                                            
1020 Kurt v. Schuschnigg, 'Das Gesicht des Österreichertums', Vaterländische Front (Niederösterreich), 1/1936, 
3. 
1021 'Das Anschlusstolle Oesterreich', Sturm über Österreich, 12 Aug. 1934, 2. 
1022 'Preussengeist ist Deutschlands Ruin', Sturm über Österreich, 29 Oct.1933, 4. 
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that despite the prevalence of Anschluss sentiment, the German dichotomy of the 
previous century – North versus South, Protestant versus Catholic, kleindeutsch versus 
großdeutsch, Hohenzollern versus Habsburg, Pan-Germanism versus ‘Austrianism’, 
Sanssouci versus Schönbrunn – continued to function as a cultural touchstone on into the 
interwar period. 
 
Figure 8: Dollfuß in the uniform of the Kaiserschützen, Schönbrunn, 14 May 1933 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv) 
Moreover, for the Christian Socials and those who saw themselves as German but 
Austrians first – Dollfuß included –their opposition to the Nazi party was built on a solid 
historical basis.  Thus, viewed along a longer historical trajectory, the Austro-German 
conflict of the interwar period fits into a much broader pattern, as the belated 
manifestation of a conflict, which had, in a sense, waxed and waned for more than two 
centuries, until it was finally put to rest by the fall of the Third Reich. 
 This longer trajectory also provides an explanation for Dollfuß’s and Schuschnigg’s 
careful, seemingly submissive, method of communicating with the Third Reich.  Under the 
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Empire, talk of German kinship and solidarity, or conversely, references to ‘un-German’ 
behaviour in an antagonist, were a commonly implemented propaganda tool, used to 
maintain the intricate balance of power within the German lands and sway dynastic – and 
later, public – opinion.  In the private sphere, references to German solidarity were as 
often used to convey a barely concealed contempt: when Franz Joseph remarks upon the 
antagonistic conduct of ‘our beloved German allies’ during the summer of 1866, the irony 
is palpable. 1023  From the Austrian perspective, whether during times of conflict or 
consensus, there was often no alternative but to work with the Prussians, even if 
‘their utter lack of principle and their uncivil pranks’ were often ‘hard to stomach’.1024  
Under the axiom ‘keep your friends close and your enemies closer’, Austro-Prussian 
animosity was expediently shrouded in a ‘cloak of consanguinity’, if not always with great 
success.  Conciliatory language, mollifying diplomatic relations – the dialogue between 
Archduchess Sophie and her sister, Queen Elizabeth of Prussia, is an obvious example – 
and eventually military alliances all served to mask the animosity and mutual distrust that 
reigned between Habsburg and Hohenzollern.1025 
 In a sense, the same was true during the interwar period, even though the 
circumstances – and the power ratio – had altered greatly.  Both Dollfuß and Schuschnigg 
went to considerable lengths to hold out an olive branch to their German neighbours.  
Despite being under constant attack from the Nazis at home and in the Reich, Dollfuß 
never failed to emphasize that Austria was always willing to work to explore ways to 
overcome any ‘misunderstandings’ that may have arisen between the two states and 
towards a cordial relationship with the German Reich.1026  Moreover, both Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg never missed an opportunity to reiterate that they deeply ‘regretted’ the 
painful conflict with Germany, ‘all the more’ because it involved two states, ‘which shared 
                                            
1023 Franz Joseph to Elisabeth, (23.7.1866). Quoted in: Brigitte Hamann, 'Die Habsburger', 225. 
1024 ‘Die Allianz mit Preußen ist die einzig richtige Politik, aber sauer machen sie es einem mit ihrer 
Grundsatzlosigkeit und ihren burschikosen Streichen'. There is no exact English equivalent of Burschikos but 
the term connotes an unconventional directness bordering on the impolite, originally associated with 
carousing and fencing student fraternities. Franz Schnürer, ed., Briefe, 19. 
1025 See: Brigitte Hamann, 'Die Habsburger'. 
1026 See, for example: Dollfuß in a speech held in Innsbruck, 29 June 1933.  Edmund Weber, ed., Dollfuß an 
Österreich, 84. 
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the closest blood-ties’ and a long and venerable history.1027  However, such protestations 
of kinship should not be interpreted as sympathy for, or an attempt to sidle up to, the 
Nazi regime.  On one level, this was emblematic of the manner in which the two countries 
traditionally communicated even when relations were bad, as demonstrated by this 
observation of the British Minister in Vienna in 1932: 
Declarations of Pan-German solidarity are as frequent in Austria as ever; but feelings towards the 
“brothers in the Reich” were not particularly cordial in government circles in Vienna during the year, 
and the relations between the present Chancellor and his immediate predecessor and the German 
Legation were at one time extremely strained.1028 
On another level, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were employing a tactic that was, in part, a 
legacy of the Imperial era; ‘…she [Austria] saw no reason not to bend every effort to live 
with the German Reich in the light of the old tradition and on the best of 
understandings.’1029  The ‘old tradition’ of course had nothing to do with being dictated to 
by Berlin.  Above all, what Dollfuß was doing here was opting for a strategy of ‘feigned 
friendship’, much like that identified by Alexander Lassner his investigation of 
Schuschnigg’s attempts to buy some time with the signing of the Juliabkommen in 1936.1030 
 Their motivations for taking this stance – rather than, for example, entering into 
open conflict with the Reich – were manifold.  On the one hand it can be seen as an 
attempt to avoid escalating a conflict with Germany that the Austrians could not hope to 
win.  Another motivation was to convince the Austrian population that the Nazis were 
solely to blame for the poor relations between Austria and Germany.  It was, after all the 
Nazis in Germany, the ‘anarchist corrupters of youth’ who were arming the youth of the 
                                            
1027 For example, Dollfuß speaking in Vienna, 18 Jan 1934, Anton Tautscher, ed., So Sprach der Kanzler, 104–
05. 
1028 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16640, paper C749/749/3, Sir E. Phipps, Annual Report on Austria for 1932, 
1 Jan. 1933, 10, para. 38. 
1029 Schuschnigg (conversation with Heß, October 1933) Kurt Schuschnigg, My Austria, 226. 
1030 This concept, used by Lassner to describe Schuschnigg’s attempts to buy some time with the signing of 
the Juliabkommen is equally as useful at describing one of the strategies of his predecessor.  Alexander 
Lassner, N., 'Peace at Hitler's Price', 726. 
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country with bombs.1031  If the Austrian government could demonstrate that the Nazis 
were the ones being entirely unreasonable, this might help minimize the appeal of Nazism 
at home.  Thus, it was imperative that Austria remain on the defensive – ‘Österreich 
müsse sich dem Deutschen Reich gegenüber auf eine Verteidigungsstellung beschränken 
und dürfte nicht selbst zum Angriff übergehen’ – as this would give the Austrian 
government the moral high ground at home and abroad.1032  Internationally this would 
enable Dollfuß to keep public and political opinion on Austria’s side.  Insisting that Austria 
had not ‘started the fight’, Dollfuß could then explain to German nationalist circles at 
home (to whom conflict with Germany was never going to be palatable), as well as to the 
wider Austrian populace, that, contrary to Nazi accusations, the deterioration of relations 
with Germany was in no way his fault.1033  After all, Dollfuß had been Chancellor a year 
before the Nazis came to power in Germany and had his government not worked 
together in all friendship with the previous German government?1034  He had always 
managed to work in close co-operation with von Papen, ‘having simply communicated by 
telephone with him whenever a serious question arose’.1035  Thus Dollfuß could challenge 
the message disseminated by Nazi propaganda that blamed Dollfuß for not only the 
conflict with Germany, but all of Austria’s ills.  This could only mean that responsibility for 
the conflict between the two states could be placed firmly at Germany’s – or more 
specifically, the Nazis’ – door. 
                                            
1031 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16641, paper C5976/2092/3, Sir E. Phipps, Austro-German relations. Dollfuß 
speech, 30 Jun. 1933 
1032 Dollfuß, MRP Nr. 898, 22 Sep. 1933, Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, ed., Kabinett Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss, MRP 
Nr. 883 vom 16. Juni 1933 bis MRP Nr. 904 vom  27. Oktober 1933, (Vienna, 1984), 407.  See also: Dollfuß in a 
speech held in Dornbirn, 29 June 1933.  See also: Anton Tautscher, ed., So Sprach der Kanzler, 101–105. 
1033 Dollfuß in a speech held in Dornbirn, 29 June 1933.  Anton Tautscher, ed., So Sprach der Kanzler, 105. 
1034 See: Dollfuß, Amstetten, 26 November, 1933; Ibid, 104; Dollfuß, Innsbruck, 29 June 1933; Edmund 
Weber, ed., Dollfuß an Österreich, 84. 
1035 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16641, paper C5975/2092/3, Sir E. Phipps, Austro-German relations. Speech by 
Dollfuß made on 25 June, 27 Jun. 1933. 
  
Chapter 7 
‘Österreich hat das Reich schon in seinem Namen’: 
Austria’s German Mission 
Why German?  The question posed by the newspaper of the Vaterländische Front in 
July 1935 is as apposite today as it was more than seven decades ago.1036  The idea that 
Austria was a German land and that the Austrian was ‘the better German’ was a central 
tenet of Ständestaat ideology, and, according to many assessments, this ‘mixed message’ 
was a primary reason for its failure.  ‘Insufficiently distinct from German identity’, so the 
argument goes, ‘Austria did not come across as unique and dissimilar to Nazi Germany, 
but rather as the poorer cousin of the Germans’, a failure which ultimately contributed to 
the ‘relatively smooth nature’ of the Anschluss in 1938.1037  Others go even further, 
suggesting that the Austrian government colluded in its own demise by ‘refusing to 
encourage the development of an independent Austrian identity based on a broad 
consensus’.1038  It is a compelling argument, especially when weighed against the successful 
nation-building strategy adopted by successive Austrian governments post-1945, which 
strove ‘to build an Austrian identity based on Austrian uniqueness vis-à-vis Germany’.1039  
                                            
1036 See: 'Warum deutsch?', Vaterländische Front, July 1935, 4. 
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Yet, it is deeply flawed.  Dollfuß’s and Schuschnigg’s ‘plain Deutschtümelei’, as one historian 
describes it, is often oversimplified and fundamentally misunderstood.1040 
 That interwar Austria failed to successfully foster a broad, inclusive ‘Austrian’ 
national identity is well known.1041  Instead, as Botz has pointed out, three basic ‘identities’ 
collided: the German-national Kulturnation, the patriotic Austrian Staatsnation and alpine 
regionalism, with no one model dominating.1042  Although such categorisation is useful, it 
fails to fully emphasize that these identities all had one thing in common – the belief that 
the Austrians were part of a larger German entity.  Although historians traditionally 
identify the Germanism of Austro-Germanism as a weakness of the Ständestaat, they fail to 
consider that in interwar Austria, there was no credible alterative to this so-called 
‘Deutschtümelei’.  This is hardly surprising considering that pre-1918 the only ‘nationalism’ 
that the Austrians had known was Habsburg (anti-national) universalism or German 
nationalism.  Although there was a small group around Ernst Karl Winter that championed 
the idea of the Austrians as a distinct nation like the Swiss, this was a very marginal 
position during the First Republic.1043  Quite simply, the ‘amorphous patriotism for the 
Greater German nation’ noted earlier, rendered unfeasible in 1933 the post-1945 strategy 
of Austria as unique vis-à-vis Germany.  Again, it is an observation by the British Minister, 
which provides the clearest explanation.  In his annual report for 1932, he details how, 
during the year ‘Dr. Dollfuss and his predecessor, Dr. Buresch, [had] on the whole 
steered a French course’ – that is, pursuing the Lausanne loan.  However, he continued, ‘it 
must not be imagined that this or any future Austrian government will pursue an 
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1042 Botz in: Petra Rösgen, Verfreundete Nachbarn, 62. 
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anti-German policy.  If it attempted to do so, it would be quickly swept away’.1044  Despite 
Austria seeking, bee-like, ‘honey in every flower’ during 1932, Seipel’s motto, ‘“nothing 
against Germany, nothing without Germany”’ remained the order of the day.1045 
 To recap: the Social Democrats were overwhelmingly deutschnational in orientation, 
that is to say, they were advocates of Anschluss and persistent champions of the German 
Reich.  And though they temporarily shelved the notion of immediate union in 1933, they 
never abandoned it.  Neither, of course, did the Greater Germans, the Landbund or the 
Nazis.  The Christian Socials, on the other hand, had, since the early years of the Republic, 
leant far more heavily towards the concept of an independent Austrian Staatsnation within 
a wider ‘German’ community.  For this reason, throughout the 1920s and early 1930s the 
Christian Socials were routinely charged with being ‘anti-Anschluss’ by the opposition, 
which, in one way or another, the majority undoubtedly were.  The debate surrounding 
the Lausanne loan provides a perfect example of the two positions.  The Socialist deputy 
Wilhelm Ellenbogen attacked the loan because it sacrificed the Anschluss.  The Dollfuß 
government countered the opposition’s objections by maintaining that the loan was 
indeed a ‘matter of national concern’ and that it would inevitably serve ‘German’ interests 
precisely because it would secure Austria’s existence and that this, in itself, was a ‘national’ 
deed.1046  Yet, to the Socialists, who rejected the concept of an independent Austrian state 
outright, ‘national’ meant Germany and Anschluss, not Austria and independence.  Thus, 
as Ellenbogen declared, the opposition were not at all taken in by the Chancellor’s ‘fiery 
national tone’ in light of the fact that ‘the Reichspost [and thus the Christian Socials] had 
always taken a stance against the Anschluss’.1047 
 The historiographical contention that it was the Ständestaat that was unable to 
extricate itself from the clutches of Germandom is remarkable in the light of the fact that 
Dollfuß and Schuschnigg faced an opposition that was overwhelmingly deutschnational and 
                                            
1044 Rather than a ‘German’ course. (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16640, paper C749/749/3, Sir E. Phipps, Annual 
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pro-Anschluss, and actually attacked Dollfuß (and Seipel before him) as a traitor to the 
pan-German cause. 1048   And while the deutschnational tradition within the Social 
Democratic movement, the Landbund and the Greater Germans is not overlooked in 
historical accounts, the implication of their stance often is.  No party could or would have 
offered an alternative that was not based in one way or another on some form of German 
nationalism.  Moreover, any attempt to refute Austrian ‘Germanness’ in the interwar years 
would very likely have met with failure.  Although speculative, it is surely worth asking on 
which basis – if indeed they could have ever agreed on one – a Christian Social–Social 
Democratic coalition would have sought to block the Nazi advance.  We can be certain 
that it would not have been one based upon the propagation of an Austrian nation that 
was separate and distinct from Germandom.  Botz asserted that Dollfuß was condemned 
to failure because ‘the image of independent Austria as the better Germans was still 
associated with German nationalism, and from this point of departure – as actually 
transpired during the final years of the corporatist state – it could be undermined by the 
Nazis’.1049  But Botz’s assertion fails to emphasize a crucial point; the inherent weakness of 
one party, was the weakness of all parties in the face of the Nazi threat.  This oversight is 
exacerbated by the failure to recognize that the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg Ständestaat was the 
only credible interwar ‘identity’ that actively espoused the preservation of an independent 
Austrian state, arguably the only sound basis for resisting a Nazi takeover.1050  There is 
also a wider issue at stake: the real problem in 1933 was not that the Austrian Germans 
considered themselves culturally German as they had done for centuries, but that there 
was a wholesale appropriation of the concept of ‘German’ by the National Socialists, 
which led to the concept’s inevitable corruption. 
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Ein Volk Ein Reich, Ein Führer? 
Although the anti-Anschluss stance of the Christian Socials had become more 
pronounced as the 1920s had progressed, the experience of Lausanne and the 
escalating Nazi propaganda assault played a key role in forcing the 
catholic-conservative right to be more decisive in their attitude towards Austrian 
independence and Anschluss.  Dollfuß was, much to the chagrin of his Nazi opponents, 
the first Austrian Chancellor of the interwar period to openly and unequivocally 
declare himself in favour of an independent Austrian state.  In the light of this, the 
charge that ‘not even Hitler's seizure of power early in 1933 was able to put an end to 
the Germanic obsessions of the Christian Socials and their support base, which 
manifested itself in their readiness to regard Anschluss as a goal’, is at best misleading, 
and at worst a serious misrepresentation of the facts.1051  While it is impossible to say 
with any certainty what the Christian Social support base was thinking, we do have a 
very clear idea of where the Christian Socials themselves – Dollfuß included – stood 
on this issue. 
 The Nazis claim to represent the whole of Germandom, inside and outside the 
Reich’s borders was a clear refutation of Austria’s right to an independent existence.  
To achieve its goal in Austria, the Nazi movement appropriated and exploited the 
most powerful tool in its arsenal:  the Anschluss tradition and its language.  
‘Austrianism’, the Nazis claimed, was the antithesis of Germandom and the Austrian 
government was ‘ungerman’ because it was anti-Anschluss and anti-Nazi.1052  The 
Austrian government’s response was to assert that, contrary to Nazi claims, ‘German’ 
had a multitude of meanings: ‘Enforced conformity’ [Gleichmacherei], Dollfuß declared 
in November 1933, ‘has never been the German way’.1053  ‘We must not’, he asserted, 
                                            
1051 ‘Auch die Machtergreifung Adolf Hitlers Anfang 1933 konnte den ‘im “Anschluß”‑Willen 
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1052 See, for instance: 'Der Vorwand für alles', Reichspost, 21 Mar. 1933, 1–2; Carl Vaugoin, Ist Österreich 
Wert?, 4. 
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‘allow the N[ational] S[ocialists] a monopoly, as if they were the only Germans’.1054  ‘Es 
muß im Reich Klarheit darüber bestehen, Dollfuß warned, in response to the 
unsolicited visit of a leading Nazi functionary to Austria, daß die Regierung in Wien 
nicht um ein Haar weniger deutsch ist als die Regierung in Berlin.  Das Reich hat also 
keinerlei Veranlassung, sich um das Deutschtum in Oesterreich zu sorgen’.  And he 
added defiantly, ‘welchen Kurs aber dieses Deutschtum in Oesterreich geht, ist eine 
durchaus innerösterreichische Angelegenheit’.1055  The Christian Socials’ thinking was a 
direct legacy of the Habsburg Empire.  Germany, the Austrian government argued in it 
press and its propaganda, referred to all areas settled in their entirety by Germans, 
irrespective of state borders, not the German Reich.1056  The problem, some Austrians 
argued, was that those in the Reich had become used to using the word ‘German’ with 
reference to the German Reich, not the whole German nation.1057  Although the 
German Reich formed the main body of the German nation, it was, they maintained, in 
no way synonymous with it. 
 The Christian Socials called upon the past to justify their stance.  Although they 
deemed the Austrians part of the larger German cultural community, they remained 
dedicated to a specifically Austrian form of German culture, based upon Austria’s ‘very 
own and separate historical past’.1058  The ‘Austro-Germans’, they maintained, boasted 
a long and prestigious German heritage, and Austria a legacy irrefutably established in 
history. 1059   The Habsburg concept of statehood is crucial to understanding the 
‘Austro-German’ identity of the Ständestaat.  In the multinational Habsburg Empire, 
nationality and statehood were not considered contradictory concepts; rather national 
identity was posited as ‘a constituent part of a broader identification with the imperial 
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house and with “Austria”’.1060  Similarly, during the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era there was 
no contradiction in Austria being both an Austrian and a ‘German’ state: just as 
pre-1918 ‘Imperial loyalty was not to supersede but to coexist with ethnic loyalties’.  
Post-1918 state loyalty, it was deemed, could co-exist with ethnic loyalty.1061  Thus, 
Heinrich Mataja, a Christian Social politician and fervent proponent of the Austrian 
idea could argue without contradiction:  As proud as we are to be Germans, so proud 
are we of our Austrianism.1062 
 Nonetheless, Austria’s German self-identity also posed a problem, as National 
Socialism had to be repelled without rejecting Germany and Germandom as a whole.  
This meant leading a population that felt it had deep historical links to Germandom 
away from its, albeit fickle, affection for Germany without appearing to act in a manner 
that was contrary to ‘German’ interests.  However, the drawing of ideological 
boundaries between Austro-Germanism, Germanism and Nazism was by no means an 
easy task, not least because the National Socialists intentionally muddied the waters.  It 
meant countering Nazi claims that ‘Nazi’ and ‘German’ were synonymous concepts.  
‘We Germans in Austria’, Dollfuß explained in July 1933, ‘want to demonstrate that a 
German and a National Socialist are not the same thing’. 1063   The Nazis also 
deliberately equated ‘national’ and ‘National Socialist’ in their propaganda and the 
Austrian authorities were well aware that every order directed against National 
Socialism would be portrayed as directed against Germandom as a whole. 1064  
Therefore, the ‘consistent and unremitting’ clarification that ‘the concept of “Austria” 
implicitly included the notion of “Germandom”, and that the struggle against National 
Socialism was never ever directed against Germandom’, was deemed by the Federal 
Chancellery to be of ‘infinite importance’.1065 
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Der Kampf um den Reichsgedanken 
Much like the Austrian Empire during the nineteenth century when faced with the twin 
threats of an emergent German nationalism and an antagonistic Prussian state, the First 
Republic was compelled, in the face of aggressive Nazi propaganda, to assert ‘her 
German character’.1066  Austria was a ‘German state’ and always had been; as Austrians, 
‘we stand, self-evidently and immovably, on German soil’ came the persistent reply 
from the Dollfuß government.1067  As Austrians, the Reichspost argued, they were not 
only a part of the German people; they were more deeply connected to Germandom 
than many other German ‘Stämme’.1068  The oblique reference was to the Prussians, 
the political equivalent of the nouveaux riches, who were, as the newspaper had 
already pointed out, not a German ‘Stamm’, merely a state.1069  Austria, on the other 
hand, was the heir to a ‘glorious past’ – again, this argument was one that was 
repeatedly used by the Habsburg Empire in their struggle against Prussia for leadership 
of ‘Germany’.1070  Unlike Prussia – that is to say, the heart and soul of the Third Reich 
– Austria could look back on more than a thousand years of history and would not be 
‘besmirched and insulted’ by the ‘gentlemen on the Spree’.1071  Austria, the Christian 
Socials maintained, was a respected and flourishing state at a time when those ‘Stämme’ 
that today claim Germandom for themselves alone, did not even know what German 
meant’.1072  Long before Berlin even existed, at a time when the Wends still occupied 
the March, German settlers in Austria were cultivating the land, establishing a living 
frontier of German culture, one Christian Social politician observed.1073  One ought to 
remember, Sturm über Österreich added, that in 1525 when ‘Prussia was enfeoffed by 
the Margrave of Brandenburg from a Polish king’ Austria was already the leading power 
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in Germany.1074  This is striking for the fact that representatives of the Dollfuß 
government were basically accusing the Prussians of being part-Polish, an accusation 
which would have had overwhelmingly negative connotations to the Prussians, but not 
to the Austrians.  It had further meaning to the Austrians who were commemorating 
the Türkenjahr of 1683, a reminder that Vienna, when under siege from the Turks was 
rescued not by the Elector of Brandenburg, who ‘left the defence of Christendom to 
the Southern Germans and the Poles’, but by the King of Poland Jan III Sobieski.1075  In 
essence what the Dollfuß government was arguing was that, contrary to Nazi 
propaganda, Austria she had a right to exist precisely because she was not merely a 
German state; she was the original, true German state. 
 Thus, the battle lines between the Austrian government and the Nazi 
movement were also deemed to be historical.  These facts of history, the Austrian 
government argued, had been appropriated – or rather misappropriated – and 
distorted to fit the Nazi worldview.  To the patriotic Austrian observer, Hitler’s 
determination to create a ‘“great and all-embracing German…Reich”’ was a deliberate 
attempt to appropriate both the mantle of ‘Greater-Germany’ and the Holy Roman 
legacy for the Nazi movement.1076  The Austrians insisted that the Third Reich, as the 
spiritual and political heir to both the Bismarckian Reich and the kleindeutsch solution, 
could call on neither the Holy Roman legacy nor the großdeutsch position for political 
legitimacy.  Firstly, there was no authentic historical link between the ‘Third Reich’ and 
the ‘First’.  As the Reichspost pointed out: 
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Es ist kein österreichischer, sondern der reichsdeutsche Schriftsteller Theodor Haecker, der die 
Gleichsetzung der Bismarkschöpfung mit dem alten Reiche als “den großen Schwindel” und “den 
großen Betrug” brandmarkt: “Preußen ist von Anfang an Minderer des Reiches der Deutschen1077 
The spirit of Potsdam, it was noted, was always in favour of a strong nation state, 
which made Bismarck’s ‘Second Reich’, by definition, the antithesis of the Reichsidee.1078  
It was interesting, one Christian Social journalist observed, that the Prussians should 
now be declaring themselves ‘großdeutsch’, as in the past Prussia had been the 
personification of the ‘kleindeutsch’ idea, so much so that the proverbially treacherous 
Prussians had even taken up arms against other Germans in its name.1079  In reality, the 
Austrians pointed out, the Großdeutsch solution to the German question, which the 
Nazis were now laying claim to, had always been perpetuated from Vienna, not from 
Berlin.1080 
 Nonetheless, it was clear that Hitler’s intention was for the ‘Third Reich’ to 
transcend Bismarck’s kleindeutsch construction.1081  It was for that very reason, that 
Nazi Germany needed Austria to be ‘brought home’ into the Reich’.1082  However, in 
the eyes of Austrian conservatives, ‘Heim ins Reich’ was a deliberate falsification of 
history: 
Die Geschichte widerlegt auch das bekannte Schlagwort: “Heim ins Reich!” das die 
Nationalstaatsidee der österreichischen Staatsidee entgegenhält.  Österreich hat dem 
zentralisierten Einheitsstaat Deutschland, der längst kein Reich in Sinne der deutschen Reichsidee 
ist, niemals angehört und kann daher nicht dorthin heimkehren.1083 
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Augustus ‘allzeit Mehrer des Reiches’. 
1078 See: Eduard Ludwig, 'Der Kampf um den Reichsgedanken', Vaterländische Front (Wien), Nov. 1933, 2. 
1079 ‘Die Feststellung, daß die Preußen Großdeutsch sind und bleiben wollen, ist interessant.  In der 
Vergangenheit war gerade im Preußentum der kleindeutsche Gedanke verkörpert und für den 
kleinedeutschen Gedanken hat Preußen gegen andere Deutsche sogar zum Schwert gegriffen’.  See: 
'Hohenzollernkrone und Anschluß', Reichspost, 23 Mar. 1933, 3. 
1080 See: Eduard Ludwig, 'Der Kampf um den Reichsgedanken', Vaterländische Front (Wien), Nov. 1933, 2. 
1081 See: 'Heim ins Reich?', Sturm über Österreich 2 Jul. 1933, 3. 
1082 See, also Ibid. 
1083 Walter  Adam, 'Die österreichische Staatsidee', Vaterländische Front, Apr. 1936, 1.  
Oberst. Walter Adam replaced Pankraz Kruckenhauser as head of the ‘Österreichischer Heimatdienst’, 
the department of propaganda in July 1934.  The Heimatdienst was closely connected with the 
Vaterländische Front.  Kruckenhauser was removed for his National Socialist sympathies, which alludes to 
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‘Anschluss’ and ‘Reich’, the Austrian government countered, were a contradiction in 
terms; Hohenzollern and Anschluss did not belong together in the same political 
concept, and ‘Heim ins Reich’ through ‘Anschluss’ was ‘an unscrupulous deceit’.1084 
 As heir to the Holy Roman Empire, Austria, according to the country’s 
Catholic-conservative right, should be recognized as the ‘true’ defender of the 
Großdeutsch ideal.  Austria was ‘fighting National Socialism’, the government’s press 
chief explained, as it was ‘the corrupter of the Reichsgedanke.’1085  One could not wipe 
out the facts of history, the Reichspost argued, as one would the scribbles on a school 
blackboard.1086  For centuries, Austria had been the Stammland of the Holy Roman 
Empire, its political and cultural cornerstone; and in Vienna, its nucleus, the 
Reichsgedanke had always been at home.1087  For more than half a millennium, Dollfuß 
noted, Vienna, home of the ‘German’ Emperors, had been a German symbol.1088  
Journeying northwest from the capital, one passed the monastery in Klosterneuburg, 
built by the Babenbergs.  On its dome was the crown of the German Reich, the 
original of which was housed in the treasury in Vienna.  In Potsdam, it was argued, the 
traveller would find nothing of the sort.1089  Austria’s history was Habsburg history, 
gesamtdeutsch history and the history of the Holy Roman Empire.1090  Austria’s mission 
and hereditary duty, as the last visible fragment of the Reich and the authentic 
champion of German people, was to keep this memory and the Reichsidee, which was 
                                                                                                                                
a greater problem faced by the proponents of ‘Austrianism’ within the Dollfuß government; that not 
everyone could be trusted.  Moreover it demonstrates that even within the government there really 
was no consensus on the future of the Austrian state and how this should be achieved and that some of 
those who did not agree ultimately went over to the Nazis. 
1084 Österreichischer Heimatdienst, Die zweite Gefahr, 14–15; 'Hohenzollernkrone und Anschluß', 
Reichspost, 23 Mar. 1933, 3. 
1085 Eduard Ludwig, 'Der Kampf um den Reichsgedanken', Vaterländische Front (Wien), Nov. 1933, 2. 
1086 'Um Oesterreichs Mission', Reichspost, 8 Jan. 1933, 1–2. 
1087 See: Eduard Ludwig, 'Der Kampf um den Reichsgedanken', Vaterländische Front (Wien), Nov. 1933, 2; 
Walter  Adam, 'Die österreichische Staatsidee', Vaterländische Front, Apr. 1936, 1. 
1088 Dollfuß, Innsbruck, 22 April 1933, Anton Tautscher, ed., So Sprach der Kanzler, 77. 
1089 See: Walter  Adam, 'Die österreichische Staatsidee', Vaterländische Front, Apr. 1936, 1; '"Aufbruch 
aus Oesterreich"', Reichspost, 5 Feb. 1933, 1-2; Kurt v. Schuschnigg, 'Österreich von heute und die 
deutsche Frage: Rundfunkvortrag des Justizministers Dr. Schuschnigg', Vaterländische Front, 1 Aug. 1933, 
4. 
1090 See: Kurt v. Schuschnigg, 'Österreich von heute und die deutsche Frage: Rundfunkvortrag des 
Justizministers Dr. Schuschnigg', Vaterländische Front, 1 Aug. 1933, 4. 
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now ‘transferred to the sphere of Spirit and Civilization’, alive. 1091   The true 
Reichsgedanke, the Austrian government maintained, was universal, European, humanist 
and federalist in spirit.  The implication was obvious: Nazi Germany was nothing of the 
sort. 
                                            
1091 'Deutsch Ehr' ist mein Ehr'', Reichspost, 24 Jun. 1934, 1–2; 'Um Oesterreichs Mission', Reichspost, 8 
Jan. 1933, 1–2; Kurt Schuschnigg, Farewell Austria. 
  
 
National Socialism – Das wahre Gesicht 
 ‘Is Germandom more favoured and more esteemed by the world at large since the 
advent of the Third Reich?’ the Reichspost asked in June 1934.1092  ‘Is it capable of 
bettering the situation of the German minorities in the different states?  Has it 
provided them with support and protection?  Has it…brought the Germans closer 
together?  Even during 1933, the answer was clear.  National Socialism was leading the 
Reich, ‘with mathematical certainty’, towards catastrophe.1093  Meanwhile, in Austria, 
the Nazi terrorist campaign – orchestrated from Berlin – proved, beyond a shadow of 
a doubt, the nature of the National Socialist threat:  ‘Now we know the reality of 
National Socialism’ the Reichspost noted in June 1933: ‘It is unrestrained fanaticism, and 
bloody terror’, ‘nothing more than organized crime’.1094  If the Nazis were to seize 
power in Austria the consequences would be obvious: …so würden sie uns einsperren, 
um die Existenz bringen und den gleichen Mißhandlungen überliefern, die sie 
Dr. Gerlich und tausenden seiner Gesinnungsgenossen zugefügt haben.1095  Rather than 
inspiring a ‘national rising’, National Socialism had meant ‘the debasement of the 
German spirit, indeed the worst betrayal of it that history has ever known’.1096  Even 
before the purge of Hitler’s political opponents in the Reich and the murder of Dollfuß 
by Nazi insurgents in an attempted coup d'état – again orchestrated from Berlin – the 
verdict had been handed down.  National Socialism was ushering the German Reich 
towards ruin, and morally compromising it in front of the whole world.1097 
                                            
1092 'Nationale Erfahrung', Reichspost, 9 Jun. 1934, 1–2. 
1093 'Deutsch Ehr' ist mein Ehr'', Reichspost, 24 Jun. 1934, 1–2. 
1094 'Das schwerste Mordverbrechen seit dem Bestand der Republik', Reichspost, 20 Jun. 1933, 1 'Nun 
aber Schluß!', Reichspost, 20 Jun. 1933, 2. 
1095 Fritz Gerlich, (15 Feb. 1883–30 Jun. 1934) was a German journalist and fierce critic of the National 
Socialists.  He was arrested on 9 March 1933 and kept imprisoned until the night of the so-called ‘Röhm 
Putsch’ when he was taken to Dachau and murdered.  Heinrich Mataja, 'Deutschtum und 
Nationalsozialismus', Der Christliche Ständestaat, 21 Jan. 1934, 7–8. 
1096 'Oesterreichs große deutsche Stunde', Reichspost, 20 Aug. 1933, 1–2. 
1097 See: 'Deutsch Ehr' ist mein Ehr'', Reichspost, 24 Jun. 1934, 1–2. 
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 Almost as soon as Hitler took office, Nazi Germany had laid its claim to Austria 
as ‘German’ territory.  In March 1933 Hans Frank, Bavarian Minister for Justice, 
asserted over the airwaves that due to the ‘incomprehensible foolishness’ of the 
government there, ‘Austria was now the one last bit of Germany in which one could 
still dare to oppress the German will’.1098  ‘He would like to warn the Austrian 
government’, Frank continued, ‘in all friendliness, and with the affection of an ally, 
against causing the National Socialists of the Reich to assume the protection of the 
liberty of their German brethren in Austria’.  It was perhaps not surprising then that, 
when Frank declared he was going to pay Austria a visit a few weeks later in mid-May 
to speak at a Nazi counter-demonstration to the Heimwehr rally to mark the 
‘deliverance of Vienna from the Turks’, that the Austrian government let it be known 
that a group of Nazi functionaries visiting on party business would not be welcome.  
Unperturbed by diplomatic courtesy, Frank and his entourage flew to Vienna, to be 
greeted ‘with a message from the Chancellor that their presence “was not especially 
desired”’.  Needless to say, Frank continued his tour and did not refrain from 
threatening the Dollfuß government with reprisal ‘for the “insults offered him”’.1099  
Having sought and failed between February and April to avoid the outbreak of conflict 
with the Nazis – and thus the Reich – the Dollfuß government went on the offensive.  
‘Both sides [had] the gloves off’, one observer noted; Dollfuß was now ‘carrying the 
war into the enemy’s camp by searching the Nazis’ premises and seizing their arms’.1100 
 Austria was made to pay the price for asserting its sovereign rights.  Days 
before the visit the new Reich Chancellor had already warned Tauschitz, the Austrian 
Minister in Berlin, that ‘if things continued in such a manner, he would find himself 
                                            
1098 From Dr. Hans Frank’s wireless speech from Munich on March 18, 1933.  (TNA): (PRO), FO 
371/18346, paper R839/37/3, Dossier prepared by the Austrian Government with view to an Appeal to 
the League of Nations regarding Alleged German Interference in the Internal Affairs of Austria, 8 Feb. 
1933. 
1099 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/18366, paper R1526/1526/3, Sir W. Selby, Annual Report on Austria for 
1933, 1 Feb. 1934, para. 24. 
1100 Note by R.M.A. Hankey: (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16641, paper C5031/2092/3, Sir E. Phipps, Austro-
German relations. Development of Austro-German enmity, 29 May 1933. 
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forced to prevent, perhaps for a year by way of experiment, the visit of any Germans 
to Austria, until Austria came to her senses’.1101  As the British legation pointed out: 
German weapons against Austria were primarily: (a) The pro-German feeling inherent in the 
majority of the Austrians: (b) Austrian economic dependence in certain aspects upon Germany.  
Both weapons were, therefore, used unsparingly to bludgeon Austria into acquiescence in a Nazi 
government, and to alienate public sympathy from Dr. Dollfuß.1102 
Thus, just weeks after the Machtergreifung, Nazi Germany employed its most 
devastating weapon, the economic boycott.  It came in the form of a thousand-Mark 
exit visa for Germans travelling to Austria, by today’s standards a sum just short of 
€4,000.1103  The measure, introduced in May 1933, was a crippling blow to the Austrian 
economy, particularly in the western provinces, which were reliant upon German 
tourists.1104  As ‘the entire German propaganda was based upon the economic situation 
in Austria’, by strangling the Austrian economy, the Nazis sought to prove their own 
dictum: that ‘union with Germany was essential for the economic salvation of 
Austria’.1105  It would remain in place until the July Agreement of 1936. 
 Combating these coercive economic measures on the part of the Reich was 
essential if Dollfuß was going to be successful in repelling the Nazi advance.  
Throughout 1933, Dollfuß endeavoured to counteract the worst effects of the Nazi 
campaign by securing whatever help he could muster abroad.  Impressing on the other 
European powers Austria’s urgent need for economic assistance if he was going to win 
his fight to prevent a Nazi takeover, during 1933 Dollfuß negotiated ‘with any power 
willing to do so, for mutual and exclusive preferences’.1106  He rarely missed an 
                                            
1101 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/18346, paper R839/37/3, Dossier prepared by the Austrian Government 
with view to an Appeal to the League of Nations regarding Alleged German Interference in the Internal 
Affairs of Austria, 8 Feb. 1933, 3. 
1102 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/18366, paper R1526/1526/3, Sir W. Selby, Annual Report on Austria for 
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opportunity to impress on the British Minister, for example, that ‘economic help must 
by some means be made available to him, if he was to consolidate his position in 
Austria and to be enabled successfully to resist Herr Hitler’1107.  Dollfuß’s suggestions 
ranged from enquiring whether British tourists could be encouraged to come to 
Austria to an appeal to His Majesty’s government to help him decrease unemployment 
in Austria by allowing Austrian goods to enter the British market, without delay, on 
preferential terms.1108  Although modest assistance was forthcoming, Italy, for example, 
‘at some sacrifice to itself, did all it could to stimulate Austrian timber exports’ during 
1933, Dollfuß’s attempt to mitigate the impact of the Nazi boycott met with much 
sympathy, but little in the way of concrete support.1109  Part of the problem was that all 
of these countries were hoping to derive some economic gain from trading with Nazi 
Germany.  Despite clear warnings from Selby in Vienna as to what the outcome of a 
Nazi takeover in Austria would mean for Britain, little Austria offered no comparable 
economic attraction.  European powers were simply not keen on doing anything that 
might imperil their access to the German market.1110 
 The most conspicuous front of the ‘war’ against the Austrian government was 
the wave of terror that swept the country during 1933, targeting Jews, members of the 
government, the Christian Social Party and the Heimwehr.1111  German Nazi agents 
initiated the violence that would soon engulf Austria with the murder of the Jewish 
journalist Georg Bell, a Reich German citizen, in April 1933.1112  Bomb attacks – a 
number directly ordered from Munich – were made possible by generous German 
financial support and became an almost daily occurrence, taking out power lines, train 
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lines, tram lines and bridges, disquieting the public and threatening to keep away 
much-needed tourists.  Something of the scale of the terror is revealed by the fact that 
140 terrorist attacks with ‘paper bombs and explosive machines’ were recorded 
between the night of 31 December 1933 and the morning of 8 January 1934 alone.1113  
Assassination attempts were made against Dollfuß, Richard Steidle, the leader of the 
Tyrolean Heimwehr and Anton Rintelen the Styrian Landeshauptmann amongst others.  
And there were constant rumours of an impending Nazi putsch.1114  The ‘terror 
strategy’ was finally abandoned with Dollfuß’s murder in July 1934.  In the face of 
international condemnation, Hitler was finally forced to change tack. 
 On 5 May 1933 the wearing of the Nazi uniform and emblems was prohibited 
nationwide.1115  Just over a month later, on the 19 June, the Austrian Nazi party was 
banned in its entirety following a hand grenade attack on a Hilfspolizei detachment in 
Krems, which left one dead, and 30 injured, 17 seriously.  In the wake of the attack the 
Reichspost was vehement in its condemnation of both the Austrian and the German 
Nazis.  The assault was so strongly-worded it is worth quoting in full: 
Das ist der neue Geist, die Erneuerung der Deutschen Nation, der Um- und Aufbruch der 
deutschen Seele, die restlose Säuberung der deutschen Volkes von allem Fremdartigen, die der 
Nationalsozialismus in täglichen Prahlereien zu bringen verspricht! Das ist das neue, das bessere 
Deutschtum, das er uns bescheren will! Nun kennen wir die Nationalsozialistische Wirklichkeit: 
Sie ist hemmungslosester Fanatismus und blutiges Grauen. …Das ist nicht mehr Politik, weder 
nationale noch soziale, sondern systemisiertes Verbrechen.1116 
The British legation reported that membership of the party was punishable with ‘a fine, 
imprisonment or loss of property, or, in the case of foreigners, immediate expulsion 
                                            
1113 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/18346, paper R839/37/3, Dossier prepared by the Austrian Government 
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from Austrian soil’.1117  Nazi deputies were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, 
and Nazi headquarters dissolved.  In an attempt to quell the continuing wave of terror 
from the now illegal Nazis, on the 10 November that same year, capital punishment 
was reintroduced, and on 8 June 1934 it was extended to include crimes involving 
explosives.  As the British Foreign Office reports make clear, the Austrian government 
managed to keep control of the situation, but only by patrolling the entire border 
between Austria and Germany and equipping and maintaining a ‘considerable number 
of Heimwehr and auxiliary police, army reserves and police reserves’ at significant cost 
to a country already suffering the worst effects of the depression.1118  German Nazi 
ringleaders, including Theo Habicht the Reich German Landesinspekteur, were arrested 
and deported back to Germany, where they received a hero’s welcome. 
 Having been expelled from Austria, Habicht took up residence in Munich, from 
where he initiated an aggressive radio campaign against the Austrian government, the 
Munich Radio Broadcast Service having been put at his disposal to disseminate his 
views over the Austrian airwaves.1119  Habicht carried on his agitation against the 
Dollfuß government across the ether, aided by other Austrian Nazi ‘refuges’, ‘ridiculing 
the Austrian government and [calling] on Austrians to carry out new acts of terror’.  
Berlin countered Austrian protests by asserting the broadcasts were for domestic 
consumption.1120  In retaliation for Habicht’s expulsion, Wasserback, the long-serving 
press attaché at the Austrian legation in Berlin, was expelled from Germany – the 
German legation had attempted to circumvent Habicht’s deportation by nominating 
him press attaché in a highly irregular attempt to see him accorded diplomatic 
immunity.1121 
  Every trick in the Nazi arsenal, from the innocuous to the perfidious, was used 
in the propaganda war against Austria.  Subversive leaflets were dropped over Austria 
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by aeroplane – promptly denied by Berlin, of course, even when the plane in question 
bore a tell-tale swastika on its rudder – which, due to a lack of fighting aircraft, the 
Austrian government was unable to counter-act.1122  In an appeal published in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung in September 1933, Reich German citizens were encouraged to 
write to their ‘German brothers in Austria’ to enlighten them as to what ‘Adolf Hitler 
has done for the German Nation’.1123  Proximity alone ensured that the border regions 
were the worst affected.  Along with the pictures, pamphlets and leaflets smuggled into 
or dropped onto Austrian territory, – one with the somewhat mendacious title of 
‘Not Hate, but Love’ – loudspeakers were set up on Bavarian territory, swastika 
fireworks were set off and even air balloons filled with leaflets were launched from 
border areas.  Within Austria the illegal Nazis were ingenious in their attempts to 
keep the swastika visible and, as Pauley points out, to prove that despite the 
prohibition the Nazi movement in Austria ‘was still very much alive’.1124 
 At home, the Austrian government fought hard to counter the Nazi attack 
‘blow-by-blow’.1125  Their attempts to discredit the Austrian Nazis were aided in part 
by the Nazi terror campaign, which did little to endear them to the wider population.  
The attraction of Nazi Germany, on the other hand, was a different matter, especially 
considering Austria’s own dire economic situation.  Thus, much energy was put into 
revealing the ‘reality’ of life in the Third Reich.  For example, exposing the failures of 
Nazi economic policy was a staple of Austrian reporting during 1933–34.  In contrast 
to Nazi claims and promises, the German economy was portrayed as being in a parlous 
state as a result of Nazi rule, ‘its concerns greater and more pressing than they ever 
were under the “Systemparteien’’’, deliberately choosing a word that the Nazis 
consistently used to disparage the Weimar era.1126  The picture painted during the 
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summer of 1933 was a gloomy one, of falling wages, shrinking credit and dwindling 
foreign trade.  Inflation was on the rise and the financial situation was deemed to be 
‘terrible’, with the German export industry and merchant trading irreparably 
destroyed.1127  Even the drop in the unemployment rate, it was claimed, was a 
falsification; despite Hitler’s promise to tackle joblessness, Germany had just as many 
unemployed as in 1932, if not more.  This ‘calamitous’ economic situation remained a 
constant theme into 1934, as, in the view of the Reichspost, general dissatisfaction grew, 
economic misery persisted and Hitler’s promises remained unfulfilled. 
 This dissatisfaction, it was suggested, was not limited to the Germans 
themselves.  Those ‘misguided’ Austrians who had fled to Nazi Germany were also 
discovering that the Nazis were offering nothing but empty promises.  In July 1933, the 
Reichspost reported how SA fugitives from Vienna, initially well-received in Germany, 
were reduced to begging in Munich and now wished to be able to come home.1128  The 
seductive promises made by the National Socialists to encourage Austrians to flee to 
Germany ended in disappointment; on arrival it quickly became clear from the 
unfriendliness with which they were received that the émigrés were nothing more than 
pawns in a political game.1129  Those who managed to avoid a stay in a ‘Zwangslager’, 
found no support in their mostly futile search for work and even if an Austrian émigré 
were lucky enough to find employment, the monthly salary was barely enough for him 
to live on, let alone his family.  According to the Reichspost, the disillusionment within 
the ranks of the Austrian Legion was even worse.  A series of reports printed attested 
to the fact that many who had fled to Germany to join the Austrian Legion were now 
bitterly disappointed.1130  Those expelled from the Austrian army for Nazi activities and 
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seduced by Nazi promises found themselves treated as second-class soldiers, mocked 
by the Germans as ‘Kamerad Schnürschuh’.  While the leaders had an easy time of it – 
living off the backs of the others – most of the legionnaires were treated as foreigners, 
and, the paper suggested, living a miserable existence; the atmosphere in the camps 
fluctuated between the deepest depression and utter despair.  Indeed the situation was 
so bad that the camps, the paper alleged, were being moved away from the 
Austro-German border to make escape impossible, while in the SS barracks in Dachau, 
the guards had been ordered to shoot any legionnaires trying to flee. 
 In an attempt to sully the National Socialists’ image in the eyes of the Austrian 
electorate, the situation in Germany was painted the blackest of black.  Nazi ‘successes’ 
were downplayed, the parliamentary elections of November 1933 and the referendum 
on Hitler’s decision to pull Germany out of the League of Nations, for example, were 
condemned as being obviously neither free nor fair. 1131   The Germans were 
‘systematically misled’ about conditions in Austria and, it was claimed, the agitation 
against Austria was ‘not popular’ in Germany. 1132  German cultural policy was deemed 
‘a scene of devastation’ much like its foreign and economic policy.1133  Hitler is a fanatic, 
a great agitator, maybe even the prophet of the “Myth of the Twentieth Century”, but 
as one Reich German writing for the Reichspost pronounced, ‘certainly not a statesman’.  
Amongst National Socialism’s other ‘successes’, the Reichspost counted: the devastating 
schism within the ‘German nation’; an economic boycott against Austria that had 
‘astonished the rest of the world’; and the catastrophic deterioration of the situation 
of the ethnic German minorities throughout Europe.1134  Thus, its ‘disastrous activities’ 
were ‘not limited to the Reich’: unfortunately, it was those Germans most imperilled 
who were paying the price of the Nazi tragedy.1135  National Socialism represented a 
‘mortal threat’ not just to the German Reich, but also to the German people as a 
whole. 
                                            
1131 'Eine Demonstration des 'Dritten Reiches'', Reichspost, 11 Nov. 1933, 1–2; 'Vor der Abstimmung in 
Deutschland', Reichspost, 12 Nov. 1933, 8; 'Ein Abstimmungssieg, der zu groß ist', Reichspost, 13 
Nov.1933, 1. 
1132 'Beobachtungen und Erlebnisse im "Dritten Reich"', Reichspost, 21 Jul.1933, 7. 
1133 'Bilanz an Hitlers Geburtstag', Reichspost, 25 Apr. 1934, 2. 
1134 Indeed, as far afield as Argentina.  See, for instance: 'Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen im 
Ausland', Die Reichspost, 25 Mar. 1934, 4; 'Pflichten der Stunde', Reichspost, 26 Jun. 1933, 1. 
1135 'Saar–Deutschland', Reichspost, 23 May 1934, 1–2. 
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 Increasing support for National Socialism amongst ethnic German minorities in 
other countries was viewed in Austria with palpable unease.  Again, the Austrian 
government attempted to increase the international pressure on Germany by 
highlighting the parallels between Nazi interference in Austrian affairs and Nazi 
agitation in countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, which was not looked on 
favourably abroad.  While not denying the injustices perpetrated by the Paris Peace 
Treaties, the Austrians condemned the radicalization of politics that had occurred in 
these areas because of the Nazi advance.  Nowhere, they argued, was the destructive 
impact [Zerstörungsarbeit] of National Socialism on Germandom more evident than it 
was upon ethnic German minorities ‘abroad’ who, ultimately, bore the brunt of 
anti-German hostility.1136  Here the Reichspost thought, Nazi propaganda had been 
‘geradezu verhängnisvoll’.  Traditionally, Auslandsdeutschtum had been a united force: 
Sie waren und blieben also in erster Linie deutsch…zugleich aber loyal gegenüber den Völkern 
und Regierungen, deren Gastrecht sie genossen. …Das ist seit der Machtergreifung durch die 
NSDAP im Reich anders geworden.  Kaum war dieser Akt vollzogen als allenthalben sich braune 
Sendlinge breitmachten, die NSDAP-Zellen aufzogen und eine rege Agententätigkeit entfalteten. 
...Die Deutschen – bisher gern gesehen – wurden durch die hetzerische, das Nationale allzusehr 
übertreibende Agitation dieser landfremden Politiker, die samt und sonders nichts zu verlieren 
hatten, in schwere[n] Konflikt mit dem Gastvolke und mit den betreffenden Regierungen 
gebracht.1137 
Thus, rather than aiding ‘beleaguered’ minorities ‘already struggling for their existence’, 
National Socialism had done ‘terrible damage’ to their cause.1138  Minorities that were 
once relatively cohesive had splintered into traditionalist and radical factions, further 
weakening their positions.1139  Nazi party politics in these areas was discrediting the 
Germans.  Hitler’s ‘totalitarian psychosis’ [Totalitätswahn] and imperialist Volkstumpolitik 
coupled with the equalization of German and Nazi made neighbouring states with 
German minorities nervous.1140  Indeed, the mere fact of the Nazi regime in Germany, 
                                            
1136 See, for instance: 'Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen im Ausland', Die Reichspost, 25 Mar. 1934, 4. 
1137 'Abkehr des Auslandsdeutschtum vom Nationalsozialismus', Reichspost, 13 Mar. 1934, 3. 
1138 'Bedrohtes Auslandsdeutschtum', Reichspost, 13 Oct. 1933, 1–2. 
1139 See: 'Abkehr des Auslandsdeutschtum vom Nationalsozialismus', Reichspost, 13 Mar. 1934, 3.  For 
further details see: Tammo Luther, Volkstumspolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1933–1938. Die 
Auslanddeutschen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Traditionalisten und Nationalsozialisten, (Stuttgart, 2004). 
1140 'Preussengeist ist Deutschlands Ruin', Sturm über Österreich, 29 Oct.1933, 4. 
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or the slightest ‘suspicion of irredentism’ was often enough to unleash distrust in those 
states.1141  The result was the increased repression of the German minorities.  In 
interwar Poland, for example, where:  
Die Gleichsetzung von ‘deutsch’ und ‘nationalsozialistisch’ bot der polnischen Presse ein 
wirksames Mittel, stärker als bisher Ängste in der polnischen Bevölkerung zu schüren und 
antideutsche Ressentiments zu erzeugen.  Zudem lieferte sie den polnischen Behörden eine 
zusätzliche Begründung für ihre gegen das gesamte Deutschtum gerichtete 
‘Entdeutschungspolitik’.1142 
Similarly, Sturm über Österreich, accurately predicted what was going to happen to the 
Sudeten Germans – that Nazi agitation would give the Czechs a ‘welcome opportunity 
to not only reduce Sudeten Germans rights, but to eliminate them completely’.1143 
 Germany’s pariah status amongst the states of Europe, caused by Nazi misrule 
– in the propagation of which Austria played a central role – was also a common 
theme in conservative newspapers during 1933 and 1934.  As far as foreign policy was 
concerned – or so the argument went – victory for the National Socialists had 
obliterated everything that had been achieved under Weimar since 1918: ‘Mit einem 
Tritt des Preußenstiefels wurden die feinen internationalen Fäden zerrissen, die im 
Laufe des letzten Jahrzehntes von Stresemann und seinen Nachfolgern gesponnen 
worden waren’.1144  In four weeks, Dollfuß contended, Germany had destroyed more 
than it had built in 12 years.1145  England was alienated, relations with Italy were chilly 
and the French were engaged in military manoeuvres.1146  Once again, Germany was 
isolated and encircled.1147  Even the worst fears about Nazi rule had been exceeded.  
The Hitler government had realized what no on had thought possible: ‘es ist ihr 
gelungen, binnen wenigen Wochen das Ergebnis einer jahrelangen Aufbauarbeit zu 
vernichten. Wie ein Elefant im Porzellanladen haben die deutschen “Diplomaten” des 
                                            
1141 'Bedrohtes Auslandsdeutschtum', Reichspost, 13 Oct. 1933, 1–2. 
1142 Tammo Luther, Volkstumspolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1933–1938. Die Auslanddeutschen im 
Spannungsfeld zwischen Traditionalisten und Nationalsozialisten, 80. 
1143 'Preussengeist ist Deutschlands Ruin', Sturm über Österreich, 29 Oct.1933, 4. 
1144 'Das Fiasko der deutschen Außenpolitik', Sturm über Österreich, 21 May 1933, 2. 
1145 See: Dollfuß to the Christian Social Party Executive, 3 May 1933: Walter Goldinger, ed., Protokolle. 
1146 'Nicht Isolierung, sondern Verständigung!', Reichspost, 21 Apr. 1933, 1–2. 
1147 See: Ibid; Heinrich Mataja, 'Oesterreichs deutsche Aufgaben', Reichspost, 6 May 1933, 1–2. 
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Hitlerregimes gehaust’. 1148   The impact of Nazi rule, the Austrian government 
contended, was devastating.  Never, it was posited by the Reichspost, had the German 
people been so badly ruled: the politics of these ‘charlatans’ in the Third Reich was the 
worst ever pursued by the German Reich.1149 
 
Figure 9: National Socialism (Die zweite Gefahr) 
As a result, the German people – and not just those in the Reich – were once again 
experiencing the immense mistrust of the majority of the outside world and not only 
that, the Reichspost pointed out, what the Nazis were actually doing was falsifying the 
historical record.1150  Stresemann, Rathenau and Brüning also fought against the Treaty 
                                            
1148 'Das Fiasko der deutschen Außenpolitik', Sturm über Österreich, 21 May 1933, 2. 
1149 'Saar–Deutschland', Reichspost, 23 May 1934, 1–2; 'Bilanz an Hitlers Geburtstag', Reichspost, 25 Apr. 
1934, 2; 'Deutsch Ehr' ist mein Ehr'', Reichspost, 24 Jun. 1934, 1–2. 
1150 See: 'Nicht Isolierung, sondern Verständigung!', Reichspost, 21 Apr. 1933, 1–2; Heinrich Mataja, 
'Oesterreichs deutsche Aufgaben', Reichspost, 6 May 1933, 1–2. 
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of Versailles, and in the process helped the Germans win back much of the sympathy 
that was lost during the war, ‘Erfolge, die heute nur allzu leicht vergessen werden.’1151  
Both the Reichspost and Sturm über Österreich sought to remind people that there were 
honest Germans during Weimar: Germans who were now being maligned by the 
Nazis; Germans who had achieved notable successes for Germany.  It was not a Nazi, 
readers were reminded, but a Zentrum politician, Brüning, who first declared, ‘wir 
zahlen keine Reparationen mehr’. 1152   These politicians had worked steadily and 
successfully towards diminishing mistrust of Germany abroad, so much so that 
successes on the issue of disarmament were within reach and even in France more and 
more could be heard advocating reconciliation and the peaceful revision of the Treaty 
of Versailles.1153  These same Nazis were now destroying everything that Stresemann 
and Brüning had achieved through their misrule: ‘Heute ist ein guter Teil davon 
abermals vertan, aber an den Verträgen hat sich nichts geändert und die Isolierung 
Deutschlands ist so groß, daß sogar der Pakt mit Polen schon als Erfolg empfunden 
wird’.1154  Thus, the Dollfuß government was not simply claiming that the Austrians 
were the better Germans, but that there were good Reich Germans who had fought 
sincerely for the rights of the German people and that the Austrians were the only 
version left after the Nazis destroyed what had actually worked during the Weimar 
Republic. 
 The situation Germany found herself in was constantly juxtaposed against 
Austria’s more favourable international position.  Austria, under attack from her 
alleged brothers in the Reich, had ‘many friends abroad, important friends’ supporting 
her in her struggle for economic and political independence; Britain, it was declared, 
was wholly on Austria’s side.1155  Germany, on the other hand, had none.  Certain that 
                                            
1151 'Ein Jahr', Reichspost, 30 Jan.1934, 1–2. 
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1153 Ibid. 
1154 'Ein Jahr', Reichspost, 30 Jan.1934, 1–2. 
1155 Dollfuß on his return from the Economic Conference in London, Aspern, 17 Jun. 1933: ‘Ich habe 
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foreign opinion was key to keeping Austria out of Nazi clutches, the Dollfuß 
government went to great lengths to ensure that the ‘world’s loathing’ remained firmly 
focused on Germany.1156  No opportunity was missed to tell the world about how the 
Hitler government was behaving towards Austria and the danger that this posed to 
European peace, seriously undermining the regime’s attempts to communicate a 
‘peaceful image’ abroad.1157  In threatening her much smaller neighbour, Germany, 
Dollfuß argued, was playing ‘a dangerous game’, particularly as Austria’s importance 
was recognized and understood on all sides.1158  Germany’s behaviour during 1933 had 
not only alarmed France, the Reichspost asserted, it had also led to Belgium, Denmark 
and even Switzerland calling for increased border protection.1159  With this strategy the 
Austrians enjoyed some relative success abroad, at least in the eyes of the German 
Foreign Office: ‘the struggle with Austria, which has already lasted so much longer than 
we had expected, is extremely costly to us’, Bülow wrote in August 1933, ‘we are 
losing the sympathies of all the smaller countries…We are antagonizing the larger 
powers.’1160. 
 Cognizant of the fact that the problem posed by National Socialism could only 
be solved from abroad, both Dollfuß and Schuschnigg were unceasing in their efforts to 
keep the eyes of western governments on the situation in Austria, and where possible, 
use them to keep Germany in check.  The initial hope was that Hitler could be 
‘encouraged’ by the likes of Mussolini to refrain from reckless dilettantism in foreign 
policy and instead act according to the traditional rules of international diplomacy; it 
was, Dollfuß told the Christian Social Party Executive, Mussolini’s intention to bring 
                                                                                                                                
Minister Simon before the House of Commons: '"Die ganze Sympathie Großbritanniens gehört 
Oesterreich"', Reichspost, 7 Jul. 1933, 3; Also, ‘Unser Bundeskanzler hat also in seinem Kampf gegen den 
Ansturm des reichsdeutschen Nationalsozialismus die gesamten Westmächte für sich.’; 'Innerpolitischer 
Situationsbericht', Vaterländische Front, Feb. 1934, 10. 
1156 Dollfuß to the Christian Social Party Executive, 3 May 1933: Walter Goldinger, ed., Protokolle, 249. 
1157 There were signals that Berlin was, at this early juncture at least, conscious of the opinions of the 
outside world and keen to at least appear not to be the aggressor, Wilhelm Engerth, Consul General in 
Munich reporting that the wording of an inflammatory radio address by Hans Frank was modified by 
Berlin, and it was the censured version that appeared in the foreign press.  (ÖstA), (AdR), (AA), (ÖVB 1 
Rep.), Berlin Gesandtschaft, Karton 16, Generalkonsul München (GK/M) to the Bundeskanzleramt 
(BKA), 22 March 1933, ‘Die Entwicklung der Dinge in Bayern’; Ronald Smelser, The Sudeten Problem, 10. 
1158 Dollfuß in Vienna on 18 Jan 1934, Anton Tautscher, ed., So Sprach der Kanzler, 101. 
1159 See: 'Ein weltpolitisches Krisenjahr', Reichspost, 30 Dec.1933, 1–2. 
1160 State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath, August 1, 1933. No. 385; DGFP C/1, 708–12 
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the German Nazis to their senses as far as foreign policy was concerned.1161  Mussolini 
was, according to Dollfuß, willing to apply pressure on Austria’s behalf in Berlin.1162  
However, the Austrians were adamant that Italy not go it alone, regarding it as 
essential, ‘if the Germans were to be brought to reason’, that simultaneous action 
should be taken by the ‘Three Powers’ – Britain, France and Italy – in Berlin.  The fear 
was that Italy might be tempted to sacrifice Austria if left to her own devices – Dollfuß 
had no such qualms about Britain approaching Berlin alone, enquiring on at least one 
occasion whether the British government ‘could not urge German government to be 
more reasonable in their attitude and policy towards Austria’.1163  However, the 
government were not asking for a discreet warning to Berlin.  Rather, they hoped to 
rouse German public opinion against the Nazis through: 
an explicit communication which would become known throughout Germany to the effect that in 
the view of His Majesty’s government the present attitude of Nazi Germany towards Austria 
involved the risk of the most serious complications and that in the interest of the preservation of 
peace in Central Europe Germany must change her attitude.1164 
However, although the British ‘unchained the press’ in the hope that their 
denunciations…choke Herr Hitler off somewhat’, they were reluctant to countenance 
a direct intervention on the grounds that Italy was the only power with sufficient 
influence to take the initiative.1165 
 Austria had to tread very carefully when asking for help against Nazi Germany 
from abroad.  While British support could be construed as an asset to the Austrian 
government, open French or Czech approval of Dollfuß’s course played into Nazi 
                                            
1161 Dollfuß to the Christian Social Party Executive, 20 April 1933, Walter Goldinger, ed., 
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1164 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16641, paper C5257/2092/3, Sir W. Selby, Austro-German relations. 
Record of a conversation with Dr. Schuller, 12 Jun. 1933. 
1165 Foreign Office note; (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16641, paper C5368/2092/3, Sir H Rumbold, Austro-
German relations. Message for Sir R. Vansittart, 14 Jun. 1933. 
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hands.1166  The prevalence of anti-Czech sentiment in interwar Austria for example, the 
legacy of the secession of the three million Austrian-Germans that lived in Bohemia 
and Moravia to Czechoslovakia in 1918, ruled out the possibility of Austria appearing 
as an ally of Czechoslovakia, as this would have been a propaganda coup for the Nazis.  
In July 1933, Austrian complaints to Berlin about abusive radio propaganda broadcasts 
having been consistently ignored, the Austrian government requested that Britain, 
France and Italy make representations in Berlin on her behalf:  although the 
propaganda did not cease, it did, allegedly, have a moderating effect.1167  Yet the 
government had to exercise caution, as any appeal for foreign intervention would 
provide grist to the Nazi propaganda mill.  Robert Hadow at the British legation in 
Austria noted the ‘anxious attempts of the government to make clear to the electorate 
its contention that the steps recently taken in Berlin by the three Great Powers were 
not taken at their request’.1168  In short, what Austria needed was its friends abroad to 
intervene in Berlin without any apparent request from Austria to do so. 
 The hope in the summer of 1933 was that Germany would take the allied hint 
and could ‘be made to realize by world opinion and, if necessary, by League action in 
defence of article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles – taken spontaneously and not at the 
request of Austria – that the council of the League [was] firmly determined to hold her 
to the letter and spirit of that article’, thereby easing the pressure on the Austrian 
government. 1169  Yet Dollfuß could not easily turn to the League for assistance ‘if he 
did so it would be represented that he had called in a foreigner against his fellow 
Germans’.1170  Indeed, in simply applying to the French and British for help, Dollfuß was, 
                                            
1166 See: Rumbold (Berlin) recorded one German newspaper’s observation that ‘It notes that the whole 
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one Nazi German newspaper accused, ‘indirectly recognising the peace treaties of 
1919’ and committing ‘treachery to the united Germanic cause’.1171  Thus, it was 
deemed critical that ‘the Austrian Chancellor should not be obliged himself to appeal 
to the Powers to maintain against Germany a provision of a treaty that stinks no less in 
Austrian than in German nostrils’. 1172   The Socialists, pressing ‘once more for 
neutralisation of Austria under the aegis of the League of Nations’ laboured under the 
same problem, and were, therefore, ‘careful not to specify at whose request this step 
[was] to be taken, for it [was] generally agreed in Austria that any party which 
appealed to the League against Germany would reawaken the pan-German feeling of 
Austrians as a whole’.1173  The British Minister in Vienna agreed: ‘My personal opinion 
is that the Austrian government should refrain as long as possible from invoking 
foreign aid against Germany.  Such action on their part would provide a formidable 
weapon to Austrian National Socialists whose power is still said to be growing’1174. 
 The reality was, ‘any Austrian government turning to the League of Nations for 
help against Germany would do so only as a last, desperate resort’.1175  Dollfuß had 
been encouraged by foreign observers to appeal to the League or to the Great Powers 
about German pressure on Austria throughout 1933, but had been, according to Selby, 
extremely reluctant to take this step in the knowledge that ‘unless active or early 
action ensued his own position would be merely weakened by such an appeal’.1176  As 
Selby noted, ‘Pan-German elements in Austria would make good use of the 
Chancellor’s “dependence upon the butchers of Versailles for armed help against his 
own people”’.1177  Instead the Dollfuß government attempted to put a positive spin on 
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the fact that they had not taken steps internationally against Germany in defence of 
‘Austrian honour and independence’, claiming that it was their ‘German sentiment that 
had prevented them from doing so’. 1178  However, by January 1934 the Dollfuß 
government was clearly desperate enough to take the risk and they put together a 
dossier proving Reich German involvement in acts of terrorism on Austrian soil.1179  
The Austrian government officially informed the Reich government that it was in 
possession of direct proof that the escalation of Nazi agitation in Austria was directly 
due to orders received from Berlin and threatened to take it to the League if they did 
not receive a satisfactory answer.  The German reply being considered unsatisfactory, 
the dossier was put to the British, French and Italian governments who were given the 
opportunity to voice their opinions before the issue was brought before the League of 
Nations.1180  Italian disinclination to take the matter to the League meant it never got 
that far. 
 Thus the fundamental problem of all Austrian politicians becomes clear.  The 
Austrians were similarly resentful toward the Treaty of Saint Germain as the Germans 
were towards the Treaty of Versailles and this affected, both directly and indirectly, 
the choices available to the Dollfuß government.  A foreign policy course bound too 
closely to France and Czechoslovakia would leave the government open to the Nazi 
accusation that it was collaborating with the very powers which had inflicted on 
Austria the humiliating fait accompli of 1919.  Equally, the military terms of the Treaty 
made defending Austria against Nazi Germany difficult.  For example, in order to raise 
an auxiliary force of 8,000 men in the summer of 1933 for the purpose of combatting 
the Nazis’ terrorist activities, the Austrian government needed to gain permission 
from the signatory powers of the Treaty.  The problem was, allowing Austria this 
concession set a ‘bad precedent for similar German [or Hungarian] violations of the 
Treaty’.1181  Austria stopped playing by the book and openly abrogated the Treaty in 
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April 1936, introducing general national service a few weeks after Hitler grossly 
violated the Treaty of Versailles by invading the Rhineland. 1182  It is not just a 
convenient excuse to say that the Treaty of Saint Germain was at the root of all these 
problems and that, in part, the limited ability of Austria to resist the Nazis originated in 
the weakened economic state and in the considerable psychological repercussions that 
Saint Germain had caused. 
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Österreichs deutsche Sendung  
With the main body of the German people ‘gagged and enslaved’ by the National 
Socialists, Austria’s role, as the only other homogenous German state, appeared clear 
to proponents of the Dollfuß government.  There was ‘no doubt as to the necessity of 
a counterweight of German reason against Nazi madness’, or, as Dollfuß put it, ‘Es soll 
noch ein Gebiet geben, wo die Welt glaubt, daß die Deutschen noch nicht verrückt 
geworden sind’.1183  Germans and Germandom were being discredited in the eyes of 
the world because of the behaviour of the Nazi regime.  Nowhere was this more 
apparent than with the murderous purge that took place in Germany between 30 June 
and 2 July 1934.  Of course, the Austrian public, the Reichspost noted, was already 
more than adequately informed about the ‘numerous heinous atrocities and murders’ 
committed by the SA against its opponents – often ‘defenceless prisoners’ – as well as 
the ‘abuses’ that stood behind such euphemisms as ‘shot while trying to escape’ and 
‘committed suicide in the cell’.1184  Nonetheless, with the summary execution of SA 
leaders and political opponents, the Nazis’ mask had slipped once and for all; this was 
decisive proof that the National Socialist system of government opposed the moral 
norms adhered to by the rest of the world.1185  Natural law, it was pointed out, 
originates from God, not Adolf Hitler.  Where else in the civilized world, the 
Reichspost asked, would the head of government personally pull a minister from his bed 
in the middle of the night and, on his refusal to commit suicide, without hesitation, 
order that he be gunned down?1186  According to Time magazine, Dollfuß was the only 
head of state to comment on the purge.1187  He was certainly remarkably outspoken: 
Erfreulich klingt all das nicht, was jetzt aus dem Dritten Reich herüberklingt.  Aber eigentlich 
wundert es uns nicht. Wir haben es erlebt. …Geht nun nicht endlich auch draußen ein Licht auf, 
daß man mit Gewaltmethoden ein Volk nicht glücklich machen kann? Geht nicht ein Licht auf, 
                                            
1183 'Saar–Deutschland', Reichspost, 23 May 1934, 1–2; Dollfuß to the Christian Social Party Executive, 
3 May 1933: Walter Goldinger, ed., Protokolle, 249. 
1184 'Ein Angriff gegen den Rechtsstaat', Reichspost, 3 Jul. 1934, 1–2. 
1185 Ibid. 
1186 Ibid. 
1187 See: W. Ormsby-Gore, 'The Forteenth Assembly of the League of Nations', International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939), 13 (1934). 
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daß, wenn man den Weg der Gerechtigkeit verläßt, man auf einen Irrweg kommt, von dem aus es 
keinen Rückweg gibt?1188 
 
Figure 10: 'Das wahre Gesicht', Vaterländische Wandzeitung Nr. 11 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv und Grafiksammlung) 
 The periodical Der Christliche Ständestaat, undoubtedly one of the Austrian 
publications most virulently opposed to National Socialism – indeed, anti-Nazism was 
its raison d'être – was at pains to emphasize that ‘the horrifying spiritual core of 
National Socialism was not only represented by Röhm and his hapless and perverse 
cronies’, but by the actual Nazi leadership.1189  The ‘Antichrist had raised its head’: 
‘what Germany and Europe need’, the author argued ‘is not a reform of National 
Socialism, but its complete elimination’.1190  Indeed, the periodical itself is interesting.  
                                            
1188 'Der Kanzler spricht über die Ereignisse im Reiche', Wiener Zeitung, 2 Jul. 1934, 2. 
1189 The author was Dietrich von Hildebrand himself.  'Die Letzte Maske Fällt!', Christliche Ständestaat, 8 
Jul. 1934, 3. 
1190 Ibid. 
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Its founder and driving force was Dietrich von Hildebrand who had fled Germany in 
the wake of the Nazi takeover of power.  Seeing Dollfuß as the best hope for 
combating National Socialism, Hildebrand went to Vienna where he won Dollfuß over 
to the idea of establishing an intellectual anti-Nazi periodical to aid in the formation of 
a ‘German Front against Hitler’.1191  Dollfuß also facilitated a professorship at the 
University of Vienna for Hildebrand against the opposition of ‘National Catholic’ 
intellectuals and financed the founding of the periodical.1192  Therefore, we can safely 
assume that Dollfuß was in agreement with the editorial line that the journal took, in 
much the same way that we can assume that Schuschnigg, as leader of the Ostmärkische 
Sturmscharen, was in agreement with the aggressively anti-Nazi line taken by Sturm über 
Österreich, the weekly journal of that movement.1193 
 With the Nazi takeover of power in Germany, Austrian independence gained 
new significance.  Austria, it was argued had a dual role to play both within 
Germandom and within Europe as a whole, again a line of argument that was a legacy 
of the Habsburg era.  Not only was Austria crucial to preserving the balance of power 
in Europe, a fact that the Dollfuß government sought to emphasize whenever possible, 
she was – unlike Nazi Germany – a force for peace.  Not only was peace in Europe 
served by Austrian independence, Austria represented no threat to her neighbours, 
rather she repeatedly declared herself committed to friendship and peaceful 
co-operation with other peoples and states.1194  Centuries of living together with other 
nations had made Austria, it was argued, ‘more mellow, more patient and more 
understanding of foreign cultures’, a claim that would both play well at home – again 
emphasizing the difference between the Austrians and the North Germans – as well as 
being an oblique reminder of the racial and expansionist threat posed by the Nazis, 
                                            
1191 Edmund Glaise von Horstenau and Peter Broucek, Ein General im Zwielicht: die Erinnerungen Edmund 
Glaises von Horstenau, (Vienna, 1980), 56 fn 10. 
1192 The most famous of the ‘National Catholics’ who tried to ‘reconcile Catholicism and an 
autonomous Austrian identity with Nazism’ was Arthur Seyß-Inquart.  See: Stanley G. Payne, A History of 
Fascism, 1914-1945, 251–52.  See also: Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat, 'Martin von Hildebrand', in  Gabriel 
García Márquez in Wien und andere Kulturgeschichten aus Lateinamerika (Vienna, 2010), 161. 
1193 The Ostmärkische Sturmscharen was a political paramilitary group formed in 1930 in opposition to 
the Heimwehr.  They recruited from the ranks of the Katholische Jugend. 
1194 ‘Wir glauben, mit Aufrechterhaltung der Unabhängigkeit und mit unserem Streben nach 
wirtschaftlicher Erstarkung weit über unsere Grenzen dem Zusammenleben und dem Frieden in Europa 
dienen zu können’. Dollfuß in a speech held in Vienna, 7 Dec. 1933, Anton Tautscher, ed., So Sprach der 
Kanzler, 90–91, 97–98. 
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aimed at foreign audiences fearful of a resurgent Germany and the spectre of yet 
another war.1195 
 If Austria’s immediate and most important task was to remain independent of 
Nazi Germany, its wider ‘mission’, in the view of the Dollfuß government, was to 
provide Germandom with a spiritual counter-pole to National Socialism – in the same 
way that the Habsburg Empire had provided a counter-pole to the German Reich.  
Austria, Dollfuß maintained, was conscious of this responsibility, towards the millions 
of Germans that lived as national minorities in other states and to Germandom as a 
whole.1196  Austria, the ‘second’ German state since 1871 – or even the ‘true’ German 
state since time immemorial – with a ‘thousand-year long tradition’ of acting and 
fighting ‘unceasingly for the protection of the whole of Germandom’ was faced with a 
‘conspicuously German task’.1197 
Wir müssen denken an das Wort Kaiser Franz Josephs “Ich bin ein Deutscher Fürst”, wir müssen 
blicken auf das Denkmal des Erzherzogs Karl am Heldenplatz, auf dem die herrlichen Worte 
stehen “dem beharrlichen Kämpfer für Deutschlands Ehre”.  Solche beharrliche Kämpfer für 
Deutschlands Ehre müssen auch wir sein.1198 
The Nazis would distort these same words just a few years later.  The ‘struggle against 
Gleichschaltung’ was conceived as a struggle for, and on behalf of, the whole of 
Germandom for a spiritual and historical tradition, which the National Socialists were 
attempting to destroy.1199  It was not just Austria that was at stake.  Indeed, this was 
why Austria’s sovereignty, it was argued, was so important, and why Austria would 
‘defend itself against every attempt at Gleichschaltung with all [its] might’.1200  It was a 
blessing for Austria and the whole of Germandom, Heinrich Mataja argued, that 
Austria had remained a sovereign and independent state.  ‘If the Anschluss had been 
carried out earlier, Austria would now be in the same position as Bavaria’, that is 
                                            
1195 Dollfuß in a radio broadcast in New York, 21 May 1933, Edmund Weber, ed., Dollfuß an 
Österreich, 65–66. 
1196 See: Engelbert Dollfuß, 'Unser Weg in die neue Zeit ', Reichspost, 24 Dec. 1933, 1. 
1197 Carl Vaugoin, Ist Österreich Wert? 4. 
1198 'Deutsch Ehr' ist mein Ehr'', Reichspost, 24 Jun. 1934, 1–2. 
1199 See: Heinrich Mataja, 'Oesterreichs deutsche Aufgaben', Reichspost, 6 May 1933, 1–2 
1200 Ibid. 
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powerless to take a stand. 1201   Here is Starhemberg, leader of the Austrian 
Heimatschutz: 
Die Erhaltung eines unabhängigen Oesterreich ist nicht nur eine österreichische Eigenwilligkeit, 
sondern ist eine Notwendigkeit für das Gesamtdeutschtum. Es ist eine Pflicht im großdeutschem 
Sinne, wenigstens irgendwo ein Stück deutschen Volkstums von der Niederknüppelung durch das 
Neupreußentum zu bewahren.1202 
Instead, ‘Felix Austria’ remained free, ‘ein Gegengewicht deutscher Vernunft gegen 
nationalsozialistische Verblendung’ and living proof to both the wider world and 
Germandom at large that, contrary to Nazi propaganda, Nazi and German were by no 
means the same thing.1203  According to Hildebrand, writing in the first issue of Der 
Christliche Ständestaat, with the descent of the German Reich into barbarism Austria 
had become, the refuge of true Germandom, of German culture and traditions, of the 
German spirit.1204  Having been spared the trials of their brethren in the north, 
Austria’s task, in the eyes of the Christian Socials, was to prove to the world now and 
in the future that the whole German people could not be made responsible for the 
misdeeds committed by National Socialism in their name.  Austria, it was argued, was 
not only protecting its own citizens from Nazi barbarism, it was defending the 
reputation of Germandom as a Kulturnation in front of the rest of the world. 
 The ideological aim of Austria’s government, or at least its Christian Social core, 
was to provide a conscious rallying point of a non- and anti-National Socialist 
Germanism, and of an humane, ‘Catholic’ Europeanism.  Therefore, Austria’s struggle 
against Hitler’s Reich was not understood as a mere political struggle, but a 
Kulturkampf in a national, Christian and ‘Austrian’ sense.1205  It was construed as a 
spiritual battle – albeit extremely unequal – for German hearts and minds: 
Zwei Weltanschauungen prallen heute mit aller Wucht aufeinander: die 
nationalsozialistisch-heidnische Berliner und die christlich-deutschföderalistische Wiener Prägung.  
Erstere schöpft ihre intellektuellen Kräfte aus den Ereignisse nach 1866, überspringt die deutsche 
                                            
1201 'Deutsch Ehr' ist mein Ehr'', Reichspost, 24 Jun. 1934, 1–2. 
1202 'Weg und Ziel des österreichischen Heimatschutzes', Reichspost, 28 Feb. 1934, 2. 
1203 'Saar–Deutschland', Reichspost, 23 May 1934, 1–2. 
1204 See: Dietrich von Hildebrand, 'Oesterreichs Sendung', Der Christliche Ständestaat, 3 Dec. 1933, 3–5. 
1205 See: 'Klarheit!', Sturm über Österreich, 1 Oct. 1933, 4. 
Chapter 7:  Austria’s German Mission  296 
 
Geschichte bis zur Völkerwanderung und knüpft dann an eine irrationale germanische Mystik an, 
die sie so interpretiert, wie es den heutigen Machthabern im Dritten Reich in den Kram paßt.  
Letztere steht auf dem Standpunkt, daß das deutsche Volk älter ist als das Zweite und Dritte 
Reich, das in Wahrheit mehr ein Großpreußen als Reich ist.1206 
Austria’s Catholic heritage was a central tenet of this counter-weight.  The dividing line 
between ‘Austria’ and ‘National Socialism’ was not understood as the border between 
the two states; rather it was a religious and cultural frontier that ran through the 
middle of the German nation, an observation ‘confirmed’ by the fact that; ‘mittlerweile 
hat sich die Bestialität des Dritten Reiches gegen alles was irgendwie katholisch ist, gar 
herrlich offenbart.’1207  Thus, in a sense, the conflict with National Socialism was 
understood as an internal conflict.  As Mataja observed, it was ‘a conflict between 
German and German, a conflict within the German nation’ which had its roots in the 
Reformation. 1208   Such an argument was, however, not suitable for foreign 
consumption, not least because there it would be likely misunderstood.  With the 
Nazis trying to convince the international community that the Austro-German conflict 
was a domestic German affair that should be settled between them, it was important 
for Austria to internationalize the conflict, pitching it abroad as a quarrel between two 
sovereign states.  However, there was no real contradiction in their argument: if one 
remembers that for patriotic Austrians, ‘state’ and ‘nation’ were not considered to be 
mutually exclusive concepts, one can see how difficult it was for them to pitch an 
argument based on political frontiers. 
 In Austria, Dollfuß argued that being German meant being Christian.1209  The 
allusion was obvious: the heathen Nazis were nothing of the sort.  Thus, this was 
clearly anti-Nazi but it was also, inevitably, anti-Social Democratic because the Social 
Democrats had chosen to present themselves as an anti-Catholic, pro-Anschluss party, 
thereby excluding themselves on both counts.  With the burgeoning Kulturkampf in the 
Reich, the Gleichschaltung of the churches, the onslaught against Catholic organizations, 
                                            
1206 Cited from the ‘Deutsche Presse’, Prague in: 'Sudetendeutschtum – österreichisches Deutschtum', 
Reichspost, 11 Apr. 1934, 1. 
1207 'Die entfesselte Kulturkampfbestie', Sturm über Österreich, 2 Jul. 1933, 2; Heinrich Mataja, 'Der 
Kulturkampf im Deutschen Reiche', Reichspost, 7 Feb. 1934, 2. 
1208 'Deutsch Ehr' ist mein Ehr'', Reichspost, 24 Jun. 1934, 1–2. 
1209 See: Dollfuß, Feldkirch, 29 June 1934: Edmund Weber, ed., Dollfuß an Österreich, 92. 
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the arrest of priests and ministers – all this despite the concordat with the Vatican – 
the true anti-Christian face of National Socialism had been revealed: ‘Der nackte 
Bolschewismus ist es, der aus solchen Brutalitäten schreit, um kein Haar besser als 
jener der Kirchenstürmer von Moskau und Mexiko!’1210  As a Christian state, Austria, it 
was argued, had a duty to speak on behalf of her spiritual brothers in the Reich who 
had been robbed of their voice as a result of National Socialist oppression.  If they gag 
our brothers in one place, the Reichspost warned, we, as German Catholics, will be 
their voice.1211  Indeed, wherever our fellow Germans may live, ‘Wir wollen ihnen die 
Gewißheit geben, daß hier in Oesterreich das Gefühl echter Deutscher 
Volksgemeinschaft’ – the type that Germany had also experienced under Stresemann 
and Brüning – ‘nicht erloschen ist und nie erlöschen wird’.1212  The ultimate hope, was 
the spiritual unity of all German Catholics, ‘may they live in the German Reich, in 
Austria or within other borders, since the Germans in Poland and in the Balkans, the 
Banat Swabians and the south Tyroleans all belong to this spiritual entity’ in the face of 
Nazi Gleichschaltung and terror.1213 
 Reasoning that Austria needed a positive national purpose to counteract the 
draw of the Nazis, in the very earliest days of the conflict with Germany, 
Dollfuß argued that Austria should seek to become the centre of the 
Auslandsdeutschtum movement.1214  Although the Austrians could never hope to 
compete with the propaganda effort of the Third Reich, financially or otherwise, some 
attempts were made to provide what backing they could to German-Catholic 
minorities outside of the Reich’s borders, particularly in those areas that were once 
within the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy.  In her study of the Catholic weekly, 
Der Deutsche in Polen and its founder Eduard Pant, Nordblom reveals how one of the 
aims of the Austrian Heimatdienst was to provide spiritual backing for German 
                                            
1210 'Herunter die Maske! ', Sturm über Österreich, 14 May 1934, 2. 
1211 Heinrich Mataja, 'Oesterreich und die deutschen Katholiken', Reichspost, 11 May 1933, 1–2. 
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Catholics across the border.1215  As non-Reich Germans, free from the yoke of 
National Socialism, Austrians, it was argued, had an even greater responsibility to 
ensure that the Gleichschaltung of every mind and thought does not spread to other 
countries and destroy our Christian institutions, as is the case in Germany’.1216  This 
support involved aiding German-Catholic newspapers abroad to help keep them 
independent from Nazi Germany, and it was in this capacity that the Dollfuß 
government pledged to provide financial support for Pant’s newspaper.1217 
 ‘What would happen’, Mataja asked, ‘if the Czechs or the Poles applied 
National Socialist totalitarian principles against their German subjects?’1218  To love 
one’s own people, he countered, you do not have to hate and despise others.  On the 
contrary, a nation with as many minorities living under foreign rule as the Germans, 
should be tolerant regarding nationality.  That was why, he argued, ‘Austrian’ principles 
would better serve German minorities.1219  These ‘Austrian’ principles were rooted in 
the multinational experience of the Habsburg era, in the belief that national or ethnic 
identity could coexist with state loyalty.  It was in this capacity that the historian 
Hugo Hantsch, a Benedictine monk, anti-Nazi and supporter of the Ständestaat, was 
assigned by the government to work for the Germans abroad by countering the 
‘phrases of the Nazis’.1220  His objective was ‘to influence Germans abroad…in an 
Austrian sense…to win them over for the Austrian position of absolute affirmation of 
the state in which the German minorities lived’.1221  However, to interpret this as 
evidence of cultural imperialism, as a reflection of a post-Imperial ‘inferiority complex’ 
or indeed as evidence of some sort of missionary zeal would be to miss the point.  The 
emphasis on the supposedly culturally superior Austrian Germans with their ‘copious 
experience of tolerance towards the Monarchy’s non-German subjects’ was not simply 
                                            
1215 See” Pia Nordblom, Für Glaube und Volkstum: Die katholische Wochenzeitung "Der Deutsche in Polen" 
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about moral superiority over the Prussian-Nazis, it was also about holding a mirror up 
to the realities of Nazi rule in an attempt to sway opinions about which horse to back 
at home and abroad.1222  When understood against the backdrop of the Nazi – and the 
perceived ‘Bolshevik’ – threat to Europe, this was about protecting long fought for 
freedoms of religious expression, ensuring the rights of minorities, and attempting to 
maintain cultural and intellectual diversity within Germandom as a whole.  Nordblom 
is right to suspect that, in contrast to Nazi Germany, Austria did not exploit the 
German minorities for its own foreign policy aims.1223  This was because for Austria it 
had nothing to do with imposing conformity or extending Austrian power or influence; 
it was merely the attempt at the establishment of a German counter-movement against 
National Socialism and, as such, one strategy in the fight to maintain an independent 
existence and evade Nazi rule. 
                                            
1222 Description cited from a statement by Anton Staudinger at the symposium ‘50 Jahre Zweite 
Republik’ held by the Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft on 8 May 1995; 
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Figure 11: ‘Zur Rettung Österreichs’ 
(Die zweite Gefahr) 
 This attempt ultimately failed.  However, it did not fail simply because Dollfuß 
had destroyed democracy, nor because of so-called Deutschtümelei, but because of the 
overriding fact that the Austrian state, weakened as it was, was not strong enough to 
withstand the extreme pressure from Nazi Germany indefinitely without real support 
from abroad.  This was obvious to contemporaries: as early as 1934 it was clear to 
Selby that ‘so long as it [National Socialism] sweeps through Germany, the Nazi 
conflagration cannot be altogether extinguished in Austria, although it may be kept 
under by international co-operation’.1224  Or, as he had noted earlier: ‘taking the 
gloomy view, he [Dollfuß] must ultimately go overboard...it stands to reason that 
Austria cannot alone stand up to Germany’1225.  Neither did the Austrian state fail 
                                            
1224 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/18366, paper R1526/1526/3, Sir W. Selby, Annual Report on Austria for 
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because the Dollfuß government and the Ständestaat, in leaning heavily on Catholicism 
and the Habsburg past, did not offer an inclusive identity that would also appeal to the 
Social Democrats.  In reality the problem was not the nature of the identity on offer 
but the fact that the strength of German nationalism and Anschluss sentiment within 
Social democratic circles as well as the abject rejection of Austrian particularism made 
any attempt to win them over to genuine support of Austrian independence futile.  
The strategy of the Dollfuß government was also more than apparent: ‘to group 
together all Austrians who favoured the continued independence of their country’ and 
‘to hold on’ until the disaster in Germany ‘is apparent, and to wait until the Nazi wave 
recedes’.1226 
                                            
1226  (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16628, paper C4462/8/3, Sir E. Phipps, Situation in Austria 16 May 1933; 
(TNA): (PRO), FO 371/16628, paper C4040/8/3, Sir E. Phipps, Situation in Austria (Telegram), 2 May 
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Chapter 8 
The Fog of Nazism 
History has largely adopted the Nazis’ version of the Anschluss: the years of waiting, 
the cheering crowds, the ‘homecoming’.1227  In the battle for the ‘German’ narrative 
that had raged between the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg governments and the Nazis since 
1932, the Nazis had finally triumphed.  The yearning for national unity was supposedly 
inevitable for two states that shared the same language, culture and history, the Nazis 
claimed as German troops invaded Austria in March 1938.  Anschluss, according to the 
Nazi narrative, was the natural culmination of years of pro-Anschluss sentiment, 
simmering under the surface of the First Republic, ‘the state that no one wanted’.1228  It 
was a historical deception that had begun years earlier, initiated on the very first page 
of Mein Kampf, where Hitler had declared his intentions for Austria: ‘German-Austria 
must return to the great German mother country’.1229  By March 1938, a similar slogan, 
‘Gleiches Blut gehört in ein gemeinsames Reich’ – repeated ad nauseum – had already 
worked its magic abroad; no one – Mexico and the Soviet Union excepted – was 
willing to contest the ‘inevitable’.1230  Austrian statehood, the Nazis claimed, was an 
historical aberration and union between the two German states a thoroughly natural 
development.  This was unification, they maintained, not annexation. 
 To this end, ‘German’ and ‘Austrian’ history were appropriated and 
misinterpreted to fit a specifically Nazi narrative linking a united Germanic past with a 
common future.  According to this Nazi narrative, the roots of ‘German’ unity were to 
be found in the ‘unity’ of the Holy Roman Empire.  To get this message across, and 
aware of their potent symbolism, Hitler ordered that the Imperial Regalia of the Holy 
                                            
1227 For an analysis of publications dealing with the ‘Anschluss Question’ since 1945 see: P. 
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Roman Empire be removed from the Treasury in Vienna and ‘returned’ to Nuremberg, 
the city of the party rallies.  The now nazified Reichspost described how: 
Nach einer jahrhundertelangen Zerklüftung, die auf die Religionskriege des 17.und die 
dynastischen Machtkämpfe des 18. Jahrhunderts zurückgeht, und die durch die tückischen 
Friedensverträge von 1919 für alle Zeiten besiegelt werden sollte, ist dank dem Genie und der 
Willenskraft Adolf Hitlers die Stunde der volksdeutschen Einheit angebrochen1231 
According to the Nazi narrative, the German nation’s path to unity had been tragically 
derailed, first in 1848, then in 1866, and again in 1918.1232  When on 15 March 1938 
Seyß-Inquart proclaimed that ‘Das Reich ist wieder entstanden’, he was deliberately 
linking the annexation with the Holy Roman tradition.  Like ‘links in a chain stretching 
back in the misty past’, ‘Germany’s’ path was represented as a series of failed attempts 
to form a unified German nation state.1233  The first of these alleged failures occurred 
with the collapse of the Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848–49.  Austria’s refusal to 
countenance an agreement that would only incorporate her German-speaking 
territories had left negotiations dead in the water, and the kleindeutsche Lösung, under 
Prussian leadership and excluding imperial Austria, the only viable alternative.  On 
11 January 1849, an Austrian representative, Camillo Wagner, addressed the chamber: 
…Lassen Sie eine Lücke für uns, daß wir immer hineinkönnen – wir werden kommen, leider 
vielleicht nicht mehr alle; wir Deutsche Österreichs kommen; wie und wann, wer kann es sagen?  
Wer kann im Buche der Zukunft lesen?  Wir kommen aber!1234 
Almost a century later, in an entirely different context, Wagner’s words would prove 
powerful bait.  In 1941, the speech was recalled in Die Ostmark: Eingliederung und 
Neugestaltung, conclusive ‘proof’ of Austria’s enduring wish – if not its historical 
‘destiny’ – to unite with their German brethren in the North.  In Nuremberg in 1946 
                                            
1231 'Der Erfüllung entgegen', Reichspost, 13 Mar. 1938, 1. 
1232 See: Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 3. 
1233 Victor Klemperer, LTI, 245. 
1234 From a speech by Camillo Wagner (Steyr) Austrian representative at the Frankfurt parliament, 
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the passage was invoked again, this time by Dr. Gustav Steinbauer, defence lawyer to 
Seyß-Inquart, in a last ditch attempt to save his client’s neck.1235 
 The term ‘Anschluss’, now synonymous with the annexation of Austria, had 
become another part of the Nazi propaganda package.  Used in the sense of ‘political 
union’ since the nineteenth century, the Anschluss tradition and its language were 
appropriated by the Nazis as historical justification for the annexation.1236  Just like 
other expressions used by the Nazis to describe the annexation – Wiedervereinigung a 
brazen lie, Heimkehr and heimfinden, perfidious plays on people’s emotions – the word 
Anschluss was used because of its strong associative power.1237  In his guise as 
‘Austria’s greatest son’, Hitler was central to the ‘Heimkehr’ charade: 
Ist es nicht eine wunderbare Symbolik, daß die triumphale Heimkehr Adolf Hitlers hier in seiner 
Geburtsstadt ihren Anfang nimmt?  Die Brücke über den Inn- bisher war sie gewaltsame, sinnlose 
Trennung zwischen zwei deutschen Ländern, jetzt wird sie für alle Zeiten unvergeßliches Zeichen 
deutscher Einheit.1238 
 Wondrous symbolism indeed.  Hitler’s birthplace, Braunau am Inn, nestling on 
the Austro-German border, provided the perfect backdrop to herald the homecoming 
of Austria’s prodigal son.  This was not invasion but reconciliation.  Another brazen lie, 
as presumably some in Braunau had not been pleased by the propaganda that had 
rained down on the border town since Hitler took power in Germany in 1933, 
otherwise they would not have helped the Austrian authorities to shore up the border 
during the hot phase of the conflict in 1933–34.  Hitler, the Austrian, after years held 
in exile, had finally returned home.  There was of course no mention of this 
propaganda war, just as there was no mention of what had prompted Hitler into exile.  
To reinforce the image, Hitler first proceeded to visit the scenes of his youth; his 
school, his family home and – the propaganda shot par excellence – the cemetery in 
Leonding where his parents were buried; Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler’s official 
                                            
1235 See: One Hundred and Eighty-Second Day, Friday, 19 July, 1946, Afternoon Session;  Trial of the 
German Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946 
["The Blue Series"], (Nuremberg, 1948), 56. 
1236 See: Thorsten Eitz and Georg Stötzel, Wörterbuch der 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung': Die NS-
Vergangenheit im öffentlichen Sprachgebrauch p. 10. 
1237 Bürckel’s title was, for example, ‘Reichskommissar für die Wiedervereinigung Österreichs mit dem 
Deutschen Reich’. See:  Victor Klemperer, LTI. 
1238 Heinrich  Hoffmann, Hitler in seiner Heimat, (Berlin, 1938), 1. 
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photographer was on hand to record the scene.1239  Then it was on to Linz, where 
Hitler continued the charade.  On arrival in Linz the Nazis destroyed the surviving 
records relating to his childhood.  Not only did they falsify Hitler’s personal record, 
they also set about changing the historical record of Hitler’s ‘adopted city’: the 
monument to Empress Elizabeth near the Landhaus was blown up and the bust of Franz 
Joseph removed.  This was a city that felt strongly German in the Habsburg Empire, 
but, as Hamann emphasizes, it was also clearly pro-Habsburg.1240  Thus, just as Hitler’s 
personal history was rewritten, so in a sense was the history of the region to fit the 
Anschluss narrative.1241  Fate had taken him from this city and given him his task – to 
return his beloved homeland to the German Reich.1242 
                                            
1239 See: Thomas Weyr, The Setting of the Pearl.  Vienna under Hitler, (New York, 2005), 34. 
1240 Brigitte Hamann, Hitler's Vienna, 3–59. 
1241 See: Harry Slapnicka, Hitler und Oberösterreich: Mythos, Propaganda und Wirklichkeit um den 
"Heimatgau des Führers", (Grünbach, 1998). 
1242 “Wenn die Vorsehung mich einst aus dieser Stadt heraus zur Führung des Reiches berief, dann muß 
sie mir damit einen Auftrag erteilt haben, und es kann nur ein Auftrag gewesen sein, meine teure Heimat 
dem deutschen Reich wiederzugeben”.  Speech by Hitler on 13 March 1938 in Linz.  'Der Führer auf 
österreichischem Boden', Reichspost, 13 Mar. 1938, 1–2. 
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Figure 12.  ‘Der erste Weg des Führers in seiner Heimat führte ihn zum Grabe seiner Eltern in Leonding’ 
(Wiener Bilder, 20 March 1938) 
Repeatedly over the coming weeks and months, Hitler’s Austrian heritage would be 
writ large, an irony, which seems to have gone wholly unnoticed.1243  Sidestepping the 
thorny issue of Hitler having avoided Austrian military service before 1914 and then 
voluntarily surrendered his Austrian citizenship in 1925 – not to mention his 
unconcealed hatred of Altösterreich – Hoffmann’s photographs became a vehicle for the 
Nazi regime’s key message – Hitler had a ‘historical’ and ‘biological’ mandate to rule in 
Austria. 1244   In Hitler in seiner Heimat and Wie die Ostmark ihre Befreiung erlebte, 
published in 1938 and 1940 respectively, Hoffmann’s images were carefully combined 
with captions to further this narrative.  Just a few years earlier Berchtesgaden, 
Obersalzburg and the Bavarian Alps had been offered as Hitler’s Wahlheimat – his 
Austrian heritage not being particularly advantageous in furthering Hitler’s popularity 
                                            
1243 Hitler’s treatment of Vienna, where the administrative and military apparatus and the city’s leading 
cultural institutions were put wholesale into the hands of non-Austrians, suggests that it was hardly a 
homecoming. 
1244 See: Per Hinrichs, 'Hitlers Einbürgerung. Des Führers Pass', Der Spiegel [online edition], 10 Mar. 2007, 
(2007) accessed: 10 Dec. 2007.  On Hitler’s service in the Bavarian army see: Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889–
1936: Hubris, (London, 1998), 89–90. 
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inside Germany.1245  Now that it was useful to say so, Hitler was an ‘Austrian’ once 
more.  The lower Austrian Waldviertel was swiftly re-instated as the Ahnengau des 
Führers – Hitler’s father had been born in Strones, in the municipality of Döllersheim – 
until this particular line too had served its purpose.  Then Döllersheim and the 
surrounding villages were quite literally razed to the ground.1246 
                                            
1245 See: Wolfgang Zdral, Die Hitlers: Die unbekannte Familie des Führers, (Frankfurt am Main, 2005), 67.  
See also: Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler in seinen Bergen, (Berlin, 1935). 
1246 The area was forcibly evacuated to make way for a military training area for the Wehrmacht. 
  
“Dieser Zug fahrt in die Hölle”1247 
The annexation of Austria was carefully choreographed by the National Socialist regime.  
Their signature was everywhere, from the farcical fake ‘telegram’ – ‘so we have 
legitimation’ – through to the sham plebiscite, via Hitler’s vainglorious return to the 
country he so despised.1248  There was no chance that Hitler would leave his first major 
foreign policy test case to merely run its course.1249  Hitler had tried to create this crisis 
for years and there was, quite simply, too much at stake to allow anything that could be 
controlled to be left to chance. 
 The familiar photographs and film footage of the Anschluss – and the referendum – 
have proven to be a valuable source of information for historians of the period.  However, 
the clampdown on the press – both local and international – from 12 March 1938 
onwards means that most of what was widely available, until recently at least, stemmed 
from Nazi sources.1250  These images are not objective artefacts taken by objective 
observers.  The Nazis were, indisputably, shrewd manipulators who were well aware of 
the power of visual propaganda and the associative role that images could play.  In her 
2004 study Photographing the Holocaust, Janina Struk cites an 1926 article in the pro-Nazi 
Illustrierter Beobachter, which argued that the ‘vivid suggestiveness of photographs’ could be 
‘more convincing than any text. …The majority of readers would regard them as an 
authentic depiction of reality’.1251  The article went further, commenting that ‘the truth of 
a photograph could be improved on by ‘shrewdly manipulating’ the relationship between 
the image and the text’.1252  Since photography ‘played an integral role’ in the Nazis’ 
                                            
1247 Franz Jägerstätter, et al., Franz Jägerstätter:  Der gesamte Briefwechsel mit Franziska.  Aufzeichnungen 1941–
1943, (Vienna, 2007), 232. 
1248 Joseph Goebbels, '"Kanonen sprechen eine gute Sprache". Tagebuchschreiber Goebbels (III): Der 
"Anschluß" Österreichs 1938', Der Spiegel, 102–10. 
1249 See: G. E. R. Gedye, Fallen Bastions, 259. 
1250 See, for example: Hans Petschar, Anschluss : "Ich hole Euch heim".  Der "Anschluss" Österreichs an das 
Deutsche Reich.  Fotografie und Wochenschau im Dienst der NS-Propaganda:  Eine Bildchronologie, (Vienna, 2008). 
1251 Janina Struk, Photographing the Holocaust:  Interpretations of the evidence, (London, 2004), 16–19. 
1252 Ibid, 19. 
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propaganda machine, and considering the fact that the party had exercised control over all 
media in Germany, including photographic production, since 1933, the historian can safely 
assume that, wherever possible, the visual image of the ‘Anschluss’ was subject to a strict 
selection process.1253  In essence, this body of material was the visual record propagated 
by the Nazis to corroborate their version of events. 
 Thus, these images provide an insight into the narrative discourse that the Nazis 
sought to disseminate.  They were, after all, tools in a propaganda war intended to 
legitimize the annexation of foreign territory.  As these pictures were intended to validate 
the Anschluss, nowhere was the takeover depicted in a negative light.  The now infamous 
photographs of Jewish ‘Reibparteien’ were conspicuously absent – these were not 
published until after the war.  Also missing is any indication of the mass arrests, the first 
transports to Dachau, the beatings, the murders, the desperate scenes on the Czech 
border as people tried to escape before it was too late or the suicide epidemic that 
followed in the wake of the Nazi invasion.1254  Petschar verifies the fact that very few 
photographs exist of the ‘victims’ of 1938, or their family members.1255  Those images that 
we do have are conspicuous in their abject lack of militarism or resistance.  Instead, the 
camera is firmly focused on the ‘delirious enthusiasm’ with which the Führer was 
greeted.1256  The narrative is one of unequivocal triumph, and deliberately so.  That is not 
to say that the opposite is true, that the enthusiasm of many Austrians was a product of 
Nazi propaganda.  Nonetheless, as documentary evidence, such images are inherently 
problematic and should be used with extreme caution.  We can assume that the 
enthusiasm was on the whole, ‘genuine’; we can also assume that this is the impression 
that Nazi propagandists were striving for.  What we cannot know from these images, 
however, is what this enthusiasm actually meant. 
                                            
1253 ‘Seit 1933 war die Fotographie in Deutschland ein wichtiger Teil der Propagandamaschinerie’.  Hans 
Petschar, "Ich hole Euch heim", 17. 
1254 See: Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler in seiner Heimat.  Cf: Hans Petschar, "Ich hole Euch heim", 16. 
1255 See: Hans Petschar, "Ich hole Euch heim", 16. 
1256 Cf: Heinrich  Hoffmann, Hitler in seiner Heimat; Heinrich  Hoffmann, Hitler befreit Sudetenland, (Berlin, 
1938) and Heinrich  Hoffmann, Hitler in Böhmen, Mähren, Memel, (Berlin, 1939) 
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 Nazi choreography poses a problem for historians.  In emphasizing the fact that 
Nazi propaganda manipulated the portrayal of the Anschluss, they run the risk of echoing 
those who dismiss Hitler’s jubilant reception as stage-managed Nazi propaganda thereby 
resurrecting the Opferthese.  As Brigitte Hamann points out, ‘this kind of argument is used 
by the Austrians who claim that they are innocent and the Nazis were the invaders’.1257  
At the same time, downplaying Nazi manipulation runs the risk of neglecting another 
historical reality: the fact that for some Austrians – the Schuschnigg government included 
– the Nazis really were invaders.  Ultimately, to say that the Nazis choreographed the 
image of the Anschluss does not automatically imply that the enthusiasm of the population 
was faked, nor should it in any way detract from the responsibility of those Austrians, who, 
whether individually or in groups, participated in the crimes of the Third Reich.  Rather, it 
suggests that there were competing realities as well as propaganda distortions: what was 
for some Austrians an invasion, was for others a moment of liberation, and yet for others 
perhaps simply party time: a surreal carnival mood when there was free food in the 
streets, military music on every corner and the most impressive Faschingsumzug Austria 
had ever witnessed; that of the mechanized Prussian ‘liberators’ sweeping into the country. 
 The Nazis’ ‘educational’ campaign commenced immediately, building on what were 
by now well-established axioms.  At home, in what was now called the Altreich, where the 
regime was already preaching to the – at least partially – converted, there was unlikely to 
be much in the way of opposition.  On the contrary, the Anschluss increased ‘Herr 
Hitler’s personal prestige and popularity, which’ according to the British Foreign Office, 
‘were already approaching perilously near to a worship, religious in its fervour’.1258  Even 
so, the regime preferred to err on the side of caution; on no account was the word ‘war’ 
to be mentioned. 1259   Instead, ‘from the very day that action against Austria was 
                                            
1257 Tony Paterson, 'Anschluss and Austria's Guilty Conscience', The Independent [online edition], 13 Mar. 
2008, accessed: 21 Nov. 2012 
1258 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/ 21750, paper C2817/2310/18, Donald St. Clair Gainer, Report from the British 
Consul General in Munich. Transmitted by Sir N. Henderson, 5 Apr. 1938. 
1259 See: Ian Kershaw, The "Hitler myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich, (Oxford, 1987). 
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inaugurated a campaign was started in the press and wireless in order to educate the 
people to approve also of its methods’.1260 
 Austria, however, was the key battlefield.  Here, in a well-ordered attack, the new 
rulers ‘employed the three-fold’ and time-honoured ‘method of exciting the faithful, 
throwing the dust in the eyes of the doubtful and intimidating or locking up the potentially 
inimical’.1261  Exciting the faithful was the easy part, and some of the ‘inimical’ saw the 
writing on the wall and disappeared – or attempted to disappear – of their own accord.  In 
some less governable regions of Austria – in parts of Styria, for example – the Nazis had in 
effect been in control for weeks before the Anschluss.  After Schuschnigg’s resignation, all 
hell had broken loose as the pent-up Nazi mob took to the streets – with the blessing of 
Berlin, naturally.  The Austrian Nazis had free reign – if only for a few heady hours – and 
spent it initiating an orgy of retribution and revenge, the principal targets being Jews and 
representatives of the old regime.1262  Especially during the early hours of 12 March, with 
authority completely broken down, Ständestaat functionaries and Jews morphed into a 
common enemy in the eyes of the Nazi mob.  G.E.R. Gedeye, a journalist later celebrated 
as ‘the greatest British foreign correspondent of the interwar years’ was in Vienna during 
the Anschluss.1263  He described the situation on the Graben, one of the most famous 
streets in Vienna’s First District, as a ‘pandemonium of sound which intermingled screams 
of “Down with the Jews!”  Heil Hitler! …Perish the Jews, Hang Schuschnigg.’1264  It was no 
coincidence that the infamous Jewish ‘Reibparteien’ were initially forced to scrub the 
political slogans of the Vaterländische Front and the remnants of Schuschnigg’s referendum 
propaganda from the street.  Indeed, Petschar reveals that in the first few days it was not 
                                            
1260 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/ 21750, paper C2817/2310/18, Donald St. Clair Gainer, Report from the British 
Consul General in Munich. Transmitted by Sir N. Henderson, 5 Apr. 1938. 
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the Pearl, 23. 
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just Jews who were forced to do this but also a number of representatives of the ‘“old”’ 
regime.1265 
 
Figure 13: Vienna, March 1938 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv) 
This was the Nazis’ iniquitous revenge for the ‘Putzscharen’ of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era 
where ‘anyone caught flyposting or chalking up slogans [would] be forced to clean up the 
signs of their handiwork under police supervision and to pay for the damage done’.1266  
Vienna’s Jewish community was brutally ‘punished’, not least for its support for the 
Schuschnigg government and its abortive referendum.1267 
                                            
1265 Hans Petschar, "Ich hole Euch heim", 16. 
1266 Kurt Schuschnigg, Farewell Austria, 176–77. 
1267 The SS-newspaper Das Schwarze Korps is littered with references to ‘Jewish influence’ on the 
Schuschnigg ‘System’ in articles published in the immediate aftermath of the Anschluss.  See, for instance: 
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 Such photos, as Petschar observes, would not have been published in 1938, largely 
to avoid any negative repercussions abroad.1268  Yet these photos, like the one produced 
here, were problematic for the Nazis, not just because they were still worried about 
images of raw anti-Semitism, but also because there was too much else going on in the 
photo.  Not only does it depict someone erasing the word ‘frei’ at a time when Austrian 
freedoms were beginning to be seriously curbed, it also provides evidence of recent 
pro-Austrian sentiment for which there must have been at least a degree of popular 
support, otherwise Schuschnigg would never have been rash enough to call a referendum.  
The slogans of the Ständestaat – as well as images of these slogans – risked blowing the 
Nazis’ cover and reminding viewers of the fact that a section of Austrian society had, in 
fact, prevented Anschluss for five long years to the intense frustration of German and 
Austrian Nazis alike. 
 Which is why the gloves came off from the moment the first Reich German Nazis 
landed.  At 4.30 a.m. on the 12 March, before the Wehrmacht had even begun to march, 
Heydrich, Himmler, Daluege, along with other NS-functionaries landed in Vienna.1269  As 
Neugebauer notes, although the Nazis were taken by surprise by Schuschnigg’s plans for a 
referendum, the procedure for extending the Nazi terror apparatus to Austria were long 
in place.1270  Hitler had entrusted Heydrich with forming the Einsatzkommando Österreich, a 
‘kidnapping and assassination team’ and precursor to the notorious Einsatzgruppen, the 
mobile killing units which followed the German army into the Soviet Union whose task it 
was to eliminate political and racial enemies.1271  In Austria, its role was to secure 
government buildings and documents and remove political and ideological opponents.  
                                                                                                                                     
'Schuschniggs Verrat – bar bezahlt!', Das Schwarze Korps, 30 Mar. 1938, 10 and 'Unser "innigstgeliebter"...', 
Das Schwarze Korps, 30 Mar. 1938, 8. 
1268 See: Hans Petschar, "Ich hole Euch heim", 16. 
1269 See: Malcolm  Spencer, ''Christus mit Radio': Eye-Witness Accounts of the Anschluß in Austria', The 
Contours of Legitimacy in Central Europe: New Approaches in Graduate Studies. (European Studies Centre, St. 
Anthony's College, Oxford, 2002), 5. 
1270 See: Wolfgang Neugebauer and Peter Schwarz, Stacheldraht, mit Tod geladen... Der erste 
Österreichertransport in das KZ Dachau 1938, (Vienna, 2008), 6. 
1271 This was led by Franz Alfred Six: Carl Tighe, 'Six, Franz Alfred: A Career in the Shadows', Journal of 
European Studies, 37/1 (2007), 10. 
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One estimate suggests that approximately 20,000 were ‘seized or arrested’. 1272  
Neugebauer and Schwarz believe the number to be somewhere between 50–76,000 
people within the first six weeks after the German invasion, which represented fully 
one per cent of the country’s population.1273  Compare this with the figure of 30,000 
victims arrested across the length and breadth of the Reich during the Kristallnacht pogrom.  
The Einsatzkommando was followed by 40,000 security police, whose task it was to carry 
out the arrests.1274  For some, such as the Heimwehr leader Emil Fey, suicide appeared to 
offer the only escape, although the circumstances of his death remain unclear.  Similarly 
General Wilhelm Zehner, Staatssekretär for National Defence under Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg and someone who was prepared to defend Austria in the event of a German 
invasion, died on 11 April.  Unwavering in his opposition to Nazi Germany, he was likely 
murdered by the Gestapo, although the circumstances surrounding his death also remain 
unexplained.1275  There are no photographs of the substantial number of corpses of people 
who had taken their own life. 
 There are no photos either of the trains destined for Dachau, from where many 
failed to return.1276  Staunch opponents of Nazism made obvious targets.  In their analysis 
of the so-called Prominententransport of 1 April 1938, Neugebauer and Schwarz note how 
during March and April 1938 the central thrust of Nazi terror was directed against Jews 
and representatives of the Ständestaat against whom, Austrian Nazis in particular, were 
intent on settling scores.1277  Thus, not all sides of the political spectrum were hit equally.  
According to their estimations, 63 of the 150 prisoners were of Jewish heritage, a third 
were supporters of the Ständestaat and approximately 10 per cent were Socialists and 
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Communists.1278  Representatives of the Vaterländische Front, General Secretary Walter 
Adam and Fritz Bock, responsible for anti-Nazi propaganda, were joined on the list by 
Theodor Hornbostel, Political Director in the Bundeskanzleramt and Dollfuß’s confidant, 
and Robert Hecht, Dollfuß’s legal adviser.  There were also a number of prominent Social 
Democrats on the list, Alexander Eifler, chief of staff of Schutzbund, for example, as well as 
Robert Danneberg and Franz Olah, although it appears that the Social Democrats were 
not the Nazis’ primary targets.  As a Jew, Danneberg, for example, was imperilled on 
‘racial’ grounds.  He had reached the Czech border on the evening of 11 March, only to 
be refused entry by the Czech authorities, who sent all those with an Austrian passport 
back. 1279  Both Eifler and Olah also had specific grounds for being singled out for 
persecution as they had belonged to those Social Democrats who had displayed a public 
willingness in the eleventh hour to reach out even to Schuschnigg to stop Hitler. 
 Unsurprisingly, members of the House of Habsburg were the first Austrian 
prisoners in Dachau.  Maximillian and Ernst von Hohenberg, the sons of Franz Ferdinand, 
the murdered heir to the Habsburg throne, as well as Archduke Josef Ferdinand had 
already been arrested and deported to Dachau by the end of March.1280  As staunch 
anti-Nazis – in stark comparison to the likes of Prince August Wilhelm of Prussia – and 
outspoken supporters of Austrian independence, they had certainly made enemies of the 
Nazi regime.  This reputation was not in the least improved by an incident a few weeks 
before the Anschluss when Ernst von Hohenberg had smashed a swastika sign at the 
German ‘Tourist Office’ in Vienna, the so-called ‘Deutsche Eck’.1281  They were joined in 
Dachau by other ‘System’ enemies, including Baron von Stillfried, commandant of 
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Wöllersdorf and Johann Lang, the executioner who put to death the Nazis found guilty of 
murdering Dollfuß in 1934.1282  Lang was assaulted and died a few days after being sent to 
the camp.1283 
 Having excited the faithful and locked up the potentially inimical, the doubtful 
elements of the Austrian populace would need a little gentle persuasion, although, to be 
sure, an ‘all-pervasive’ fear certainly helped in this regard.1284  To this end, all of the 
linguistic, semantic and propagandistic tricks in the National Socialist arsenal were called 
upon.  It should come as no surprise that Goebbels’ propaganda machine was rolling 
before German troops had received their marching orders.  Late on 10 March, with an 
invasion inevitable, Hitler and Goebbels discussed the propaganda arrangements – ‘leaflets, 
placards, radio’.1285  There was to be a ‘huge air campaign’ and Hitler himself would go to 
Austria.1286  The parole was simple; not as ‘tyrants’ had they come, ‘but as liberators’.1287  
For this reason, the martial nature of the invasion was deliberately downplayed.  Military 
vehicles were festooned with swastikas and foliage, and ‘the infantry proceeded not in 
battle formation, but with flags and martial music’, ‘a strategy which proved highly 
successful’.  As one officer noted, ‘the populace saw that we came as friends’.1288 
 The propaganda campaign ran, by Goebbels’ own estimations, ‘like clockwork’.1289  
Over the coming days, 300 million leaflets were scattered over Austria by Luftwaffe 
planes.1290  On the ground, government offices and key media channels – the press and 
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radio broadcasting stations – were singled out by the Austrian Nazis and quickly overrun.  
On the evening of 11 March, with the internal takeover well underway, Odilo Globocnik, 
a prominent Austrian Nazi, and subsequently a central figure in the holocaust, was 
instructed by Berlin to remove ‘all the press people, they all have to go and our people get 
in there’.1291  To ensure that the Nazi message was the only one that got across, over the 
coming days and weeks ‘the lid of Nazi censorship was harshly clamped on Vienna’s 
journalists’.1292  Perceptions were important and in a blatant attempt to clamp down on 
the flow of undesirable information abroad, ‘telephone calls for foreign correspondents 
were tapped, mail was watched, teletype communications halted.  Nearly half of Vienna's 
25-member Anglo-American Press Association found it wise to get out of Vienna—or 
were bluntly ordered to leave’.1293  For the historian, however, this can be useful: it means 
that every word that was written at the time, every speech that was delivered, and every 
photograph or film reel selected for publication was deemed suitable by the new Nazi 
authorities. 
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Figure 14: Heldenplatz, from Hitler's perspective 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv) 
 In propaganda terms – if not logistically – the German invasion of Austria went 
without a hitch.  Hitler had banked on the Wehrmacht not encountering any military 
resistance from the Austrian army.  What he had not anticipated was the outpouring of 
Austrian enthusiasm.  German units were greeted by jubilant crowds; this was 
‘”frisch-fröhlicher Krieg” with a vengeance – ‘a war with no enemy but with excellent roads, 
petrol and other supplies provided by the country invaded’, as one British Foreign Office 
observer dryly noted.1294  Numerous eyewitness accounts corroborate the ‘“delirious 
enthusiasm”’ and ‘“boundless popular jubilation”’ encountered by the Eighth Army as it 
meandered towards Vienna.1295  A few hours later Hitler’s cavalcade entered Austria to a 
                                            
1294 Erwin Helmuth Kampelmacher, In die Emigration, (Vienna, 1988), 17; (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/21749, 
paper C 2405/2310/18, Sir N. Henderson (Berlin), Recent move of German troops into Austria, 28 March 
1938. 
1295 Evan Burr Bukey, Hitler's Austria, 29. 
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hero’s welcome.  By the time it reached Vienna the whole country had, it seemed, 
succumbed to the contagion of Nazi hysteria; tens of thousands had amassed on 
Heldenplatz to celebrate the arrival of their new Führer, and to witness him declare, 
‘before the face of history’ the ‘return’ of  ‘die alte Ostmark’ to the Greater German Reich. 
 The enthusiasm demonstrated by large swathes of the Austrian population for the 
Anschluss proved to be a godsend.  In a sense, they played right into the Nazis’ hands.  A 
huge victory for the Nazi propaganda machine, it was heartily exploited by the party.  The 
‘extraordinary complete emotional surrender of the Austrians’ served to corroborate 
Hitler’s claim that in invading Austria he was merely fulfilling the will of the Austrian 
people, a claim, which was as easy to substantiate, as it was difficult to refute.1296  The 
grainy black and white photographs taken that fateful day have haunted the nation ever 
since, demonstrating that many Austrians – although crucially, not the Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg governments – were complicit in, or at least apathetic about Austria’s demise.  
It is an incontrovertible fact that many Austrians welcomed regime change and approved 
of the ‘Anschluss’ with Nazi Germany.  It is also correct to say that the Nazi takeover was 
partly initiated from the inside; yet, it was years of German pressure and not internal 
revolt – however grave the situation had become during the final weeks of independence 
– that ultimately brought the Ständestaat to its knees.  Certainly, in the days and weeks 
that followed, most turned a blind eye to the violence meted out against their Jewish 
neighbours by the Austrian Nazis; while some willingly participated in the violence, 
plundering Jewish businesses and expropriating Jewish property, only a courageous few 
engaged in active resistance against the regime. 
 The new regime had little option but to hold a plebiscite, having prevented 
Schuschnigg from holding his.  Yet, they were apprehensive about it, and with good reason.  
Most reliable estimates concur that, held under free and democratic circumstances, it 
would have yielded at most thirty-five to forty per cent in favour of union with Nazi 
Germany; as it was the result was over 99 per cent. 1297  A member of the British 
                                            
1296 'Across Nazi Austria', The Times, 16 Mar. 1938, 15. 
1297 See: Erich Bielka, 'Wie viele Österreicher', 50.  At any rate, only about a third of the population could 
be considered dyed-in-the-wool Nazis.  See: Evan Burr Bukey, Hitlers Österreich, 58. 
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diplomatic corps noted how; ‘behind this exterior of genial confidence which the [Nazi] 
authorities showed to the world could be felt a carefully suppressed but nevertheless 
insistent undercurrent of anxiety and nervousness’.1298  This appears to be confirmed in 
Josef Bürckel’s warning to Seyß-Inquart and the Austrian government just four days after 
the Anschluss that ‘die augenblickliche Massenbegeisterung darf nicht überschätzt werden: 
infolgedessen hat sich die Wahlarbeit auf die Erfassung jedes einzelnen 
Deutscher-Österreichers zu erstrecken’.1299  The result of the plebiscite had to be decisive.  
Spontaneous enthusiasm, although welcomed by the new regime, meant little and the Nazi 
authorities knew it.  Once the euphoria had worn off it would be difficult to maintain such 
momentum.  Indeed, the ‘revolutionary élan’ of the Austrians was eyed with suspicion by 
the Nazi authorities, especially when expressed in the clamour for posts in the weeks and 
months following the Anschluss.1300  Within the space of a few short weeks it was being 
reported that, weary of celebration, ‘the applause, the songs of victory and shouts of 
triumph have now for some time had rather a hollow ring, when compared with the 
frenzied demonstrations of the first few days’.1301  The thousands who gathered on the 
Heldenplatz were certainly not all dyed-in-the-wool Nazis; rather, they were potential 
‘recruits’. 
 Thus the propaganda drive became ‘feverish’ following Hitler’s announcement of a 
plebiscite to be held the following month.1302  ‘Vienna became one giant election theatre’, 
                                            
1298 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/21750, paper C3139/2310/18, Mack, Point of view of Austria on the plebiscite, 
11 Apr. 1938. 
1299 Heinz Arnberger and Rudolf Ardelt, "Anschluß" 1938. Eine Dokumentation, (Vienna, 1988).  In 
March 1938, Josef Bürckel was made acting head of the Nazi Party in Austria and charged with carrying out 
the Anschluss referendum.  From April 1938 to 1940 he held the title Reichskommissar für die 
Wiedervereinigung Österreichs mit dem Reich, responsible for the political, cultural and economic integration of 
the ‘Ostmark’ with the German Reich. 
1300 'Wir haben gelernt', Das Schwarze Korps, 30 Mar. 1938, 2. 
1301 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/21750, paper C3139/2310/18, Mack, Point of view of Austria on the plebiscite, 
11 Apr. 1938. 
1302 Ibid.  Mack continues: ‘…the word “feverish” is not an exaggerated epithet to apply to the general 
atmosphere of unnatural enthusiasm and tension which has prevailed here’. 
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as one historian has described it; with the opposition quickly silenced, ‘all anyone heard or 
read was the drum beat of Nazi propaganda’.1303  The British Foreign Office reported how: 
All the way from the Frontier to Vienna the villages and towns were elaborately decorated.  In 
addition to the usual flags nearly all villages had triumphal arches, gigantic swastikas on pedestals, and 
large portraits of the Fuhrer [sic] on view.  Almost without exception every house was bedecked 
with flags and festoons of evergreen.  In nearly every locality the local S.A. Hitler Jugend and BdM 
were marching about – generally with a band.1304 
 According to one British Embassy official, the chief tenor of the propaganda 
campaign was, quite simply, ‘to impress on Austrians the fact that Herr Hitler has 
delivered their country from oppression and starvation and has made it part of a Reich 
flowing with milk and honey’.1305  This may provide a partial answer to the question of 
enthusiasm for the Anschluss.  The Dollfuß and Schuschnigg governments had gone to 
great lengths to regenerate the Austrian economy – in the face of constant sabotage from 
Nazi Germany – and with some success.  The British Embassy regarded the year 1936 
‘within limits, very satisfactory’ in this regard, noting a ‘gradual economic improvement’.1306  
Nonetheless, the Ambassador continued, ‘the poverty of the country and the smallness of 
the internal market [made] any improvement slow’ and ‘unemployment in the towns 
remained serious’.1307  Against this backdrop of severe economic hardship, particularly in 
the towns, the German authorities, it was duly noted, ‘lost no time in evincing the greatest 
interest in the welfare of the workers’, a fact ‘carefully strengthened by well-advertised 
soup-kitchens, trips to Germany organized by the “Strength through Joy” Movement and 
generous gifts from the Hermann Goering Fund’.1308  By the 18 March an impressive 
                                            
1303 Thomas Weyr, Setting of the Pearl, 71–75. 
1304 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/21749, paper C3241/2310/18, German Military Attache, Transmitted by Sir N. 
Henderson in Berlin to Sir A. Cadogan, 13 Apr. 1938. 
1305 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/21750, paper C3139/2310/18, Mack, Point of view of Austria on the plebiscite, 
11 Apr. 1938. 
1306 (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/21118, paper R820/820/3, Sir W. Selby, Annual Report on Austria for 1936, 27 
Jan. 1937. 
1307 Ibid. 
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Annexation of Austria, 8 Apr. 1938.  ‘One of the main objects of all this propaganda was to make certain of 
 
Chapter 8:  The Fog of Nazism  322 
 
contingent of the Hilfszug Bayern – a sizeable field kitchen, which at wide distances 
allegedly covered several miles of road space – had reached Vienna where it set about 
distributing free hot meals, targeting the working class districts.1309  The Hilfszug also went 
to Marienthal in August 1938, focus of the ground-breaking study on the psychological 
effects of unemployment by Marie Jahoda, Paul Felix Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel 
undertaken during the depression.1310  Over the next few days the first ‘Strength Through 
Joy’ trains departed for Germany, replete with Viennese workers, providing yet another 
ready-made photo opportunity, and a wealth of propaganda material for years to come.1311  
The distribution of free food and the granting of holidays was more than a thinly-veiled 
attempt to guarantee the acquiescence of the working classes, according to Kirk an 
‘important, latently oppositional group’.1312  Rather, this was another facet of what Gedye 
has described as ‘a great campaign of flattery of the Reds’, the attempt to win over the 
Left, the main opposition group of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg governments by the new Nazi 
regime.1313 
 As well as delivering Austria’s workers to the land of milk and honey, the Nazis 
also attempted, as they had done throughout the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era, to capitalize on 
points of common interest with the left, namely anti-clericalism and the ‘shared 
                                                                                                                                     
securing the Socialist vote’.  (TNA): (PRO), FO 371/21750, paper C3139/2310/18, Mack, Point of view of 
Austria on the plebiscite, 11 Apr. 1938. 
1309 A little known detail, the same propaganda strategy was employed in Prague and Warsaw the following 
year.  See: Dorothee Hochstetter, Motorisierung und "Volksgemeinschaft". Das Nationalsozialistische 
Kraftfahrkorps (NSKK) 1931–1945, (Munich, 2005), 143. 
1310 Marie Jahoda, et al., Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal. Ein soziographischer Versuch über die Wirkungen 
langdauernder Arbeitslosigkeit, mit einem Anhang zur Geschichte der Soziographie, (Leipzig, 1933).  See: 'Der 
"Hilfszug Bayern" in Marienthal, August 1938' http://agso.uni-
graz.at/marienthal/chronik/06_1938_hilfszug.htm, accessed: 15 Dec. 2012. 
1311 See: Hans Petschar, "Ich hole Euch heim", 94. 
1312 Tim Kirk, Nazism and the Working Class in Austria: Industrial Unrest and Political Dissent in the 'National 
Community', (Cambridge, 1996), 49.  This is precisely the problem where a historian’s own perspective will 
guide their perception.  We see the working classes as an important opposition class in Germany and we 
assume this will also be case in Austria.  However, it is not altogether clear if this was actually warranted, or 
whether the Nazi strategy was based on a shrewd calculation that the Austrian working classes might be a 
target for co-option. 
1313 G. E. R. Gedye, Fallen Bastions, 324. 
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persecution’ at the hands of their ‘common enemy’, the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg ‘regime’.1314  
The Dollfuß-Schuschnigg ‘System’ became the scapegoat for all of Austria’s woes.  The 
Germans-Austrians, it was maintained, had been let down by their government, a despotic 
regime which did not enjoy the support of the Austrian people and had failed to protect 
them in their hour of need.  Instead, a ‘minority of ten per cent had suppressed the 
90 per cent majority’.1315  Austria’s grave economic and political problems stemmed not 
from the injustices of St. Germain, nor from years of Nazi harassment and economic 
pressure, but from the actions of these ‘criminals’ and their brutish regime, Das Schwarz 
Korps argued, with breath-taking hypocrisy.1316  With their prisons, concentration camps 
and gaols, the SS-newspaper continued, Dollfuß and Schuschnigg had attempted to rule the 
legal majority through terror, violence and suppression with all of the instruments of 
power available to the state.  The new Nazi regime went about the task of delegitimizing 
the erstwhile regime with gusto, detailing the ‘2000 hanged or shot’, the tens of thousands 
driven from house and home, and the many others beaten and tortured in the 
concentration camp established by the oh-so ‘Christian’ Dollfuß.1317  Both Dollfuß and 
Schuschnigg were lampooned; Schuschnigg was so ‘treasured’ by his people, he lived not in 
the Belvedere as was widely assumed, but in the ‘Stöckel’, a ‘prison’ with bars on the 
windows and doors and a machine gun posted on the main gate.  There, as well as in his 
heavily armoured car, he was safe from the ‘love’ of his people.1318  Hitler had of course 
had attempted to warn the Austrian regime of the folly of their actions.  After all, ‘nur ein 
Wahnwitziger konnte glauben, durch Unterdrückung und Terror dem Menschen die Liebe 
zu ihrem angestammten Volkstum auf die Dauer rauben zu können.’ 1319   Thus, 
                                            
1314 Tim Kirk, Working Class, 49. 
1315 Extract of a message from Hitler to Ward Price on 14 March 1938.  Reinhold Lorenz, Der Staat wider 
Willen. Österreich 1918-1938, (Berlin, 1940), 282. 
1316 See: 'Wir waren in Wöllersdorf', Das Schwarze Korps, 24 Mar. 1938, 1–2; Heinz Ehring, Oesterreichs 
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1317 Völkischer Beobachter, Vienna Edition, 25 Mar. 1938.  Cited in: Heinz Arnberger and Rudolf Ardelt, 
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responsibility for the demise of the Austrian state was placed firmly at the door of the 
ousted ‘regime’. 
 It is in this light that we should consider Bukey’s observation that although the 
Nazis ‘arrested and imprisoned a number of Social Democratic activists immediately 
following the Anschluss, and dispatched several prominent leaders to Dachau…the sum 
total of those taken into custody appears to have been relatively small’.1320  As he points 
out elsewhere, ‘in contrast to the Altreich, the Nazis did not regard the labor movement 
in Austria as their principal adversary’.1321  Again this fact has gone down as little more 
than a footnote in history.  There were two phases of the same civil war in 1934, the Nazis 
argued, and Dollfuß, the power-hungry crusader for political Catholicism and Habsburg 
restoration, was ultimately responsible for both.1322  Thus, the spectacle of Wöllersdorf – 
die Lager der Schande – in flames was not merely an act of posthumous ‘retribution’, but 
can also be understood as part of a Byzantine courtship ritual of the Austrian left.  
Similarly, the description of ‘the badly-injured Münichreiter’, the potent symbol of the 
Republikanischer Schutzbund’s unsuccessful armed uprising in February 1934, ‘unconscious, 
bleeding, carried from the stretcher to the hangman’s noose’ an act unprecedented in the 
civilized world.1323  Against the backdrop of Nazi treatment of the SPD, the hypocrisy was 
staggering. 
 Yet, as this Social Democratic election poster from 1956 demonstrates, this 
courtship ritual and shared victimhood did not end with the collapse of the Third Reich.  
Three Schutzbund members executed for their part in the February uprising are listed 
alongside the Nazis executed for murdering Dollfuß in the attempted coup of July 1934. 
                                            
1320 Evan Burr Bukey, Hitler's Austria, 251 fn. 4. 
1321 Evan Burr Bukey, 'Popular Opinion in Vienna after the Anschluss', in ed., Fred Parkinson Conquering the 
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1322 See: Heinrich Hoffmann, Wie die Ostmark ihre Befreiung erlebte. Adolf Hitler und sein Weg zu 
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Figure 15: SPÖ election poster, 1956 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv und Grafiksammlung) 
The point here is not to tar an entire political party with a Nazi brush, or to suggest that 
there was anything undemocratic about post-war Austrian Social Democracy, but this 
extraordinary election poster points to the fact that the year 1934, and by extension the 
Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era, really did represent something of a blind spot for parts of 
Austrian Social Democracy.  It is impossible to look at this poster and not be reminded, 
uncomfortably, of Bernaschek’s point about the Nazis being closer to the Socialists that 
the Christian Socials.  While it is difficult to quantify the extent of such thinking inside 
Austrian Social Democracy, it was clearly large enough for the party to run with this kind 
of election poster even decades after.  And one is probably justified in seeing some 
connection here between this extraordinary poster, where Nazis are used by a 
democratic party as though they had been victims rather than ‘Täter’, with the vehement 
claims in the Second Republic that Austrian Social Democracy had been the first to resist 
fascism in Europe.  In other words, some unacknowledged, but obviously recognized sense 
of failure has distorted Social Democratic perceptions of the year 1934.  But it also proves, 
of course, that there was something for the Nazis to exploit in March 1938. 
 The outburst of enthusiasm for the new regime in March 1938 is interesting, in the 
light of the fact that, had Schuschnigg’s plebiscite taken place as planned, he would almost 
certainly have received a share of the vote adequate enough to pull – however 
temporarily – the rug on German designs on Austria.  In his recollections of the Anschluss, 
George Clare recounts how: 
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On 10 March Vienna woke up in a fever of patriotic fervour.  The painting columns of the Fatherland 
Front had been at work all night stencilling Schuschnigg’s portrait, huge ‘Yesses’ crutched crosses and 
slogans on walls and streets. …Aeroplanes showered leaflets over the city. …Demonstrators were 
marching through every district shouting their loyalty to Schuschnigg and to Austria.  The whole city 
was a seething, teeming hotbed of patriotic emotion and activity.1324 
Nonetheless, Clare was at pains to point out that ‘…all these outward similarities 
between the clerico-fascist Austrian and the Nazi German production ended the moment 
Schuschnigg began to speak’.  There was, he adds, ‘no ranting, no shouting, there were no 
threats, no accusations, but in a clear, steady voice he delivered the greatest speech of his 
career, a passionate plea for Austria’.1325  Yet, literally hours after Schuschnigg finally 
buckled under the intense Nazi pressure and resigned, Heldenplatz was full to bursting 
with elated Austrians hoping to get a glimpse of their Führer and within a few weeks 
Austria has voted overwhelmingly for incorporation into the German Reich.  Either 
Hofmannsthal was right when he suggested that the Austrians took ‘play-acting’ seriously 
or there is more to the Anschluss than meets the eye. 
 Can these two facts ever be reconciled?  One answer that could be posited is the 
presence of latent pro-Nazi sentiment within Austrian institutions as well as the wider 
populace.  While there is some evidence to suggest that the Nazis had been fairly 
successful in infiltrating, for example, the apparatus of state, supporting this statistically is 
problematic.  In the pre-Anschluss period, the Nazi party was banned and few National 
Socialists would take the risk of openly unmasking their allegiance.  Conversely, in the 
post-Anschluss period many were clamouring to prove their Nazi credentials and thereby 
ingratiate themselves with the new regime; even the new Nazi authorities looked on these 
Austrian Postenjäger with considerable suspicion.1326  Assessing the opinions of the wider 
populace is even more difficult.  The result of the referendum, which was neither free nor 
fair, obviously cannot be used as evidence of the rapid ideological conversion of the 
Austrian populace.  If the SS-newspaper Das Schwarze Korps felt the need to comment on 
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1326 See: 'Wir haben gelernt', Das Schwarze Korps, 30 Mar. 1938, 2. 
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the haste with which many Austrians flocked to the Nazi banner, we can safely assume the 
transformation must have been conspicuous: 
Wenn unsere wohlmeinenden Freunde im Ausland immer wieder fassungslos vor solchen Wundern 
stehen, wenn sie jetzt wiederum nicht begreifen können, wieso die doch einst immerhin vorhanden 
gewesenen Anhänger eines “selbständigen, unabhängigen” Österreichs über Nacht zu 
Nationalsozialisten geworden sind, so ist es gar nicht erstaunlich, daß sie “Erklärungen” suchen, die 
im Bereich ihres politischen Horizonts liegen.1327 
 In a sense, the Anschluss defies rational explanation.  It was, in essence, an 
explosion of pent-up sentiment, a collective hysteria.  For more than a decade Austrians 
had lived internally in a state of latent civil war, and for five years they had lived in the 
shadow of Nazi violence.  After years of economic hardship, political violence and 
uncertainty the tension had finally broken and, theoretically – although certainly not in 
practice – without a drop of blood split.  Thus, the outpouring of emotion can only be 
understood in connection with the two decades that preceded it.  It cannot be simply 
explained as an outpouring of latent Nazi sentiment or ‘brotherly love’.  How the does 
one explain the fact that German troops were even greeted in the streets of Slovenian 
villages in Carinthia?1328  Such transitory exuberance cannot be used as evidence of genuine 
support for the Nazi regime, not least because what we do know is that within months 
this enthusiasm had collapsed.  The most prescient assessment comes from a 
contemporary observer: ‘The obvious fact, however, that a small country like Austria is 
not in a position to resist indefinitely the pressure of such a country as Germany over a 
long period must lead to the surmise that the same crowds who have acclaimed 
Dr. Dollfuss might be ready to cry “Heil Hitler” with equal enthusiasm were Germany to 
be generally believed to be the winning horse.’1329 
 Yet, fear of falling into the trap of resurrecting the Opferthese coupled with the fact 
that in some ways the Ständestaat remains an ideological taboo means that, on some level, 
                                            
1327 'Was nun?', Das Schwarze Korps, 14 Apr. 1938, 1–2. 
1328 See: Evan Burr Bukey, Hitlers Österreich, 52. 
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we all continue to accept the Nazis falsified record when it comes to the Anschluss.  We 
are all familiar with the pictures of the crowds on Heldenplatz in March 1938: how many 
Austrians know this picture of the memorial service held for Dollfuß after he was 
murdered in the failed Nazi coup?  
 
Figure 16: Memorial Service for Dollfuß on Heldenplatz, 8 August 1934 
(ÖNB Bildarchiv) 
Four years earlier, the crowds turned up on Heldenplatz just as freely to protest against 
what was, in effect, an attempted Nazi takeover.  Not only does this challenge powerfully 
the Nazi version of events, it reminds us that a significant number of Austrians, not an 
absolute majority but a sizable minority, supported the Ständestaat and Dollfuß’s attempt 
to keep Austria independent of Nazi Germany.  There is surely something deficient about 
public consciousness about Austria in the Anschluss era if this picture is unfamiliar to us.  
And if it is unfamiliar, it is not just the work of the Nazis, it is also, in part, the result of 
post-war politics that systematically sought to delegitimize the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg 
governments in their attempt to resist the Nazis, culminating in that extraordinary 
election poster where a democratic party actually equated Social Democrats and Nazis in 
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an effort to describe, not Hitler but Dollfuß, as the supreme villain of the 1930s.  One 
does not have to be a die-hard supporter of the Ständestaat to see that there is something 
wrong here.  No political party in Austria can claim the monopoly on virtue in the first 
half of the twentieth century.  The Social Democrats have significant virtues but their 
record between 1933 and 1945 and some of their post-war utterances about the period 
do not do them much credit.  Conversely, for all the obvious faults of the Christian Socials, 
and of Dollfuß in particular, it should not be forgotten that he was the only head of 
government in Europe who gave his life – and the phrase seems appropriate – in opposing 
the Nazis.  This does not make everything he did acceptable but it constitutes substantial 
merit, and rather than feeling ashamed about it, Austria and the Austrians might have 
reason to feel a degree of pride in the fact that the country can legitimately claim to have 
had a government that opposed the Nazis at a time when more powerful nations in 
Europe were falling over themselves to appease the Third Reich. 
  
Conclusion 
The 12 March 1938 was not only the beginning of Nazi rule in Austria; it was also the end 
of a six-year struggle by a significant minority of Austrians to maintain Austrian 
independence against very considerable odds.  This study has sought to refocus attention 
on the role of the Dollfuß government 1932–34 in attempting to prevent a Nazi takeover, 
and to reassess the state of current scholarship on the reasons for its collapse.  In this 
regard, this thesis has set out to re-examine the behaviour and motivations of Dollfuß in 
particular, and the Christian Socials in general, during the period in question, as well as to 
document and clarify the key strategies of the Austrian leadership in dealing with the twin 
threats of Austrian and German National Socialism.  Its overall conclusion is that there is a 
pressing need to modulate the historical narrative of the Dollfuß era to reflect more 
accurately what actually occurred. 
 This study has shown that there is an imbalance in the available literature on the 
Dollfuß era, and not simply in the Anglo-Saxon world.  It has demonstrated that the 
source of the problem is Austria’s politicized historical tradition, which has been 
conspicuously partisan in its handling of the interwar years.  Indeed, the evidence indicates 
that, although duty bound to extend the benefit of the doubt to all sources of evidence, 
even otherwise reputable historians are still making assumptions about the era based upon 
pre-formed judgements.  This is not simply a case of judging Dollfuß guilty even where the 
evidence is lacking (as in the case of his supposed anti-Semitism), it is a case of notable 
harshness against one protagonist being combined with a ‘soft-focus’ approach on his 
opponents who are frequently spared closer scrutiny: the lack of focus on the 
Pan-German traditions of Austrian Social Democracy and its role on weakening interwar 
Austria, both politically and psychologically, is remarkable and so persistent that is hard to 
explain as an innocent oversight.  While the record of Austrian Social Democracy in the 
twentieth century is in many ways a distinguished and impressive one, Austrian Social 
Democracy, did not achieve anything like the clarity of their German counterparts on the 
issue of National Socialism, although it is obvious that its leadership had no sympathy for 
the Nazi cause.  To say so is a simple act of fairness to Social Democrats outside Austria 
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and to that minority of Social Democrats inside Austria who were later ready even to talk 
to Schuschnigg to prevent Anschluss and often paid a very high price under Nazi rule for 
their courage.  It is emphatically not an issue of left versus right, but of those who put 
Austria first, versus those who valued the Anschluss above all else. 
 Dollfuß’s willingness to speak to the Nazis is, therefore, a crucial issue.  This study 
seeks to demonstrate that explanations which focus on supposed ideological overlaps 
between the Nazis, Dollfuß and the Christian Socials are unsound and that Dollfuß’s 
efforts to prevent a Nazi takeover were actually far more nuanced than some 
interpretations allow for.  Dollfuß’s strategy here fluctuated according to domestic and 
international pressures – fear for example, that Austria would be sacrificed in British, 
Italian, French or Papal efforts to reach a compromise with Nazi Germany, or due to 
machinations within his coalition.  However, the fact that any communication with the 
Nazis or their more moderate allies was based on the strength or weakness of his political 
position, in itself demonstrates that it was not ambivalence towards the Nazis that was 
driving him to do so.  It was thus not ideological ambivalence but short-term tactical 
considerations that drove him to seek to ‘string the Nazis along’ to buy him time to deal 
with the other crises.  Thus, while the observation is true that Dollfuß followed a ‘zig-zag’ 
course, he did so with the intention of keeping the Nazis away from the centres of power, 
not in the hope of winning an ally against the Socialists.  And while German conservatives 
of various stripes, including Catholics like von Papen, helped the National Socialists to 
power, this cannot surely be said of Dollfuß. 
 This thesis also questions the traditional focus on the breakdown of democracy as 
an explanation for the collapse of the Austrian state in 1938.  Not only do international 
comparisons – the Saar, Danzig, Czechoslovakia and, of course, Weimar Germany – mean 
that this line of argument does not stand up to closer scrutiny, contemporary observers 
confirm that the key factor in whether Dollfuß and Austria could hold out against Hitler 
and Nazi Germany was the willingness of international players to prevent it, not the 
presence of democratic institutions.  Thus, the oft-cited assertion that Dollfuß, in 
destroying Austrian democracy paved the way for Hitler is misleading, as it was clear to 
foreign observers and Dollfuß alike that if Germany could not be made to abandon its 
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crusade to bring Austria to her knees, Austria would eventually succumb.  And while 
Dollfuß has been much maligned, first by the Nazis and then by a reluctance in the 
decades following 1945 to delve too deeply into the events of the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg era, 
in the light of this, it is surely inappropriate to continue with the massive delegitimization 
of someone who, despite giving up on democracy, did oppose the Nazis.  In short, the fact 
that Dollfuß ruled without parliament cannot be used to diminish the fact that he resisted 
Hitler. 
 Which leads to the major thrust of this thesis, that, contrary to accepted wisdom, 
far from undermining the ability of the Austrian Republic to defend itself against the Nazi 
threat, Dollfuß – and later Schuschnigg – used all realistic means at their disposal to keep 
the Nazis from the centres of power while maintaining Austrian independence.  It 
re-emphasizes the fact that there is danger in overplaying the desire for Anschluss on the 
Christian Social right, and with Dollfuß in particular, and challenges the assertion that 
Dollfuß’s defence of Austrian independence cannot be understood as a rejection of 
National Socialism in itself.  It details how the Christian Socials, whence Dollfuß came, 
rejected National Socialism on both ideological and historical grounds, with the reminder 
that Anschluss was after all a core Nazi aim. 
 The fact that Dollfuß chose not to enter into a coalition with the Social Democrats 
cannot simply be explained with recourse to Dollfuß’s rejection of Socialism.  It also 
suggests that a shared anti-Socialism should not blind us to the fact that Christian Social 
sentiments in this regard were fundamentally different from the virulent and radical Nazi 
strain.  Rather, the decision not to lean on the Social Democrats must be considered 
within the context of the domestic and international constraints of the time: Dollfuß could 
not enter into a coalition with the Social Democrats because if he had done so he would 
have lost the support of both Mussolini and the Vatican, who would, sooner or later, have 
sacrificed Austria to Nazi Germany.  At home, any serious flirtation with the ‘hated 
Socialists’ would have brought his government down and destroyed the Christian Social 
Party in the process.  Thus, Dollfuß opted for a middle way, a shrewd political calculation 
based on a tacit understanding with the Social Democrats that it was not his intention to 
push measures against them to extremes, in the hope that something could be done 
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internationally to keep Hitler in check and that with any luck, Austria could, in this manner, 
weather a potentially short Nazi storm.  This, in turn points to another danger, that of 
viewing Dollfuß’s actions during 1932–33 through the prism of February 1934 and 
March 1938.  The evidence of the British Minister in Vienna suggests that, although the 
Social Democratic leadership were naturally unhappy about the course of events, from the 
perspective of 1933, Dollfuß was not viewed quite as unfavourably as one might suspect. 
 This thesis also specifically addresses the issue of whether the Ständestaat’s 
‘German’ identity undermined Austria’s capacity to defend itself against National Socialist 
ideology, concluding that this common assertion ignores a number of underlying cultural, 
political and historical realities.  It also maintains that the Social Democrats’ outright 
rejection of an independent Austrian identity was arguably far more problematic in the 
face of the Nazi threat than an identity which emphasized Austrian difference vis-à-vis 
(Nazi) Berlin.  Moreover, it suggests that the identity proffered by the Dollfuß government 
and then the Ständestaat – Catholic, anti-Prussian and leaning heavily on the Habsburg past 
– had solid cultural and historical precedents and were, in fact, not radically different from 
that successfully propagated post-1945.  Austria’s fundamental problem during the period 
was surely not ideological ambiguity but underlying economic weakness exacerbated by 
the Nazis, and the fact that no-one at the time believed that Austria was in a position to 
defend herself indefinitely against the Nazi threat without decisive outside help.  The 
‘Germanism’ of the Ständestaat was not what really made Austria vulnerable to the Nazis, 
while its ‘Austrianism’ offered a credible banner under which to rally against the Nazis. 
 This leads to a third observation: the pervasiveness of a specific Austrian 
consciousness throughout the interwar years and beyond into the Nazi era.  Taken 
together, these findings concur with those who suggest that the Ständestaat, far from being 
an interregnum was both a clear precursor to stable Austrian nationhood in 1945.  
Ultimately, if the Second Austrian Republic proved conspicuously successful against the 
backdrop of the abject failure of the First, it was not just due to its economic success but 
also the fact that the Second Republic managed to build on these concepts of 
‘Austrianness’ and reclaim the Austrian past in the way that the First had not been fully 
able to do so.  The key difference being that as the Second Republic wore on, Austrian 
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Social Democracy gradually abandoned its earlier attachment to Anschluss and was now 
prepared to join their coalition partners in celebrating Austrian identity. 
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